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Abstract: 
 
Natural resources have long been associated with strategic benefits and the potential to generate 
impressive economic wealth. Consequently, scarce and exhaustible natural resources have been 
moreover coveted given the prospects for even greater gains. However, competition over 
ownership rights to reserves can lead to tensions as well as conflict. Resource nationalism has 
been described as the case in which governments and/or ethnic groups lay claim to natural 
resources located within territorial boundaries for the purposes of ownership and control. This 
thesis examines the impact of resource nationalism on international relations and the shaping of 
geopolitics using the Persian Gulf countries of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
as case studies. It employs a multi-faceted approach in which components of resource 
nationalism are identified and expounded. The materials of focus are oil and gas, both of which 
are present across Persian Gulf region and are the primary generators of revenue for each case 
study. 
 
The thesis explores the dynamics of resource nationalism through various interpretations and 
manifestations, demonstrating its utilization in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Additionally, derivations of respective implementations are reviewed such as economic entities 
and militarization. In this vein, existing and developing ethnic tensions are also assessed. 
Afterwards, further unexplored and unidentified usages of resource nationalism are additionally 
covered. The research concludes by providing conceptual solutions for the shortcomings of 
resource nationalism framework, recommendations for tactical management of deficiencies, and 
prospects for proliferation. 
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Introduction 
Situated at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and Asia, the Middle East has historically 
been a strategic area that has been vied for over centuries by competing powers. In modern 
history, the region had been traditionally dominated by the Ottoman and Persian Empires until 
the arrival of colonial European powers. With the influx of novel players to the pivotal 
constituency, a new set of authorities were to extend their influence into the region. External 
dominance loomed against the backdrop of the decline in supremacy of the formerly vigorous 
domestic Middle Eastern empires, which also coincided with stagnating economies that were 
unable to compete with the flourishing ones of Europe. Moreover, intense competition between 
European powers for the expansion of their territories in the Middle East further served as a 
catalyst to not only the demise of the Ottomans and Persians but also the changing of the 
political landscape in the region. The Persian Gulf region in particular had been affected and 
throughout history had witnessed dramatic rises and gradual ebbs of empires that once 
maintained boundaries along its shores. At the time of withdrawal from the Middle East by the 
Europeans, the Persian Gulf found itself with a very different set of states than prior to 
colonization. The newly reshaped Persian Gulf eventually found itself to include Iraq, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman as allocating nations 
opposite the traditional littoral state of Iran. Despite the formation of the new states in the region, 
the Persian Gulf had already been host to a variety of ethnicities and histories as well as being 
endowed with coveted natural resources; including pearl-producing oysters (Davidson 2005: 5- 
6), fishing grounds (Ibid), date palming estates (Ibid), oil
1
, gas (Ibid), and even water as a 
potential source of wealth
2
. The strategic waterway is moreover significant since it provides 
tactical access to the historic Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Strait of Hormuz, and to the rest of 
the world past the Arabian Sea. Indeed, the Persian Gulf can be viewed as an attractive 
interaction of wealth and diversity, however, ethnic variability and an abundance of natural 
resources can potentially be a budding dilemma. 
Ethnic tensions have long been associated with the presence of natural resources. At 
times, the strains build to such an extent that it eventually leads to violence, with resources 
evidently at the core of the conflict. Given the diversity of the Persian Gulf and that it is a 
                                                 
1
 See Bridge, G. and Le Billion, P. (2013) Oil. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
2
 See Feldman, D.L. (2013). Water. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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congregation point for a variety of ethnic groups in tandem with natural resources being present 
the region does not seem to be exception to a possible connection between ethnic tensions and 
natural resources. However, the causal links between resources and conflict are not always clear 
(O’Lear in Le Billon ed., 2005: 162). Moreover, it has never been established if there are any 
direct correlations between ethnic tensions and natural resources in any scenario. 
There are different theoretical frameworks that have been utilized to illustrate and 
investigate the associations between ethnic tensions and natural resources. One of such 
framework would be that of resource nationalism. In general terms, it is the case in which 
governments and/or ethnic groups lay claim to natural resources located in their territory for the 
purpose of ownership and control (Nurmakov in Overland, Kjaernet, and Kendall-Taylor 2010: 
20 – 21). It is expected to have a role in ethnic tensions if there is a conflict of interests over the 
rights to the natural resources. Resource nationalism frequently involves governments 
implementing policies and using private actors in order to increase their control over the natural 
resources (Ibid: 20 – 21). The materials of focus for the policy depend on geography and in the 
case of the Persian Gulf region oil and gas often become the resources of attention given the 
considerable status it has due to its scarcity, demand, and centrality to the functioning of many 
states as well as being a common focal point for conflict. For economic reasons, peak oil has 
additionally driven many states to seize control of fossil fuel reserves as it is the point in which 
the maximum global rate of petroleum extraction is reached, after which there is a decline
3
. 
Resource nationalism has been implemented in many countries throughout the world, including 
the littoral states of the Persian Gulf. Notable instances include Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates from the Arabian Peninsula as well as Iran. Occupying one of the most important 
regions in the world for the exportation of natural resources, such as oil and gas, policies of 
resource management becomes increasingly important in these states. With the mounting 
demands for such commodities and the availability of such resources becoming increasingly 
scarce
4
, the international system is competing with more ferocity than before for the maximum 
potential possession of natural resources. Therefore, possession of reserves is a key and 
important interest to governments. However, claims to resources are not always clear-cut issues 
                                                 
3
 (No Author Indicated). “Exploring Hydrocarbon Depletion”. Available online: http://peakoil.com/what-is-peak-oil/ 
(Last retrieved: May 25, 2014). 
4
 The demand for oil, for example, is expected to grow at an average of about 2% per year in the next 20 years, but 
some pessimistic predictions suggest that maximum global oil production will be reached by as early as 2010 (Le 
Billon 2005: 8) 
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and can create the grounds for tensions, especially if there are different ethnic groups that are 
drawn into competing for resources. Since the Persian Gulf is host to many different ethnicities, 
there are numerous themes that arise when coupling the inhabitants with the resource-rich 
environment
5
. Indeed, the region has been established as a diverse energy producing area and 
will certainly maintain this essential role in the future. 
While there is a vast amount of literature concerning the resource sectors of Middle 
Eastern energy superpowers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, the issue of resource 
nationalism has not yet been addressed. There appears to be a missing gap in academic research 
in this respect. Therefore, in an effort to bridge this void, the project will investigate resource 
nationalism in the Persian Gulf region using the three countries as case studies. All three states 
are fascinating and comparable cases with diverse populations of varying ethnic and linguistic 
backgrounds. Moreover, it would be beneficial to analyse the three countries since all have 
implemented some interpretation of resource nationalism as a state policy. Further discussion of 
selecting such countries for the study will be reviewed in the subsequent chapter. 
Objectives of the Study: 
The study will be conducted in an effort to contribute to the progression of knowledge 
and academia, will challenge conventional norms, and set forth novel insight. Resource 
nationalism given its varied understandings all conforms to an apparent consensus that the 
framework is simple and basic in any of its forms. However, resource nationalism is far the 
antithesis of such an observation. Hence, the main hypothesis of the project would be that 
resource nationalism is far more complex than its superficial understandings and has extensive 
impact for its utilization; it also has the potential to influence issues outside of its described 
boundaries that can impact international relations. 
The project will naturally have a series of arguments supporting my position and views, 
therefore, questions that will be answered along the course of the project will include the 
following: 
1. How has resource nationalism been implemented in the Persian Gulf and what have been 
the effects on each of the case studies employing such a policy? 
                                                 
5
 Contested ownership of certain oil-producing areas also add up to tensions over resource supply (Le Billon 2005: 
8). 
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2. What are the current complexities, difficulties, and issues associated with the presence of 
natural resources in tandem with resource nationalism? 
a. For example, issues of ownership and exportation of natural resource deposits. 
3. Is there an effect of resource nationalism on national and/or ethnic identities in the 
Persian Gulf in any of the case studies and how would this impact International 
Relations, if at all? 
4. Does resource nationalism incite or intensify tensions between populations inhabiting the 
Persian Gulf? 
Moreover, given that there are many important and crucial gaps in the present understanding and 
literature of the topic that can be filled with conduct of the study, other aims will include the 
following: 
1. Present a view of the ethnic tensions that exist within the Persian Gulf. 
2. Are any states in the Persian Gulf experiencing or on the path to experiencing a “resource 
curse” (Le Billion 2005: 11) and is this a result of utilizing resource nationalism? 
3. Determine how the region is moving towards or is currently experiencing economic, 
political, or violent conflict as a result of resource nationalism. This is very much related 
to the derivations and implementation of resource nationalism as a framework. 
4. Provide prospects and potential solutions to the region with reference to the framework. 
Given the diversity and abundance of natural resources found in the Persian Gulf region, in order 
to create a more manageable project, the materials of focus will be oil and gas. 
The Literature and Theoretical Debates: 
While there is a vast amount of literature concerning the resource sectors of Middle 
Eastern energy powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, the issue of resource 
nationalism has not yet been addressed. There appears to be a missing gap in academic research 
in this respect. 
 Despite the lack of direct research, there is literature available that does assist in 
developing the project. Philippe Le Billon for example provides an overview of resource wars
6
. 
Although resource nationalism itself has not been touched upon and no country in the Persian 
Gulf region has been used as a case example, there are important themes that relate to the 
                                                 
6
 Le Billon, P. (2005). The Geopolitics of Resource Wars: Resource Dependence, Governance, and Violence. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
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project. Namely, since resource nationalism encompasses a possibility of conflict, resource wars 
would be undoubtedly relevant to the research or at least the possibility of one. War in this sense, 
of course, should not be limited to violence but should also be inclusive of economic and 
political warfare. Following the general overview of resource wars, Le Billon continues to 
describe the notion and effects of “resource curse” or the situation in which natural resources that 
would normally be viewed as a positive addition to the state instead become a root for societal/ 
state damage (Ibid: 11), making it a burden upon the state rather than a source of relief. Le Billon 
further elaborates resource wars by investigating armed conflicts and how they can be fuelled by 
natural resources. However, the disheartening tone of the work was paired with a chapter on 
implications for conflict prevention and termination (Ibid: 51). Solutions detailed included 
United Nations (UN) policy shaming (Ibid: 58), restricting markets to the state until an 
acceptable degree of transparency is achieved (Ibid: 64), and of course the sharing and 
distribution of wealth (Ibid: 66). Le Billon in fact initially had previously focused on peace 
building in resource-rich environments and collaborated with E. Nicholls
7
 to provide potential 
solutions to even reducing the overall possibilities of resource wars. The Persian Gulf has only 
been mentioned by Le Billon alongside F. El Khatib
8
 from a geographical perspective. However, 
the work gives important insight to the notion of whether oil in particular is a source of modern 
conflict and whether it will extend beyond the geographical constraints of the Strait of Hormuz. 
 While the theme of ethnic tensions in association with resource nationalism had not been 
touched upon, having instead addressed the association between ethnic tensions and natural 
resources, Le Billon did introduce an intense debate within the field that applies to the project. 
The resource curse has been described as the case in which countries with an abundance of 
natural resources tend to have inferior economic development compared to other countries whose 
economies are lacking the abundance of natural resources. Subsequently, it has been observed 
that such countries decline in competitiveness with other economic sectors, often relying on the 
revenue generated by the sales of its natural resources to support the state. The consequences of 
lethargy in this setting leave the overall economic state fragile as well as vulnerable due to the 
volatility and at times the unpredictable nature of global market trends. Moreover, countries with 
                                                 
7
 Le Billon, P. and Nicholls, E. (2007). “Ending ‘resource wars’: Revenue sharing, economic sanction, or military 
intervention?” in International Peacekeeping, 14(5), pp. 613-632. 
8
 Le Billon, P. and El Khatib, F. (2003). “From free oil to ‘freedom oil’: Terrorism, war, and US geopolitics in the 
Persian Gulf” in Geopolitics. 
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an abundance of natural resources tend to suffer from governmental mismanagement and can 
sometimes be found sustaining weak, ineffective, and/or corrupt institutions. In turn, an 
environment that is more prone to conflict is created due to the frustrations and tensions 
fomented from the societal inefficiencies. The 1997 text Paradox of the Plenty by Terry Lynn 
Karl investigates the paradox of the resource curse and delves further into other themes that arise 
from an abundance of natural resources such as Dutch Disease (Karl 1997: 5 – 6), which is a 
decline in the manufacturing sector resultant from economic gain from natural resources and 
rentierism (Ibid), which is the term that is used to describe states that derive a substantial 
proportion of their income from “economic rents” or the sales of internal natural resources to 
external clients. Although the volume set forth by Karl seems dated for a field that is 
experiencing constant developments the concepts and themes still hold ground. More so, the 
resource curse is a debate that is still currently ongoing and there has been no definite conclusion 
or solution reached. In the work, Karl specifically uses Saudi Arabia and Iran as examples that 
illustrate the themes of Dutch Disease and rentierism as well as the controversial debate of 
resource curse. The UAE was not utilized as an example by Karl, which is one of the highest 
exporting hydrocarbon states in the world and would have been beneficial to review. But, at the 
time of publication the UAE did not generate considerable academic interest since the Emirates 
were to yet experience their oil boom and successive expansion. 
 While Karl endorses the view that petro-states experience a cycle of resource curse or one 
of the thematic elements tied to it, there is an opposing view that refutes the inevitability of 
entering such a pattern. The publication set forth by D. Lederman and W. F. Maloney argues that 
natural resources are neither the cause of a resource curse or are determinant of a particular fate 
for states in possession of natural resources. The case studies used in the work do not involve the 
Persian Gulf region and instead focus on the economies of Latin America, however, as far as 
conceptuality is concerned with the debate of resource curse there are numerous refutations that 
argue against the paradox. One argument would be that the management of the rapid influx of 
funds into a state is a problem that contributes to the resource curse and because the policy is the 
problem the cause of resource curse and its detriments is not with the existence of natural 
resources. Hence, should a solution such as effective management policies be set in place, the 
chances of a resource curse or any of its detriments are greatly reduced and even have the 
possibility of being eliminated. The issue of ethnic tensions is not addressed in the work since 
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the refutations were focused primarily on targeting the issue of the resource curse itself. 
However, the societal element of population was addressed, which therefore leaves an avenue 
available for ethnic groups and consequential tensions. 
 In essence, there are hints of the resource nationalism and suggestions of ethnic tensions 
that have been set forth by academics and relate to case studies that can be located from all over 
the world, but there is never a direct correlation or investigation that is argued or explicitly 
stated. This appears to be a crucial missing element in the present works and literature that would 
be filled by an investigation of resource nationalism in the Persian Gulf. 
 
Framework of the Analysis: 
As previously noted, resource nationalism has been understood as the case in which 
governments and/or ethnic groups lay claim to natural resources located in their territory for the 
purpose of ownership and control. Yet, this general understanding of the concept alone, while 
insightful can hold deeper and more specific meaning to describe the scenarios of the Persian 
Gulf. Within the overarching understanding of the principle come two views, one being a 
political aspect and the other economic. Given that resource nationalism is the framework of the 
analysis, it is beneficial to understand that it has a number of different aspects as well as 
understandings; both of which will be more carefully examined in subsequent chapters of the 
project. 
However, an establishment that should be made would be with regards to the political 
aspect of resource nationalism, the emphasis of the principle is placed on political features, 
mechanisms, and potential. In this respect, resource nationalism can be utilized as an 
administrative tool. An example would be the case in which an ethnic group or government can 
pride themselves in the presence or possession of coveted resources and derive nationalistic 
sentiments from them. After all, natural resources can carry significant political weight, which 
can be viewed as a sign of wealth and therefore power in a state or community. Nationalism in 
this sense falls within an emotional spectrum and is not the only one that can be influenced by a 
policy of political resource nationalism. Emotions such as pride can be invigorated and instilled 
into a population, as was the case with Azerbaijan and the hydrocarbon industry following the 
dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which contributed to an Azeri 
sense of security in independence and autonomy. However, emotions are not the only element 
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that can be influenced through a political aspect of resource nationalism since the behaviour of a 
population can be manipulated through psychological grips that can be set forth by a ruling 
authority. With regards to the economic aspect of resource nationalism, the emphasis of the 
principle is placed on economic features, mechanisms, and potential. In this sense, resource 
nationalism is viewed as an economic policy set forth by ethnic groups and/or states. Essentially, 
natural resources are taken into possession and put under control or ownership for financial 
purposes.  
There are striking similarities between the two views of resource nationalism and both 
often interact intimately with each other since they not only fall under a common encompassing 
framework but also that they can be utilized simultaneously even mutually influence each other. 
An instance demonstrating the interaction between political and economic resource nationalism 
would be the case in which a population generates nationalistic sentiments from resources 
present within its domain and consequently nationalize the resources under an economic policy. 
One example would be the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) initiating efforts to sustain 
its dense forestry (Le Billon 2012: 129 – 130), which is a natural resource in itself that is host to 
other commodities such as arable land, fresh water, and the ability to produce charcoal.  
In this vein, it should be noted that resource nationalism is not without its flaws. Potential 
conflict can ensue should an ethnic group and state disagree on the ownership status and rights to 
resources within a territory and a calamitous political situation can develop. For example, in the 
case of Kazakhstan the state declared that all hydrocarbons within its political boundaries would 
be placed under a policy of resource nationalism with the purpose of financially stimulating their 
economy. Despite the ethnic Kazakh population being satisfied with the policy, ethnic Russian 
inhabitants were claiming primary ownership on the grounds that Kazakhstan did not exist as a 
state with formalized boundaries prior to subjugation and therefore had no legitimacy in claiming 
the hydrocarbons as their own (Ostrowski 2009: 63). Moreover, majority of the population at the 
inception of the Kazakh state was ethnically Russian (Ibid: 65) and there was an inherent fear in 
that because Kazakhs are ethnically different from Russians that there would be discrimination 
against them, such as what had occurred in the Caucasus
9
. Also, the USSR had ethnic Russians 
in practice placed before other Soviet citizens and in Kazakhstan ethnic Central Asians were now 
                                                 
9
 Halilov, E. (2001). “Eyewitness: A Republic Loses Faith”. Available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1477933.stm (Last retrieved: September 10, 2010). 
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in control. Additionally, the windfall from the hydrocarbon proceeds was perceived to go 
towards ethnic Kazakhs as the primary benefactors while the ethnic Russians would be 
secondary instead of an overall equally distributed revenue for all Kazakh citizens. As a result of 
the rising tensions, a dire political atmosphere unravelled, which included ethnic Russians 
forming separatist parties in Kazakhstan (Ostrowski 2009: 63). Although a general acquiescence 
persevered, the situation could have devolved into a violent setting. Similarly, the states 
implementing policies of resource nationalism in the Persian Gulf region could follow on the 
path of what occurred in Central Asia but could also even follow a more violent one like that of 
the Caucasus.  
A more thorough review of resource nationalism will be covered in Chapters 3 and 5. In 
the meanwhile, in order to pinpoint areas in which resource nationalism can have shortcomings 
or strengths, it is necessary to identify its components. In Chapter 2, it will be established that the 
vital components of the framework would be the state, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity. Each 
has a crucial role in the development of resource nationalism and will be examined later in the 
project. 
 Already, there is direction that the concept of resource nationalism is incredibly dynamic 
and can grant deeper understanding into observing and interpreting the environments of the 
Persian Gulf. Hence, taking into consideration potential avenues of interpretations, the 
theoretical framework for the project will be resource nationalism. 
 
Organisation of the Project: 
The main divisions in the project are between six sections. In the ensuing chapter, an 
overview of a foundation for resource nationalism in all the countries sharing bordering along the 
Persian Gulf will be covered. The major components to Chapter 1 would be to describe in brief 
the political structure of each country, demographics, economic figures, military expenditures, 
and unique or notable geographic features among other facets. The case studies will additionally 
be discussed as to why they were specifically chosen for the research project. Chapter 2 will 
investigate theoretical concepts that are components to the framework of resource nationalism. 
The notions of the state, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity will be covered along with setting 
guidelines for terminology usage for the remaining chapters. Chapter 3 investigates resource 
nationalism and its varied interpretations as well as manifestations with the case studies. Ethnic 
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tensions will also be examined given that a model in theory can be vastly different than when 
implemented in actuality and there is already some sort of a relationship that can be observed. 
Hence, the implementation of resource nationalism in each state is accounted for and assessed 
along with ethnic tensions that exist within each case study. A product of resource nationalism, 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), will also be covered along with its relationship to the 
framework. Chapter 4 concerns the geopolitics of petroleum and energy security. Pipeline 
politics along with major oil and gas fields as well as projects will be addressed before moving 
on to the notion of security and militarization. Conflict and ownership disputes over select fields 
and areas will also be mentioned. Chapter 5 addresses theoretical shortcomings of resource 
nationalism and provides conceptual solutions to them. Finally, the project is paired with a 
conclusion that summarizes the main points and arguments of the project. It also discusses 
implications for the field and noteworthy future directions of research. 
In sum, the project moves from coverage of the Persian Gulf area in short with 
foundations of the framework to a theoretical examination of the components that make up 
resource nationalism before exploring its usage. Then, a deeper take on the framework will be 
presented along with its complications as well as products. Other usages of resource nationalism 
will then be produced that extend beyond the domestic boundaries of the case studies, which is 
followed by an investigation to shortcomings of the framework paired with potential solutions 
before the conclusion. 
 
Methodology: 
This part will discuss the methods involved in the conduct of the project. Before delving 
into the reasoning of the approach and the details of the methods used for the study it would be 
beneficial to note that since a primary concern would be to not overextend the limitations of the 
project given the time constraints, concentrating the focus of natural resources to be oil and gas 
is advantageous and will avert potential mismanagement. 
 With that taken into consideration, the general methodological approach to the topic 
would be a comparative study using case examples. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were 
selected from the many states in the Persian Gulf region because of not only their comparability 
with each other but also that the relationship between each of the states in intricately tied to the 
other. Aside from the history of interaction and sharing common geography as littoral states, all 
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cases possess vast hydrocarbon fields within their boundaries and accommodate diverse ethnic 
groups. Moreover, each state holds its own strengths. Iran and Saudi Arabia are both regional 
powers that are able to project their influence across international borders. Both with regards to 
religiosity can be considered figureheads in the Muslim world. After all, Saudi Arabia exists in 
the space in which Islam was first introduced to the world and has historically been a symbol for 
the religion ever since. The Muslim pilgrimage sites of Mecca and Medina along with relics of 
early Islamic history are additionally within Saudi Arabian borders and generate a constant flow 
of capital from tourists into the country. Religious knowledge and academia are also exported 
from Saudi Arabia particularly with thought pertaining to Sunnism. Similarly, Shi’ism has been 
increasingly coming under Iranian control, which has been spreading its interpretation of the 
religion with fervent zeal since the 1979 revolution in which the religious authority Ayatollah 
Khomeini seized power. Ever since, it can be arguably stated that transnational Shia networks 
experienced newfound revitalization. The UAE although lacking a command of religious 
influence has been gaining significant economic ground. The general trajectory of the UAE has 
also given it an increasingly formidable reputation coming to rival that of Saudi Arabia, which 
has been an established economic power for some time. The vibrant economies of the Arabian 
Peninsula are in stark contrast to the ever-weakening, sanctioned, and eroding one of Iran. The 
UAE was also chosen though for its perceived status of neutral ground in the Middle East, 
especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It also retains a unique role of mediator, although that 
has yet to be exercised to its potential. A paralleled example of the UAE in the Middle East has 
often been compared with Switzerland and Western Europe. 
Indeed, for centuries there have been many factors for the migration of peoples around 
the region, such as economy, with the Persian Gulf as no exception. Societal makeup therefore 
will naturally change and be ethnically varied over time. Within the case studies of Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, and Iran there are diverse ethnic groups that maintain a presence in each of the 
countries. Persians, Arabs, Baluch, Lors, and Lars are just a few groups belonging to numerous 
that share the common grounds of these countries. Given the range of ethnic groups in the 
region, it is beneficial to limit the study to be a comparative analysis of Arabs and Persian since 
they are the two largest. This enables the project to be more manageable and does not undermine 
the status or role that other ethnicities have. After all, everyone inhabits the area and influences 
politics as well as the relations of the region just as much as any other group; it is purely for the 
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sake of the limitations of the project that the largest groups were selected. Another rationale 
underlying the two groups being selected would be that there is already a history of conflict 
between Iranians and Arabs that can be traced to pre-colonial times and arguably there are a 
series of potential conflicts currently in motion. With other factors such as the onset of 
globalization, intermarriages between the two groups, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula, are 
becoming more frequent and lead to questions of identity, especially in the traditionally male-
dominated societies of the Middle East. The concept of ajams is also vital to understanding 
ethnicities in the region as this group although ethnically Iranian does not speak Persian or 
identify them as Iranian. Rather, ajams inhabit the Arab world and speak a derivative of Middle 
Persian, which has been influenced by Arabic after generations of settlement on the Arabian 
Peninsula. Identity concept in this group is dissimilar and has yet to be defined according to a 
common description. Such an issue potentially poses a new challenge for the distribution of 
hydrocarbon revenue in all littoral states. There is rising tension in the region and the states of 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, as well as Iran along with their ethnic groups are pivotal to the strains. 
Consequently, industries such as the energy sector can be immediately influenced. 
Logistics and management of the project is straightforward. The study is conducted using 
a range of sources; textually reliant on primary and secondary sources, but would also depend on 
the exact countries of discussion since some states such as Saudi Arabia have more 
documentation than others such as the UAE. There are a variety of academic journals that are 
beneficial to the project that regularly address energy issues in the Persian Gulf region such as 
Oil and Gas Journal, Petroleum Economist, and Middle East Policy. Also, there are ever-
increasing secondary publications on the region since it is becoming a global focus due to the 
attention given to resource exportation. Consulting the many other media outlets such as news 
agencies of Persian Gulf states also gives some insight to the national perspectives on certain 
issues, such as views on economy, ethnicities, and the status of natural resources. Moreover, 
primary sources give a recent insight to the mechanisms and developments of the region, being 
especially helpful with generating data for the project. Sources will be used until the end of 2013. 
Of course, given the nature of the topic, it is noteworthy to mention that the endeavour will be 
analytical and deductive in approach. Language for the most part does not seem to be a barrier 
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since Persian, Arabic, and a derivative of the former
10
 were all spoken in my household and I 
have therefore grown up with all the languages, giving me a familiarity unattainable to many 
other researchers. Furthermore, I have already spent a significant amount of time in the Middle 
East, particularly in the UAE and am familiar with the cultures, customs, and habits of the 
Iranian, Saudi Arabians, and Emiratis. Similarly, this experience is applicable to the broader 
Arab world. Field work was not necessary, but I did travel on a number of occasions to the UAE.  
For safety as well as citizenship reasons, Iran was not an option for me to travel to but it was also 
not necessary or integral for the continuation of the study. Conceptualization of the project will 
be done along the theoretical framework of resource nationalism and will naturally take 
influence from the various theories and themes recurrent within political science, especially the 
components of the state, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity noted earlier. 
Overarching methods of gathering information also included the possibility of conducting 
interviews and surveys. However, surveys were not necessary for the development or 
undertaking of the project and were consequently not included. Likewise, formal academic 
interviews were not conducted given the sensitivity of the petroleum industry to each country, 
which entailed that many potential interviewees were uncomfortable or potentially at risk should 
an academic interview be conducted. But, conversations were taken note of and influenced the 
project. It should also be noted that while there was influence, the project did not develop into 
one that is ad hoc in nature. 
In sum, there were not any significant difficulties with completing the project. There was 
plenty of literature that was relevant to the study, the language barriers did not pose a challenge, 
and any individuals that needed to be accessed were done so in Dubai. Also, since the venture of 
energy policies such as resource nationalism is on the cusp of a revival, there were be many 
incoming and newly acquired developments that were incorporated into the project.  
                                                 
10
 The Iranian language referenced is a derivative of Middle Persian and varies in structure depending on the area it 
is spoken in, but is widely understood between associated villages that have populations spread across the entire 
Persian Gulf. The collective term from Arabic labels this group of dialects as “ajami”, which itself is derived from 
the Arabic word denoting a mute or non-Arabic speaker. 
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Chapter 1: Foundations of Resource Nationalism in the Persian Gulf 
The Persian Gulf has established itself as a strategically significant waterway that can 
influence global energy markets with its immense hydrocarbon exportations. It can also provide 
vital transportation routes to numerous markets given its geographic location. Indeed, it has 
come to represent universal desires such as prodigious wealth and diversity but also some of the 
more adverse ones such as violence, fanaticism, and corruption. Such duality while seemingly 
contradictory in nature can in fact be viewed more as a complimentary and reciprocal 
relationship given the domestic and region-wide interactions of the Persian Gulf area, especially 
with regards towards resource nationalism. However, before investigating such phenomena it is 
beneficial to gain an understanding of the littoral states of the Persian Gulf.  The following 
chapter will provide a brief history of each country from the founding of its modern 
independence in the international system along with economic statistics, demographics, social 
factors, and military details that grant further insight to the respective state. Hence, brief 
coverage of governmental structure will also be mentioned as well as specific intrastate and 
interstate issues, which will then lead to collective regional tensions in the Persian Gulf. The 
framework to be analysed in the thesis will be resource nationalism, which has been described as 
the case in which governments and/or ethnic groups lay claim to natural resources located in 
their territory for the purpose of ownership and control (Nurmakov in Overland, Kjaernet, and 
Kendall-Taylor 2010: 20 – 21). ). Applications to the countries of the Persian Gulf are numerous, 
but particularly relevant with the petroleum sector since all the littoral possess oil and gas 
deposits that greatly contribute to economic affluence. 
At present there are eight countries that maintain boundaries on the gulf, which are 
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Six of these countries 
hold membership to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
11
, which is also known as Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) (Ibid) and is a regional bloc designed to 
facilitate political and economic relations between its members; the countries holding 
membership are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (Ibid). The most 
significant economic commodity, especially given its historical worth would be hydrocarbons. 
The Persian Gulf has been responsible for quite some time for the possession and exportations of 
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 http://www.gcc-sg.org/ (Last Retrieved: February 2, 2011). 
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crude oil and natural gas, being the single largest source of such materials in the world
12
. A few 
of the major areas holding such resources would be the Ghawar Oil Field of Saudi Arabia, which 
is the largest single oilfield in the world possessing upwards of an estimated 83 billion barrels 
(bbl) with a high recoverability rate
13
 and the South Pars Gas Field, which is a giant reserve that 
extends across the Persian Gulf median line of Iranian territorial waters to the Qatari side where 
it is known as the North Field and possesses an upwards estimate of 1,800 trillion cubic meters 
(cu m) of natural gas
14
. Naturally, related industries and services to the petroleum sector follow 
to dominate the economics of the region. For example, in the case of Qatar with an elaborate 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry in addition to the petrochemical refineries and maintenance 
of such businesses (Ibid). 
Given the significance of natural resources in the region it is only logical for energy 
concepts such as resource nationalism to have some degree of presence in the area. Indeed, all of 
the countries bordering the Persian Gulf demonstrate at least the foundations for resource 
nationalism to develop should the concept not already be implemented. Since fundamentals are 
important to consider the littoral countries will be reviewed in a counter clockwise manner 
starting with Iran, given that it is the only country in the region that does not conform to a 
majority Arab identity despite possessing Arab communities within its borders. The Arabian 
countries from the Al Faw peninsula southwards will then be covered ending with Oman at the 
southernmost tip of the Arabian Peninsula. 
 
Iran: 
Iran, unlike many of the other countries of the Middle East, has existed independently for 
centuries and was not colonized by imperial powers. Prior to the 1934 the area was known as 
“Persia” but had the name changed to “Iran” by Reza Shah Pahlavi (Abrahamian 2008: 86) in an 
attempt to create social reforms and an industrialized country. A monarchical system remained in 
power until 1979 when the Iranian Revolution occurred, overthrowing the ruling Pahlavi dynasty 
(Ibid: 155 – 162). Since then a complex and convoluted political structure unique to Iran has 
been in place, which combines democratic and theocratic elements to form what Iran terms an 
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 Sorkhabi, R. (2010a). “Why So Much Oil in the Middle East?” in GeoExpro, 7(1). Available online: 
http://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2010/01/why-so-much-oil-in-the-middle-east (Last Retrieved: June 3, 2013). 
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  Sorkhabi, R. (2010b). “The King of Giant Fields” in GeoExpro, 7(4). Available online: 
http://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2010/04/the-king-of-giant-fields (Last Retrieved: June 3, 2013). 
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 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=qa (Last Retrieved: February 2, 2011). 
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“Islamic Republic” (Figure 1.1). Elected institutions would include the roles of president, 
cabinet, parliament, assembly of experts, as well as an electorate (Figure 1.1). Popular elections 
are for the posts of President (from which a cabinet can be appointed without popular consent), 
Assembly of Experts, and Parliament via the pre-approved electorate; this is essentially the 
extent of democratic components in the Iranian political system. Unelected institutions are 
comprised to the Supreme Leader, armed forces, Head of Judiciary, and the Expediency Council 
(Figure 1.1). Links between elected and unelected bodies would be through the Guardian 
Council, from which both bodies interact (Figure 1.1). However, while the Guardian Council 
appoints and/or approves members of cabinet, it is not a paralleled relationship with the Supreme 
Leader or the Head of Judiciary, which can both either appoint and/or approve members of the 
Guardian Council. Additionally, an Assembly of Experts appoints and/or approves the Supreme 
Leader. Power distribution within the political model has historically been in favour of 
religiously oriented figures loyal to the Supreme Leader and following a conservative Shia 
Muslim doctrine. 
The population of Iran is currently posited (Figure 1.2) at around 80 million people
15
. The 
largest portion of the population is between 25 and 54 years of age at around 45.3%, the 14 years 
and under category is at around 23.8%, and the 15 to 24 years of age group at 19.8% (Ibid). The 
55 and over group makes up only around 11.2% of the total population, which is the smallest 
group of all the categories (Ibid). Naturally, the significance of the population makeup alone 
would be that there is a majority of youth in the country, which has significant implications for 
the economic sector. The religions of Iran while numerous in diversity are overwhelmingly 
dominated by Islam at 98% of the population with Shi’ism holding 89% and Sunnism at 9% 
(Ibid). Other religions include Zoroastrianism, Yezidism, Yarsanism, Mandaeism, Judaism, 
Christianity, the Baha’i Faith, and Sikhism. Often with varieties in religions come varieties of 
people and Iran is no exception, having a multitude of Iranian, Turkic, Semitic, and other groups 
within the country. Persian is the most widely spoken language and the official one of the 
country, however Arabic, Armenian, Baluch, Georgian, Gilaki, Kurdish, Luri, Mazandarani, 
Turkish, Turkmen, Talysh, and other languages can also be found. 
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 http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-republic (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013) and 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013). 
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The economy of Iran is weak with low international presence and suffers for a multitude 
of reasons including inefficient domestic policies and international sanctions. The heavy reliance 
on oil and gas revenues, which comprise a large portion of government income, also contributes 
to the continued weakened state of the economy. However, such a dependency is not the only 
factor for economic stagnation. Government limitations such as price controls, subsidies, and 
other institutionalized deficiencies prevent the country from experiencing any potential for 
growth. The private sector is also monitored with activities being typically limited to light 
manufacturing and agriculture. Such factors coupled with black market activity and corruption is 
only natural to weighing any economy down from reaching any reasonable state of international 
competition. Since the 1990’s the Majles has publicly recognized the need to reduce economic 
inefficiencies but action addressing the issue was absent until 2007 with the gasoline rationing in 
the country that would theoretically save $60 – 100 billion United States dollars (USD) annually 
and was benefiting a primarily wealthy class in any case. Further economic reforms would be in 
2010 with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad passing the Targeted Subsidies Reform to 
implement rationing on food and energy
16
. Cash pay-outs by the government to the population 
calmed initial resistance to the Targeted Subsidies Law but by 2012 international sanctions 
deepened the Iranian economic woes and such pay-outs had a significantly eroded value as well 
as purchasing power due to domestic inflation rates. A 50% currency depreciation rate against 
the USD within a matter of weeks, forced government spending cuts, restrictions on oil and gas 
exportations, and consequential significant reductions in oil and gas revenues to the central 
government are just a few of the crippling effects international sanctions has had on Iran
17
. 
 With a setting of economic destitution the figures of the Iranian economy have the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) purchasing power parity (ppp) in 2012 estimates at $997.4 billion 
USD, which is down from the previous year of $1.007 trillion USD that in turn was up from the 
2010 estimates of $986.8 billion USD
18
. The GDP real growth rate was -0.9% in 2012, which 
was the first time in two decades that the Iranian economy turned negative, 2% according to 
2011 estimates, and in 2010 was at 5.9% (Ibid). The GDP per capita ppp remained at around 
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 Guillaume, D., Zytek, R., and Farzin, M. R. (2011). IMF Working Paper: “Iran – The Chronicles of Subsidy 
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$13,000 USD between 2010 and 2012 with the GDP sector composition being 11% agriculture, 
38.4% industry, and services at 50.6% for 2012 (Ibid). The major industries in the Iranian 
economy would be petroleum, fertilizers, textiles, food processing, ferrous fabrication, non-
ferrous fabrication, cement, and other construction materials (Ibid). Public debt and 
unemployment rates of course are high with the former being 18.8% of the GDP and the latter 
being an estimated 15.3% after a regular exodus of educated as well as skilled labour (Ibid). 
Statistics on exports and imports often can appear as simple figures that can give a reference 
point to the viewer, however with the case of Iran it also grants insight and subtle hints towards 
its political relations. The top export commodity from Iran is the petroleum and its associated by-
products at around 80% with it in addition to smaller industries such as foodstuffs and 
handicrafts. The main export partners of Iran are China at 21.4%, Japan at around 9.1%, Turkey 
at close to 8.8%, India at 8.1%, South Korea at 8%, and Italy at 5.3 (Ibid). Imported commodities 
include industrial supplies, capital goods, foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and technical 
services. The top import partners would be the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 30.9%, China 
17.4%, South Korea 7.1%, Germany 4.8%, and Turkey 4.2% (Ibid). 
 With petroleum being traditionally the largest source of income and exportation for the 
Iranians, figures are vital to understanding the sector. Crude oil production from 2011 was 2.4 
million barrels per day (bpd), which was the 5
th
 highest in the world with exports prior to 
international sanctioning being 2.295 million bbl/day placing Iran at the 5
th
 highest global 
position once more
19
. Proven reserves of crude oil as of January 1, 2013 would be 151 billion 
bbl, which is the 5
th
 highest in the world and does not take into consideration any shale potential 
(Ibid).  Refined petroleum production figures in 2008 were 1.801 million bbl/day placing the 
country at 14
th
 in the world with the consumption rates in 2011 being 1.694 million bbl/day 
(Ibid). Refined petroleum product exports was 246,500 bbl/day according to 2008 estimates with 
import figures being 187,000 bbl/day keeping both statistics at the 26
th
 and 27
th
 highest in the 
world, respectively (Ibid). According to 2012 statistics, figures of proven reserves of natural gas 
stand at 33.07 trillion cubic meters (cu m), which sets Iran as the third largest possessor of such 
materials in the world (Ibid). However, it should be noted that there are many suspected areas in 
Iran that have natural gas deposits that have not yet been explored, which creates immense 
reserve potential for the country. In 2010 natural gas production was 146.1 billion cu m with 
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consumption rates being 144.6 billion cu m; both rates are high and are tied at 6
th
 in the world 
(Ibid). Natural gas export figures from 2010 stand at 8.42 billion cu m with imports from the 
same year being 6.85 billion cu m (Ibid). Indeed, given the statistical information on the oil and 
gas sectors of the country
20
 in addition to the awareness of the revenue makeup to government 
funds there is an obvious notion of Iran being a rentier state. However, Iran existing as a rentier 
state extended to previous regimes preceding the Islamic Republic and is not limited to the 
current ruling government. 
 The military of the Islamic Republic is comprised of two main divisions. One would be 
the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Artesh, which is the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
and the other would be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which are the Ground 
Resistance Forces, Navy, Aerospace Force, Quds Force, and Law Enforcement Forces (Ibid). 
Military service in Iran is mandatory at 19 years of age for 18 months, 17 for law enforcement 
forces, 16 for volunteers, and 15 for Basij (Ibid). Women are exempt from mandatory military 
service but can join a specially designated arms force for women (Ibid). Manpower available for 
military service in Iran is abundant given the youthful makeup of the country with males aged 
between 16 and 49 providing an estimated 23,619,215 units and females in the same age range 
providing 22,628,341 (Ibid). According to 2010 figures, manpower reaching military age 
annually would be 715,111 for men and 677,372 for women (Ibid). Military expenditure was 
2.5% of the GDP in 2006 but has risen dramatically since then (Ibid and Figure 1.12). Iran has 
become increasingly reliant on domestically produced equipment since the ousting of the Shah 
and has increased domestic production since the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (Ward 
2009: 304 – 306). Ties between the military and the Islamic Republic are vital and have been 
established since the earliest stages of the regime. Iran has fought a violent eight year 
conventional war with neighbouring Iraq from 1980 to 1988 and has had a further couplet of 
years combating border insurgency with Iraqis despite declaring an end to the conflict. Border 
tensions towards the west with Iraq were not the only strained ones however. Prior to 1990 Iran 
had four bordering neighbours: Iraq, the USSR, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Following the 
dissolution of the USSR however, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan found themselves as 
newly formed countries maintaining borders along Iran. Pre-existing war in the South Caucasus 
over Karabakh between the Armenians and the Azeris carried into the 1990s to the northwest 
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above Iran and an increasingly aggressive Taliban in Afghanistan nearly brought Iran to regional 
conflict once more. Iranian public distaste for newly initiated wars however prevented any 
further action. 
At present, Iran shares lengthy political borders on the eastern and western portions of the 
country totalling to around 5440 kilometres (km)
21
. Countries surrounding Iran would be 
Turkmenistan to the northeast at approximately 992 km, Afghanistan to the east at approximately 
936 km, Pakistan to the southeast at approximately 909 km, Iraq to the west at a sizeable 1458 
km, Turkey to the northwest at 499 km, the Republic of Azerbaijan exclave of Nakhcevan to the 
northwest at 179 km, Armenia to the northwest at a mere 35 km, and the Republic of Azerbaijan 
to the north at 432 km (Ibid). Iran also maintains maritime boundaries on the Caspian Sea as well 
as the Persian Gulf. The former is subject to intense debate as Iran insists on a single multilateral 
agreement between all five countries that have shores on the Caspian Sea to an equal division of 
the waters (Granmayeh in Akiner, S. (ed.) 2009: 23 – 31). However, a stable multilateral 
agreement in which all parties are acquiescent has yet to be reached. Borders in the Persian Gulf 
though are not subject to intense debate since Iran has maintained a relatively stable relationship 
with its Arabian neighbours concerning the maritime boundaries between each country with few 
exceptional cases. The borders of the Persian Gulf entail that a halfway demarcation or median 
line is respected. A strategic feature to note would be the Strait of Hormuz, which are vital 
maritime pathways for not only the transportation for petroleum exportations to international 
markets but also for importation. Maritime disputes in Iran though are not limited to the Caspian 
Sea and Persian Gulf. The lack of a fixed maritime boundary between Iran and Iran at the mouth 
of the Shatt Al Arab
22
 waterway is also a source of international tension. Since the Iraq War of 
2003 there has been a surge of refugees and international displaced persons (IDPs), upwards of 
43,000, that have pursued sanctuary in Iran
23
. Other international tensions would be with the 
UAE concerning the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands, which is currently in possession of Iran but 
the UAE objects to
24
, Turkey concerning Kurdish separatist groups such as the Free Life Party of 
Kurdistan (PJAK) (Elik 2012: 90 – 92), and Pakistan with Baloch separatist groups inclusive of 
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Jundullah
25
. Naturally, sharing a lengthy border with Afghanistan would also create tensions on a 
number of levels starting with refugees and IDPs numbering to figures upwards of 2.4 million
26
. 
Limiting of water flow from the Helmand River branches to Iran during times of drought have 
also been a historical source of pressure (Dehgan, Palmer-Moloney, and Mirzaee in Weinthal, 
Troell, and Nakayama (eds.) 2013: 313). Narcotics and illicit substance trafficking is an 
additional hindering experienced between Iran and Afghanistan as trafficking routes from 
Afghanistan through the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan are frequent courses 
(Chouvy 2009: 85). Human trafficking naturally follows such routes as well but is not limited to 
Afghanistan given the sensitive geographic positioning of Iran. 
 
Iraq: 
The independence and establishment of the state of Iraq is more complex than that of Iran 
since there was never a sovereign Iraqi state prior to its founding as a kingdom in 1932. Before 
the monarchy of Iraq was instituted, its political boundaries had been under British dominion 
(Kamrava 2005: 41 – 42). In fact, Iraq was introduced to the international system at the League 
of Nations in 1920 as a territory under United Kingdom (UK) management. Of course, it should 
be noted that the boundaries of what is now Iraq was formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire but 
was lost to the British at the end of the World War I, which was therefore the logical transition 
for Iraq to be under British influence. The monarchy of Iraq did not last for long however as a 
military-led coup d’état was initiated against the king, who was overthrown in 1958. A decade 
later in 1968 the Baath party led by Saddam Hussein violently seized governmental power and 
ruled the country until the 2003 invasion by the United States (US) and its allies. Prior to the 
2003 US invasion, Iraq had suffered decades of conflict with the Iran-Iraq war from 1979, which 
was concluded in 1988 to status quo ante bellum but extended with light border skirmishes with 
Iran until the early 1990s. After the bitter war with Iran, Iraq invaded and occupied neighbouring 
Kuwait in 1990, which initiated the Persian Gulf War in January 1991 but was a conflict that was 
concluded with the defeat of Iraq by the US-led United Nations (UN) coalition by February 
1991. Throughout all conflicts domestic insurgency was present, stemming from dissatisfied 
Kurdish and Shia populations that felt discriminated by Sunni Baathist policies. Following the 
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expulsion from Kuwait, Iraq was required by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to 
demilitarize and dispose of its weapons of mass destruction as well as long-range missiles and 
allow for UN inspections to ensure that the state would be in compliance of the UN designated 
measures. However, Iraq was deemed to be in continuous noncompliance with the security 
regulations set forth by the UN, which led to international sanctions being put on the country. 
Consequentially, Iraq experienced deteriorating economic conditions and even further 
resentment with the ruling party, which was perceived as brutal and ruthless with its population. 
On grounds that Iraq had continually been in violation of the UNSC mandates with regards to its 
weapons of mass destruction and that it was among many other serious issues a supporter and 
financer of international terrorist organisations the US with its allies invaded Iraq in 2003 and 
toppled Saddam Hussein along with his Baath party. The swift defeat of Iraq experienced during 
the First Persian Gulf War was not a repeated scenario as the US remained with military 
operations in Iraq until the end of 2011
27
. At the moment, Iraq is a country that is still in 
transition with regards to its population and government. While there are declared democratic 
institutions in place such as elections, for all intents and purposes the country remains shattered 
and divided. Most notable, the Kurdish dominated areas of the country have established 
themselves effectively as an independent authority with the emergence of a political 
administration known as the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Kurdistan Regional 
Government has increasingly been attempting to project political power throughout Iraq while 
maintaining a secure degree of autonomy in its northern power base. Moreover, it has begun to 
secure crucial oil and gas contracts that generate foreign investments to the Kurdish areas that 
are not to be shared with any other part of Iraq since the investments come theoretically directly 
to the Kurdish Regional Government
28
. Indeed, Iraq is a country that on numerous levels 
demonstrates the dynamic applications of resource nationalism and has yet to develop its 
interpretation of the concept fully given the nascent stage of its post-invasion reformation. 
Iraq while a comparatively large country in the Persian Gulf region maintains only a mere 
58 km border with the shores of the waterway. However, despite maintaining such a small 
littoral border Iraq holds a strategic position at the head of the Persian Gulf with the Tigris and 
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Euphrates rivers passing through it to make a confluence. The saturated landscape of the 
southern areas bordering Iran is especially apparent in Shatt Al Arab
29
 waterway, which is an 
area known for its marshlands and minority population of “Marsh Arabs”30. The waterways 
throughout the south of Iraq, such as Khor Al Zubayr, have become a breeding ground for illegal 
crude oil trafficking to Iran since the fall of Saddam Hussein
31
. Petroleum and natural gas though 
are not the only significant natural resources found in Iraq, salts such as phosphates and other 
natural elements such as sulphur are mined in the country, which contribute to the development 
of the state economy. 
The population of Iraq stands at around 31,858,481
32
. The largest age groups would be 0 
– 14 years of age comprising around 37.2% and the 25 – 54 years of age with 35.8% of the total 
population (Ibid). Other groups would be the 15 – 24 years of age category standing at around 
19.6% and the 55+ group with the remainder at 7.4% (Ibid). An obvious but nonetheless 
significant feature of the statistics would be that the vast majority of the population is under the 
age of 55. Moreover, it can be observed that during the early years of the US-led invasion, the 
survived birth rates dropped, undoubtedly correlated with the conflict. Furthermore, with the 
progression of the war the birth rates seemed to have climbed. Unfortunately, what cannot be 
ascertained by the statistics would be the rates of survived babies that are mentally or physically 
affected by the consequences of war such as birth defected children in Kirkuk or those exhibiting 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
33
. 
The economy of Iraq has been improving in recent years given the improving security 
environment starting from the Green Zone of Baghdad, which assists in the generation of foreign 
investments and businesses to spark economic activities. Major sectors of the Iraqi economy 
affected by such funds would be private security, construction, and energy; namely oil. The 
history of the material in the area is quite extensive, notably stretching to the Ottoman Empire 
when Calouste Gulbenkian, an Ottoman citizen of Armenian heritage, assisted in the creation of 
the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) in 1912. After the outbreak of World War I and the 
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dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the TPC was succeeded in the newly created Iraq as the Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC). Under the Hashemite Monarchy until 1958 there was no serious 
tension between the government and the TPC/IPC. Yet, following a coup d’état in which a 
Baathist government replaced the monarchy, relations were not as amicable and tensions 
escalated to the point in which oil was ultimately nationalized in 1972. Oil production 
throughout the change in regimes provided each government with valuable concessions and the 
material even after the removal of Saddam Hussein remains the core generator of funds for the 
country. As of 2013, over 90% of government assets are earned from the petroleum division, 
which is largely managed by the state under the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. Facts and figures regarding 
the daily export of oil have actually reached a peak unseen for decades under the previous Baath 
regime with 2.7 million barrels per day (mbpd) set forth on average in 2012. Before the newly 
reached heights were achieved the preceding year established the record for oil output at an 
average of 2.2 mbpd. Oil prices remained high for much of 2012 due to international political 
tensions, which contributed greatly to the revenue directed towards the state. However, statistics 
on state-generated petro-dollars while available are becoming progressively more difficult to 
realistically gauge given the complex situation in the country with a Kurdish dominated north
34
 
and a primarily Arab dominated south. The Iraqi Kurdish Region maintains an independent and 
active political body that is separate from the federal government authority hailing from 
Baghdad. Hence, the Iraqi Kurdish Region exercises growing autonomy with the Kurdistan 
Regional Government and passed its own oil law in 2007, which also led to the signing of its 
own oil contracts and production sharing agreements (PSAs). The oil managed by the Kurdish 
Regional Government draws on reserves within the its own jurisdiction and directs funds 
generated from sales to the Iraqi Kurdish Region exclusively; with no monies ever reaching or 
contributing to the development of areas outside its de facto boundaries. Conflict and tensions 
unquestionably arise with regards to the oil sales of regional versus federal authorities, especially 
with the areas that are disputed between Kurds and Arabs. Baghdad frequently asserts that the 
Kurdish Regional Government has no legal authority within their country and is consequentially 
often labelled as separatists or insurgents against the state. Furthermore, Baghdad refuses to 
recognize any authority in the Iraqi Kurdish Region that does not comply with the power of the 
federal government. But, the fact remains that the southern provinces of Iraq remain shattered 
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after the US-led invasion and the state is in no position to assert dominance over the northern 
Kurdish populated areas. This essentially leaves the Kurdish Regional Government able to act 
and behave with a great degree of autonomy. Already, the Iraqi Kurdish Region has begun direct 
deals with traditional state rivals such as Turkey, which despite being a commonly viewed 
enemy to Kurds has signed lucrative and beneficial oil deals with the governing body. 
Implications of the growing deals of course pave way for what has become known as the 
“Kurdish corridor”, which is a term designed to illustrate Kurdish oil politics that are intended to 
divert oil away from Persian Gulf transportation and dependence instead to the Mediterranean 
Sea via Turkey and/or other alternative developing routes. In the same move, by creating a 
“corridor” the Kurds have also denied Baghdad benefits of petro-dollars and taken away not only 
a serious bargaining chip but also potential revenue that could be used for the reconstruction and 
redevelopment of the southern regions. Oil trade in the south is moreover affected with the 
illegal trafficking of resources to Khuzestan in Iran through an elaborate network that is both 
terrain- and naval-based. “Governmental assets” therefore can be regarded as an ambiguous and 
increasingly vague term in Iraq given the presence of the Kurdistan Regional Government and 
the independent signing of oil contracts away from the federal government based in Baghdad 
coupled with the notion that the secretive trade certainly affects statistics. 
Aside from the oil sector other factors affecting state economic growth would include 
corruption, ineffective infrastructure that is out of touch with the general needs of the population, 
and feeble legal parameters that prevent commercial advancement. While investment security 
has improved since the 2006 legal reformations, there is still sizable room for improvement. 
Much of the economic benefits generated by Baghdad are not divided evenly throughout the 
provinces or in such a way that productivity cultivates further development. The public sector 
has been overwhelmed because of the lack of freedoms that should enable ordinary Iraqi citizens 
to establish businesses and manage independent enterprises, however the standing laws makes it 
difficult for such citizens to do so. Foreign companies and investors consequentially suffer 
alongside the populace with similar unnecessary difficulties. The private sector therefore has 
been thoroughly underdeveloped, which leaves an optimistic potential for improvement in the 
country but must be addressed responsibly in order to benefit the state. Economic statistics from 
2012 placed the Iraqi economy as having a GDP ppp of $155.4 billion USD, which is up from 
the $141 billion USD figure in 2011, and up from the previous 2010 figure of $129.6 billion 
38 
 
USD
35
. The real growth rate is positively correlated with the rise in GDP ppp figures with the 
2012 figure at 10.2% up from the 8.9% of 2011, which is up from the 3% of 2010 (Ibid). The 
GDP per capita ppp has been steadily rising at $300 USD per year from 2010 at $4,000 USD to 
2012 at $4,600 USD (Ibid). GDP sector composition stood at agriculture at 8.7%, services at 
25.1%, and industry at 63.8% according to 2012 figures (Ibid). 
However, while the positive trend may appear optimistic as far as statistics are concerned 
the figures may in fact be quite deceptive considering the chasm between the north and south of 
the country, which is populated predominantly by Kurdish and Arab populations, respectively. 
Furthermore, a lengthy war has been in place in Iraq since 2003. A decade of conflict has 
certainly taken a toll on the infrastructure and while a dictatorial government has been removed, 
there has not been a stable or more effective one that has replaced it given the autonomy 
exercised by the Kurdish populated regions versus the devastated southern areas mainly 
inhabited by Arabs. It should also be mentioned that prior to the Iraq War of 2003, the country 
suffered a militaristic defeat in the Persian Gulf War that was also preceded by a brutal conflict 
with neighbouring Iran. All conflicts coupled with insurgency set economic progression and 
further industrialization back. Naturally, being a rentier state the industrial and service values of 
the GDP composition are mainly directed towards the oil and gas sectors. Given the abundance 
of petroleum reserves in the country it is expected that exports include oil and gas. However, it 
should be noted that other industries such as chemicals, textiles, construction materials, food 
processing, and metal fabrication are also sources of exportation from the country. 
What can be clearly illustrated given the oil politics of Iraq would be that resource 
nationalism has multiple simultaneous presences within the country. The occurrence of resource 
nationalism from Arbil greatly differs than that of Baghdad and evidently petroleum statistics 
become important when evaluating the concept given the immense earning potential. At present, 
crude oil proven reserves in Iraq stand at around 141 billion barrels (bbl)
36
 with exploration 
measures still being undertaken given the probabilities of finding future reserves, making it one 
of the largest areas on the planet with such a high concentration of such materials. Crude oil 
production was an average of nearly 3 mbpd in 2012 and surpassed Iran to take the number two 
spot behind Saudi Arabia for production in OPEC (Ibid). Naturally, with Iraq being a rentier 
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state, crude oil import figures are at 0 barrels per day (bpd) as all domestic needs were satisfied 
with domestic production (Ibid). Refined petroleum production topped over 450,000 bpd in 2011 
with the domestic consumption making up nearly 82,000 bpd (Ibid). Natural gas production 
since 2010 is over 1.3 billion cubic (cu) meters (m) with the domestic consumption being the 
entire figure (Ibid). Proven reserves of natural gas are close to 3.2 trillion cu m with export sales 
reaching $88.27 billion USD in 2012 which is up from the preceding year of $79.68 billion USD 
(Ibid). 
Export commodities in Iraq naturally have been crude oil making up around 85% of the 
total exports with other crude materials composing the majority of the remaining 15% of 
exports
37
. Top export partners purchasing Iraqi commodities from 2011 would be India at around 
22.5%, the US at close to 22.3%, China at 13.4%, South Korea at 11.7%, Japan at nearly 5%, 
and the Netherlands at 4.3% (Ibid). Imports in Iraq have risen in the past years from $47.8 billion 
USD in 2011 to $56.89 billion USD in 2012, signifying greater facilitation with the international 
system (Ibid). Iraqi import commodities are food medicine and manufactures with the top import 
partners from 2011 being Turkey at 25.3% of total imports, Syria at 18.3%, although this has 
been since affected by the ongoing civil war with the Assad regime, China at 11.7%, the US at 
7.4%, and South Korea at 4.7% (Ibid). 
International issues with the country are numerous given the Iraq War of 2003. One issue 
would be with millions of Iraqis that have fled conflict with a majority of IDPs taking refuge in 
nearby Syria and particularly Jordan with other diaspora populations fleeing to Iran, Turkey, and 
other Western countries such as Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Of course the ongoing 
conflicts between the Syrian government and rebels have further displaced diaspora communities 
in addition to creating further international havoc. Iraq also lacks a distinct maritime boundary 
with neighbouring Iran, which deepens Iraqi naval woes given that there is already limited shore 
on the Persian Gulf. The Shatt Al Arab waterway known as the Arvand Rud in Iran has typically 
been the focus and centre of the maritime disputes. The Kurds in the northern regions of Iraq also 
have been a concern for neighbouring Turkey, Iran, and Syria of which all three have Kurdish 
populations. 
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Kuwait: 
To the south of Iraq is Kuwait, which is a country that maintains more shoreline than its 
northern neighbour on the Persian Gulf. The current political boundaries of Kuwait fell under the 
jurisdiction of the political boundaries of Iraq prior to independence, which was under Ottoman 
rule for centuries. During this time, the areas which composed Kuwait were never truly regarded 
as significant areas and consequently there was a lack of attention to such areas in favour of 
other cities that exist in current Iraq such as Karbala, Baghdad, and Arbil. Moreover, similar to 
Iraq, Kuwait never existed in history prior to its independence especially considering that even 
the tribal populations inhabiting the area did not have any formal political relations with any 
entity. With the expansion of colonial powers however and the waning influence of the Ottoman 
Empire, Kuwait became more important as the British Empire gradually extended their influence 
into the region and elevated the Al Sabah family to ruling status. The borders between Iraq and 
Kuwait were drawn in this period and were specifically designed to limit the Iraqi access to the 
Persian Gulf. British maintenance continued until 1961 when Kuwait was declared an 
independent state and while the British authority lessened in the country, the hydrocarbon 
exportations increased, pushing Kuwait down a path of rentierism. Hydrocarbon production and 
output was relatively steady until 1990 when Iraq under the Baath regime invaded Kuwait. The 
First Persian Gulf War ensued and concluded with the expulsion of the Iraqis under a US-led UN 
coalition that reinstated the Al Sabah family alongside the re-established elected legislative 
bodies. The elected bodies act as a parliament but are under significant sway from the royal 
family. Nonetheless, Al Sabah rule is being increasingly met with a growingly aggressive and 
assertive parliament. In 2010 uprisings around the Arab world inspired Kuwaitis without 
citizenship, known as “bidoons”38, to demonstrate against the government calling for equal 
treatment and benefits that are granted to recognized Kuwaiti nationals
39
. Among the calls for 
equality were the right to Kuwaiti citizenship, job opportunities, and oil revenue benefits (Ibid). 
Corruption had also been denounced by follow-up demonstrations that continued deep into 2011 
and were mainly comprising of youths. The prime minister and his cabinet were specifically 
targeted on the grounds of facilitating corruption, which led to the eventual dismissal of the 
prime minister through political manoeuvring of opposing legislators. 
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Kuwait, as mentioned before, is a geographically small country and hosts a relatively 
small population of around 2.7 million residents about half of which are Kuwaiti nationals
40
. The 
population growth is low at slightly above 1% (Ibid) but given the small size of the country and 
the amount of the residents, a low growth rate is unsurprising. Majority of the population are 
between two age groups, with half of the population being in the 25-54 years of age and a quarter 
of the population being between 0-14 years of age (Ibid). The group aging 55 and older number 
the remaining percentage at roughly 6.5% (Ibid).  
However, despite an unimposing geographic size with a low population Kuwait more 
than compensates with immense petroleum production and exportations. Petroleum reserves 
under Kuwaiti boundaries place the country at holding around 7% of the total world reserves 
with an estimated 102 billion barrels
41
. In 2011 crude oil production levels were at 2.682 mbpd 
with exports around 1.5 mbpd (Ibid). Naturally, the imports of crude oil would be unnecessary 
and remain at 0 bpd (Ibid). Refined petroleum production figures stood at 902,000 bpd from 
2008 and have since increased, but refined petroleum consumption has remained about a third of 
the figure with 2011 consumption being around 339,000 bpd (Ibid). Exports of refined petroleum 
were approximately the remaining two-thirds with imports standing at 0 bpd (Ibid). Natural gas 
production since 2010 has been 11.73 billion cu m with the consumption being 12.62 billion cu 
m in the same year, naturally to make up for the difference 890 million cu m of natural gas was 
received; there were no additional exports (Ibid). Proven reserves of natural gas were substantial 
given the size of the country with 2012 figures estimating 1.798 trillion cu m (Ibid). Needless to 
say, Kuwait is an illustrative example of a rentier state in terms of its state economy. The 
overwhelming majority of state revenue is determined on the prices placed on crude oil and 
natural gas. There also seems to me less direction steering away from rentierism given that 
Kuwaiti officials have committed to increasing crude oil production to 4 mbpd by 2020 (Ibid). 
Further evidence would be that spikes in global oil prices rose Kuwaiti government spending and 
revived the pre-existing stagnant economic situation, which promoted economic growth (Ibid). 
The oil windfall also naturally increased state budget expenditures as well as wage hikes for 
public sector employees. All along, steps towards economic diversification were not taken nor 
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present in Kuwait partly due to the fact that the Kuwaiti dinar value was very high and partly 
because of a particular business climate that created an unwillingness to pursue alternative 
investments (Ibid). Of course, this was coupled with the National Assembly combating the 
executive branch of the Kuwaiti government, which historically stifled economic reforms (Ibid). 
There are hints of government-sponsored economic redirection with the passing of an economic 
development plan in 2010 in excess of $130 billion USD over the course of five years that would 
not only begin shifts in steering the country away from its rentier history but also encourage 
private sector growth and greater participation in the state economy (Ibid). 
The GDP of Kuwait as of 2012 stood at $173.24 billion USD up from the 2011 figure of 
$156 billion USD and higher than the 2010 $144.3 billion USD amount
42
. GDP per capita ppp 
was between $45,800 and $43,800 USD in 2012, $42,400 USD in 2011, and $40,300 USD in 
2010 (Ibid). GDP by sector composition would be 42.3% industry, 57.5% services, and 0.2% 
agriculture (Ibid). Oil and gas related activities unsurprisingly dominate the services and 
industrial sectors but there is also a sizable market for construction materials, including cement, 
for recent building endeavours (Ibid). Water desalination and related services also have a niche 
within the Kuwaiti economy given that it is a desert country that must sustain its population 
(Ibid). The agricultural sector logically entails then that Kuwait would be capitalizing on its 
coastal position rather than its desert landscape to export fish, shrimp, lobster, and other marine 
life (Ibid).  Exports in 2012 were at $109.4 billion USD, over $5 billion USD more from the 
previous year (Ibid). The largest export partners were South Korea at 17.7%, India at 15.3%, 
Japan at 13.7%, China at 9.6%, and the US at 8.4% (Ibid). Imports were less in cost than exports 
with $24.1 billion USD reported in 2012 (Ibid). Most of the imports to Kuwait amounted to food, 
construction materials, vehicles, technology, and clothing with the US making up 12.4% of all 
imports, China at 9.7%, Saudi Arabia at 8.4%, South Korea at 6.5%, India at 6.4%, Japan at 
6.2%, Germany at 5%, and the UAE at 4.3% (Ibid). 
The military of Kuwait is a small and ineffectual force given the size of the country and 
its population. However, there are a large number of foreign presences in Kuwait that collaborate 
closely with the government to provide and preserve its security. This would of course be a 
deepened relationship after the liberation of its borders from the 1990 Iraqi invasion. The major 
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military collaborations would be with the US, UK, and France – all of which maintain presences 
in some form throughout the majority of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Kuwait has 
additionally purchased military equipment such as combat vehicles and aircraft from Egypt, 
Russia, and China. However, as noted before there is a lack of population that would be able to 
use such equipment and the training of Kuwaiti troops are lacking with regards to the usage of 
such hardware. This reason alone makes Kuwait increasingly reliant off of foreign military 
presence and assistance, which is certain to continue into the future. 
 Transnational issues with Kuwait are numerous. There is an ongoing dispute with Iran to 
negotiate a maritime boundary, which is also a problem held with its northern neighbour of Iraq. 
Essentially, figurative and imaginary boundaries have been drawn on a maritime map but do not 
necessarily reflect the reality in which states behave to respect them; frequently crossing over the 
margins or being accused of doing so. Slavery and trafficking of all kinds also exist within 
Kuwait, with forced labour and involuntary prostitution being to most commonly cited forms of 
bondage. While many workers do initially arrive to the country for the purpose of legitimate 
services, some eventually become subject to forced labour, typically abused by the very sponsors 
that hosted the visa procedure in the first place. Unfortunately, Kuwait does not at present 
comply with any standard for the elimination of such practices and has not taken any effective 
steps to doing so as well. Considering that Kuwait is a state that is dependent upon foreign 
services and labour, it would be in the best interest of the country to create a body in which 
victims are able to identify their abusers without fear of reprisal so that such individuals and 
cruel practices are eventually eradicated. Surely, the continuing security and reputation of the 
country would benefit from implementing standards to protect all their inhabitants. 
 
Saudi Arabia: 
Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 by Abdelaziz bin Abdulrahman Al Saud after a 
campaign that unified much of the Arabian Peninsula following a decline in Ottoman Empire 
dominion (Commins 2012: 135). The country never existed in history prior to 1932, which can 
be evidenced through various channels such as the lack of recognized political relations with 
other countries, although there are domestic Saudi Arabian arguments claiming existence from 
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1744 to 1818 as the Emirate of Diriyah
43
 as well as 1818 to 1891 as the Emirate of Najd
44
 
(Commins 2012: 63). However, the Ottoman Empire existed from 1453 to 1923 with the Arabian 
Peninsula coming under the boundaries of its empire. Naturally, the Ottoman Empire regarded 
any entity within its boundaries that declared independence from the sultan or empire as 
rebellious, which concluded with the absolute destruction of the Emirate of Diriyah following the 
Ottoman-Saudi War (Ibid: 63). The subsequent Emirate of Najd was an area in which there was 
constant fighting between the Ottoman Empire
45
, the Emirate of Jabal Shammar
46
, and other 
Arabian tribes (Commins 2012: 135). Nonetheless, following in the monarchical traditions 
established by Abdelaziz Al Saud, the male descendants have inherited the territory gained in the 
Arabian Peninsula campaign that was concluded in 1932 in the political structure of a monarchy 
(Ibid). There is no constitution of Saudi Arabia but has instead declared the Quran as an 
equivalent source with the implementation of Sharia law to be adhered to by the population. In 
1992 the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia was supplemented and acts in the closest sense to the 
function of a constitution, but is purposely titled “Basic Law” rather than “Constitution” and 
came long after the monarchy was established (see Appendix B). 
Since the inception of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, there has been widespread 
discontent with the ruling family. Previously authoritative Arabian families and tribes that ruled 
over independent emirates and kingdoms, such as in Hijaz and Jabal Shammar were co-opted 
into the precursor state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Wahhabi interpretation 
that was initiated by the Emirate of Diriyah created tensions with other Islamic interpretations 
such as with Shi’ism, which is still a tension that has yet to be resolved with the country. There 
have been a number of protests that have occurred in the country throughout its existence, with 
particular strains happening in 2010 with uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa that 
became known as the Arab Spring. Predominantly Shia demonstrators called from the release of 
detainees as well as the withdrawal of Saudi Arabian forces from neighbouring Bahrain under 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force (PSDF). Majority of Shias in Saudi 
Arabia are located in the eastern portion of the country, which is next to Bahrain. Protests though 
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were not limited to the Shia population as there were Sunni demonstrations in various parts of 
the country
47
. The response of the King in 2011 was the announcement of a series of benefits to 
Saudi citizens that included affordable housing, salary increases for government workers, greater 
political participation in the political system of the country, education reforms, and 
unemployment benefits (Ibid). However, purchasing state peace through incentives is not a 
solution to any issue and political participation in an absolute monarchy will always be limited 
given its structure. Unexpectedly, anti-government demonstrations expanded across the country 
with Shia protestations escalating into violence in 2012 (Ibid). 
Despite the strife, Saudi Arabia has remained a top global exporter of oil and gas, which 
is responsible for the majority of state funds that sustain its inhabitants. The population of Saudi 
Arabia in 2013 has been estimated at close to 27 million (Figure 1.13) inclusive of around 
5,576,076 as expatriates
48
. The age groups that are most populous in the country would be the 25 
to 54 years set consisting of 44.8% of the population, 15 to 24 having 19.6%, and 28.2% being 
up to the age of 14 (Ibid). The economy is based primarily on its oil and gas sectors as well as 
associated industries, which is expected to a degree given that the country is in possession of 
over 15% of global proven petroleum reserves that certainly accounts for the massive generation 
of state wealth (Ibid). The GDP ppp in 2012 was an estimated $740.5 billion USD, which was up 
from the previous year of $698.8 billion USD, and was up from the 2010 estimated value at 
$652.8 billion (Ibid). The GDP per capita ppp was $25,700 USD in 2012, which was up from the 
2011 value at $24,800 USD, and was up from the 2010 value at $23,700 USD. The GDP sector 
composition is industry at a reported 67%, services at 31.1%, and agriculture at 2% (Ibid). The 
low agricultural composition to the GDP sector is obvious given the lack of arable land in Saudi 
Arabia considering nearly the entire country is desert and has resulted in a food dependency. The 
industries and services composition while mainly being concerned with oil and gas production, 
petroleum refining, and associated petrochemical industries also have ground in construction 
materials production such as cement, metals, ship repair, and aircraft repair (Ibid). Economic 
diversification is low nonetheless with strict government control over major industries and many 
profitable areas of the economy being divided amongst the royal family and their counterparts. 
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Despite the statistics of state wealth and comparatively small domestic population, the 
government is struggling with high unemployment, which has been reported by the government 
to be less than 11% but has been estimated by other organisations to be upwards of 25% (Ibid). 
The country also maintains high levels of water and energy consumption. 
Exportations amounted to an estimated $381.5 billion USD in 2012, which was higher 
than the previous 2011 value of $364.7 billion USD with majority of the commodities exported 
being petroleum and its associated by-products
49
. Major export partners in with the country in 
2011 are Japan at 13.9%, China at 13.6%, USA at 13.4%, South Korea at 10.2%, India at 7.8%, 
and Singapore at 4.8% (Ibid). Indeed, there is a growing presence of an Asian customer base 
over previously established relations with Western countries. Imports were priced at around 
$136.8 billion USD in 2012 and $120 billion USD in 2011 with the majority of commodities 
being machinery, foodstuffs, and textiles (Ibid). The main import partners to the country in 2011 
were China at 12.8%, USA at 11.9%, Germany at 7.1%, South Korea at 6%, Japan at 5.6%, India 
at 4.9%, and Italy at 4.1% (Ibid). 
Crude oil production in the country was an estimated 10 million bpd in 2012 with 
exportations being around 6.88 million bpd in 2009
50
. Proven reserves of crude oil are estimated 
at a staggering 264.4 billion bbl from 2013 (Ibid). Natural gas production is 99.23 billion cu m 
from 2010 estimates with consumption being the entire production (Ibid). Natural gas proven 
reserves are 478.4 million metric tonnes from 2012 estimations (Ibid). Refined petroleum 
production in 2010 was 1.914 million bpd with consumption rates being 2.817 million bpd in 
2011 (Ibid). The refined petroleum exports were around 951,000 in 2008 with importations in the 
same year being 160,100 bpd (Ibid)
51
. 
Although not in possession of a river, there are coastlines on the Red Sea as well as the 
Persian Gulf. Shipping routes are of vital strategic importance to these bodies of water and have 
significant Saudi Arabian interests that are tied through the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz.  
Protecting the geographic integrity of the country would be the military, which is comprised of 
the Royal Saudi Land Forces, Royal Saudi Naval Forces, Royal Saudi Air Force, Royal Saudi 
Air Defence Forces, Royal Saudi Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Saudi Arabian National 
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Guard
52
. There is no conscription for the military but the minimum age requirement for 
enlistment is 18 (Ibid). According to 2010 estimates the amount of population reaching military 
age annually is 261,105 for men and 244,763 for women (Ibid). Military expenditures have not 
been reported by the state each year but were 10% of the GDP in 2005 (Ibid and Figure 1.20). 
Being a regional power in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is certainly not without its 
international disputes. On the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia has had historically tense 
relations with Yemen, which fought against the Al Saud conquest of the Arabian Peninsula that 
ended with the Treaty of Taif in 1934. Saudi Arabia has created a concrete barrier following the 
Treaty of Jeddah in 2000, in which Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed on a demarcated boundary 
between the two countries. However, completion of the reinforced structure has been intermittent 
with the Yemenis fiercely opposing construction of the barrier and cross into territory deemed 
Saudi Arabia. Conventional conflict erupted between the two countries notably in 2009, when 
Saudi Arabian forces and Houthis from Yemen clashed
53
. Other international issues concerning 
Saudi Arabia would be with human trafficking. Given the strategic geography of the country 
being a hub between Europe, Asia, and Africa coupled with the image of an oil-rich kingdom, 
Saudi Arabia struggles with containing and addressing trafficking routes. The country is 
categorized as not fully complying with minimum standards for the reduction of human 
trafficking and is not currently working towards a productive solution to the matter either
54
. 
Indeed, such practices as forced labour and withheld salaries add degrees of complexities to the 
situation (Ibid), but nonetheless it would be in the greater interests of Saudi Arabia to 
constructively address human trafficking. While some efforts have been made from 2009 such as 
the implementation of an anti-trafficking law in addition to legal conviction, governmental 
prosecution to punishing offenders has been arbitrarily applied and selective (Ibid). One such 
benefit can at least be international recognition for the country being responsible and effective 
enough to resolve such abhorrent practices. Moreover, by focusing energies on the elimination of 
human trafficking, Saudi Arabia would strengthen its conviction in being a conscious and 
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responsible country. Another international issue would be with refugees and IDPs that have been 
historically maintained by Palestinians that have fled the Mediterranean region (Ibid). With 
ongoing regional tensions such as the civil war in Syria, the number of IDPs has increased (Ibid). 
Responsible management and sustainment of refugees and IDPs remains an issue for the 
kingdom to resolve effectively. Additionally, there are apparently continuing discussions on a 
maritime boundary with Iran considering that it is another regional power in the Middle East. 
Ongoing tensions with Iran of course far surpass a delineation of Persian Gulf maritime 
boundaries and are more concerned with other issues such as the nuclear program of Iran as well 
as the potential influence the country might project into the Saudi Arabian Shia population. 
 
Bahrain: 
Off the shores of Saudi Arabia in the midst of Persian Gulf waters would be the island 
country of Bahrain. Its independence while claimed by the current kingdom to exist since the 
later 1700s  was in fact in Iranian possession until it was relinquished to the British from which it 
gained independence in 1971. Evidence of Iranian dominion and influence continues to the 
present with the local Arabian dialects mimicking heavy Persian accents in addition to the usage 
of Persian terms in daily vocabulary. The territory nonetheless was historically a rich area, 
particularly during the time under British influence in which pearling was a commodity high in 
demand from the industrialized world. Once pearling was in global decline however natural gas 
was discovered and replaced pearls as the state generator of funds. Tensions arose in Bahrain 
however given the oppressive Sunni minority rule over the Shia majority. A tipping point 
occurred in the 1990s in which Shia activists launched low level insurgency against the kingdom, 
calling for greater equality with the Sunni population. Up until this time, the Sunni kingdom 
imported foreign Sunni nationals and granted some of them Bahraini citizenship, a privilege to 
which not all Shias were presented. Part of this would be due to the extreme minority of Sunnis 
in comparison to Shias inhabiting the island. The imported populations were not well-received 
by the local Shias and were utilized as security forces to quell the demonstrations and uprisings 
against the Al Khalifa monarchy. Attempts in 1999 were initiated by the Al Khalifas with the 
succession of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to placate relations with the Shias and to improve 
the perception of the kingdom within the large community. However, the moves were not 
received without a suspicious sentiment and were evidenced with the boycotting of elections in 
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2002. Perceiving that political victories from elections to the legislative and municipality 
branches would give a strengthened position to the Shias in the country, Shia parties participated 
in elections in 2006 as well as 2010. 
 Following the demonstrations in the Arab world, the Bahraini government feared 
growing momentum in the movements against the kingdom and began violent repression against 
its citizens. A state of emergency was declared by the kingdom and a new set of rules were 
placed on the population that included the banning of mass public gatherings and to label 
offenders as being civilly disobedient. The PSDF from the GCC was additionally deployed to 
Manama, composed of mainly Saudi Arabian and Emirati troops for the purpose of protecting 
critical infrastructure as well as the element of fear for the toppling of the Al Khalifa monarchy. 
Protesters were subsequently massacred and a lack of media coverage ensued to a point where 
events such as the Formula One racing in Bahrain were being broadcasted over international 
news while the grievances of the demonstrators was essentially ignored. Despite the combative 
efforts by the PSDF, protests have continued into 2013 with occasional clashes occurring 
throughout the months. In an effort to satisfy demonstrators and coax the population to a state of 
calmness an inquiry was formed to address issues occurring from the time of the initial protests. 
The king endorsed the findings of the inquiry, which was reached within 5 months of its 
formation and concluded that reforms would be made throughout the infrastructure of the 
country such as policing procedural reform, rehiring dismissed workers, rebuilding religious sites 
that were damaged and/or destroyed over the course of the protests, and establishing a 
compensation fund organisation for other damages done to the population by governmental 
forces. But many in the population do not believe the rhetoric of the government and there have 
been no attempts as of 2013 to act in accordance with the conclusions of the findings. Instead, 
brutal crackdowns and political oppression have ensued, which were covered by some media 
outlets. Torture, kidnapping, and rapes were all reported in the country, which have yet to reach a 
definite end. A National Dialogue was established in February 2013 with the purpose of 
mediating between the government and the opposition but have yet to reach amicable terms at 
the time of this publication. 
 With the frequency of demonstrations in the country, it is important to note statistics that 
make up the country. Over half of the population at 54% is described as non-Bahraini by the 
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government with 46% being described as Bahraini
55
. Of course, such governmental statistics can 
be deceiving with the vagueness of what constitutes “Bahraini” and what does not; but this is an 
issue expressed throughout all Persian Gulf countries. Languages spoken all through the island 
would be Arabic, English, Hindi, Persian, and Urdu (Ibid). The major religious denominations 
would be Islam at over 80% with Christians and other minorities representing close to 20% of 
the beliefs reported (Ibid). An obvious note would be that the Sunni-Shia chasm is not explicitly 
expressed by the government or able to be accurately gathered by any other means except for the 
general knowledge that Shias remain a majority interpretation of the Muslim faith. 
 Despite the minute size of the country, Bahrain has been host to violent outbreaks more 
frequently than some of its other regional neighbours. Such ferocity is limited to a meagre total 
population of 1,281,332 (Ibid). It is only logical that a small desert island would not be able to 
support a massive population without significant infrastructural strength, which is lacking in 
Bahrain. The age groups represented within the population would be 56.4% of the people being 
within the 25-54 group, 0-14 comprising 20%, 15-24 comprising 15.9%, and the remainder 5.2% 
being 55-64 years of age (Ibid). Reported unemployment however has skyrocketed with over 
30% of the population being jobless prior to the demonstrations (Ibid). 
The economy of Bahrain has been reliant off of hydrocarbons since its discovery of 
natural gas following the global decline in demand for pearls. The 2012 GDP rests at $32.44 
billion USD which was a rise from the $31.81 billion USD in 2011 and the $31.16 billion USD 
in 2010
56
. The GDP ppp per capita would be a solid $28,200 USD for the past three years, but 
statistics as noted before can be deceiving especially taking into consideration the deteriorating 
conditions in which majority of the population lives in (Ibid). The 2012 GDP by sector 
composition would be 50.7% industry, 48.9% services, and 0.4% agriculture (Ibid). Exports of 
Bahrain in 2012 amounted to $20.95 billion USD, which was up from the $19.91 billion in 2011 
(Ibid). Export partners with Bahrain were Japan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to name a 
few (Ibid). Imports in 2012 amounted to $14.95 billion USD, which was a higher figure than the 
$12.11 billion mark of 2011 (Ibid). Major import partners as of 2011 would be with Saudi Arabia 
at 28.2%, USA at 10.5%, China at 7.6%, Brazil at 6%, India at 5/7%, Germany at 4.8% and 
Japan at 4.1% (Ibid). Of course, the petroleum industries and services dominate the GDP but it 
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should be recognized that Bahrain has taken significant steps to diversifying its economy. 
Notable instances would be with the implementation of Gulf Air transportation services, which 
was a precursor to other Arabian airlines such as Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways. 
Multinational investment and banking firms also were seated in Manama prior to the 1990s 
tensions and served as a model for other Persian Gulf states. Islamic banking has recently begun 
to become a financial focus for the country and it directly competes with other leaders in the 
field such as Malaysia. Aluminium smelting has also been an industry that has proved beneficial 
to Bahraini economic diversification and profit, which in turn also has served for other countries 
to follow in its experience; the aluminium industry is the second largest area of Bahraini 
economy after petroleum. Naturally, as an island Bahrain capitalizes on its geography to promote 
ship-related services such as shipbuilding and repairs, which also relate to the hydrocarbon 
harvesting done by multinational corporations. 
 In spite of the economic diversification taking shape in Bahrain, oil and gas must be 
addressed when describing the country due to its pivotal importance as the backbone of the state 
economy
57
. Crude oil production in 2012 was 44,800 bbl per day with crude oil exports being 
152,600 bbl per day in the same year
58
. Proven crude oil reserves were 107.2 million bbl as of 
2013, which are posited to contribute to further Bahraini economy (Ibid). Refined petroleum 
production in 2012 was 270,800 bbl per day with the consumption of such materials being a 
minimum of 51,450 bbl per day since 2011 and exports reaching 226,000 bbl per day in 2012 
(Ibid). Natural gas proven reserves in contrast with the crude oil reserves were in excess of 92.03 
billion cu m (Ibid). The Bahraini oil and gas industries are markedly smaller in comparison to the 
neighbouring giants of the region such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE but the 
revenues gained still make up the majority of governmental income at reportedly over 70% 
(Ibid). Considering it is the majority wealth generated by the country and is a small amount in 
comparison with wealthier GCC members it is no wonder Bahrain started early diversification of 
its economy. Regardless of such strides and income however, much of the population remains 
poor especially with consideration towards the strength of the Bahraini dinar as was evidenced 
by the GDP ppp per capita. 
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There is significant evidence that the military of Bahrain is an ineffectual force in need of 
greater GCC and foreign assistance when reviewing the ongoing protests taking place in the 
country. The fact remains that it is still a weak entity that is constantly reliant off of foreign 
support, not only from the PSDF but also with imported security that acts both within and out of 
the public sector. This would be due in part to the fact that majority of the population is Shia and 
would refuse by enlarge to combat other Shias protesting against Sunni dominion. Imports 
therefore are commonly found from countries such as Pakistan and territories such as the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. A major foreign presence on the island to note would be the US Naval 5
th
 
Fleet stationed at Manama, which has direct permission from the Bahraini government to operate 
from the city.   
 Intercontinental issues of course would be with Iran and the Bahraini fear of Iranian 
expansion into its borders. Frequently, the country has accused Iran of attempted interference 
with its internal affairs chiefly on the grounds that it is a Shia state supporting Shia discontent 
with the Sunni rule as well as its historical and cultural claims to Bahrain. With the advent of 
protests in Manama, Bahrain also became heavily involved with the presence of the Peninsula 
Shield composed of Saudi Arabian and Emirati soldiers. Consequently, Bahrain has extended out 
of its borders to imploring regional assistance that can be interpreted as a transnational issue on 
the grounds of other countries actively interfering with the notion of state stability. While such 
an issue is not an aggressive state stance as one taken contrary towards Iran, the majority of the 
population in Bahrain as Shia do harbour negative attitudes towards the two countries as the 
Peninsula Shield actions can be viewed as unjust and despotic. 
Considering that Bahrain is geographically close to strategic Middle Eastern petroleum 
reserves in the Persian Gulf from which much of the global oil and gas supplies must pass 
through, Bahrain is a country that has continuous strategic significance. Even the outcome of the 
continuing protests are a part of a larger portrait with the Iranians having much to gain with a 
Shia dominant population in power off the coast of Saudi Arabia and the Saudis in turn as well as 
Western powers inclusive of the US having significant interests to sustain with a Sunni power in 
place. 
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Qatar: 
Qatar is a country that shares its borders with Saudi Arabia, being a jutted landmass from 
the Arabian Peninsula. Formerly within the claimed boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, Qatar 
has been managed by the Al Thani royal family for over a century. Like many other countries in 
the Persian Gulf, Qatar was a British protectorate until gaining its independence in 1971. Qatari 
history has always been closely tied with its economy given the geographic positioning of the 
country in a desert setting. The past two decades in particular have proven avant-garde in the 
direction of the country considering that in the 1980s and 1990s the Qatari Emir ruling since a 
year after his country gained independence was siphoning oil and gas revenues for personal gain 
at the cost of crippling the state economy and general population well-being. Once his successor, 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, came to power in 1995 the direction of the economy and country 
changed drastically. Pre-existing border disputes with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were resolved 
and since 2001 the state focus changed to developing the country such as improving economic 
infrastructure and education. By the time of the demonstrations spreading throughout the Arab 
world, Qatar witnessed relative calm compared to other countries such as Egypt, Syria, and 
Bahrain. Rather, Qatar seemed to be leading the GCC and Arab League to assist in overthrowing 
other dictatorial regimes such as in Libya. While it was criticized in turn for unbalanced media 
coverage from its Al Jazeera network and being of monarchical structure itself, Qatar has 
certainly demonstrated that despite its small size it has the capacity to project effective 
international political power. 
 The population of Qatar is in the early stages of growth given the emerging economic 
situation in the country. The total population as of 2013 was around 2,042,444 and is extremely 
internationalized with Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis, and Iranians comprising the most 
nationalities
59
. Nearly 70% of the reported population is between the ages of 25 and 54 (Ibid) 
with the 0-14 years of age group maintaining 12.5% of the population and the 15-24 group 
having 13.9% (Ibid). Unemployment is low in the country and one of the lowest in the world 
with an apparent 1.6% being jobless, in part credited to the small population and growing 
economy (Ibid). 
At the time of colonization, Qatar was one of the poorer emirates of the British 
protectorates. Like Bahrain, Qatar generated much of its early income via pearling (Ibid). 
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Eventually, like many of its regional neighbours in the Persian Gulf, Qatar encountered oil and 
natural gas deposits within its borders that were projected to contribute significant income to the 
state economy and centralized governmental authorities. Qatar GDP in 2012 was $189 billion 
USD, a rise from the previous year of $177.8 billion USD, an additional rise from the 2010 
figure of $155.8 billion USD
60
. GDP ppp per capita in 2012 was the highest in the world at 
$102,800 USD, a significant increase from the preceding year at $88,300 USD and $77,300 USD 
before that (Ibid). The statistics are misleading though since not every individual in Qatar 
receives a six-figure income, it is simply a matter of averaging immense wealth with a small 
population. GDP by sector composition in 2012 would be industry at 77.8%, services at 22.1%, 
and agriculture at 0.1% (Ibid). Industries dominating Qatari economy would of course be 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), crude oil, and related productions but other significant contributions 
would be aluminium smelting, steel refining, construction materials inclusive of cement, 
banking, education, and nautical vehicle repair (Ibid). Industrial growth rate is the first in the 
world at a staggering 27.1% (Ibid). Exports are in excess of $117.7 billion USD as of 2012 with 
top export partners being Japan at 25.7%, South Korea at 17.7%, India at 9.6%, Singapore at 
6.3%, and the UK at 6.2% (Ibid). Imports cost far less for Qatar, amounting to $23.49 billion 
USD in 2012, down from the previous year of $26.93 billion USD (Ibid). The main commodities 
would be machinery and food (Ibid). Main import partners from 2011 would be the US at 12.7%, 
the UAE at 12.3%, Saudi Arabia at 9.3%, the UK at 6.2%, China at 5.4%, Germany at 5.2%, 
Japan at 4.6%, France at the same percentage, and Italy at 4.5% (Ibid). 
Due to the meteoric growth of Qatar, the global financial crisis stemming from 2009 did 
not affect the country as much as other countries. Qatari officials invested heavily in the 
domestic banking sector and additionally made significant foreign investments. For example, 
The Shard in the London financial district, which was initially conceived as a symbol of Western 
capitalism, was purchased by the Qataris. Following such investments was an increase in oil and 
gas prices that in turn directed funds towards the state and reinvigorated growth. Qatar 
particularly benefited from the gas sector, from which it has one of the largest fields in the world 
– the North Field, which is shared with Iran61 across the Persian Gulf62. Natural gas proven 
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reserves located mainly in this gas field are an estimated 25.2 trillion cu m from 2012 statistics, 
which is at present more than 13% of the world reserves and the third largest reserve in the world 
(Ibid). The immense reserves total natural gas exports to 113.4 billion cu m from 2010 estimates 
with a consumption rate of 21.8 billion cu m in the same year (Ibid). Production in the gas sector 
was additionally 116.7 billion cu m in 2010 (Ibid). Crude oil alternatively while not as massive 
in reserve as natural gas amounted to 25.57 billion bbl from a 2013 estimate and had a 1.631 
million bbl per day production rate in 2011 (Ibid). But it should be noted that crude oil can be 
harvested and exported for at least an additional 50 years before rates envelop the entirety of the 
reserve (Ibid). The profits gained from the sales of oil and gas make up more than half of the 
yearly GDP making up around 70% of government revenues (Ibid). 
Indeed, oil and gas has enabled the country to become first in the world as the highest per 
capita income destination with the lowest unemployment rate, but it is well-known that the 
materials are not the sole source of income for the country. A notable instance of economic 
diversification would be in the education sector with a host of international universities building 
campuses in Education City on the outskirts of Doha
63
. Universities include Carnegie Mellon 
University in Qatar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, HEC Paris, 
Northwestern University in Qatar, Texas A&M University at Qatar, University College London 
Qatar, Virginia Commonwealth University in Qatar, and Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar 
(Ibid). Part of the impact of having Western institutions such as the aforementioned in a 
traditionally conservative environment would be that in theory the culture would gradually 
liberalize but of course in practice this may not be the case. There have criticisms on multiple 
fronts directed at Education City, one being that Qatar in a sense can be viewed in to “buying 
prestige” with big name universities. Moreover, some of the universities such as the Weill 
Cornell Medical College in Qatar are not equitable degrees with Cornell University in New 
York, which even has separate admission standards than the Qatari campus association 
signifying that there is a difference between the Ivy League institution and the Education City 
one. Additionally, the student body greatly differs between the campuses abroad and the ones in 
Qatar but this serves at present as a beneficial quality. Many GCC students graduating from high 
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school choose to study in Education City for different reasons but commonly cite proximity of 
being closer to home under the assumption of getting a world-class education. Therefore, even if 
the educational quality is not the same as abroad from a business aspect all the currently existing 
campuses are profitable investments that simultaneously boost the image of the country. Efforts 
in creating the site are accredited to Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al Missned, the wife of the 
former Qatari Emir and mother to the current Emir. 
Qatar also has made a surprisingly successful bid to host the World Cup in 2022. 
International shock was expressed on copious grounds. Firstly, the climate of the country during 
World Cup summer seasons is extremely hot and humid, certainly unaccommodating to the 
average tourist. Another reason would be that the country is still in the midst of developing its 
infrastructure, which has yet to create a soccer stadium large enough to support World Cup 
masses. While there are plans to create an architectural masterpiece stadium that would have 
features such as air conditioning, the construction is not yet complete. More hotels are also 
needed to keep all the masses coming to the World Cup event. Even though Qatar is aware of 
such issues and is confident that it will be able to complete all the required projects on time, 
which is inclusive of additional transportation developments such as a metro system, light rail 
system, and causeway linking Qatar to Bahrain past countries have experienced incredible 
difficulty in meeting lesser requirements. Optimistically, a new international airport is projected 
to open by the end of 2013 with an annual passenger capacity of 24 million so that may be a sign 
as to the Qatari commitment to building its infrastructure but then an issue of compromising 
quality in favour of time constraints remains. 
The Qatari military is small and requires no mandatory military service from its 
population. In spite of this, Qatar spends a sizable portion of its GDP on military purchases, 
upwards of 10% since 2005
64
. Tensions within the country are low though and Qatar does not at 
the moment have significant international disputes that would require heavy military backing so 
there is no real need for an imposing force in any case. Moreover, foreign presence is stark with 
the US maintaining the Al Udeid Air Base in Doha (Ibid). Essentially, the military assistance of 
the US is present should Qatar ever require or need its assistance. This has been in place since 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 (Ibid). But it should be noted that future tensions could escalate 
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with Iran over the sharing of the gas fields in the Persian Gulf due to the vagueness and at times 
arbitrariness of dividing maritime lines indicating state boundaries. 
 
United Arab Emirates: 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was formed in 1971 with the merging of six emirates 
to form a federal union. Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujeira, Sharjah, and Umm Al Quwain were 
later joined in 1972 by Ras Al Khaimah, which completed the seven emirates that comprise the 
country. Prior to existing as the UAE and federation the emirates were a collective British 
protectorate known as the Trucial States
65
 from 1820 (Commins 2012: 78) to 1971 (Commins 
2012: 160). The territory had previously been in possession of Oman under the Al Bu Said 
sultanate but gradually had shifted to British control. The vast transoceanic empire of Oman had 
experienced a decline in power across its territory in dealing with invasions, rebellions, and trade 
issues. Moreover, the ruling Al Bu Said were concerned with the increasing aggression from the 
reported Franco-Persian relations that would use Muscat as a base to attack India. A strategic 
treaty was signed in 1798 between Oman and the British that would secure Al Bu Said rule while 
also keeping other foreign powers at bay. The British in turn benefited from the alliance by 
solidifying their reign in the Indian subcontinent (Ibid). However, forces that had troubled the Al 
Bu Said would also prove to be frustrating to the British as well. Piracy against the British East 
India Company in the Persian Gulf was widespread and such concern that the British Navy 
engaged in a series of campaigns against the raids in 1805, 1808 (Commins 2012: 73), and 1811. 
Despite the engagements between the British and the raiders, piracy was still affecting British 
interests in the region. Therefore, in 1819 a large scale fleet was launched in the Persian Gulf to 
deal with piracy once and for all (Commins 2012: 74). The campaign was successful and acted 
between both the Persian and Arabian shores of the waterway (Ibid). A General Treaty of Peace 
was imposed on sheikhs in the area and piracy had ultimately ceased operations against the 
British, of course maritime warfare was a separate issue and was still engaged for decades to 
come (Ibid). The significance of the General Treaty of Peace extends far beyond the namesake of 
the contact though. The 1820 signatory date is used as the establishment of the Trucial States in 
the Persian Gulf as a British protectorate. It also highlights and reveals the relationship the 
British had with the Omanis in distinguishing the Trucial States as separate from the sultanate. 
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The Great Treaty of Peace additionally did not prevent sheikhs from arguing between each other 
as there were notable clashes between Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and Ras Al Khaimah.  
 In 1833 an upheaval between all the emirates ensued after the sheikh of Abu Dhabi was 
assassinated by his brothers Khalifa and Sultan ibn Shakhbut (Commins 2012: 84). Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, and Sharjah were yet again vying for power in the region. The British however took 
advantage of the situation and proposed the Maritime Truce in 1835, which did not directly relate 
to the mainland issues between the sheikhs but did have the emirate of Dubai recognized as 
independent (Ibid). The Maritime Truce intended to keep traffic moving through the Straits of 
Hormuz, which was designed to proliferate British interests and also kept a mutually beneficial 
economic environment to all participants involved. A revision in 1839 included the banning of 
slavery, which was illegal in the British Empire and was dually targeting an economic staple of 
the area. Despite the reduction in oceanic trafficking, the practice was never fully eliminated 
although the British did take strides to further contain the practice inland (Commins 2012: 82 – 
83). In 1853 additional modifications came to form the Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity, which was 
a particularly significant document in that it solidified British supremacy in the area (Peck 1986: 
36). According to the Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity, all disputes between the sheikhs in the 
trucial system would be settled with British arbitration (Ibid). 
 The British oversight of the trucial system would not last however. In 1968 London 
announced that it would withdraw naval forces from the Persian Gulf by 1971 (Commins 2012: 
192). Chronic budget issues coupled with a change in the political ideology of the ruling Labour 
Party in London turned colonial mind-set to an anti-colonial movement that was more geared on 
generating funds to the government rather than maintaining British presence abroad (Ibid). Plans 
for the formation of a new country that would be comprised of nine emirates were explored 
(Ibid). The Trucial States in addition to Bahrain and Qatar discussed potential developments to 
be unified under a single federation (Ibid: 193). Initially, Bahrain was the economic superior out 
of the all the sheikhs but had competition from Abu Dhabi that had the potential to become the 
wealthiest of all emirates (Ibid). Favouring options for independence, both Bahrain and Qatar 
withdrew from discussions to become countries in their own right (Ibid). Thusly, seven emirates 
straddling the southern Arabian Peninsula were left to discuss a federation between themselves. 
An agreement in 1971 was reached between the six emirates of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Fujeira, 
Sharjah, and Umm Al Quwain to form the UAE (Ibid). Ras Al Khaimah would join in 1972, 
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completing the seven emirate composition of the country (Ibid). The political structure of the 
UAE as a federation entails that a sheikh is appointed to each emirate and has the right to utilize 
power within the boundaries of the emirate. No other emirate may interfere with the affairs of 
another emirate and Abu Dhabi is appointed as the head of the federation. This is of course, a 
basic overview of the political structure and like all political systems is more complex when 
investigated comprehensively. 
 The population of the UAE is diverse, with a legacy of Persian and Omani empires 
existent from the diverse groups inhabiting the country. The globalization and early 
diversification of economy in the country propelled the UAE to sustain nearly 6 million 
inhabitants by 2013 estimates of which over half are expatriate makeup (Figure 1.21). The 
youthful composition of society places 0 – 14 years of age at 20.6% of the population, 15 – 24 at 
13.8%, 25 – 54 at 61.5% with the remainder being 55 and over66. The GDP ppp in 2010 was 
around $247.8 billion with the per capita being $47,500; 2011 amounted to $260.7 billion with 
the per capita being $48,500 and 2012 generated $271.2 billion with the per capita being $49,000 
USD (Ibid). 
The economy is based primarily off of oil and gas sales, with reserves coming mainly 
from Abu Dhabi. Indeed, this is illustrated by the GDP sector composition, which is comprised 
of industry at 56.1% and services at 43.1% related to oil and gas
67
. Crude oil production 
according to 2012 estimates was a little over 3 million bbl/day (Figure 1.22) with exports being 
around 2 million bbl/day. Proven reserves from 2013 estimates positioned the country at 97.8 
billion bbl (Figure 1.23). Refined petroleum production was 346,900 bbl/day in 2008 with 
exports being 452,400 bbl/day and consumption being 572,100 bbl/day; imports amounted to 
377,300 bbl/day (Figures 1.24 – 1.25). Natural gas has also proved lucrative with proven 
reserves of 6.089 trillion cu m being forecasted in 2012 and production being 51.28 billion cu m 
with a 60.54 billion cu m consumption rate (Figures 1.26 – 1.29). Natural gas has also been 
exported from the UAE at a 7.65 billion cu m rate with imports being greater at 16.991 billion cu 
m according to 2010 figures (Figures 1.26 – 1.29). The country has attempted to make early 
diversification moves away from oil and gas sales however, with other significant economic 
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sectors being with industries such as hospitality, tourism, aluminium smelting, and banking that 
have been pioneered by Dubai. Free trade zones, such as in Jebel Ali, have also assisted in 
generating foreign investments. Major export partners excluding oil and gas sales in 2011 would 
be Japan at 16.2%, India at 13.5%, Iran at 10.9%, South Korea at 5.6%, Thailand at 5.5%, and 
Singapore at 4.4%
68
. Exportation sales amounted to $281.6 billion USD in 2011 and $300.6 
billion in the subsequent year. Importations conversely amounted to $220.3 billion in 2012, 
which was up from the previous year of $202.1 billion USD (Ibid). Imported commodities were 
mainly machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, and food with major partners in 2011 
being India at 19.8%, China at 13.7%, USA at 8.1%, and Germany at 4.6% (Ibid). In 2009 
though, the highly integrated economy of the UAE was severely damaged by the global financial 
crisis, with Dubai being evidently the most affected by the deflation. The dependency on oil and 
gas sales as well as foreign labour indeed presented challenges that were exaggerated during the 
crisis. 
The military of the UAE has historically not been a focus of the country. However, 
military expenditure has had a positive trajectory since 2002 (Figure 1.30) with significant 
purchases of arms such as F-16s, F-22 Raptors, Predator drones, and missile defence systems
69
. 
The armed forces are comprised of the Land Forces, Air Force, Navy, Air Defence, Border and 
Coast Guard Directorate, as well as Critical Infrastructure Coastal Patrol Agency (Ibid). The 
security provided by the country has been sufficient for the handling of domestic affairs and 
safeguarding itself against any potential foreign attacks. Domestic intelligence for example has 
operated against domestic movements towards international terrorism, such as with the Muslim 
Brotherhood hailing from Egypt. 
The UAE possesses a unique geographic layout in that while it maintains shoreline on the 
Persian Gulf as well as the Gulf of Oman, it does not hold any ground on the Strait of Hormuz. 
Rather, the territory on the strait is the Al Musandam exclave of Oman, which is an international 
issue in itself coupled with Al Madhah, which is yet another exclave of Oman that is within 
Emirati boundaries. The exclaves however have not been subject to significant controversy or 
contestation, instead controversy ensued when the UAE had been caught spying on Oman in 
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2011
70
. Since the occurrence of the incident however, the parties have reportedly resolved 
affairs. The UAE also claims dispute with Iran over the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands that are 
located in close proximity of the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the UAE has also committed 
significant forces to the PSDF that operate in Bahrain, suppressing domestic protests against the 
ruling authority. Other issues include narcotics and illicit substance trafficking given the nearby 
location to the Golden Crescent. The economic standing of the country also facilitates money 
laundering. 
 
Oman: 
At the mouth of the Persian Gulf holding one of the pillars of the Strait of Hormuz is 
Oman, which is country with an extensive history dating to antiquity. During the time in which 
the Persian Gulf states were colonized, Oman experienced a unique relationship with the 
dominant power in the region which was the British Empire. Oman had since the late 1700s 
entered into amicable treaties with the British, which complimented its own seafaring empire that 
had experienced victories in the Indian Ocean down the coast of continental Africa, in the 
Baluchistan region between the modern boundaries of Iran and Pakistan, and across the Arabian 
Peninsula. However, Oman eventually became dependent on the British Empire for political and 
military support but was never systematically colonized in turn. While there were regions in 
which the British gained dominance over the authority of Oman, such as with the Trucial States 
of the Coast of Oman, the country did not experience widespread resentment and resistance 
towards the British as it had the Portuguese colonizers centuries before. The population rather 
was more attuned to the inner workings of its own political system – the sultanate. In 1970 
Qaboos bin Said Al Said launched a coup d’état against his unpopular father and was declared 
sultan. He has ruled ever since and worked to modernize the country, focusing on all areas of 
infrastructure including education and transportation. There have been few instances of uprisings 
against the ruling sultanate with the most notable ones being with the Dhofar Rebellion and the 
2011 riots. The Dhofar Rebellion started in 1965 before Sultan Qaboos took rule but intensified 
during the ousting of the father in 1970 and was finally put down in 1975 with domestic military 
reformations taking shape in conjunction with the foreign assistance of Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, 
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and the UK. The Dhofar Rebellion called to implement socialism in place of the sultanate a year 
after oil was discovered in the country and was backed by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR). After the rebellion was put down Oman experienced relative calm until the 
2011 riots in which citizens demanded greater economic benefits, denounced corruption, and 
desired greater political say. Sultan Qaboos in turn has been responsive to his public and 
committed to implementing reforms both economic as well as political. Unemployment benefits, 
job creation, and legislative powers granted to the Majles were just some of the royal decrees 
that were acted on within the year. The immediate receptiveness of the Sultan has been to say the 
least, impressive. It is not the norm for a political ruler to be sensitive to the extent of 
immediately changing direction once the public has demonstrated or rioted against the ruling 
authority. Moreover, the implemented decrees are actually effective with results being visible in 
the entire country. 
The population of Oman is an estimated 3,154,134 inclusive of nearly 580,000 non-
citizens
71
. The majority of the country is between the ages of 25 and 54 amounting to roughly 
42% of the population, the next bulk would be around 31% being between the ages of 0-14 with 
the 15-24 years of age group being 20.2% (Ibid). For all intents and purposes, Oman is a country 
that is quite youthful in its composition. It is also a diverse country with many different 
languages being widely spoken that include Arabic, English, Baluch, Urdu, and Hindi (Ibid). 
Nationalities represented by the linguistic groups are by enlarge a legacy of the extent of the 
Omani Empire with Arabs, Baluch, Tanzanians, and many others settling in the country.  The 
religious makeup however is not as diverse with majority of the country at 75% following Ibadhi 
Islam, an indigenous interpretation of Islam stretching back to the early Islamic period, with the 
remainder including Sunnis, Shias, Zoroastrians, Baha’is, Christians, and Hindus (Ibid).  
The economy of Oman is mid-sized undergoing an average of 5% GDP real growth rate 
per year from 2009 – 2013 (Ibid). The country is a rentier state that is heavily dependent on the 
revenues of natural resources, namely oil deposits that are well past peak production levels, to 
provide for the bulk of the GDP. Due to the nearing reality of the country being at a permanent 
loss of oil, the Sultan has outlined an economic development plan that focuses on diversification, 
industrialization, and privatization (Ibid). The draft could not come at a better time with the 
                                                 
71
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mu.html (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013) and 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/oman (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013). 
63 
 
population being quite youthful and energetic to contribute to economic growth. At present, 
tourism and natural gas are the starting points for Omani economic diversification. The fact that 
other models exist in the Persian Gulf for these two endeavours provides Oman with an 
opportunity to learn and ameliorate errors to improve its own situation. Careful budgeting must 
be in place though in order for the orchestrations to take place successfully since there are 
economic and social assumptions that are taken into consideration for future development such 
as the price of oil remaining high with a consistent customer base and that the population will be 
in turn receiving a steady income from which they will be satisfied. 
In 2012 the GDP of Oman stood at $90.66 billion USD, which was a rise from the $86.38 
billion USD in the preceding year, which was also a rise from the $81.92 billion USD figure in 
2010 (Ibid). The GDP ppp per capita from 2010 to 2012 has remained between $27,500 USD 
and $28,500 USD but while this figure may not seem high, it is before the economic reforms 
introduced by the Sultan and is projected to rise steadily with the recent calls for 
entrepreneurship (Ibid). The government has been directed to assist the population in creating 
businesses and providing a more accommodating environment for start-up companies as well as 
privatization (Ibid). At present the GDP composition by sector is industry at 50.4%, services at 
48.1%, and agriculture at 1.5% (Ibid). The major industries in Oman being a rentier state would 
logically be the oil and gas (Ibid). There are other emerging industrial sectors though such as 
construction materials production, cement manufacturing, chemical refinements, and metal 
refineries (Ibid). The services GDP contribution is naturally based off of the existing industries 
in the country with a great potential for the advancement of maritime services (Ibid). The 
agricultural sector is comparatively small in Oman, but there is already great diversity in the 
foodstuffs produced in the country such as various fruits, vegetables, livestock, and fish (Ibid). 
The agricultural sector must expand rapidly for the coming generation so that the reliance on 
imported foods would not be a future risk and more so to provide additional areas for export 
revenue. The exports from 2012 amounted to $48.43 billion USD, a slight rise above the 2011 
figure of $47.09 billion USD (Ibid). The main exports were petroleum, metals, and food with 
major partners being China at 30.2%, South Korea at 10.9%, the UAE at 10.6%, Japan at 10.4%, 
India at 9.2%, Thailand at 5.3%, and the US at 4.6% (Ibid). Imports resulted in $23.37 billion 
USD in 2012, a rise from the $21.35 billion USD in 2011 with major partners being the UAE at 
nearly 28%, Japan at roughly 12%, the US at 6.1%, India at 5.4%, China at 4.2%, Saudi Arabia 
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at 4.1%, and Germany at 4% (Ibid). The largest imports were machinery, heavy transportation 
equipment, food, and other manufactured goods (Ibid). 
An area not yet focused on with its role in the Omani economy would be petroleum. As 
stated before, Oman is in possession of dwindling oil deposits that have a proven reserve of 
4.902 billion bbl from a 2013 estimate
72
. The daily production in 2012 was 915,600 bbl and had 
an export of 253,100 bbl per day (Ibid). Natural gas reserves however are far in excess of the oil 
deposits with 2013 proven estimates reaching upwards of 849.5 billion cu m (Ibid). The natural 
gas production, reliant on an increasingly sophisticated and industrializing LNG transportation 
method, amounted to 35.94 billion cu m in 2012 with exports being 11.49 billion cu m in the 
same year (Ibid). Foreign investments have become extremely attracted to the LNG sector of 
Oman with specialized Japanese and Emirati companies heavily investing in its furthering. The 
Emiratis have taken particular notice of the lower economic positioning of Oman to invest in the 
development of not only the LNG sector but also the future of maritime transportation with 
special attention to petroleum. 
 The military of Oman at present is nearly 2 million strong with both men and women 
serving in the armed forces
73
. There is no mandatory conscription and women typically do not 
volunteer for such service but are free to do so should they choose (Ibid). The military is 
completely self-reliant off of indigenous citizens rather than dependent on foreign assistance 
such as with other neighbouring Persian Gulf countries although a historic importation of Baluch 
from Gwadar contributed to Omani military composition (Ibid). The Baluch of course were 
regarded as Omani citizens with the empire having a seamless multicultural identity. In fact, 
many Baluch still maintain ties to Oman despite being mainly populated within Pakistani 
boundaries. An increased spending on military surplus by the Sultan in recent years has also 
gained international attention with the annual GDP towards military spending being 11.4% since 
2005 (Ibid) but the traditional nonaligned and non-involved position of Oman credits it to being 
a responsible enough state to not generate international condemnation. The navy in particular is 
receiving upgrades with the UK building state-of-the-art corvettes for Omani usage (Ibid). 
                                                 
72
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mu.html (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013), 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/oman (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013), and 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=MU (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013). 
73
 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/oman-mil.htm (Last Retrieved: June 1, 2013). 
65 
 
Missile shields and airpower are also receiving upgrades that are projected to bolster the country 
to a more secure position on the peninsula. 
 Oman does not have many significant international issues since it is regarded as a 
relatively neutral state, particularly when concerning Middle Eastern affairs. Quite often in fact 
the country has served as a mediating power between others, such as famously with Iran and 
various members of the international system. Boundaries with the UAE though were intensely 
contested since the formation of the united sheikhdoms. Oman and the UAE currently do not 
have border synergy in the sense that there are exclaves from both countries in the other. 
Apparently in 2003 a boundary agreement was signed and ratified with the UAE but the details 
have not been made public. Indeed, in recent years the historic neutrality of Oman seems to be 
slowly led into a direction that compromises its nonaligned position. An example would be with 
the UAE being caught of spying on Oman with elaborate networks being uncovered and another 
instance being with the increased Saudi Arabian aggressive expansionist demeanour that is 
pressing on Omani borders. Regardless of the ongoing international scenarios though, the more 
intense and concerning issues would be the domestic ones; particularly those related to the 
battered economic situation and the future continuation of a strengthened Oman. 
 
Collective Regional Tensions: 
While the aforementioned countries of the region each possess uniquely specific 
intrastate issues with transnational ones sometimes being even more specifically tailored to a 
country, there are overarching themes that can be observed as collective effects between the 
littoral inhabitants. Interstate suspicions run deep through the Persian Gulf and can be argued to 
be platforms for developing, continuing, and future problems in the area. After all, interstate 
suspicions share a close affinity with interstate competition. 
One of the more notable collective issues in the region would certainly be one that is 
visually present. The dispute referenced is over the naming of the body of water that lies between 
the Iranian Plateau and the Arabian Peninsula. Prior to the rise of pan-Arabism in the 1960s, the 
Persian Gulf was the undisputed internationally recognized name for the waterway. However, 
with the advent of pan-Arab nationalism sweeping throughout the Arabic-speaking world the 
name was put into question by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was president of Egypt at the time and 
initiated a proposal for a name change from “Persian Gulf” to “Arabian Gulf”. The claims put 
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forth by Nasser were on the grounds that Iran was engaging in ties that were excessively cordial 
with the declared arch-rival of the Arab world, Israel. Hence, a name change for the waterway 
would be appropriate to not only denote a collective Arab distaste for Iranian relations with 
Israel but also to challenge the legitimacy and authority of a regional power. While this shift is a 
well-documented event, there have been educational shifts in the Arab world since then that do 
not acknowledge the existence of a Persian Gulf. Yet, this philosophy does not carry 
international weight. For instance, the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO), which is 
an inter-governmental organisation representing the hydrographic community enjoys observer 
status to the United Nations (UN), has asserted that the official name of recognition for the body 
of water lying between the Iranian Plateau and the Arabian Peninsula is the Persian Gulf
74
. It has 
also used the title “Gulf of Iran” as an alternative name in order to dispel any myths or potential 
association with the Arab world or “Arabian” in terminology (Ibid). There have been attempts to 
alternatively rename the area as “The Gulf”. But this of course is a ridiculous notion given that 
there are quite a number of gulfs in existence. An analogous comparison would be renaming the 
Indian Ocean as “The Ocean”. Moreover attempts to manipulate terminology of the Persian Gulf 
would also be with the usage of “Arab Gulf” or “Gulf Arab”. However, the UN in addition to the 
IHO as well as most governments in the world has acknowledged the body of water as the 
Persian Gulf
75
. 
Tensions surrounding the Persian Gulf though are not solely with regards to a naming 
dispute. The Strait of Hormuz, which is the mouth of the channel shared between Iran and Oman, 
has even more international attention. At its narrowest point, the strait is 54 km with 32 km of 
navigable water, making this area a geographic chokepoint. The significance of the Strait of 
Hormuz is crucially tied to a number of matters, such as petroleum and its transportation routes. 
The potential for regional conflict to erupt can potentially disrupt the importation of necessary 
products for sustainability and exportations of petroleum to the rest of the globe. Hence, 
suspicions run high in the littoral. Indeed, fears of a rising Iran dominating the area and 
influencing trade keep the Arabian neighbours uncomfortable. In this vein, all Arabian countries 
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along the peninsula are deeply suspicious of each other, fearing foreign involvement in domestic 
affairs or domineering competition. Iran is also suspicious of movements on the Arabian side 
that could affect its standing as well, such as with the militarization of countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. Another area of tension would be with the popular movements against 
autocratic regimes in the Arab world from 2010. Many Arab states not only fear public uprising 
but looming Iranian influence, which is particularly enhanced with countries that possess 
sizeable populations of Shias, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Conclusion: 
 From the overview of the countries inhabiting the littoral, several countries have unique 
discerning features that separate them from the others. Iran for example is the only Islamic 
Republic, Saudi Arabia in turn is the largest monarchy, while the UAE is the only federation of 
emirates. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are established regional powers while the UAE possesses 
an economy that generates more funds than Iran. The foundations of resource nationalism in 
each country must also consequently be expressed differently. Such features inclusive of other 
dissimilarities, such as the degrees of power and influence of each country, provide Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and the UAE to be fascinating case studies for the investigation of resource nationalism 
in the Persian Gulf. All case studies participate in intricate interstate relations while possessing 
unique intrastate issues as well. Selecting the three countries is not to take away any importance 
from the others however. Rather, other countries could as well be included in a study of resource 
nationalism but would overextend the limitations of the thesis. Hence, creating a manageable 
project would entail that using Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is sufficient.  
68 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework – The State, Nations, 
Nationalism, and Ethnicity 
 
In order to understand resource nationalism, particularly with respect to the case studies, 
it is essential to grasp the components that make up the framework. Hence, the concepts that will 
be reviewed in this chapter will be the notion of the state, nations, nationalism, and ethnicity. 
Each notion will be gauged and covered with its relationship towards resource nationalism, 
which will in turn reflect applicability to the case studies. Terminology will be then clarified for 
the purposes of the research project following the revision of all models. A final description of 
measuring the resource nationalism framework in the case studies will be presented as well. 
 
Notion of the State: 
There are numerous issues that are involved when investigating the idea of the state. A 
major one would be the issue of sovereignty, which is vital to understanding the state given that 
states must be classified as sovereign or not. Sovereignty is the condition in which a state is not 
subject to or dependent upon any other power or state. There are certainly technicalities when 
defining sovereignty from such a perspective but the aforementioned proposition does provide 
sufficient grounds to give a definition of what a state can be understood as. In general terms, the 
state often refers to a defined territory and population residing under a set of governing 
institutions. The aforesaid constituents may demonstrate sovereignty, which is a reference to the 
independence of authority and rule within defined geographic boundaries. However, the state can 
also be used as a reference to the secular branches of government that are contrasted to 
theological frameworks , which can be applicable to both the Iranian and Saudi Arabian case 
studies. Of course, should a state be of a purely theological construction then the reference would 
naturally be without contrast and follow the first description of the state provided, which can be 
demonstrated with the existence of the Vatican as a state that is built with purely theological 
mechanisms. 
A sovereign state can take abundant forms such as with the case of federated states, 
which typically operate under a federal union. Features of federalist entities would be a group of 
members being unified by an agreement that points to a representative head. A constitution 
typically distributes power between the central governing authority and its members in varying 
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or equal degrees depending on the case investigated. In this manner, federalism can be 
understood in either asymmetric or symmetric terms. The former is the case that exists where 
states are granted different powers, or some possess greater autonomy than others do. This is 
often done in recognition of the existence of a distinct culture in a particular region or regions 
such as with the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, where the native inhabitants of the 
region are traditionally regarded as Uyghurs rather than Han, the former of which is of Turkic 
origin while the latter is distinct (Dillon 2004: 23 – 24). While China is not a federation, it does 
possess at least a nominal autonomous province that vivifies the aspect of distinct cultural groups 
receiving a varied degree of power separate from other provinces in the country. Russia on the 
other hand is a federation and does possess numerous autonomous provinces that feature a 
dominant regional cultural group differing from one area of the country to the other. Examples of 
autonomous provinces within Russia would be with Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Dagestan, and 
Tatarstan (Azat Khurmatullin in Dannreuther and March (eds.) 2010: 103 – 121). All 
aforementioned provinces, at least theoretically, maintain a degree of autonomy within 
boundaries set forth by the Russian Constitution and moreover possess distinct ethnic groups 
separate from the dominant Slavic one. It should be noted that while only four have been named, 
Russia holds twenty-one diverse autonomous regions. Symmetric federalism by contrast follows 
a more streamlined and simplified approach when compared to the potential complications that 
may arise from asymmetric federalism. In a symmetric understanding, all states have equal 
powers. The USA is illustrative of symmetric federalism but only when concerning the fifty 
proper states of its territory and not other territories such as Puerto Rico or Guam. Each of the 
proper states bears its own laws and regulations while ultimately being under the authority of the 
central government based in Washington, D.C. Another example of a federal union would be 
with the case study of the UAE, which is a country that is comprised of seven emirates. Each 
emirate has its own head ruler or “sheikh” that wields absolute power in the area prescribed to 
the respective emirate. Theoretically though, all emirates do fall under the final authority of the 
Abu Dhabi emirate. The formation of this federation was initiated in 1971 and concluded in 1972 
with the integration of the Ras Al Khaimah emirate into the UAE, which is the time in which 
state sovereignty is generally referenced to as solidified. 
Contrasting to the amalgam of federalism would be when a state is unitary in structure, 
which is the case in which the state is governed as a singular unit and the central government 
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reigns supreme over all administrative divisions that may exist. Any administrative divisions that 
do exist wield authority and power in the respective division only to a defined extent that the 
central government permits them to do so. With reference to the case studies Iran and Saudi 
Arabia are both unitary states alongside other world powers such as the UK, Germany, China, 
and Japan. Unitary states though are not necessarily easily defined or described when compared 
to federalist entities. For example, Saudi Arabia is a declared kingdom or absolute monarchy that 
is founded upon theocratic tenets. The King of Saudi Arabia is the head of state as well as head 
of government and has the power to act final say on all matters. In practice though much of the 
decision-making process and power is distributed between members of the royal family that are 
composed of the House of Al Saud along with their associates in addition to consultation with 
the religious establishment or ‘ulema since reasonably no singular person would be able to 
manage all the affairs of a country as large or populous as Saudi Arabia. The constitution is 
declared to be the religious book of Islam, the Qur’an, and laws are enacted through Shari’a or 
religious law gained from textual interpretation of the Qur’an. In this instance, the central 
government would be analogous to the royal family and monarchical circles of the country with 
the King as its absolute head, which can technically be regarded as the reigning singular unit. 
State sovereignty for Saudi Arabia is recognized as 1932, the date in which the current Al Saud 
family solidified its rule in the Arabian Peninsula within the political boundaries the kingdom 
currently maintains.  
Iran on the other hand is a unitary state that is more complex in structure when compared 
to Saudi Arabia. There are directly elected and non-elected bodies in the country that contribute 
to the arrangement of the central government (Figure 1.1). Elected bodies would include the 
President, Assembly of Experts, and Parliament while unelected bodies would be the Supreme 
Leader, Guardian Council, and Cabinet in addition to other posts such as those belonging to the 
military, media, Head of the Judiciary, Expediency Council, and Leaders of Friday Prayers 
(Ibid). The powers of the unelected bodies are greater than those of the elected bodies but there is 
nonetheless a central government, albeit convoluted, that deals with all affairs of the state. A 
unique feature of Iranian political structure as a unitary state would also be that there is the 
inclusion of a Supreme Leader, who has the final say on all domestic as well as international 
affairs that are concerning the country. However, in recent years there has been incidents in a 
struggle for power between the President of Iran, namely during the term of Mahmoud 
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Ahmadinejad, and the Supreme Leader as to where ultimate authority should reside. A 
constitution is in place and defines powers of the government as well as that of the Supreme 
Leader. With regards to state sovereignty, Iran is one of the oldest continuously assertive states 
in the world stretching its unified political history to the origins of the Achaemenid Empire 
founded by Cyrus the Great in 550 BC with other pre-Achaemenid Iranian dynasties and empires 
inhabiting various regions of the country such as the Elamites and Medeans. While the state itself 
had been conquered at times throughout the millennia of its existence the political boundaries in 
which Iran now exists is a direct derivative of its ancient heritage. Given that Iran was also not 
colonized by Imperial powers, placing a singular date in which Iran gained state sovereignty 
would be inaccurate and subject to intense scrutiny. 
State sovereignty can indeed be a difficult terrain to traverse given the dimensions of 
technicalities. A modern conception of state sovereignty, derived from the Age of Enlightenment 
and furthered by European political thought, would signify the inclusion of four elements: 
territory, population, authority, and recognition (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 46). Certainly a 
territory can provide a physical form or area for the state and consequentially a population to 
inhabit it, these two elements is straightforward enough. However, the latter connotations of 
authority and recognition are more complex ideas that require further investigation. With regards 
to authority, the term must be understood in a political context when evaluating state sovereignty 
and is in essence a reference to the legitimacy, ability to justify, and right of state to exercise 
power, where power is implemented through state structure.  Examples of applied authority 
would be through societal features such as a parliament, judiciary, or military. Conceptually, 
authority is given to state by the population and in contrapositive terms can similarly be 
rescinded. Of course, the latter would be more difficult to enforce should the authority of the 
state be strong and must also take into consideration state capabilities resulting from strong 
authority. For instance, in the case of the US, American citizens have reinforced legitimacy of 
the state to exercise power such as with the military or the judicial system in place. In the case of 
Libya, the population rescinded authority from the state under the Gadhafi regime and staged a 
successful revolution. 
With an understanding of authority provided, recognition remains the final element of 
review. In state terms, recognition is the case in which a sovereign state treats another entity as a 
sovereign state, where recognition can be either expressed explicitly or implied. Specific 
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terminology using “entity” would be illustrative of international relations in many different parts 
of the world such as with Russia recognizing the Abkhazian region of Georgia as a sovereign 
state, where it is in fact a province of a sovereign state recognized by majority of the 
international system
76
. Another example would be with Turkey recognizing the existence of a 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and is the only UN member state to do so. An additional 
example would be with one hundred thirty-four UN member states recognizing a State of 
Palestine with varying degrees of political boundaries. Indeed, recognition shares an intimate 
relationship with state sovereignty but at times states are subject to external sovereignty or 
overbearing hegemony when definitive authority lies in another state. Palpable examples would 
be with client states, which are states that are “economically, politically or militarily subordinate 
to another more powerful state in international affairs,” types of which include associate states, 
satellite states, puppet states, and vassal states (Fry, Goldstein, and Langhorne 2002: 9). While 
there are subtleties between the various forms of client states a unifying feature would be the 
subordination or subservience of one state to another in the international system. Vivifying 
examples would be with Manchukuo from 1932 to 1945 as an extension of Imperial Japanese 
authority or with the Kingdom of Iraq from 1941 to 1943 in which it was under the influence of 
the UK. It should be noted that the former example did not receive international recognition as a 
sovereign state but did operate in effect as a state in the time described under Imperial Japanese 
power. The latter example though did maintain sovereign state recognition in the international 
system. Both examples however illustrate nominal state sovereignty, meaning that absolute 
independence of authority from other states was not exercised. 
 Recognition of the state can also be seen in legal terms, which are additionally very 
closely tied to political ones when concerning sovereignty of the state. Constitutive theory for 
example defines a state as a person that is subject to international law if and only if it is 
recognized as sovereign by other states. While equating a state to a person may not necessarily 
be a balanced association the point is illustrative of the aforementioned Russian case with the 
Republic of Abkhazia. Declarative theory dictates that a state is a person in international law 
should there be a defined territory, permanent population, government, and capacity to enter 
relations with other states. Statehood is additionally independent of its recognition by other states 
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 As of 2014 there are six UN member states that recognize the Republic of Abkhazia, which are Nauru, Nicaragua, 
Russia, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. 
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(Ibid). However, exclusively following the conditions of declarative theory in an international 
context provides a problematic world view. According to the premises there may in fact be a 
number of states that are (technically) in existence but not recognized by any entity. Not needing 
to be member to any organisation or body that would recognize the state creates additional 
vagueness. Moreover, the notion of sovereignty was not directly or effectively addressed. 
Declarative theory though does give rise to the notions of de facto and de jure theories. In the 
case of the former, the practice of acting in actuality without necessarily having legal recognition 
to do so while the latter is concerned with the matters of law. For example, in the Caucasus, the 
Republic of Artsakh has de facto status as operating as a state although de jure there are no legal 
frameworks that provide the entity to do so.  
Taking into account the exploration conducted thus far it is implicit that the descriptions 
provided for states were for entities that emerge into the international system and/or are already 
currently existing, which leaves room for the antithesis of state extinction. In conceptual terms, 
states can be resilient entities but that does not conclude that they are eternal. States can be 
destroyed either through voluntary means such as with the dissolution of the USSR or by 
conquest such as with the Byzantine Empire by the Ottoman Turks. But, given that states are 
nonphysical entities extinction must occur on societal and judicial levels as well. In effect, the 
idea of the state must be eliminated. Should this not occur then reassertion or reapplication of the 
state may manifest. In the case of Iran, the country traces its origins to the Achaemenid Empire 
despite it being destroyed by the armies of Alexander. The groups inhabiting regions of the 
former empire re-established the idea of the state and this pattern was repeated throughout the 
various conquests in history arriving to the present-day form of Iran. What is to be gained from 
this notion is that the durability of the state can resist total extinction as is demonstrated by not 
only the case study of Iran by also by other members of the international system such as China 
and Turkey, the former of which is one of the oldest continuously assertive states in the world 
and the latter of which is a direct derivative of the Ottoman Empire. 
 Typically, the term “state” is equated with the term “country” in casual terms and does 
work with some of the general parameters described. But, when technicalities are taken into 
consideration such as with terming “sovereignty”, “independence”, and “recognition” the state 
can indeed become a much vaguer idea. For the purposes of  this research project the case studies 
of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE will be regarded as sovereign and maintain independence 
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from other authorities; meaning that no case study will be referred to or considered a client state. 
All case studies have declared sovereignty and autonomy from each other. Additionally, each 
case study recognizes the others’ boundaries although tensions do exist between Iran and the 
UAE over the Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb islands. Border insecurity between 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE is also a sensitive issue given the dominating presence of Saudi 
Arabia on the Arabian Peninsula but there are political boundaries and geographical divisions 
that are recognized by both parties to delineate state borders. 
 
Nations and Nationalism: 
 The terms “nation” and “nationalism” in everyday speech are commonly used when 
describing situations that occur in a number of academic fields including political science, 
sociology, and psychology. Given their extensive usage, it would seem as if there was a 
commonly understood meaning of the terms. Yet, when investigating such an appearance it 
proves to be a misleading observation in that there are many understandings of the terms and 
their usage consequently differs. Even within a particular academic field there is a vast range of 
paradigms that have been set forth to describe what “nation” and “nationalism” entails, all from 
different traditions of thought. Indeed, both “nation” and “nationalism” are terms that are evasive 
to denotation, especially taking into consideration the fact that individuals think differently from 
one another and therefore come to varied understandings of the terms. Moreover, it seems that a 
universally accepted definition of “nation” may not exist in part because of the political 
connotations and properties of “nationalism”, in that is one of both inclusion and omission with 
some properties deemed acceptable and therefore inclusive while others are not, which leading to 
exclusion (Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 15). 
Recognizing “nation” and “nationalism” as concepts assists in their comprehension 
because like all concepts, there are numerous perspectives and traditions of thought that explains 
their standpoints. Hence, looking into the existing paradigms that provide descriptive 
perspectives in which to view the concepts can be advantageous to understanding them further. It 
should be noted beforehand however that given the multitude of sides involved, a tumultuous 
debate has already been set in motion that has yet to reach a definite conclusion on the meanings 
of the terms; in short, there is still a lack of consensus on a commonly accepted definitions for 
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the two. Nevertheless, understanding the concepts provide assistance with the means to 
understand resource nationalism on a deeper level. 
 
Paradigms of Nationalism: 
Modernism: 
The modernist perspective will first be reviewed. It holds that nationalism as an ideology, 
social movement, and/or symbol is a relatively recent and novel innovation stemming from the 
modern period and has been created as a result of modernity (Smith 2010: 50). Of course, an 
obvious issue with such a generalized description would be that the time frame of “modern” is 
the subject of considerable disagreement (Ibid). Regardless of the temporal areas of dispute, 
modernists unanimously possess the view that the “nation” was produced from the concept of 
nationalism in an attempt to answer the perplexing political situation of where sovereignty lies 
(Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 15).  An example of modernism could be seen 
as the Unification of Germany in 1871 under Otto von Bismarck. 
 
Idealism: 
Another paradigm would be that of idealism; which is essentially the romantic spirit that 
is commonly associated with nationalism. According to the model, nationalism reasons to 
“supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government 
exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right 
organisation of a society of states,” (Kedourie 1960: 9). In this view, the notion of sovereignty is 
clearly addressed and intimately held at the heart of the claims of the paradigm. An example of 
idealism could be seen with the French Revolution. 
 
Materialism: 
The materialist paradigm proposes that nationalism is closely linked and may even be 
correlated with industrialization. The dominant view within this model is that the transition from 
an agricultural society to an industrialized one explains the emergence of conceptual terms such 
as “nation” and the ideology of nationalism. Within materialism is also the notion that 
industrialization is dependent upon the mass organisation of people who are focused around the 
state and have been transformed into a mass literate society by the regulations of the state. The 
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element of nationalism in this model is not only that the concept arises out of industrialization, 
but also that nationalism is forwarded by the centralization of people to the state and have in turn 
become educated by it, creating a continuous cycle that is able to sustain itself. An example of 
materialism could be with the USSR. 
 
Constructivism: 
The constructivist account of nationalism can be seen as the mediation and fusion of the 
materialist and idealist paradigms endorsed by the authorities of Gellner and Kedourie, 
respectively. An emphasis on the role of printed media is principal to this view. It is argued that 
the concept of “nation” rose out of a need for the communal workers that left agrarian life behind 
to fill a gap that was previously filled by a familiar understanding of rural life. Promotion of the 
nation therefore made its way into media such as with art, novels, and newspapers that were 
readily available to the public and refocused their energies on a common notion of the nation 
rather than an agrarian community (Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 17). An 
example of constructivism could be exemplified with the development of China through its 
socialistic reformation. 
 
Primordialism: 
Primordialism is idea that nations have their origins deeply rooted in ancient history. It 
stresses the importance of continuity over change, thereby endowing the nation or “national 
community” with a sense of authenticity or what it means to be a part of a particular nation. 
Language in this tradition is particularly accentuated by primordialists because of its properties 
of identifying an out-group or a separate community. Nationalism with regards to issues such as 
the notion of sovereignty or the preservation of a group’s authentic characteristics can be 
generated straightforwardly from a primordialist perspective. An example of primordialism 
would be with Nazi Germany, determining who was a “pure” German versus those that were not. 
 
Ethno-symbolism: 
Another view would be ethno-symbolism, which is a theory proposed by Anthony Smith 
who posits the view that national identities (i.e. nations) are essentially based on myths and 
memories, which is the base of nationalism that distinguishes groups of individuals from one 
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another. In this outlook, the role of the arts and humanities are regarded with particular reverence 
because students of such fields are able to fashion and at times refashion ancient and inherited 
traditions that form a national identity. Indeed, there are echoes of both primordialism and 
modernism in ethno-symbolism with regards to roles of a perceived national origin and temporal 
focus in the view, respectively. Ethno-symbolists contend that such a merging, which leads to 
their position, provides better explanations and reasoning for governmental behaviour that many 
times includes symbolic goals in national politics and policies. Instances would be the accessing 
of a national education, broadcasting and printing of media in a national language in addition to 
other emblematic engagements such as preserving historical sites (Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and 
Wolff (eds.) 2011: 19). Ethno-symbolism additionally incorporates a focus on the role of writers 
and artists in society, whose position is to shape and reshape the literature and art that generates 
nationalism (Ibid). An example of ethno-symbolism would be with Greeks and the Acropolis of 
Athens as well as the extensive literature and archaeology produced during the Greco-Persian 
Wars period. 
 Despite the numerous paradigms, each one can assist in the perception of nationalism. 
While looking through the lens of some paradigms can be more convincing or applicable than 
others, what are to be gained from the diversity are different and competing perspectives that 
delve into the conceptual dimensions of nationalism. In turn, a product can be a deeper 
understanding of not only nationalism, but its derivatives as well. 
 
The Nation: 
A debatable product of nationalism would be “the nation”. The proposal follows that 
conceptually the “nation” may not have existed without the idea of “nationalism”. In other 
words, nations may very well be the product of nationalism with the latter concept preceding the 
former. Delineation of such an argument can be seen with many areas that have been colonized 
or conquered over the span of history. Examples with respect to the case studies of the Persian 
Gulf are Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with neither countries existing prior to colonization.  Both 
lacked formal political ties to any entity or body prior to their individual establishments. Rather, 
in the case of Saudi Arabia the Al Saud tribe ended up conquering much of the territory that is 
currently the political boundaries of the country, with evidence of their authority and dominance 
moreover passed on to the name of the kingdom. With regards to the UAE, in simplified terms 
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the country was formed with the amalgamation of seven different principalities or emirates, 
which was formerly collectively known as the Trucial States of the Coast of Oman (Commins 
2012: 52) and prior to that was even in possession by Oman. 
 Indeed, viewing the nation as a product of nationalism can be a persuasive argument. 
Regardless of the conclusions on how the nation is formed, derived critical questions still remain, 
particularly, what is a nation and how is it defined? 
 In order to ascertain potential answers, it is beneficial to follow the paradigms of 
nationalism that have been set forth, which describe a setting in which the term “nation” can be 
used. Firstly, it is necessary to recognize that the world is divided into nations, each with a 
specific character and history (Smith 2010: 25). Following this would be that the nation is the 
ultimate and therefore sole source of political power (Ibid), which then leads to the notion that 
loyalty to the nation overrides all other loyalties (Ibid). Under such principles, the concept of the 
nation has been investigated and suppositions on its properties have been drawn. For example, 
David Miller defines the nation or “nationality” under five criteria. The first would be that, 
“nations are a community that are constituted by a shared belief and mutual commitment,” 
(Miller 1995: 27). Moreover, nations are extended in history and are active in character being 
committed or attached to a particular territory (Ibid). Finally, the nation is marked off from other 
communities through a distinct public culture (Ibid). According to Miller, should any group fall 
under and fulfil such criteria, they can very well be regarded as a nation. Yet, Smith defines a 
nation as, “a named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common 
myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all 
members,” (Smith 2010: 13).  
For the purposes of this project, I will adopt for the most part the definition of “nation” 
proposed by Smith given its neutrality, objectivity, and applicability to the project. The only 
potential issue with the definition proposed by Smith is “homeland”, which is a conceptual term 
that has connotations of its own and can arguably be a concept that does not have any empirical 
basis; meaning that “homeland” only exists in the theoretical realm and the psychology of people 
while having no inherent tangibility and therefore lacks empiricism. To the credit of Smith, he 
specifies that homeland is perceived, yet the definition can be modified to instead have the 
understanding that a human community can be residing in a territory that is perceived as their 
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own. Nonetheless, Smith provides a crafted definition that has commonalities with other 
explanations that have been provided for the concept of nationhood. 
 
Homogeneity in Nations in Utilizing Nationalism as an Ideology: 
 Nationalism as it has been described thus far provides it to be utilized as an ideology 
within a state. After all, it places the nation at the epicentre of its concerns and seeks to promote 
its welfare, which in turn can be beneficial to the state should a nation be at the heart of it. The 
general goals of nationalistic philosophy are to endorse and uphold a sense of national autonomy 
which addresses the notion of sovereignty, to sanction unity within the nation, and to support an 
identity as a nation. Given the diversity of paradigms used to illustrate nationalism, there must 
also be numerous features that make it possible to view it from so many different angles with 
separate focuses on its attributions. Some of these aspects can directly influence and/or impact 
the homogeneity of the state as well as nation.  
 Language as a nationalistic feature has commonly been cited as a major factor that can 
affect homogeneity. Political stability as well as societal cohesiveness are just two of the many 
elements that can be affected depending on the treatment of language. The former constituent of 
political stability can be influenced for example in a case in which a practice of linguistic 
homogeneity is in place. Linguistic minorities consequently are not likely to equally coexist in 
such a system should that community desire to participate in and benefit from the fullest 
potential of society. Linguistic assimilation therefore seems to be the only way to ensure equality 
and such a practice may not be accepted entirely by members of a linguistic minority 
background, who may protest conformity to linguistic sameness on grounds that a distinguishing 
characteristic of theirs is being tampered with and arguably being at least passively extinguished. 
In this vein, the latter constituent of societal cohesiveness can be affected since the entire 
population may not be satisfied with having a common language that is not held by all people of 
society in the same regard; meaning not every individual has the accepted common language as 
their first. Discontent naturally derives from dissatisfaction and does have the potential to affect 
the maximization of societal harmony. Further, it can be debated that the proper function of 
representative institutions cannot be achieved under a same-language practice or policy because 
the “representative” elements of society are not in fact indicative of the entire sample that entails 
the exclusion of linguistic minorities. There is also the take that every language provides a 
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particular and therefore distinct manner of thought. Hence, what is understood or expressed in 
one language can never be entirely perceived or articulated in the same way in another language 
(Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 21). For such a reason accurate communal 
understanding and the development of a unified community is only truly able to be achieved by 
the native speakers of the public language. This would be because of the linguistic restrictions 
and circumstances that prevent cross-communication that provides mutual understanding and 
sympathy between groups (Ibid). However, one of the many functions and purposes of language 
is to communicate not only within a particular group or nation but attempt to do so with others as 
well that reach far beyond the circles of the in-group. 
The use of language in a nationalistic context has implications which can extend deep 
into society and penetrate the core of each individual. Whether nationalism as a concept is 
relatively new or not is irrelevant, it can be agreed that there is a process of formation and 
growth within nations, which is inclusive of a sentiment of belonging to one. An example of 
language being used in a nationalistic setting would be with Pan-Arab rhetoric endorsed by 
Gamal Abdel-Nasser throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Language in this period was used to 
passively and actively exclude people from the Egyptian nation. Namely, Coptic Egyptians were 
directly targeted and deemed as being an out-group category that did not fit the newfound ideals 
of the Egyptian nation. While all communities inhabiting Egypt did adhere to Arabic as a 
primary language, the existence of a Coptic language in the Coptic Orthodox Church of 
Alexandria created a feature in which a distinct nation could be formed that was separate from 
other in-group Egyptians that did not possess a Coptic language element. A sense of belonging to 
mainstream Egyptian nationalism during this period on behalf of Copts was consequently 
confusing in that while many Copts were nationalistic to Egypt despite the aggressive targeting 
from Nasser, the sense of belonging was tainted given that Copts were no longer viewed as 
Egyptians of equal status at best.  
Indeed, language coupled with the social and political dimensions of nationalism can 
contribute to a sense of belonging. When concerning homogeneity it is unquestionable that 
nations can be greatly influenced by nationalism. Language is certainly an important element to 
address therefore as well. Homogeneity is the element that binds nations together and provides 
reflexive reinforcement to nationalism. Given the diversity of paradigms, understandings, and 
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interpretations of nationalism and the nation, it is an obvious issue to resolve as it is a significant 
factor that gives rise to the prosperity of nationalism. 
 
Nations and Nationalism with Respect to Resource Nationalism: 
 Yet, with regards to resource nationalism how can the paradigms of nationalism and the 
notion of the nation assist in understanding the case studies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE? 
At the moment it seems that there is an evident examination of theory but a lack of illustration 
with the case studies. 
 As far as nationalism is generally concerned, host countries do not want foreign 
companies or IOCs having ownership of the natural resources within their boundaries since they 
would prefer to own it themselves, which is a prime reason for utilizing resource nationalism. 
Basically, when concerning the theme of hydrocarbons states prefer to have ownership of 
reserves located in their own country rather than have a foreign company or IOC assert control 
and ownership. Consequently, nationalism is generated in one sense because the population can 
see the foreign companies and IOCs as “invaders” that are attempting to “own” them. Hence, 
resource nationalism deriving from nationalism out of a perceived defence can be used as an 
analogy to war. The traditional method of taxing and the payment of royalties or PSAs under 
resource nationalism become nullified and no longer apply. PSAs contractually grant the 
contractor or hydrocarbon company control over the reserves. Naturally, host governments prefer 
to have direct access to what is seen as their own monies and choose to negate the application of 
PSAs through methods such as utilizing resource nationalism. Foreign companies obviously do 
not want such agreements to be nullified since it would signify that exclusive access to reserves 
are not necessarily granted anymore and are under the control of another body as is commonly 
exercised with NOCs. Indeed, larger more influential companies have been increasingly been 
brought to compromise. This is especially the case with natural resources such as oil and gas 
because they are coveted materials that will only rise in price as they are scarce. Therefore, 
competition will only increase for access to the resources, which means that foreign companies 
and IOCs do not at the moment have much negotiating space or power. The role of the nation 
with resource nationalism would be that the component of population would be fulfilled by the 
named human community (or communities) that have commonalities of myths, history, public 
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culture, laws, and customs that resides in a specific area in which resource nationalism is able to 
be claimed. 
In short, with reference to the paradigms of nationalism, any model can be taken and used 
for the purposes of gathering an additional perspective or different take on the matter and with 
regards to the nation, holding a consistent definition in line with nationalism is key. Ultimately, 
with regards to “nation” and “nationalism” the conceptual terms are reliant off of the author or 
debater, who set their terms and conditions. By extension, the constructor also sets the criteria for 
national membership. Regardless of whichever way nation and nationalism are constructed, the 
influence they have with resource nationalism is clear and evident.  
 
Ethnicity: 
However, “nation” and “nationalism” are not the only conceptual terms that influence the 
frame of resource nationalism. Although superficially similar to “nation” in its definition, 
“ethnicity” holds an entirely different weight and is a very different concept, which consequently 
carries divergent political connotations. There are many manners in which to comprehend 
ethnicity as a concept. One understanding of ethnicity would be that, “a group is an ethnic group 
if its members share the following traits: a common name, a believed common descent, elements 
of a shared culture (most often language or religion), common historical memories, and 
attachment to a particular territory,” (Kaufman in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 92). Following 
the proposed understanding would be that while there is an attachment to a particular territory, 
the community does not need to be in physical possession of the land or historic territory. 
“Attachment” can also signify that inhabiting a territory is not necessary either, as is the case of 
communities that are permanently migratory.  An example would be with nomadic Turkic 
communities that inhabit Central Asia. Another example would be with diaspora communities 
and IDPs. 
When contrasted to the concept of the nation there are noticeable omissions for why a 
nation is not an ethnic community. This is due to the fact that despite some overlapping of 
commonalities, such as with collective cultural identities, the ethnic community usually does not 
possess political referents (Smith 2010: 12 – 13). In many cases, there is also a lack of public 
culture (Ibid). Additionally, the ethnic community does not need to be in physical possession of a 
historic territory (Ibid). The nation though, “must reside in a perceived homeland of its own, at 
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least for a long period of time, in order to constitute itself as a nation; and to aspire to nationhood 
and be recognized as a nation, it also needs to evolve a public culture and desire some degree of 
self-determination,” (Ibid). According to the contrapositive, recognition of ethnicity does not 
necessarily need a public culture to be evolved and there also does not need to necessarily be a 
degree of self-determination. 
 
Paradigms of Ethnicity: 
Primordialism: 
Another understanding of ethnicity would be with primordialism. “Nation” is often 
confused with “ethnicity” in the primordial nationalist model, in which membership to the nation 
is determined through natural and innate characteristics that cannot ever be changed even by 
instruction or absolute assimilation (Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 22 – 23). 
With regards to ethnicity however, primordialism holds that ethnicity has always existed and that 
ethnic groups that are seen today are modern derivations of historical groups that existed in the 
past. Hence, the closeness of relationship between ethnicity and nation for primordialists are 
apparent. 
Primordialism can be understood in several different manners. Essentialist primordialism 
for example holds that ethnicity is a fact that is assumed before human existence, or a priori, 
meaning that ethnicity precedes human social interaction and that ethnicity is unchanged by 
human social interaction (Smith 1999: 13).  Ethnic groups are viewed as more than historical, 
they are viewed are naturally occurring (Ibid). However, based on the premises of essentialist 
primordialism there is no explanation provided for ethnicities seemingly appearing, disappearing, 
and sometimes reappearing throughout history. An example would be with the Scythians that 
were existent at a point of time in history but are currently regarded as an extinct ethnic group. 
There are also fallacies with addressing human continuity and interaction such as intermarriage 
between groups, migration, and colonization for multi-ethnic societies (Smith 1999: 13). The 
case in which new ethnic groups emerge as derivations from other pre-existing ethnic groups 
cannot also be addressed through essentialist primordialism. 
Kinship primordialism is another manner in which primordialism can be understood and 
holds that ethnic communities are extensions of kinship units (Ibid). Cultural signals such as 
language, religion, or customs were signs of demonstrating biological affinity with common kin 
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(Ibid). Myths of common biological ancestry, which are pivotal to ethnicity, are understood as 
denotations of biological history (Ibid). An example would be with the Jews and the Arabs citing 
common biological ancestry through Abraham. Of course, origin myths can be purely 
fabrication, which means that some ethnic groups can have a contradictory biological history to 
their associated ethnic community (Ibid). In this vein, one of the many problems with this view 
would be that other ethnic communities being co-opted into a greater dominant group cannot be 
successfully addressed. An example would be with the Mongols co-opting other rival 
communities into their group while all sharing a common origin myth of being biologically 
derived from Genghis Khan. 
Geertz primordialism endorses the view that humans by enlarge attribute power to 
primordial human traits or “givens” such as biology, language, territory, and culture (Ibid). The 
view asserts that ethnicity is not primordial in itself but that many believe that it is due to their 
experiences with the world (Ibid). Geertz proposes a perspective through that is largely 
observational and can therefore have alternative interpretations. Furthermore, the assumptions 
and premises of primordialism have been carried over.  
Primordialism as a notion is inherently exclusive in its construction given that an 
individual is not allowed to determine their nation but rather that the nation determines the 
individual (Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 22 – 23). An example would be the 
Parsis in India. In order to be part to the nation of Parsis, one must be born into the group from 
two parents that have been determined to be members of the community as well. While there are 
instances in which one parent may be an individual from a community separate from the Parsis 
and their children may be regarded as a part of the greater Parsi community, in order to be a bona 
fide member to the nation one must have lineage of both parents being Parsis. There are 
significant flaws, contradictions, and shortcomings with the concept and the varied manners of 
its understandings. Yet, it should be noted that despite such faults there are societies and 
countries that do conform to some form of an idea of primordialism. It is not however the only 
frame in which ethnicity can be understood. 
  
Perennialism: 
 An additional manner of understanding ethnicity would be with perennialism. According 
to this approach, nations and ethnicity are regarded essentially the same phenomenon. 
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Perennialism is more concerned with nationhood than ethnicity though and holds that the nation 
as a type of social and/or political organisation that is of long-established or perennial character 
(Smith 1999: 159). Following this understanding would be several variants of thought. 
The first variant would be perpetual or continuous perennialism, which asserts that there 
are specific ethnic groups that have existed continuously throughout history (Ibid: 5). Another 
view would be recurrent or situational perennialism, which is concerned with ethnic group 
formation, change, and disappearance throughout history (Ibid). Ethnicity in this respect is 
viewed as a tool that is used by political bodies to politically manoeuvre resources to favour the 
interests of their particular group. Tangentially relating to situational perennialism as far as a 
functional sense is concerned would be instrumentalist perennialism, which explains ethnicity as 
a means for the hierarchical stratification of individuals in society. In this manner, ethnicity is 
not simply a tool but a versatile one that assists in the structure of societies. A difference between 
situational and instrumentalist perennialism would be that the former holds ethnicity as a tool 
that is used by political bodies while the latter holds that ethnicity is an organisational tool but 
does not necessarily need to relate to a political environment. 
 
Constructivism: 
The constructivist view holds that both primordialism and perennialism are 
fundamentally flawed. Constructivism rather endorses that ethnic groups are only products of 
human social interaction and are maintained only as social constructs. Modernist constructivism 
endorse that the emergence of ethnicity is positively correlated with a movement towards an 
understanding of nation-states (Smith 1999: 4 – 7). Ethnicity, nations, and nationalism are held 
as modern creations and did not appear throughout all periods of history. Accordingly, ethnic 
homogeneity was not considered a necessary component for the creation of large, unified 
societies. However, it can certainly be argued at varied points in history that the modernist 
approach is incorrect in that it ignores many parts of human history such as with the creation of 
the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire or the Iranian moves for independence and the removal of 
perceived foreign occupation throughout its history. Indeed, taking into consideration such 
events would nullify the claim of ethnicity being only a modern invention that never existed 
prior to the movement towards nation-states. However, when regarding ethnicity as an invention, 
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it is not necessarily wrong to make such an assertion in that it is certainly something that is 
constructed. 
 
Homogeneity and Harmony in Utilizing Ethnicity: 
 When concerning ethnicity and ethnic communities there are a number of terms that are 
commonly used in describing what ethnicity is. People, human, stock, and breed are such 
examples and are used with the intent of referring to something like “people” with the exception 
of a less commonly used word of “genos”, which is used more so along the ideas of “nation” 
(Fenton 2009: 15 – 16). The term was carried into Latin and then English where it took the form 
of “genus” and has been consequently been used in science to distinguish between different 
categories such as “stock, race, and kind” (Ibid). While science has used “genus” to denote many 
things aside from people, such as distinguishing between different varieties of species within the 
plant kingdom, the word appears as a prefix to the word “genocide” that is understood as,  “a 
deliberate extermination of an ethnic or national group” (Ibid). Usage of “genocide” as a term 
instead of “ethnocide” highlights an unresolved difficulty in defining ethnicity. Indeed, a 
consensus on “ethnicity” must be reached in order to understand its prefixed form of “ethno-” in 
conjunction with the suffix “-cide”. Even the term “ethnos” has been used inconsistently 
throughout history, such as its referencing to initially signify other people that spoke different 
languages or lived in different countries to the context of individuals being non-member to the 
Jewish or Christian faiths (Ibid). Therefore, in addition to conceptual complications of agreement 
there is also a temporal factor. 
 Such impediments are illustrative of some of the copious sensitivities in utilizing 
ethnicity, which in turn affects the definition of ethnic conflict. Certainly, there is at least a 
superficial understanding of what ethnic conflict is, which is when competing groups engage in a 
struggle. Arriving to such a stage though and delving deeper into the philosophies of what 
constitutes ethnic conflict to have the act established is tied with the genos and ethnos. 
Technicalities aside, multi-ethnic existence within a state that conforms to uniformity is a model 
that tends to be more hostile towards ethnic minorities given the potential for discrimination 
(Jackson-Peerce in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 22 – 23). Therefore, although there may be 
freedom within the state for ethnic minorities to practice and develop distinctness, there may also 
be a path towards the erosion of ethnic minority identities that is paved with an ideology that 
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does not facilitate homogeneity or harmony (Ibid). That is not to say that multi-ethnic 
coexistence is impossible or that all systems with ethnic minorities are inherently inclined to 
disregarding them but rather that a degree of attention should be given. 
 
Notion of the ethnie: 
The ethnie shares much in common with the nation but lacks the crucial element of 
having a sense of self-governance (Fenton 2009: 52). In this logic, if the ethnic group or ethnie 
wishes to practice self-governance then the entity would need to be labelled a nation (Ibid). 
However, a point to observe would be that many states are multi-ethnic in composition, which 
demonstrates that the state and nation are not always equated (Ibid). In the case of multi-ethnic 
states, the possibility can exist for smaller ethnic entities to move towards autonomous 
governance (Ibid). After all, the ethnie are only a small feature away from nationhood. 
Therefore, a potential solution that could promote harmony in a society utilizing ethnicity or 
ethnie as an ideological facet of society would be for the nation to loosely understand ethnicity 
and to stress the civic element rather than the ethnic one to develop the idea of a civic nation 
(Ibid). The “civic” element holds that people are “defined as citizens with legal status rather than 
as a people who share ancestry and origins” (Ibid). Many states in the international system 
conform to a civic nation formulation. One state though that emphasizes the ethnic element over 
the civic would be Israel, which has been described as an “explicitly ethnic nation” (Ibid) despite 
its multi-ethnic composition given its ideological foundations. While it can be argued that the 
civic is a contrary element to nationalistic sentiments promoting ethnic origins of people (Ibid), 
within the civic nation there is room for a reinvention, reinterpretation and revision; for example, 
with origin myths or historical sites under ethno-symbolism. 
 
Ethnicity versus Race: 
At this point, a distinction between ethnicity and race must be clarified. The terms are not 
interchangeable (Gilligan in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 79). Fenton has described that the 
terms “ethnic group”, “race”, and “nation”, while subtly different from each other share a 
common core, which is the idea of descent or ancestry (Ibid: 80). Fenton also elaborates that 
ethnicity, race, and nation are a series of discourses that are attuned to the historical demands of 
specific countries, regions, and internal social as well as politics dynamics (Fenton 2009: 49). 
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Such demands include the search for dominance over others. In the USA, the definitions of terms 
were across physical features and were central to the development of the country since its 
inception (Ibid). Native Americans and Africans were markedly different in appearance than the 
European descent settlers. Hence, “race” refers to the descent and culture communities that 
possess, “the idea that ‘local’ groups are instances of abstractly conceived divisions of 
humankind and that the idea that race makes explicit reference to physical or ‘visible’ differences 
as the primary marker of difference and inequality,” (Ibid: 22). 
In the sciences, academics and practitioners had incorrectly asserted through observation 
that individuals from different parts of the world look physically different from each other 
because humankind is divided into biologically distinct groups or races (Gilligan in Cordell and 
Wolff (eds.) 2011: 85). However, it has been determined that not only is there greater genetic 
variation within a given human population than between two different populations but that 
boundaries that were arbitrarily constructed and that there were no such determinations made by 
nature (Ibid). Hence, races do not exist in any biological sense and they are even more 
pronounced as being at best social constructs. “Race” just like “ethnicity” was created and 
reproduced in the human mind and not through biology. Race takes characteristics of physical 
characteristics rather than ethnicity though, which is an important feature to note in order to 
distinguish the two. 
 
Influential Factors and Features of Ethnicity: 
 Within ethnicity, there are features that hold a significant role in influencing the concept 
and consequentially the framework of resource nationalism. Some of the elements would be 
groups, migration, indigeneity, religion, and identity; with all directly affecting the case studies. 
Many of the facets can also dualistically apply to the nation, but can be regarded as more fitting 
within ethnicity. 
 
Groups: 
 A noticeable factor to briefly mention would be groups, which can be defined in a 
pluralistic sense in that a group would be three or more individuals that adhere to a particular 
psychological and social construct. Groups are durable and very real only insofar as the 
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psychology and social senses are confirmed. Groups cease to be real once such activities are 
stopped but can be resurrected at another time. 
 
Migration: 
 Another factor would be migration, which has been described as “a primary social 
context for the formation of ethnic identities,” (Fenton 2009: 115) and is often referenced in 
groups. In this sense, the impact of migration must certainly not be undermined. After 1815 there 
was an era of voluntary mass migration that over 90.5 million people shifted around all 
inhabitable continents (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 23). With the advent of modern transportation 
technology and globalization, more countries than ever before have participated in migrations 
and even in relatively settled communities, there can be a commutation between a new country 
and a base country that contributes to the rise of transnational communities and transnational 
transfers (Fenton 2009: 117 – 118). Indeed, in the Persian Gulf region, migrations between the 
Arabian Peninsula and Iranian Plateau across the waterway and via the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers have been occurring for millennia. The Middle East has been described as accounting for 
“more than 10 percent of the world’s total migrants and the oil-rich countries of the Arab Gulf 
have the highest concentration of migrant workers in the world,” (Calandruccio 2005: 268). The 
new paradigm of temporary and circular migration (Martin and Martin 2006) is exemplified in 
the region. Typically, migrants to the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf have “no expectations of 
permanent settlement or citizenship rights” (Ibid), despite forming a sizeable portion of the 
population (Fenton 2009: 119). Certainly, questions of integration and citizenship are just two of 
the numerous issues produced by migration. With modern migration, the state is a centripetal 
actor (Ibid: 124 – 125). The state regulates migration and has a role in determining the status of 
immigrants as well as minorities, which is also inclusive of migratory issues like citizenship 
(Ibid). Ethnicity is influenced by activities of the state, and shaping the identity of migrant 
communities can be one of its functions. The importance of migrant community identities would 
be with the survival, continuation, merging, or domination of an ethnic group with another; there 
is also the dimension of inhabitancy such as becoming a permanent settlement versus a transient 
one (Ibid: 125). This feature is undoubtedly applicable to the case studies of the Persian Gulf 
with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all dealing with migration and migratory communities in 
their respective histories. 
90 
 
 
Indigeneity: 
Tying into previously referenced features of ethnicity would be the notion of indigeneity. 
The definition of what is “indigenous” can indeed prove to be just as vague as the paradigms of 
ethnicity in that there is no universal consensus on describing the term. Rather, it is important to 
assert that indigeneity is socially constructed, which also entails that it can be reconstructed. For 
example, in South America indigeneity is often described as a characteristic possessed by the 
descendants of inhabitants that were subjugated by the colonial powers of Portugal and Spain 
(Sawyer and Gomez in Sawyer and Gomez 2012: 17 – 19). Since colonialism, postcolonial and 
commercial forces have attempted to assert control over indigenous peoples through social, 
political, and economic forms as well as seeking to convert, civilize, and modernize the lifestyles 
practiced by the inhabitants while exploiting the resources within the land (Ibid). Such an 
understanding of indigeneity has been recognized by many countries in the continent, including 
Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. Therefore, it can be demonstrated that recognition holds 
a vital role in the social construction of indigeneity and exemplifies that the feature is socially 
fabricated. There are also geographic and historical parameters to consider given that regions can 
vary dramatically from one another. Nonetheless, indigeneity is commonly used in conjunction 
with ethno-symbolism in an attempt to establish the “earliest”, “original”, and therefore 
“authentic” members of a particular group to a certain area. In resource extractions, indigeneity 
becomes of strategic importance to the ethno-symbolist concerning rights to the properties. 
 
Religion: 
One of the more sensitive features of ethnicity would be that of religion. Smith had 
defined ethnicity as involving each of the following six features: a common name, a myth of 
common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of common culture, a link with a 
homeland, a sense of solidarity (Smith 1986: 21 – 31). Under this frame, religion may fall under 
the common culture aspect that partially constitutes the ethnie; but this may not address the 
territorial as well as descent-related emphases (Ruane and Todd in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 
2011: 68 – 69). However, when investigating the Copts of Egypt, there are territorial as well as 
descent-related emphases. Indeed, there are many examples in which ethnicity and religion are 
used synonymously. Jews and Sikhs for instance are simultaneously ethnic and religious groups. 
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In this vein, there should be a distinction between interchangeability and ethnic religions, which 
in this respect would not only be Judaism and Sikhism but also be inclusive of others such as 
Hinduism, Shintoism, and Nuristani polytheism, which are contrasted to universalistic religions 
commonly referenced with Christianity and Islam (Ibid: 69). Tensions can arise with religion as 
those adhering to a particular set of beliefs as being a part of an out-group. Indeed, ethnic 
tensions can be featured with religion at the core. Dimensions such as conversion can further 
complicate matters (Ibid: 67). At times, religion can become very closely linked to politics. For 
instance, ethno-territorial claims made by Palestinians took larger and stronger religious 
connotations to garner further support for their cause (Ibid: 70). Tensions may be exploited in 
radicalism but could also comfortably coexist, reinforcing national origin myths, values, and 
ideologies informed by religious ideas (Smith 2003: 166 – 217). Religion can also prove to be 
malleable, shaped and formed to accommodate needs. Hence, religion from the aforementioned 
description is best described as a feature of ethnicity and while it does not necessarily constitute 
an ethnicity in itself, it sometimes can, but quite often is not the pivotal factor that determines 
ethnicity. Between the case studies, the sects of religion become particularly evident. 
 
Language: 
A commonly cited distinguishing feature between ethnic groups has been language. It has 
been labelled as a determinant for discerning ethnicity, but this view is irresponsible as it could 
very well be the case that an ethnic group could speak a variety of languages. Multilingualism 
can be seen in many countries with Kazakhstan, Russia, Switzerland, and Uzbekistan as 
examples. An aspect of language to note though would be with favourability and to members of 
a particular linguistic group. Once favourability has been established and it reaches a 
governmental state, perceived group threat theory begins to become relevant as at least one 
group may feel pressured since their respective linguistic group has not been treated equally. 
 
Identity: 
A final feature of ethnicity to cover would also be that which can be described is an 
underlying factor for other features already mentioned, which is identity. There is impressive 
psychological weight placed on this element given that it is determined by the inclinations of an 
individual. For example, in the USA there are a number of individuals that identify with Latin 
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America despite being in the USA and never seeing any site in Latin America. Hence, identities 
are not only socially constructed with psychological elements but also extremely powerful and 
complex as well. Identities can vary from group to group, subgroup to subgroup, and individual 
to individual (Ruane and Todd in Cordell and Wolff 2011: 69). Taking into consideration the 
multitude of ways that an individual would be able to identify themselves is crucial to 
understanding the Persian Gulf. In the littoral, it is not uncommon for members of a country to 
identify with a religion, sect of religion, language, and group. This multi-layered composition 
alone illustrates how diverse the area can be. Noting the fact that there are shift in identities, such 
as with a change in beliefs or other situation, demonstrate the unstructured and vagueness 
encountered when addressing identity. One argument would be that the ethnic identity is 
instrumental above all else, which does work to a degree but is again not entirely justifying all 
the complexities associated with the feature (Kaufman in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 92). 
The degree to which individuals form their ethnic identities for example is one of the difficulties 
(Ibid). Needless to mention, the parameters in which people form ethnic identities can lead to 
tensions on intrastate and interstate levels. 
 
Unequivocal Terminology and Vagueness Clarified: 
 From the terminology reviewed it is apparent that none of the terms of state, nation, 
nationalism, ethnicity, and race are equivalent. In order to proceed consistently with the project, 
a distinction must be made between the terms though and usage must be clarified. 
The state can be straightforwardly addressed in that it can be associated with “country”. 
While technicalities of the term in its philosophical elucidation may conflict with the likening, 
there will not be a conflict encountered in this project with such usage. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
the UAE will be regarded as sovereign and maintain independence from other authorities; 
meaning that no case study will be referred to or considered a client state. All case studies have 
declared sovereignty and autonomy from each other. Additionally, each case study recognizes 
the others’ boundaries although tensions do exist between Iran and the UAE over the Abu Musa, 
Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb islands. Border insecurity between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is 
also a sensitive issue given the dominating presence of Saudi Arabia on the Arabian Peninsula 
but there are political boundaries and geographical divisions that are recognized by both parties 
to delineate state borders. 
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I will also adopt for the most part the definition of “nation” proposed by Smith given its 
neutrality, objectivity, and applicability to the project. He has defined a nation as, “a named 
human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a shared 
history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members,” (Smith 2010: 
13). The only potential issue with the definition proposed by Smith is “homeland”, which is a 
conceptual term that has connotations of its own and can arguably be a concept that does not 
have any empirical basis; meaning that “homeland” only exists in the theoretical realm and the 
psychology of people while having no inherent tangibility and therefore lacks empiricism. To the 
credit of Smith, he specifies that homeland is perceived, yet the definition can be modified to 
instead have the understanding that a human community can be residing in a territory that is 
perceived as their own. Nonetheless, Smith provides a crafted definition that has commonalities 
with other explanations that have been provided for the concept of nationhood. In this vein, the 
paradigms of nationalism will be used and depend on the case study for usage. 
Ethnicity will be understood from Smith as well given its neutrality, objectivity, and 
applicability to the project, which would also keep in consistency. The definition of ethnicity 
proposed would be, “a group is an ethnic group if its members share the following traits: a 
common name, a believed common descent, elements of a shared culture (most often language or 
religion), common historical memories, and attachment to a particular territory,” (Kaufman in 
Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 92). 
 Given the closeness of relation between ethnicity and nation even with the definitions of 
Smith being used, usage of “nation” will be more so with the political referent whereas 
“ethnicity” will not. However, it could be applicable at times to use the term “nation” in place of 
“ethnicity”, but this again will be evident in context. The term “race” will not be used in this 
project as it is inapplicable to the region given that phenotypes across the Persian Gulf are not 
indicators of belonging to a particular ethnic group or nation and moreover cannot be readily 
discerned in all scenarios. 
 
The National and Ethnic Components of Resource Nationalism: 
The national and ethnic components to resource nationalism are of vital importance to the 
vivification of the framework and should be reviewed with applicability to the case studies. 
Indeed, the basis for tensions can be difficult to comprehend without and understanding of why 
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there would be a rise for strains to occur. Three integral drivers will hence be covered that are 
rooted in the national and ethnic components of the framework. 
 
Competition: 
 The first element to be covered would be that of competition. Humankind has long been 
in contest for access to resources and this can be viewed as one of the core drivers for tensions. 
Barthian emphasis denotes that socially constructed boundaries through which ethnic groups 
ascribe difference determine a mode in which competition is set (Fenton 2009: 93). In 
environments such as the workplace, boundaries such as “white”, “black”, “Asian”, and 
“Hispanic” become mechanisms in which there is reinforcement (Ibid). Competition theory 
builds on ethnicity, which can noticeably be observed in a competition model. For example, 
Group A can perceive competition with Group B as a threat and develop antagonism towards 
Group B can as a result (Ibid: 113). Hence, prejudice and antipathy between groups should be 
recognized as a natural occurrence. Within the case studies given that there are a number of 
ethnic groups, there will subsequently be expectations of tensions as well.  
 
Conflict: 
 An additional element to be mentioned would be that of conflict, which in many respects 
can be seen as an amplification or result of competition. Ethnic conflicts in particular are very 
real and tangible contests, such as over the status of holy sites in Jerusalem, and are often 
stemmed from the manner in which individuals define their identities rather than a desire for 
materialism (Kaufman in Cordell and Wolff (eds.) 2011: 91). A conflict is ethnic though “only if 
all the sides if all the sides involved are distinguished primarily on the basis of ethnicity. Often 
one or both sides in an ethnic conflict will be a coalition of ethnic groups, rather than a single 
one, but the conflict is still ethnic because the people involved choose sides on the basis of their 
ethnic group membership, rather than other considerations such as economic interests,” (Ibid: 
93). In ethnically diverse societies, it is often the case that conflict over economics is equated 
with ethnic issues, especially when there is a disparity between populations and one group 
outnumbers another (Ibid: 95). 
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Civil War: 
 An extreme result of competition and conflict would be civil war, which is encapsulating 
of widespread violence and is an amplification of conflict. Such a result is visible throughout the 
world, such as with the Middle East in Syria, North Africa with Libya, Sub-Saharan Africa with 
the DRC and South Sudan, as well as Europe such as the case in Cyprus. 
 
Resource Nationalism versus Resource Nationalization: 
 With the concepts of the state, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity covered, a brief but 
important distinguishing must be made between nationalization and nationalism that has 
implications for the project framework. Nationalism, given its close relationship and sometimes 
interchangeability
77
 with nation, operates intimately with the nation. Logic dictates that 
nationalization therefore must also operate intimately with the nation as well though, so there 
must not be a real or significant difference between the two. However, this is not the case upon 
closer inspection. This would be due to the fact when “nationalism” or “nationalization” are 
coupled with the prefix of “resource”, the understanding changes in that resource nationalism is 
encapsulating more so of other components, namely the state and ethnicity, while resource 
nationalization is more exclusive to its relationship with the state. For instance, should a 
procedure of resource nationalization occur, this would be with specific reference to a state 
implementing a policy of nationalizing resources; which in political terms is more referring to 
the state than nations, nationalism, and ethnicity. This is not to say that resource nationalization 
does not have impact or consideration for the other concepts but that resource nationalism 
instead is more so appropriate for dealing with all four components. Naturally, the state can 
likewise implement a policy of resource nationalism but similar to how there are subtle 
differences and sometimes none between nation and ethnicity, resource nationalism and resource 
nationalization at times share common functions but also operate on preferred levels in which 
one would be more appropriate than the other. 
 An interesting implication for resource nationalization versus resource nationalism on a 
international geopolitical scale would be that if a country such as Iran, which is under 
international sanctions, undertakes a policy of resource nationalism instead of resource 
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 Anthony Smith has used nationalism and nation interchangeably given his view that the two share a symbiotic 
relationship (2012: 12 – 13). 
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nationalization and there is a ban on the importing of Iranian oil it begs the question as to 
whether the well-being of a nation is being sanctioned rather than the state economy. Meaning, 
sanctions are intended to punish a state and not necessarily a nation for a particular action, set of 
actions, and/or behaviour. Indeed, Iran may not be the only case in which this may occur and 
there can even be cases in which the state is not necessarily wholly targeted but rather only a 
particular sector of the state economy. It should be mentioned that while there are specific 
sanctions targeting the Iranian energy sector, particularly with oil and gas, there are also other 
sanctions against the country such as exporting arms and obtaining technology that could be used 
for the production of weapons of mass destruction. There is certainly space for moral 
connotations and debate to surround issues like sanctioning a nation versus a state in terms of 
resource nationalism versus resource nationalization; however, this will not be addressed in the 
project. 
 
Gauging Resource Nationalism: 
From the components of resource nationalism being thoroughly evaluated a helpful 
viewpoint on assessing the usage of the framework can be now addressed. With respect to case 
studies, resource nationalism can be seen as a scale with four areas of stress; those being the 
state, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity (Figure 2.1). Each of these areas acts as a type of weight 
on the scale given the fact that no two usages or interpretations of the framework will be the 
same, meaning values are placed differently on separate areas of the scale. Indeed, it will be 
demonstrated that some cases will stress more emphasis on the state, others ethnicity, and others 
nation as well as nationalism. The framework may appear as seemingly rudimentary given its 
basic understanding, however it is in fact extremely powerful and increasingly complex with 
implications that have the potential to affect sectors and entities well beyond its initial 
application. Consequently, an investigation may become convoluted to comprehend its 
intricacies. At this point, it should be mentioned that there is no balance ever experienced in the 
scale. Rather, it is a shifting set of values that can be adjusted accordingly to a situation such as 
short term versus long term alterations to the emphases on the weights. The purpose of the scale 
perspective on assessing resource nationalism would simply be for providing an understandable 
step in comprehending the complexities of the framework usage in case studies. While it is not 
necessary to utilize such a view to understand the framework, it will be touched upon in this 
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project with the case studies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to make the study more 
intelligible to a wider audience. 
 
Conclusion: 
Resource nationalism is a single multidimensional framework that is applicable to 
numerous case studies that extend far beyond the ones selected for this project. However, in 
order to understand it, there are layers of components that must be addressed and defined in 
order to keep it structured and logically consistent. Vague definitions, ambiguity, and the 
slippery slope inclination of concepts such as the state, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity are 
issues that must be resolved before investigating the framework with any case study. The term 
“nation-state” for example will not be used given that the word is an amalgamation of two 
separate concepts that have already been defined for the project and moreover the term can 
certainly be seen as inherently contradictory. Obviously, there are cases of stateless nations
78
 and 
nationless states
79
 that exist in the world, which means that including usage of the term would be 
counterproductive. Similarly, the term “race” will not be used due to the potential moral and 
political tones of the word as well as its unfavourable historical usage. Moreover, it is a term that 
would be highly insufficient and unreliable for determining group membership, such as Arab 
versus Persian, in the Persian Gulf region. Religion, language, and other additional descriptive 
features that can contribute to the understanding(s) of nation and/or ethnicity will be addressed 
accordingly in the study. With an understanding of all the terms provided and clarified for the 
purposes of the research, a deeper understanding of resource nationalism can be explored. 
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 The Kurds for example can be regarded as a stateless nation given their status of existing between multiple states, 
with majority of the population residing between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, while simultaneously not possessing 
a formalized sovereign state of their own. 
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Chapter 3: Resource Nationalism and Ethnic Tensions in Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
This chapter will address resource nationalism as well as the ethnic tensions that are 
present in the case studies of the Persian Gulf following the theoretical paradigms covered in 
Chapter 2. The chapter will first cover accounts of resource nationalism since the concept 
possesses many understandings given its amorphous definition. Coupled with the accounts of the 
concept would be the motivations and incentives for implementing resource nationalism. Next, 
state interpretations of resource nationalism in the case studies will be examined. There, 
historical usage of the concept in addition to its experience within the case studies will be 
covered. Naturally, the interpretations will vary depending on political systems as well as 
temporal context and is important to review since it impacts the current manifestation of resource 
nationalism in the case studies. The chapter will then move to address the role of ethnicity in 
association with resource nationalism. Particularly, a conceptual overview of ethnicity and its 
factors leading to tensions will be touched upon as it will provided a structured platform from 
which the association of resource nationalism and ethnic tensions can be analysed. Afterwards, 
current manifestations of the concept using the aforementioned findings will be explored. 
Sovereign Wealth Funds will subsequently be accounted for as it will be revealed that their 
establishment and sustainment is directly correlated with a policy of resource nationalism. Next, 
the shortcomings of the concept will be mentioned since every notion has its limitations, which 
are moreover areas in which the concept will be able to modify and ameliorate in order to make 
up for its inadequacies. Following a product of resource nationalism, the conclusion will leads to 
the succeeding chapter of energy security and the geopolitics of petroleum. 
 
Accounts and Drivers for Resource Nationalism: 
It is without further declaration that resource nationalism is lacking a set definition. Yet, 
while absent boundaries can prove to be serious detriments with other concepts it is in fact the 
formless nature of resource nationalism that contributes to its exceptional quality of applicability. 
It demonstrates a dynamism that is not maintained by other theories, having potential 
applications and influence across all fields of the social sciences. Covering some of the 
descriptions of resource nationalism from different industries, scholars, and schools will not only 
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demonstrate its dynamism as well as range of applicability but will also create a setting in which 
resource nationalism can be understood when applied to the case studies of the Persian Gulf. 
Resource nationalism has already been described as the case in which governments 
and/or ethnic groups lay claim to natural resources located in their territory for the purpose of 
ownership and control (Nurmakov in Overland et al. 2010:  20 – 21). Such a general definition 
though does not always justify the intricacies that the concept manages, especially with regards 
to various industrial sectors. For example, in terms of oil and gas it has been described as the 
case in which international oil companies (IOCs) find it more difficult to operate in another 
country due to the presence and role of national oil companies (NOCs), which prevent IOCs 
from operating freely and without bounds within a particular territory (Bahgat 2012: 13). It 
should be noted of course though that the latter argument as framed by Bahgat is extremely 
narrow in its description of the concept since it has only been applied to oil in its 
characterization. Limiting resource nationalism conceptually to simply a single resource such as 
oil when the theory can truly be applied to all natural resources such as gas, water, foliage, 
precious metals, and rare earth elements demonstrates that the boundaries framed by Bahgat is 
insufficient in capturing the dynamism and range of natural resources that the theory can be 
applied to. For instance, in the mining sectors an understanding of resource nationalism would be 
that the concept “encompasses efforts by resource-rich nations to shift political and economic 
control of their mining sectors from foreign and private interests to domestic and state-controlled 
companies,”80. Similarities between resource nationalism although being described in distinct 
industries are clear. One significant element would be that there is an implementation of a state-
owned company that is designed to interact with the international companies in dealings with 
foreign investments in the importation and exportation of the natural resources in question. 
Another commonality would be that there is a shift of power, namely with that of ownership and 
control over the natural resources; meaning that there is a perceived dominance that must be 
addressed in such a way that a transition occurs. Also, the parties involved would be a shared 
element across understandings. Some of the components would be a domestic authority 
(typically a government), ethnic group(s), and an international market that is to be interacted 
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with
81
. A foreign presence is not mandatory for resource nationalism to be spurred since a 
conflict of interests between domestic parties or groups could occur and promote a move towards 
resource nationalism as state policy rather than be due to a perceived outside dominance. 
Other common understandings would be when resource nationalism is described as a 
process or situational set of circumstances such as when “the threat of tax increases, [which leads 
to a] renegotiation of terms, larger participation of state-owned companies and ultimately 
nationalization,”82. Another would be describing resource nationalism as the “situation where 
producer countries want to maximize their [future] revenues from present production by altering 
terms of investment,” (Ibid). It is important to note that maximization of future revenues also 
entails that there is a perceivable profit to be made, which can impact the perception of other 
industries since many of the oil and gas producing countries do not focus so much on other 
industries like agriculture or mining with a view of resource nationalism since the profits are 
seemingly greater with petroleum. 
Following such understandings of resource nationalism would be what has been termed 
by some scholars and schools as its “forms”, which are with specific reference to resource 
nationalism as state policy. One form would be state domination, in which populist and 
geopolitical agendas threaten investors with expropriation in favour of national or oligarchic 
companies (Nurmakov in Overland et al. 2010:  20 – 21). Another would be balanced state 
participation, where politically articulated desires to capture greater benefits from resources may 
jeopardize contracts, with increasing state ownership in projects (Ibid: 20 – 21). A third form 
would be geopolitical expediency, in which the authorities use resources to secure foreign policy 
objectives, making contracts highly vulnerable to license revocation (Ibid: 20 – 21). An 
additional form would be greater economic participation, where domestic policy agendas may 
lead to increased tax rates and pressure on operating profits (Ibid: 20 – 21). The forms of 
resource nationalism are particularly relevant in the growing understanding of the concept as 
fronted by many of the resource-rich countries that comprised the former USSR such as 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. In particular, the state domination 
model is especially relevant since national and oligarchic companies are leading enterprises in 
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the aforementioned countries such as can be found with State Oil Company of Azerbaijan 
Republic (SOCAR), KazMunaiGaz (KMG), Rosneft, and Uzbekneftegaz. 
But what are the incentives and motivations for states to implement resource nationalism? 
Economic drivers would be that there are high perceived profits to be gained from a particular 
industry
83
. In the case of oil and gas the apparent gains of immense petrodollars to the state and 
the fact that PSAs can broker funds quickly establishes the fact that rapid economic capitals can 
be generated without significant economic development since the oil and gas deposits are simply 
standing for collection. Of course, petroleum is not the single area in which there are perceived 
profits from natural resources, which again highlights the applicability of resource nationalism. 
As mentioned before, other industries such as with mining materials like gold, columbite-
tantalite (coltan), and diamonds are sectors that have seemingly large revenues to be gained 
(Nest 2011: 42). Another incentive that is commonly cited would be the lack of perceived 
benefits to host countries and/or communities from which materials are taken. Essentially, a 
relationship which a “fairer share” is given to host countries and/or communities by international 
companies and/or investors is desired and in such a situation resource nationalism seems to be an 
effective option in creating such a relationship. Supporting such a move would be a changing 
balance of power between resource owners and developers in which the international system has 
moved in a direction where it has become a more acceptable norm in to respect state sovereignty; 
inclusive of the rights to ownership and authority over natural resources located within its 
boundaries. Moreover, there is a general industry shift from capital to opportunity constraints as 
demand has grown and more customers are readily able to participate in the services related to 
natural resource production. It had been a fixed standard for over a century that the industrialized 
countries, namely Western Europe and the United States, were the harbingers of international 
companies and investments for the development as well as reaping of natural resources in other 
territories around the world. However, the era in which international companies and investors 
from traditionally industrialized countries have previously dominated is starting to see the 
threads of its binding unravel as developing economies and newer business strategies enable 
other countries to compete. A clear illustration of this observation would be with China and the 
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rise of Sinopec to being one of the largest companies in the world
84
. Sinopec operations are 
conducted in major regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the Asian Pacific
85
. Continuing the rise of Sinopec into future development would be 
evidenced by research deals made with petroleum majors such as with ConocoPhilips to conduct 
shale gas studies
86
. Other countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, South Korea, and Japan are also 
starting to pick up on the international scene especially with respect to competition with 
traditionally dominant countries. An example would be with India conducting petroleum deals 
with Iran despite the US-led sanctions. With Western companies and traditionally dominant ones 
adhering to trade policies such as those with the sanctioning of Iranian petroleum, developing 
economies using their own international companies will be able to have more freedom in 
choosing to deal with similar scenarios differently than their Western counterparts. Ironically, in 
limiting trade relations with Iran in an attempt to coerce policy changes in the country, Western 
companies have bolstered competition and facilitated the rise of companies operating out of 
developing economies. After all, especially with industries related to natural resources the 
commodities are in limited supply and once the materials are depleted they are gone forever 
without the possibility of replenishment. Signifying in turn that should larger companies remove 
themselves from competing then smaller companies can assume the role and eventually gain 
enough momentum to provide full-scale economic opposition as well as alternative. 
The instances of the rise of new economies seamlessly ties in to the drivers of resource 
nationalism on socio-cultural and technological levels. A noteworthy start would be the 
technological advancements in the communications sector, which have revolutionized the 
conduct of business between international investors and host countries. Certainly, a higher 
percentage of propositions and ventures are communicated between the two compared to 
previous years since contact is more responsive and frequent than ever before. Moreover, 
business volume raises as time progresses since services that were once expensive and designed 
for an elite customer base are becoming readily available to the public in the form of cost-
efficient amenities such as secure mobile devices, internet-based calling, and electronic 
messaging. Technological diversity would also be a contributory factor to fostering resource 
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nationalism in host countries since the rise of Asian technologies as direct competition to pre-
existing Western ones provides alternative markets for host countries to deal with. Indeed, this 
technological driver links with the socio-cultural phenomena of “Asianization”; which is 
understood as a process in which Asian economies are expanding international influence and is 
evidently apparent in resource-rich economies such as those of the case studies. Technological 
drivers as evidenced by the communications sector and rise of industrializing countries hold vital 
roles in the strengthening of a host country implementing resource nationalism since more 
options are available to the host; empowering the country to choose between a selection of 
options. However, technological factors have been demonstrated to be sharing a relationship with 
socio-cultural drivers such as with Asianization. Other cultural drivers would be that on a global 
scale in an idealistic sense there has become a growing awareness and consequential intolerance 
of poverty. There are greater expectations on businesses operating in host countries to have a 
constructive role in the alleviation of dire conditions, particularly when concerning natural 
resources located within an area that is already stricken with poverty. Negative publicity with 
international companies such as BP and ExxonMobil having caused or facilitated destructive 
issues such as environmental damage due to oil spills
87
, burdening of economic hardships onto 
host populations due to incompetent adherence to standard operating procedures
88
, and the lack 
of improvement of living conditions for populations inhabiting resource-rich areas  create a 
legacy that international companies can no longer afford to uphold given potential backlashes 
that may ensue including public outcry, demonstrations, and the threat of license revocation. 
Competition provided by other companies can be sought as replaceable alternatives to 
incompetency. After all, it would reflect poorly on a host country should there be a known 
tolerance of perceivable abuse towards populations inhabiting resource-rich areas such as with 
the conflict-ridden areas of the Niger Delta (Ariweriokuma 2009: 255), fisheries in the Azeri 
waters of Caspian Sea expelled from operation and forced into abandoning the sole means of 
income in favour of deep-water drilling , and violence promoted in the Fergana Valley over the 
rights to fertile land  are some areas in which negative legacies will be enduring. A history of 
similar cases that can be found across the globe in different time periods reinforce a socio-
cultural driver of inheriting a negative legacy since they are viewed as contributory to many 
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distressing international issues such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity reduction, food 
security, human rights abuse, water availability, conflict. At the time of the writing of this 
chapter some issues would be the mining strikes in South Africa, the selling of Syrian gas fields 
by the Israelis to firms operating in the USA, and the further polarization of Erbil in the 
Kurdistan Regional Government against the centralized southern-based Baghdad. Consequently 
there ought to be a sense of responsibility and duty by international companies and investors to 
alleviate as well as improve domestic issues so as to disassociate themselves from the adverse 
past, but of course this is once again in an idealistic sense and not necessarily the reality. 
Political drivers therefore already have an obvious stage in which they will become 
active. One would be that emerging economies are striving to have their presence made 
significant in the international system. Another desire at least with respect to emerging 
economies would be asserting state interests as their economies and foreign interactions develop. 
An additional political driver would be a rise in the global awareness of democratic political 
structure, which encourages group participation and activity when concerning the distribution of 
natural resource wealth. Symbiotically, local empowerment also increases, which also ties in to 
paradigms of the nation. 
 
State Interpretations of Resource Nationalism: 
The littoral countries of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE along the Persian Gulf each 
have a distinct interpretation of resource nationalism. The influence of the concept can be clearly 
observed in each of the case studies and in the circumstance of Iran, resource nationalism has 
even taken a step further from a theoretical framework to be moreover implemented in the 
constitution and enacted as state policy. Before an overview of state interpretations of resource 
nationalism is presented, the common constituent of nationalized companies will be discussed 
since it is an ever-present fundamental that has been employed as a result of the concept. A 
popular implementation would be with the usage of NOCs, which are oil corporations that are 
entirely or majority-owned by the state. NOCs have been gaining significant momentum in the 
world of oil and account for majority of the control exercised over proven global oil reserves. 
Additionally, NOCs have been acting outside their traditional respective state boundaries and are 
increasingly investing abroad, which rivals the historical role and economic power held by IOCs. 
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In this vein, IOCs such as the “supermajors”89 of British Petroleum (BP), Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total have been obliged to interact with 
NOCs in order to maintain some sort of stake in the oil sector of a foreign state. Yet what is the 
relationship of NOCs with resource nationalism and why is it moreover significant? NOCs are 
noteworthy because they enable states to assert control over oil reserves within their borders and 
consequentially exemplify the desired outcome of resource nationalism. Indeed, the companies 
hold a vital role in the country and empower it to exercise governance over a valuable industry. 
Of course, as stated before oil is not the sole material of focus that can be covered by resource 
nationalism and gas has already been mentioned as another resource that will be included in the 
research. NOCs, as a company exclusive of gas, have simply been discussed since they are an 
example that directly relate to the study and are companies that have nationalized a particular 
resource, which is illustrative of a product shaped by resource nationalism. With respect to gas, it 
should be noted that transportation of the substance is much more efficient through a liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) process that converts gas into liquid form. Also, while there are companies 
that exclusively deal with LNG and are nationalized, NOCs are far more popular because of its 
cost of transportation and production being less than that of LNG coupled to its extensive 
history. However, oil and gas are many times grouped together under the term “petroleum” since 
they can be found in the same reserve and nationalized, examples from the Persian Gulf region 
would be Qatar Petroleum (QP) and Dubai Petroleum Company (DPC). As the theme of 
nationalized companies has been briefly addressed with respect to the concept, the case studies 
will be presented and evaluated. 
 
Iran: 
Resource nationalism in Iran has extensive historical roots that stems back to the early 
half of the twentieth century with Mohammad Mossadegh advocating the nationalization of 
Iranian oil and gas, which effectively removed the dominance of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC) in the country. Prior to nationalization the AIOC had long established itself as the oil 
and gas industrial authority of Iran and reaped the benefits of securing and processing foreign 
hydrocarbons. Industrial presence in the petroleum sector of Iran though preceded the AIOC, 
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with the earliest interactions being between William Knox D’Arcy and Mozzafer al-Din Shah 
Qajar in 1901. The initial agreement granted exploration rights to D’Arcy in exchange for equal 
amount of shares to the shah in his company as well as a future promise of 16% profits made 
(Ibid). While the D’Arcy Concession is not exclusively a PSA since it also possesses exploration 
rights clauses, which is a feature that is now separate from PSAs, it was certainly regarded as 
one. Despite being of wealthy background though D’Arcy and his exploration team encountered 
financial difficulties in his search for Persian oil. However, in 1908 when operations were nearly 
halted altogether significant reserves were discovered (Ibid). The founding of the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company (APOC) ensued with D’Arcy selling most of his shares to the Burmah Oil 
Company in an effort to recuperate from his losses. In 1909 APOC assumed all operations with 
D’Arcy as a board member, keeping to the original terms agreed upon in the D’Arcy Concession 
(Ibid). In 1925 Reza Pahlavi staged a successful coup d’état against the ruling Qajar monarchy 
with British support. The implications for the petroleum sector were not immediately clear since 
the initial policy of the D’Arcy Concession stood. But, in an effort to generate more funds 
towards the central government, assert a greater degree of control over state resources, and lessen 
the presence of a concession that was widely unpopular throughout the country, Reza Shah 
fronted a revisionist policy towards APOC. At the preliminary forefront of renegotiations from 
the Persian side would be Abdolhossein Teymourtash, who argued that a revisiting of the terms 
of the D’Arcy Concession was crucial given that national wealth had been granted in pressure 
under inequitable terms by a non-constitutional government. Changes made since the ousting of 
the Qajars would not only be a constitution but also a complete transformation of government in 
addition to the newly changed name of the country (Ibid). Teymourtash strengthened the Persian 
position in negotiations by retaining French and Swiss oil experts (Ibid). However, after years of 
attempted renegotiation Teymourtash was unsuccessful. Reza Shah then directly intervened in 
the negotiation process and in a dramatic series of events, which was elevated to The Hague, a 
revisionist set of policies were once again unsuccessful. In 1933 following the repeated attempts 
there were contractual modifications that ensured corporate responsibility on behalf of APOC for 
the development of surrounding areas to petroleum reserves, albeit with production revenues in 
favour of the British. But, once again the majority of funds were directed away from the central 
government in addition to a pittance of the petroleum revenues being received due to the 
multiple subsidiary companies that were created in an effort to maximize APOC earnings. 
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Ultimately, despite the changes in rhetoric and contractual revisions the resulting effectiveness 
amounted to the former being nominal at best with Persian petroleum wealth being exploited. In 
1935 APOC was renamed to the AIOC following the name change of the state and operations 
continued following the APOC contract as well as frameworks. The onset of World War II found 
Iran in a declared neutral position; however, the crucial transportation routes and vast petroleum 
reserves were too precious for the Allies to even consider losing to the Axis powers. In addition 
the Persian Corridor provided routes for the British to provide the Soviet Union with supplies to 
engage Nazi Germany and the Axis. Consequently, in 1941 the Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran 
occurred with the Soviet Union occupying the northern regions of the country and the British 
occupying the southern regions of the country. Reza Shah was forcibly abdicated under duress to 
his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, in 1941 following the joint invasion and ensuing withdrawal 
from the country (Ibid). Within a decade of the invasion however petroleum affairs in Iran began 
a new cycle with Mohammed Mossadegh gaining traction in the Iranian parliament. Mossadegh 
campaigned with nationalistic fervour and politically manoeuvred multiple Iranian parties to 
support his operation for the nationalization of Iranian oil and gas. In 1951 the Iranian parliament 
voted to nationalize Iranian oil and gas, thereby wresting AIOC presence away from the country. 
Mossadegh was shortly afterwards elected Prime Minister of the country and after an abdication 
of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi followed by a brief period of democratic rule; Mossadegh was 
removed in a coup d’état funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the name 
cryptonym of Operation Ajax. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi reassumed his former role as Shah and 
ruled until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. By the end of his reign, Iran had achieved its objective 
of controlling domestic natural resources, which was gained through skilful diplomacy, 
negotiations, and agreements with IOCs. Notable contractual agreements would include five 
major agreements throughout the 1960s with IOCs that directed significant cash flow to the 
central government
90
. Another would be the 1974 Petroleum Act and Risk Service Contracts, 
which reaffirmed Iranian ownership over natural resources and concluded that exploration and 
production agreements with IOCs “could only be reached under contracts in which the contractor 
had no ownership rights to reserves discovered during explorations nor to any production from 
the agreement area,” (Ibid). 
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Regardless of the changes in government since the nationalization of petroleum, Iran has 
maintained a state policy of resource nationalism since 1951 and has followed through decades 
of an evolutionary but deliberate process of asserting control over its own natural resources. Iran 
has even gone so far as to create constitutional articles since 1979 explicitly stating its position 
on domestic petroleum reserves. Three particular articles in the existing constitution that are 
concerned with natural resources, its ownership, and distribution would be 44, 45, and 81. A 
translation of Article 44 states, “The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother 
industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking… shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all 
these will be publicly owned and administered by the state,” (see Appendix A). The phrase 
“owned and administered by the state” is critical to understanding the inherent constitutional 
position of Iran with respect to the possession of state materials such as natural resources. Not 
only is there a conscious idea of the state being a collective entity belonging to the citizens of the 
country but also that the phrase forbids any form of privatization, including private investment(s) 
whether foreign or domestic in addition to any private ownership of the sector irrespective of 
scale (Shahri 2010). Article 45 states, “Public wealth and property, such as uncultivated or 
abandoned land, mineral deposits, seas, lakes, rivers, and other public waterways, mountains, 
valleys, forests, marshlands, natural forests, unenclosed pastureland, legacies without heirs, 
property of undetermined ownership, and public property recovered from usurpers, shall be at 
the disposal of the Islamic government for it to utilize in accordance with the public interest. 
Law will specify detailed procedures for the utilization of each of the foregoing item,” (see 
Appendix A). While some natural resources have been mentioned in Article 45, the notion of 
petroleum is noticeably absent. However, the tangential association of petroleum to Article 45 
would be through the Islamic concept of anfal, meaning public wealth and property. The concept 
entails that anfal belongs to the God and the Prophet Mohammed but in place of the two would 
be the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following a Shia doctrine, anfal cannot be 
sold or transferred to anyone, which creates serious impediments and difficulties for privatization 
whether foreign or domestic. Implicitly, natural resource wealth is categorized under anfal and is 
inclusive of oil and gas revenues.  Article 81 states, “The granting of concessions to foreigners 
for the formation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, 
services, or mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden,” (see Appendix A). The phrase of 
“absolutely forbidden” in the context of Article 81 signifies that theoretically should concessions 
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be even attempted to go forth with approval through the Iranian Parliament the motion would not 
hold any legitimacy. Of course, it is important to note that simply proposing concessions in the 
Iranian Parliament is expressly forbidden by the preceding Articles. Following the constitutional 
articles in addition to the nationalization process proposed by Mossadegh in the 1950s the 
Iranian government is the sole authority that can legitimately deal with natural resources, 
particularly concerning petroleum. As a result, Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs) and joint 
ventures are illegal in Iran (Shahri 2010). The three aforementioned articles are the premises for 
the prohibition of concession granting, PSAs, joint ventures, and any other contractual regime(s) 
involving foreign participation and/or control, ownership, and/or establishment of foreign 
companies with respect to the natural resource sectors.  
The state interpretation of resource nationalism in Iran can be clearly observed on a 
number of levels. The earliest attempts to regulate concessions through parliamentary procedure 
in 1906 under the Mashrouteh Constitution (Abrahamian 2008: 47) were ineffective and led to 
further efforts by subsequent regimes to assert more control and authority over the natural 
resources located within the state boundaries. It was not until the arrival of Mossadegh that a 
state policy of nationalization was able to be enacted, creating the basis for resource nationalism 
in the country. The initial form resource nationalism took in the Mossadegh period would best be 
described as balanced state participation, in which politically articulated desires to capture 
greater benefits from resources may jeopardize contracts, with increasing state ownership in 
projects (Nurmakov in Overland et al. 2010: 20 – 21). Under the same political figure the model 
evolved to take on a state domination form, in which populist and geopolitical agendas 
threatened investors with expropriation in favour of national or oligarchic companies (Ibid: 20 – 
21). AIOC in particular was the target company of nationalizing the petroleum sector and was 
essentially nullified with the creation of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which 
fundamentally co-opted the AIOC into Iranian possession. At present the NIOC still maintains a 
significant presence in Iranian petroleum affairs and has experienced a turbulent record of 
extreme polarizations, with highs and lows of oil pricing affecting the state revenues. After the 
ousting of both Mossadegh as well as Mohammed Reza Pahlavi the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
specifically referenced natural resources and concessions for the newly formed Islamic Republic, 
which highlights the importance of natural resource management to the nation. Given the 
previous track of unimpressive management and corruption the articles in the constitution were 
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designed to minimize institutionalized deficiencies, mismanagement, and eliminate foreign 
influence. To further solidify and bolster the articles of the constitution that are concerned with 
natural resources would be the presence of nationalized companies such as NOCs. The 
continuing legacy and existence of NOCs to the current regime indicates that a nationalized 
company for the management of oil and gas wealth is an entity that is positively received by the 
nation. Certainly the psychological benefits of removing foreign influence to be replaced by 
national interests are obvious and visibly present with the creation of nationalized companies. 
State interpretation therefore is demonstrated with the constitution and its articles, the presence 
of nationalized companies such as NOCs, and the history of interaction with politics such as with 
the parliamentary procedures under the Iranian nationalist Mossadegh. Foreign domination in the 
Iranian petroleum sector was perceivably wrested away to be under national control and for more 
financial benefits to be directed to the central government of the state. 
 
Saudi Arabia: 
Resource nationalism in Saudi Arabia is strikingly different to that of Iran; one noticeable 
difference would be the lack the parliamentary drama that occurred in Iran due to the 
monarchical structure that has existed in the state since 1901. After a series of wars by the Al 
Saud tribe, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was declared in 1932 following the conquest of much 
of the Arabian Peninsula that included former autonomous authorities under the Ottoman Empire 
such as Najd and Hijaz. Abdulaziz Al Saud was proclaimed king and generated much of his 
funds historically via taxes on pilgrims to Mecca and Medina. However, following a decline in 
pilgrimage taxes due to a lower number of visitors coming to the region, an alternative source for 
generating wealth was pursued by the Al Saud. Indeed, prior to 1938 there were an additional 
two other major factors that triggered the search for petroleum in the Arabian Peninsula, which 
was the demand for oil during the course of and the period following World War I as well as the 
discovery of oil by APOC in north-western Persia. The latter led to speculation that the Eastern 
Province bordering the Persian Gulf would have oil reserves whereas many geological 
consultants at the time believed that the Arabian Peninsula was entirely barren of any noteworthy 
natural resources such as oil. Political instability in some of the Arab countries such as Yemen 
and Oman additionally hindered any serious exploration efforts by foreign investors. 
Nonetheless, King Abdulaziz followed the vision of oil in Arabia by enlisting the support of 
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mining engineer Major Frank Holmes, whose premonition of discovering Arabian oil was ahead 
of his peers. Concessions were signed in 1923 by the King to Holmes for the exploration of 
petroleum in Eastern Saudi Arabia but significant foreign investments were absent given that 
major banks were apprehensive at the proposal for funding a project searching for oil in Arabian 
territories. In 1925 Holmes strategized to receive a concession from the sheikh of Bahrain and to 
receive funding for a project on a smaller geographic scale with potentially larger economic 
returns. While initially recruiting Gulf Oil in 1927 to support the project, the Red Line 
Agreement between Gulf Oil and other regional companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and 
APOC prevented the project from being developed by Gulf Oil. Instead, Standard Oil of 
California (SOCAL) was transferred with the promising deal. Meanwhile, King Abdulaziz had 
employed mining engineer Karl Twitchell to investigate the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, 
which followed encouraging results as to the presence of petroleum in the area. Seeps were 
found in eastern Saudi Arabia and the king was advised to hold off on granting concessions 
before the results of the Bahraini project were released. The advice was wisely heeded as in 1932 
SOCAL struck oil in Bahrain, which invigorated international interests to the prospects of 
Arabian oil. The next year negotiations for concessions for the Eastern Province were opened 
with SOCAL as the final victor, which granted exploration rights for 60 years in a space of 
930,000 square km. A subsidiary by the name of California Arabian Standard Oil Company 
(CASOC) was created and joined with a regional heavyweight developer, the Texas Company, to 
form the California Texas Oil Company (CALTEX) in 1936. The tactical venture proved capable 
with the discovery of crude oil in the renowned Dammam Number 7 well, which at the time truly 
was a finding in itself and was revealed to be one of the largest sources of crude oil in the world. 
In 1944 CASOC changed its name to Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and 
numerous revisions were made to the original concession. One of the first changes would be that 
the operational exploration rights were granted to a greater area and extended for an additional 
six years to 1999; in return, ARAMCO would provide free amounts of petroleum products. In 
1950 a new deal was signed by ARAMCO and the King, which entitled a 50-50 profit-sharing 
agreement to the parties. Throughout the decades subsequent revisions were made to the PSA 
that not only reduced the operational concession area of ARAMCO, with a reduction to 220,000 
square km from the original 930,000 square km, but eventually led to the entire purchase of 
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ARAMCO by Saudi Arabia in 1988. The company was renamed Saudi Aramco but still relies on 
foreign investments in order to upkeep operational activities. 
But where is the role and influence of resource nationalism? Indeed while there has been 
a revision of petroleum history in the state of Saudi Arabia the presence of resource nationalism 
is seemingly lacking. However, upon closer observation and taking into account temporal 
cultural practices in addition to political structure the presence of resource nationalism very 
much visible. The first observation to establish would be that the Arabian Peninsula prior to the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932 largely existed in divided territories. The Al Saud tribe 
twice tried to establish a unified state in the Arabian Peninsula, once in 1744 with the dissolution 
of the first Saudi state
91
 in 1818 resulting from the Ottoman-Saudi War (Steinberg in Aarts, P. 
and Nonneman, G., eds. 2005: 15) and another from 1818 to 1891
92
 (Ibid). Of course, it should 
be noted that from the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabian Peninsula was a part of 
its territorial sovereignty and rule save for a select number of territories that were recognized 
with separate autonomous dominions (Ibid). Therefore, the Saudi states prior to the loss of the 
territories in World War I were regarded as rebellions rather than formal political states. 
Nonetheless, from 1901 the Al Saud once again projected its power to conquer other 
neighbouring emirates and kingdoms (Ibid). Following the completion of the conquest, the entire 
state was titled with the name of the Al Saud family. Regional and cultural practices of the time 
indicate that whatever was conquered by another would become the property of the victor, as 
evidenced by Arabian victories against the Ottoman armies with British support. Following this 
approach, the territories conquered by the Al Saud were therefore property of the family. The 
addition of the family name to the title of the country is sheer transparency of its perceived 
ownership and dominance over the terrain. The monarchical structure further sealed and focused 
power to the family along with the submission of the various independent principalities that were 
co-opted. By extension, all materials that were under Saudi Arabia were property of the King, 
such as the natural resources inclusive of water and later petroleum following its discovery. The 
King after all was the figure that not only hired engineers and geologists to survey the landscape 
of the country but also did so for the purposes of generating personal revenue considering that 
the land was in his view personal property. The permissions were not the only allowances made 
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personally by the King; the concessions for oil were as well. In terms of resource nationalism the 
state interpretation of Saudi Arabia would entail that the King would be the living embodiment 
of the nation and sometimes the state given the role and functions exercised by him. 
The foundations of Saudi Arabia were termed and influenced greatly by the Al Saud 
family. Even conceptual features and factors of ethnicity such as religion were subjected to the 
Wahhabi interpretation sponsored by the Al Saud tribe for generations (Ibid: 12 – 20). The idea 
of the nation in Saudi Arabia was additionally cultivated under Al Saud leadership, with a 
nationalistic sentiment originating from the charismatic authority of Abdulaziz Al Saud. With 
regards to more tangible indicators of resource nationalism in Saudi Arabia would be the 
presence of a NOC. Similar to the Iranian case in which AIOC was transferred to the central 
government via political mechanisms, ARAMCO was eventually transferred to the central 
government of Saudi Arabia via economic mechanisms
93
. The outright purchasing of shares in 
the company enabled the country to assert more authority over its natural resources. The 
dimension of kingship in Saudi Arabian resource nationalism again does hold a role in the 
nationalizing process of ARAMCO since business deals and negotiations were conducted at 
various stages with the King as an omnipresent factor. When his attendance was absent, 
representatives were sent in place of the King to represent his interests as well as those of the 
country. After all, the petroleum wealth that was directed to the King was also being distributed 
at some point to the rest of the country and its inhabitants. 
Granted, the interpretation presented of Saudi Arabian resource nationalism is a 
streamlined view of the model given that it has become more complex with the progression of 
time since the founding of the country, but the elemental interpretation has been provided and 
does owe a great deal of its evolution to the earliest stages of interactions between the King and 
foreign investors and the subsequent oil concessions. The path of resource nationalism in Saudi 
Arabia is vastly different from that of Iran given the tumultuous political affairs and processes 
that were experienced in order for the Iranians to gain authority over their petroleum and other 
natural resources. Certainly, the lack of parliamentary procedures and constant shifting of 
governments contributed to a more stable and straightforward environment for Saudi Arabia to 
develop its resource nationalism. However, the more direct track experienced by Saudi Arabia 
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can be contributed to not only the assistive foreign investors that were interested in developing 
the area with mutually beneficial deals favouring the host country but also the existing petroleum 
infrastructure that was already in place in Iran since oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia after 
other territories such as Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq; there was more business competition in the 
developed areas rather than the prospects of an open area desert. The closest form of resource 
nationalism in Saudi Arabia would be state dominion as was evidenced by the PSAs between the 
ARAMCO NOC and the country. There is no set state policy explicitly implementing the 
framework but there is undoubtedly a practice. Indeed, resource nationalism can be intimately 
tied with the history of interaction between host and natural resources located within a 
geographic boundary, which is particularly evident with petroleum history in Saudi Arabia. 
 
United Arab Emirates: 
Resource nationalism in the UAE is more complex than that of Iran and Saudi Arabia 
partially due to the fact that the state is multidimensional being comprised of seven emirates. The 
path to resource nationalism in the UAE is also different than both that of Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
The UAE was not a territory that was conquered by a single family or tribe and did not operate 
under a unified banner until 1972 with the inclusion of Ras al Khaimah into the federation. The 
unification process was moreover diplomatic and conducted via contractual agreement for each 
acquiescing emirate to adhere to the UAE Constitution. There is no singular sheikh in the UAE 
that holds absolute power in the country like in a monarchical system similar to neighbouring 
Saudi Arabia. Rather, there are many sheikhs and the head sheikh of each emirate wields 
absolute authority in their respective emirate and should not interfere in the affairs of any other 
emirate according to the agreement between the rulers of each of the seven principalities. 
Therefore, the embodiment of the state and/or nation in a singular absolute ruler such as in Saudi 
Arabia would not be applicable to the UAE given its more convoluted political structure. 
Before the political sophistications and complexities were arranged in the formation of 
the UAE, the sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi under the Trucial States of the Coast of Oman 
experienced a discovery that would alter the economy of not only its own emirate but also the 
future federation that it would be capital to. In 1935 Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan of 
Abu Dhabi was met by APOC geologist Peter Cox to discuss the projections of freshwater 
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exploration projects in the emirate (Morton 2011: 53)
94
. The drilling for water in nearby Bahrain 
by Major Frank Holmes inspired the sheikh to follow similar projects in his own emirate (Ibid) 
However, despite the water project request made to the IPC, a subsidiary of APOC, the interests 
expressed were more in favour of oil and discussions of oil concessions ensued (Ibid). Sheikh 
Shakhbut was aware of the increasing regional activities with regards to the petroleum sector and 
was keen to not be isolated from the lucrative and beneficial deals that were being conducted 
throughout the Persian Gulf. Shortly after the meeting with Cox, William Williamson on behalf 
of the IPC obtained a two year concession for Abu Dhabi in 1936 at the cost of 7,000 rupees with 
3,000 rupee a month
95
 follow-ups; the rupee was the de facto currency of the Trucial States of 
the Coast of Oman at the time (Ibid). IPC created the subsidiary Petroleum Development Trucial 
Coast (PDTC) to conduct exploration activities in Abu Dhabi (Ibid). By 1939 PDTC had signed 
a subsequent 75-year oil concession agreement with Sheikh Shakhbut and exploration rights 
covered the entire borders of the emirate on the Arabian Peninsula in addition to part of the 
offshore boundaries
96
. With the advent of World War II and the devastating toll taken on the 
foreign investors, there was a period of stagnation and explorations efforts were temporarily 
suspended (Morton 2011: 53). From 1946 though exploration efforts resumed and continued 
deeper into Abu Dhabi territory until 1950 when geographic hindrances of sand dunes affected 
the ability to conduct further research and was damaging transportation equipment (Ibid). In 
1953 transportation had improved, helicopters were added to the exploration fleet, and tire 
technology aided in the ability to cover the previously unfavourable terrain (Ibid). PDTC 
continued to penetrate western Abu Dhabi but shifted its efforts once a boundary dispute with 
Saudi Arabia, down as the Buraimi Dispute, broke out and closed certain areas of the emirate to 
exploration (Ibid: 54). During this time, the Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited (ADMA) that was 
a jointly owned company between BP and Compagnie Française des Pétroles, which was the 
precursor to Total, obtained an offshore concession (Ibid). Offshore seismic surveys and 
explorations revealed bountiful reserves and drilling began in the Umm Shaif field (Ibid). PDTC 
also made its own discoveries in 1959 with the Murban-3 oil field (Ibid). Discoveries 
proliferated into the 1960s with the Bu Hasa and Zakum oil fields (Ibid: 56). PDTC in this time 
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relinquished much of the Trucial Coast exploration areas but did retain Abu Dhabi and changed 
its name to the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) (Ibid). The new company signed a 50-
50% oil-sharing agreement with Sheikh Shakhbut in 1965; ADMA signed an identical contact 
with the sheikh in 1966 (Ibid). In the same year, Sheikh Zayed assumed power of the emirate and 
in 1971 became president of the UAE and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)
97
 
was created (Ibid). In 1974 ADNOC acquired a 60% stake in ADPC and ADMA, which were 
both reconceived as the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operation and the Abu Dhabi 
Marine Operating Company, respectively. 
 In addressing the existence of resource nationalism in the UAE, some additional factors 
must be accounted in viewing the evolution and history of the framework. During the era of the 
Trucial Coast, the PDTC acted as a singular NOC for all emirates since it carried out 
explorations and were granted rights for the entire length of the Trucial Coast. Although the 
PDTC did retreat back to Abu Dhabi prior for the formation of the UAE, it did span a greater 
area than the ADNOC and in many respects was its spiritual predecessor. But this should not 
take away from the importance of the ADNOC in the scope of resource nationalism since other 
emirates did produce other NOCs, such as ENOC from Dubai, and simply because NOCs are not 
unified across a country that does not signify resource nationalism did not exist even prior to the 
formation of the federation. The UAE is a successor state to the collective political entity of the 
Trucial Coast, which means that there was a new point in which to observe resource nationalism. 
The UAE was formed in 1971 and solidified in 1972 with seven emirates. Therefore, for 
resource nationalism to exist in the UAE at the inception of the state, it would need to be present 
from 1971 onwards, which it was evidenced through the presence of the ADNOC. However, 
each emirate is able to assert control over its own natural resources, meaning that ADNOC was 
not technically a NOC that was for the benefit of the entire country, although it did traditionally 
provide funds to other emirates for the betterment of the federation. In technical terms, the 
ADNOC was for the management and dealings of the Abu Dhabi emirate only, which meant that 
although it was a NOC it was not necessarily for the benefit of anybody outside the emirate of 
Abu Dhabi. This can be clearly seen in the explicit state policy of resource nationalism visible in 
the UAE Constitution, which unlike Iran was very quickly and peaceably incorporated into a 
constitution without significant controversy or happenings. Article 23 states, “The natural 
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resources and wealth in each Emirate shall be considered to be the public property of that 
Emirate. Society shall be responsible for the protection and proper exploitation of such natural 
resources and wealth for the benefit of the national economy,” (See Appendix C) which also 
implies that the sheikhs are not the owners of the natural resources or wealth generated from the 
sales of them and that resource nationalization on the national level and resource nationalism on 
the state level is inherent to the Emirates constitutionally. Article 10 states, “The aims of the 
Union shall be the maintenance of its independence and sovereignty. The safeguard of its 
security and stability. The defence against any aggression upon its existence or the existence of 
its member states. The protection of the rights and liabilities of the people of the Union. The 
achievement of close co-operation between the Emirates for their common benefit in realizing 
these aims and in promoting their prosperity and progress in all fields. The provision of a better 
life for all citizens together with respect by each Emirate for the independence and sovereignty 
of the other Emirates in their internal affairs within the framework of this Constitution,” (See 
Appendix C). This means that other emirates cannot interfere with the natural resource affairs of 
any other emirate 
Regardless, disunity of NOCs existing in the country is complimentary to the political 
structure of the federation. With a constitutional description of natural resources being the public 
property of a specific emirate and that the respective society is responsible for the security as 
well as exploitations of natural resources and revenue(s) generated from sales of such materials, 
there is an unwavering article that guarantees the existence as well as theoretical state 
interpretation of resource nationalism. In these regards, the closest form of resource nationalism 
form would be the state domination form in which populist and geopolitical agendas threaten 
investors with expropriation in favour of national or oligarchic companies (Nurmakov in 
Overland et al. 2010:  20 – 21) and is evidenced with the presence of NOCs such as ADNOC and 
ENOC. State domination though would need to be understood in terms of the Emirati context in 
which there are seven different entities forming a federation; meaning that emirate domination 
would be a more appropriate terminology for understanding the form. According to the 
constitution, there could be balanced state participation from the public reserving the right to 
increase state/emirate ownership in projects. This could indeed come in the form of politically 
articulated desires to capture greater benefits from resources may jeopardize contracts (Ibid). 
Lastly, should the public also desire to shift towards a greater economic participation form, in 
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which domestic policy agendas could lead to increased tax rates to put pressure on operating 
profits (Ibid), the constitution provides the rights to the public to do so. But at present, the state 
domination form does apply more so than the others and similar to Saudi Arabia each of the head 
sheikhs from the seven emirates can be viewed as the living embodiment of the respective 
emirate. In this vein, it should also be noted that Abu Dhabi is the dominant emirate and 
therefore its sheikh is the foremost of all sheikhs, which means that should there be a singular 
figure needed to personify the UAE it would be the primary sheikh of Abu Dhabi. The 
nationalizing process of natural resources in the UAE occurred instantaneously with the signing 
of the constitution inclusive of Article 23, which greatly differs than the paths taken by Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it is a more complex interpretation of the framework given that Article 10 
guarantees that there can simultaneously be seven different resource nationalisms under a single 
union. But this is moreover exemplary of the framework being central to the addressing of 
natural resources in the UAE. In a rudimentary philosophical logic format for determining the 
presence of resource nationalism in the federation, it can be firstly established that if there is a 
UAE then there is a constitution. Then, if there is a constitution then there is a set policy of 
resource nationalism. Therefore, if UAE then resource nationalism. 
 
Theory versus Reality: 
Thus far, an overview of the case studies interpretations and basic understanding of 
resource nationalism have been covered. However, the state models illustrating the conceptual 
influence of resource nationalism have been explained in a functionally ideal setting and 
theoretical scenario and already there are leads to discrepancies. Essentially, the state 
interpretations are simplified descriptions of the functional reality of utilizing resource 
nationalism, which is inclusive of veritable flaws such as the creation of institutionalized 
deficiencies. Hence, in order to comprehend resource nationalism in the case studies further to 
their entirety, it is necessary to delve deeper into the framework with realistic usage and factors 
at play. 
The concepts reviewed in the previous chapter grant insight to potential areas that can 
cause serious impairments to the ideal treatment of resource nationalism. After all, the concepts 
of the state, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity are integral components to the framework that can 
influence its outcome. For example, the notion of ethnicity could be polarized on to such an 
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extent that a presence ethnic tensions could exist or develop. Indeed, when viewing this on the 
scale of resource nationalism, it would demonstrate noticeable disproportion. Historically, such 
tensions have demonstrated the capability of fragmenting a country. Indeed, ethnic tensions exist 
across all states of the Persian Gulf and the case studies are no exception. Ethnicity undoubtedly 
shares ties to nations and nationalism as well as the state, which consequently illustrates the 
necessity to examine the concept in the case studies given its vital role in resource nationalism. 
Similarly, polarizations could occur with the other conceptual components of resource 
nationalism; namely, the state, nations, and nationalism. Hence, the realities of implementing a 
theoretical framework can be drastically different than its philosophical setting. Therefore, 
manifestations of resource nationalism in the case studies must be reviewed in order to fully and 
responsibly address the framework. 
 
Manifestations of Resource Nationalism: 
When investigating the manifestations of the theoretical framework there are recurring 
themes that act as stress points and can bilaterally influence the components of resource 
nationalism. One theme to express, which is the keystone of the framework, would be the issue 
of ownership. There are different types of ownership, for example one may not technically own 
property because taxes must be paid otherwise it will be seized. One could own a pen, but only if 
it is paid in full and there are no other continued fees that can be attached onto the object. 
Therefore, there is no legitimate authority that will be able to rightfully take the pen away based 
off of tax claims or similar. One can own a car after all the payments have been cleared but it 
cannot be legally driven in some countries without the proper taxes or insurances, which means 
that while one can own the car there is no permission given to drive it legally. With resource 
nationalism the aspect of ownership is more along the lines of to whom or what receives the 
funds generated from natural resources. If the state is the benefactor, that is an abstract and 
intangible concept. Yet, should the state from a resource nationalism interpretation be absolutely 
or partially represented through personification then in reality the funds would be going towards 
a person and/or set of individuals that have complete control over the monies. This can 
effectively call in to question the acceptability of the resource nationalism interpretation based 
on its definitions of state ownership, claim, and belonging. 
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Concerning ownership and belonging, questions arise as to who or what the natural 
resources belong to. For example, do the natural resources of oil and gas belong to the fisherman 
whose fishing grounds the petroleum falls under or would it be the government? According to 
the rule of capture, should an individual own the surface of the land then everything that falls 
under it is their property as well. Of course, oil and gas ownership according to rule of capture 
have become more sophisticated since the inception of the rule but it does present a valid 
question. In a federalist model, questions arise as to which ownership rights are more legitimate. 
In basic terminology would it be the state or the province that receives a greater claim to the 
natural resources? 
 Once oil and gas is discovered and a significant investment has already been made with 
regards to the sector, then the relative bargaining power switches between the IOC and the host 
country. Typically, the host country tries to change the economic outcomes of operations by 
changing the terms of the original contract or agreement, such as a PSA, in order to seek higher 
gain from natural resource revenue. Hence, after there has been immense capital invested in the 
sector, there is seemingly not much an IOC can do should a host country decide to change the 
terms. Indeed, issues of ownership can lead to tensions as well as conflict and is dependent on 
the manifestation of resource nationalism. Violent conflict will not be reviewed in this subsection 
as it will be addressed later on in the subsequent chapter. 
 
Iran: 
The vivification of the theoretical framework in Iran was initiated by Mossadegh in 1951 
and can be seen as an expression of political antipathy towards foreign powers. While this move 
was argued to have been socialistic in nature and an inclination towards the Soviet Union, this is 
certainly an unsophisticated view on the matter. It can be successfully argued that nationalization 
and resource nationalism was a democratizing move since it involved not only a parliamentary 
procedure with popular vote but also was collective in its development, which is a pattern that is 
repeated with democracies. Once materials are nationalized as well, there is unquestionably a 
communal manner of thinking in what to do best with the natural resource wealth that is to be 
generated from sales, which can be achieved through popular acquiescence. Meaning, even if the 
Iranian public did not identify with democratic structure consciously, there is an unconscious 
reality that is present.  
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 Political structure and democratic arguments aside, resource nationalism has been 
explicitly included in the subsequent constitution of the Islamic Republic, which means that the 
framework is an inherent right. The consequential presence of a NOC such as the NIOC is an 
indicator of the manifestation of resource nationalism. However, Article 45 did not directly 
reference petroleum and even a tangential association of anfal is unreasonable considering that 
the majority of revenue for Iran has come from the sales of oil and gas for over half a century 
(See Appendix A). It could be argued through anfal that petroleum is included as a natural 
resource with this article and with the structure of the Islamic Republic having theocratic roots 
that is acceptable. The grouping with mineral deposits is also insecure since petroleum can be 
argued out of category. Article 81 though expressly forbids any form of concession granting to 
any non-Iranian entity and that no company or institution can be formed for the purpose of 
“dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services, or mineral extraction,” (See Appendix 
A). From this article, petroleum and its associated services were assumed to have been 
unequivocally referenced along other natural resources such as gold. However, despite there 
being resource nationalization in the constitution, the outcome of resource nationalism has 
deviated from the framework ideals. 
 One constant dilemma that has stricken Iran with its petroleum industry would be 
corruption and subsequent institutionalized deficiencies. A striking example would be with an 
international bribery case involving the Norwegian Statoil and Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani
98
. A 
significant relationship of the latter figure would be that he is the son of Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, who was the fourth President of Iran, former member of the Assembly of Experts, 
and the chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council. It was also under Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani that the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was ushered into power. The bribery 
allegations asserted that Statoil received advice from Mehdi Rafsanjani some time between 2001 
and 2002, who at the time was the head of a NIOC unit, on gaining a successful contract to the 
South Pars gas field
99
. Mehdi Rafsanjani jointly operated with the Turks and Caicos-based 
Horton Investment, which was owned by Abbas Yazdi, and upon consulting Statoil received 
large payments that were directed to the accounts in the Caribbean Sea (Ibid). The recorded 
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transactions amounted to $15.2 million USD and occurred between 2002 and 2003 in an effort 
for Mehdi Rafsanjani to utilize his influence to obtain awards to Statoil for the development of 
the 6, 7, and 8 phases of the South Pars gas field
100
. While Statoil confesses that it did not know 
who ultimately received the funds, it did admit bribery and improper conduct that included 
account books manipulation
101
. A subsequent lawsuit was filed against Statoil and a record fine 
of $21 million USD was placed on the organisation for violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, which is a law that is designed to prevent companies from paying bribes in an 
attempt to gain contracts (Ibid). Resignation of the Statoil chief executive officer (CEO) as well 
as several top officials followed but there was an apparent lack of action against the Iranian 
citizens involved in the case as there have been no admissions as to any verdict regarding the 
case against Mehdi Rafsanjani. In the Statoil corruption case, there has unequivocally been a 
direct violation against Article 81. In addition, Article 45 has also been violated in that there is 
effective privatization that has occurred in the Iranian petroleum industry. With consultancies 
and other subsidiaries of NIOC operating outside the scope of a nationalized company, effective 
privatization has visibly formed and siphoned away funds that were constitutionally ensured to 
be owned by the state and public. 
 An additional example of privatization through subsidiaries would be with the National 
Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), which operates the largest tanker fleet in the Middle East
102
. In 
2000 the Iranian government transferred the NITC from NIOC to a number of Iranian pension 
funds
103
. This move signified that a major component to the operation of a NOC was being 
privately managed, at least to a degree
104
. Another subsidiary of NIOC would be Naftiran 
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Intertrade Company (NICO), which was established in 1991 in the Jersey Channel Islands
105
 
before moving its headquarters to Lausanne. Switzerland
106
. The company is significant because 
it has extensive ties to the international markets, with companies such as Petro Suisse Intertrade 
Company in Saudi Arabia, Noor Energy in Malaysia, and Petro Energy Intertrade in the UAE
107
. 
Also, the Iranian Oil Company, which is a subsidiary of NICO, owns half of the Rhum gas field 
in the North Sea, which is of substantial wealth
108
. The privatized operations of NICO that act as 
an international presence for NIOC when sanctioned create a publically visible and operated 
violation of the Iranian constitution given that the petroleum funds are not directed towards the 
central government. Nonetheless, despite there being explicit violations of the constitution and 
there being limited theoretical avenues in which even a minor privatization can occur, the 
practice does persist. In 2013, it was revealed that Babak Zanjani and his group of companies, 
including the notable Dubai-based Sorinet, was withholding at least $1.9 billion USD of 
petroleum revenue from Iran
109
. How state petroleum funds came into the possession of a single 
person is problematic enough for Iran to explain, but it has been claimed that Zanjani acted as an 
international figure that was helping the country evade sanctions (Ibid). This is not the first case 
though in which Iranian petroleum funds have gone missing. In 2009 it was publically exposed 
that there were at least $1 billion USD missing from petroleum revenue
110
. President 
Ahmadinejad at the time stated that his government was not at fault and did not fail to meet 
obligations or procedure regarding petroleum funds and stated, “No one in the country has the 
right to illegally spend even one dollar from the reserve… All government spending should be 
approved by [the] Parliament. We cannot withdraw from the reserves whenever we want,”111 
which does implicitly reference the constitution but also does acknowledge that there have been 
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instances in which the articles are not adhered to. Iranian lawmakers also did previously discover 
that the government was making purchases without consent of the Parliament, which is against 
protocol (Ibid). 
The existence of such effective privatizations defeats the entire purpose of forming a 
NOC. When national companies are illegally bypassed for the sake of personalized gain and 
coupled with the direct contradictions as well as violations of the constitution in addition to 
rampant venality existent throughout the political structure, this can only be described as 
corruption. The effects of which, paired with institutionalized deficiencies such as poor 
management, sabotage the manifestation of resource nationalism away from its ideals. Indeed, 
ownership issues are brought into question when this happens, which has led to tensions in the 
country. If nationalized materials are being sold with revenue directed to select individuals rather 
than the central government and public as defined by the constitution then obviously there will 
be a rise in negative sentiments. The point of nationalizing natural resources and developing a 
NOC was to reduce foreign influence in the country, access greater benefits to its properties, and 
provide more to the state for the population. Yet utilizing the NIOC or complete circumvention 
has occurred and thusly state ownership of natural resources has been cast into doubt. In a 
resource nationalism framework this subsequently affects other components and has created 
major security concerns for Iran. 
While the theme of security will be investigated in greater detail in the subsequent 
chapter, it should be observed at this time that the notion of ethnicity is severely affected by the 
framework manifestation. Indeed, nations and nationalism have likewise been influenced but 
Iran is a multinational country whose citizens identify with cosmopolitanism and do not stress on 
one particular nation being superior to another. It is quite an integrated society in this respect and 
there is a clear identity of what constitutes an Iranian, which is a liberal understanding that 
incorporates many different groups and beliefs. But, given the theocratic elements that have 
existed in society, the ethnic feature of religion has been more focused on than background. 
Shias, commanding the largest following and dominant in the political system, are preferred over 
other religious interpretations such as Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Judaism, and the Baha’i 
Faith. The second largest religious interpretation of Iran would be Sunnism. In Larestan, the 
majority of the inhabitants are Sunni (Frye 1987: 27). The people of this province are of the 
south-western Iranian group and speak the Lari language rather than Persian (Ibid: 27 – 29). Lari 
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is closely related to Old Persian and Luri, which is another Iranian group that speaks an 
independent Iranian language related to Middle Persian (Ibid). Resource nationalism can be 
credited to a degree for affecting such communities with a perceived imbalanced receiving of 
petroleum wealth and state funds that keeps the area in destitution. Many have left Iran for the 
GCC and settled in every country that is member to the organisation. Some areas affected in a 
similar fashion to those of Larestan would be villages including Bastak, Evaz, and Khunj in the 
Hormozgan and Pars provinces. It is crucial to observe though that there are some Shia areas that 
receive as little or less windfall than some Sunni areas and since the state publically 
acknowledges Shi’ism as its religious preference, with theocratic elements visible in the public 
sphere, strains are present on some level and a sentiment of discrimination has been cultivated in 
tandem. The framework has only flared such tensions since nationalized state wealth was not 
perceivably distributed productively to the Sunni-inhabited region(s). As a result of the 
migrations to the Arabian Peninsula and a harboured sense of discrimination, interstate tensions 
between Iran and the countries of the GCC have worsened. Other instances of tensions that are 
more closely tied with nations and nationalism that have also been aggravated to the point of 
conflict will be covered in the next chapter with regards to energy security. Nonetheless, ethnic 
tensions are a core outcome of the framework manifestation.  
 Ultimately, in Iran the manifestation of resource nationalism is present but it is not 
consistent with the state ideals and interpretation of the framework. Ownership of oil and gas has 
essentially gone to individuals either through technicalities of effective privatization, corruption, 
or institutionalized deficiencies. It has thusly devolved to express and exhibit the dilemmas and 
strains that are currently existent in the country. Tensions resulting from the manifestation are 
closely tied to ethnicity and with a specific stress placed on religion. Critics may argue that 
resource nationalism does not exist since the manifestation is too deviant from the interpretation. 
However, it is in fact because of such a deviation that it can be asserted that resource nationalism 
is very much present. While the manifestation may not be representative of the interpretation, it 
has simply been manifested negatively. 
 
Saudi Arabia: 
The manifestation of resource nationalism in Saudi Arabia is drastically different than 
that of Iran partly due to its political structure but also because the components of the framework 
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are valued and viewed differently in the kingdom. The lack of a constitution and poor legal 
system are additional drawbacks that have affected the outcome of the framework. Given the 
absence of articles setting resource nationalism as state policy, the kingdom is more reliant on de 
facto capabilities and traditions inherited from the establishment of the kingdom. It is a fact that 
King Abdulaziz Al Saud granted exploration rights and concessions to foreign entities that 
eventually led to the establishment of ARAMCO. The PSA initially detailed that there would be 
a 50-50% divide of the profits between ARAMCO and King Abdulaziz. Once he passed away 
however, the deal was in reality inherited by his successor, which was in accordance with the 
rules of monarchy and on grounds that ARAMCO was inheritable property for the family of 
King Abdulaziz. Of course, the company was not entirely directing its profits to a single person, 
but it certainly was directing its revenue to the Al Sauds and their associates. 
 The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia (See Appendix B), which was drafted in 1992 in place of 
a constitution, has several articles that confirm through a convoluted evaluation that the practice 
is in some manner legitimate. It also reveals the means to which resource nationalism has 
manifested itself and acts more as a confirmation of practice since the Basic Law was adopted 
during the reign of King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who came much after King Abdulaziz. 
According to Article 5 the political structure is declared to be a monarchy from one of the four 
sons of King Abdulaziz and their descendants (See Appendix B). Religious authority and an 
implicated divine sanction for the king maintaining his position of power as well as 
governmental authority is referenced in Articles 6 and 7 (See Appendix B). But the referencing 
of a point in which ARAMCO can be inherited is seemingly absent, that is, until Article 14 
details that, “All natural resources that God has deposited underground, above ground, in 
territorial waters or within the land and sea domains under the authority of the State, together 
with revenues of these resources, shall be the property of the State, as provided by the Law. The 
Law shall specify means for exploitation, protection and development of these resources in the 
best interest of the State, and its security and economy,” (See Appendix B). The subsequent 
Article 15 states, “No concessions or licenses to exploit any public resources of the country shall 
be granted unless authorized by provisions of the Law,” while Article 18 states, “The State shall 
guarantee private ownership and its sanctity. No-one shall be deprived of his private property, 
unless in service of the public interest. In this case, a fair compensation shall be given to him,” 
(See Appendix B). With reference to the first premise of natural resources, the legal system of 
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Saudi Arabia is based on the Quran, Sharia, and Sunnah; all of which are subject to a variety of 
interpretations. In the legal system, according to Article 50, “The King or whomsoever he may 
deputize shall concern himself with the implementation of judicial rulings,” which are indeed 
venerable powers to possess (See Appendix B). With regards to the second premise of Article 
15, concessions and licenses were already granted before the Basic Law was set forth but can 
also be manipulated in such a way that the provisions of the law would eventually reconfirm the 
authority of the King. The premise of Article 18 has difficulties in that there could be 
technicalities in what defines private property in the dominion of an absolute monarchy, what 
would be defined as the public interest and how this would be determined, in addition to the 
notion of a fair compensation and what this would entail as well as which authority would be 
determining such a reparation. Also, private property in this sense could be argued to be the 
petroleum fields for the Al Saud family, but this would contradict Article 14, unless the notion of 
the state can be defined as the King with the state being understood as having authority and the 
King having powers of authority. Critics could argue that the King would be exercising powers 
of the state rather than being the incarnation of such a notion. However, a single individual 
exercising powers of the state is representative of possessing a trait of statehood only if the king 
can utilize power legitimately; it is an absolute monarchy after all that has a single person at the 
apex of the political structure. Indeed, evaluation of the articles leads to hints of tangible 
ownership of natural resources, but without directly referencing the King. Yet, the King being 
the highest authority in the country could in theory and does in practice influence the outcome of 
the natural resource wealth. This can of course be asserted on the grounds of not only divine 
powers of authority attributed to him by the Basic Law but also that it is in the interests of the 
state. Moreover, should there be any opposition to the King or any of his actions then there will 
be an exercising of de facto capabilities. Articles 60 and 61 for example state that the King is the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and can mobilize the military for action (See 
Appendix B). Hence, the conclusion would be ultimately that the King is the embodiment of the 
state in that it is an absolute monarchy in which the highest figure can act with the utmost 
authority and without question. There is divine sanctioning for his position and all behaviours 
conducted would be excusable by religious and legal interpretations. Furthermore, unilateral 
military action can be exerted on behalf of the King to his discretion.  
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 When King Abdulaziz conquered the territories that eventually formed the country, the 
idea of nation was crafted by the Al Saud for national membership that was emphasizing 
tribalism and tribal notes that would benefit the Al Saud more than others. Not every individual 
in the newly formed Saudi Arabia was enthusiastic of the forcible nature of the tribe though. 
Indeed, even at present there is public sentiment in the province of Hijaz that there was a degree 
of non-integration to national membership in the sense that the cultural differences from Riyadh 
are not necessarily accepted. Indeed, the initial overbearing presence of the Al Saud with the 
violent takeover of the Kingdom of Hijaz may have influence in this mentality. The traditional 
economic generators of Mecca and Medina from religious pilgrimages directed much of their 
revenue to King Abdulaziz. Nationalism in Saudi Arabia consequently took a longer and more 
astringent path. After all, when identifying with Saudi Arabian nationalism there must at least by 
definition is passive support for the Al Saud. Ethnicity also suffered as a result of national 
membership forged by the Al Saud, specifically, the Shia of the Eastern Province felt incredible 
discrimination. One of the reasons of course would be religious differences, with the Shia holy 
city of Karbala being sacked by the Wahhabis in 1801 (Khoury in Prakash, G. and Kruse, K. M., 
eds. 2003: 200), which was the official religious interpretation of the Al Sauds (Ayubi 2003: 75). 
Another would be the lack of received benefits and revenue generated from the oil and gas fields 
in the Eastern Province, which is the region where the major petroleum reserves are. There is 
also an element of non-Arab identity that is across all components of the framework and adds a 
layer of complication to address. This is noticeable with communities such as the Uzbeks that 
have been migrating from Central Asia to the Arabian Peninsula for centuries, settling mainly in 
Hijaz
112
. Iranian groups similarly have followed an analogous migration, but with the setting of 
heavy anti-Iranian sentiments, do not readily identify with such ancestry. The connotations are 
not only with the rival regional power of the Persian Gulf but also the association with Shi’ism. 
It was in fact from Iran in 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini seized power that the exportation of a 
Shia revolution was initiated
113
. An attractive argument to the Shias of the Eastern Province 
would be that Khomeini called the inheritable transferal of power in monarchy illegitimate 
(Ayubi 2003: 113) and therefore against Islam. Insurrections in the Eastern Province against the 
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Al Saud and ARAMCO began but did not meet any widespread success (Ibid). Further security 
implications that have continued since 1979 in the Eastern Province will be covered in the next 
chapter. Hijaz, having more ethnic variability than other provinces in Saudi Arabia, is also tense 
but not as much as the Eastern Province where conflict has taken hold. 
 Ownership and management of natural resources are other sources of tensions that 
interact with the existent strains from the framework components. NOCs in many cases have 
been described to behave as malicious economic actors that act as states-within-states and this is 
certainly evident with Saudi Aramco (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 88 – 89). The lack of attention 
directed to other areas of the state economy has produced negligible economic diversification. 
The kingdom is a rentier state that is reliant on the sales of petroleum. Saudi Aramco has 
presented itself as a self-styled emporium that is mired with non-commercial obligations and 
incompetence (Ibid). The latter can be described as the irresponsibility of the state diversifying 
other economic potentials, making the country reliant on foreign support for sustainment, and 
facilitating ethnic tensions. NOCs are responsible for the managerial and regulatory demands of 
the oil industry and in the case of Saudi Aramco has also been the means for political patronage 
as well as elite empowerment (Ibid). The manifestation of resource nationalism lacks the 
multiple avenues of subsidiaries from NOCs that enable others aside from the Al Saud family 
and the elite to directly benefit. Rather, effective privatization has occurred in an absolute 
monarchy structure albeit with some exceptions since responsibilities and duties cannot be 
fulfilled by a single person or family alone and therefore assistance from the elite is provided. 
Ownership rights are therefore extremely sensitive to being wrested away from a single family, 
although the state interpretation of resource nationalism has manifested itself consistently and the 
NOC duties fulfilled. It is dependent upon the definitions of the notions that make up the 
framework in order to have perceived legitimacy. As a result of the Saudi Arabian definitions, 
ethnic tensions are more extreme than the other case studies and an absence of a constitution and 
set legal system further aggravates the existing strains. The Shias are not able to access natural 
resource benefits from the windfall and the materials are concentrated in their province
114
 but, 
they are not the only community affected by the imbalanced distribution of wealth (Ibid). Other 
Sunni citizens have demonstrated against the monarchy for basic needs such as affordable 
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housing (Ibid). In 2011 an economic stimulus package of $37 billion USD was proposed to the 
Saudi Arabian population by the King, but was not able to abate aggression directed towards the 
central government (Ibid). Rather, the package was viewed as a King attempting to purchase the 
contentment of subjects whose loyalties and misfortunes were able to be procured. It seemed as 
if there was no real care or consideration of the sentiments of the population, that moreover feel 
unprepared for a beneficial future that will enable them to compete with the international system 
due to the tightly monitored and Wahhabi-influence religious establishment that regulates 
education. A demand for greater political and economic participation in the country, which is 
also concerning the regulation and management of natural resources, was also ignored. The 
stimulus package also was keeping discrimination boundaries against gender and religious sect, 
with women and Shias unable to obtain certain benefits and occupations in the country
115
. The 
manifestation has facilitated tensions through marginalization that have led to joblessness and 
imbalanced salaries that affect many groups of the population. 
 Ultimately, in Saudi Arabia the manifestation of resource nationalism is present and 
consistent with the state interpretation of the framework, even though it may lead to hindrances 
inclusive of corruption and institutionalized deficiencies (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 89). 
Ownership of oil and gas has been essentially seized by the King and Al Saud through Saudi 
Aramco, which does not benefit the entire population. Thusly, it has resulted in tensions, which 
have impacted ethnicity and with a noticeable emphasis placed on religion. Critics may argue 
that resource nationalism does not exist since a person cannot embody the state, but a king can 
represent a kingdom and is the pinnacle of the political structure. Hence, resource nationalism is 
very much present and manifested in consistency with the theoretical interpretation. 
 
United Arab Emirates: 
The manifestation of resource nationalism in the UAE differs from both that of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia as it has multidimensional facets that influence its outcome. Indeed, the political 
structure as well as history of the country has influenced the components of the framework, 
which in turn have produced a unique result. The Constitution of the UAE references natural 
resource ownership rights as well as the integrity of each emirate to maintain independence with 
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internal affairs without risk of other emirates interfering (See Appendix C). The constitution was 
also the document that was signed by representative sheikhs from each emirate that brought the 
country into being. The union though has suffered a kind of identity crisis and aspects of its 
framework weigh heavily on notions of nation, nationalism, and ethnicity. 
 The formation of the UAE, as referenced earlier, was a collective agreement between 
seven emirates that were formerly under the banner of the Trucial Coast. Bahrain and Qatar were 
both invited to join, but eventually declined. Hence, the seven emirates embarked on a path 
together but did encounter great difficulties in forging an identity. Firstly, the UAE is a 
multiethnic assemblage of groups that have ancestry stemming not only from the immediate 
region of the Persian Gulf but also from other areas inclusive of the Indian subcontinent and 
Eastern Africa. The major ethnicity has been described as Arab but there are difficulties in 
assessing what constitutes an “Arab”. For instance, would an Arab be defined as one because of 
direct ancestry leading to an Arabian tribe or could it also be an individual from a separate 
lineage and ethnicity that goes through a series of adaptations to become an Arab? During the 
Umayyad Caliphate, ethnic non-Arabs were not allowed to hold particular positions in society or 
even to convert to Islam after a certain point because such elements were described as being a 
reserved exclusively for Arabs; in order to ascertain such elements one would need to become a 
mawali or servant of an Arabian host and eventually be determined by the sponsor as being Arab 
after a period of servitude, despite not possessing Arab ancestry. Similarly, with the creation of 
the UAE came the initiation of the Emiratization program, which has been described in basic 
terms as a program designed for the reduced dependency on foreign labor as well as the 
advancement of the local population
116. However, the definition of “local” and therefore 
authentic became subject to question with major categories of the bidoon and the ajam being 
factors. The bidoon or “without”, signifying statelessness, was a category created during the 
formation of the union, which entailed that there was a lack of citizenship grants. The receiving 
of citizenship was commonly either achieved through patronage by the sheikh of the emirate or 
through applications. There is also the scenario in which Emirati women do not have eligibility 
for their children to gain citizenship should her partner be outside the scope of the UAE, thereby 
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making her children effectively stateless
117
. Apparently, there have been steps made towards the 
granting of citizenship to stateless children of Emirati mothers
118
, but this has yet to become a 
stable and solidified practice. Rather, the stateless have been encouraged at times to receive 
Comoros citizenship
119
, which has been proposed in place of the UAE citizenship.  
The term “ajam” technically denotes all members of non-Arabic speaking background 
but has been applied more frequently to individuals of Iranian descent in the Persian Gulf. The 
term translates roughly to “mute” or “incapable of fluency”, referencing and emphasizing the 
difference in languages between Arabs and non-Arabs. Needless to mention, the term is 
derogatory in its historical application and has been used in a pejorative manner. Therefore, the 
term will henceforth instead be used in the descriptive manner to which individuals of Iranian 
descent that reside in the UAE refer to their group, which is “khodmooni”120. The Emiratization 
program has already resulted in many khodmoonis being unwilling to admit Iranian ancestry, 
eroding such ethnic features such as language, out of fear of being unable to access the societal 
benefits provided by the UAE should they not be viewed as authentic enough and essentially 
Emirati. Indeed, many families can be readily identified as being of Iranian descent through such 
indicators as surname, lacking Arabian tribal affiliation, being unfamiliar with Arabian culture 
and practices, as well as other signals. Some khodmoonis have even attempted to invent history 
by labelling the group as Hula or Bani Hula in some effort to align the group with Arabs. 
However, this is certainly a newly occurring psychological phenomenon that is undoubtedly 
directly correlated with the fears of being excluded from the state and is more of a social 
response than a cohesive and collective movement to shift an entire group identity. After all, 
much of the UAE is comprised of khodmoonis that have constructively contributed to the 
progression of every one of the emirates before the country was formed as a federation. 
Certainly, there are well-documented invitations from local rulers in the 19
th
 century that have 
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invited mainland Iranians to develop the economy of what became the UAE; one such instance 
would be with Dubai and Bastakiyya (Commins 2012: 87). Nonetheless, discrimination against 
khodmoonis is present in the UAE and there is an obvious as well as concerted effort, such as 
with the Emiratization program, to discount them from society. After all, systematic attrition of 
ethnic features and cultural identifiers in favour of another group is undoubtedly evidence of 
prejudice. 
The Emiratization program has endeavoured to capitalize on membership recognition in 
an effort to create a unified identity. Naturally, the state holds significant weight in the 
recognition process. Formalized confirmation of state acceptance can come in a number of ways; 
one such manner would be with a passport. National membership is assumed to be connected 
with possession of a passport, however in the UAE there is a separation of citizenship and 
passport. The former is of vital importance and is truly indicative of national membership to the 
UAE, being the means to which authenticity is granted. It should also be mentioned that 
possession of the latter does not signify entitlement or possession of the former. However, the 
relationship is reversed in the contrapositive in that citizenship does entail passport possession. 
The bidoon have already been described as not being entitled to either, it has been reported that 
khodmoonis have experienced difficulties in obtaining both, gender issues exist in that 
citizenship is passed to subsequent generations only from the male line, but there is a noticeable 
lack of Arabs experiencing difficulties in obtaining citizenship as well as passports even if 
coming from scenarios identical to the bidoon or khodmoonis, such as previous failures to fill 
application forms. Indeed, Emiratization appears to be undeniably equated with Arabization. 
Inhabitants that are determined to not conform to the “Arabness” required are forced into societal 
erasure with alternative citizenship offers at best should they not be deemed as belonging to the 
state. There is also preference and promotion of one group with defined characteristics that is 
determined to be the only “real” one of the country121. However, exclusions can prove damaging 
to Emirati ethnic and national understandings with subsequent consequences for nationalism and 
identity. For example, excluding the khodmooni and therefore Iranian features from Emirati 
identity proves to be impossible. The emirate of Dubai for example was built on the economic 
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frameworks set forth by Iranian migrants (Commins 2012: 87). Symbols of the country, falling 
under the ethno-symbolist paradigm, include the ubiquitous badgirs
122
 that is a technology 
hailing from Iran and appears on the UAE currency. Yet, psychological phenomena have instead 
taken hold in the country, such as with invented histories, reformed language
123
, and the constant 
changing of names to distance khodmoonis from their ethnic background. It should also be 
mentioned that such phenomena are arbitrarily applied and constantly change. 
Emiratization could have taken a path that is multifaceted in its approach. After all, 
unification does not necessarily entail uniformity, especially in an ethnic or national application. 
The UAE could have created a multifaceted identity that is inclusive of a variety of ethnicities, 
such as in Iran and Switzerland, which would easily address much of the tensions that currently 
exist within the country. Realistically though, neither the creation of a newly understood 
definition of Emiratization or the equality of gender will be implemented in the near future. 
Instead, the paradigm utilized and is most visible in the UAE would be with primordialism and 
Arabization. The emphasis on authenticity and therefore bona fide status is inherently 
problematic, which is certainly illustrated in the convoluted and contradictory methodology of 
determining rights to citizenship in the UAE. With the exclusions of the bidoon as well as the 
ethnic pressure put on to the khodmoonis in the UAE the platform for tensions has been set. 
Tensions thus far have not resulted in anything other than a strong desire to Arabize, which is 
conforming to the Emiratization program and illustrative of desperate aspirations to be included 
in society and to access natural resource wealth. But the situation is delicate and there is certainly 
latitude for the situation to worsen and problems become exacerbated to the point of conflict. 
Already, citizenships have been revoked on grounds of terrorism
124
 but also can be perceived as 
rescinding citizenship for political differences. Indeed, there are serious questions that arise to 
future progression in the country should the threat of revocation be present. Certainly, 
developments occur only with change but should the prospects of change lead to severe 
consequences then advancement may not effectively occur. 
 The manifestation of resource nationalism in the UAE has directly been affected by the 
components of ethnicity and nation that form ideas of the population makeup. Some questions 
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that arose would be with regards to citizenship and identity, which of course has a significant 
impact on the patriotic zeal of nationalism. It is also difficult for those not included in society to 
feel nationalistic towards a nation that only produces rejection. There is also the issue as to who 
the state and natural resource wealth belongs to. The federation has acted with the head sheikhs 
from each emirate taking hold of the natural resources, which is particularly evident in the 
petroleum overlord of Abu Dhabi. There is consistency in this respect with the state 
interpretation of resource nationalism as well as the constitution. However, while NOCs as well 
as prodigious subsidiaries exist and are managed by sheikhs in each emirate, such as ADNOC 
and its subsidiaries having significant involvement from the Al Nahyan, the boundaries of 
ownership and management can become confused. Indeed, there is speculation that calculations 
of wealth for sheikhs in the UAE at times are inclusive of petroleum funds that are, 
constitutionally, funds generated from public property. The means to which monies generated 
from the sales of public natural resources come to the possession of managers must presumably 
have some sort of regulation from the public, yet this is lacking. It has also reached a stage that 
much of the population in the UAE believes and/or claims that the natural resources within each 
emirate belong to the head sheikh. Article 23 of the constitution explicitly forbids the practice of 
sheikh ownership in the natural resource sector. The same article states that the wealth of each 
emirate is to be considered public property as well. Therefore, while the functional managerial 
performance has been instituted and practiced by the sheikhs, it is the vagueness of boundary 
been personal and public funds that would be a significant factor in determining whether the 
UAE has been consistent with the state interpretation of resource nationalism or not. Ownership 
issues are extremely subject to scrutiny based on this premise and could directly violate the 
constitution should public funds be intertwined with personal wealth, where personal wealth is 
not necessarily confined to the sheikhs alone as corruption or institutionalized deficiencies could 
enable others to siphon funds for personal gain. This can additionally contradict Article 63 which 
states, “The members of the Council of Ministers shall aim to serve in their conduct the interests 
of the Union, the promotion of public welfare and totally renounce personal benefits. Members 
of the Council of Ministers must not seek profit from their official positions in any way 
whatsoever for themselves or for any person closely related to them,” where the Council of 
Ministers can be comprised of citizens aside from the sheikhs and their families depending on 
the interpretation of Article 56, “Ministers shall be chosen from among citizens of the Union 
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known for their competence and experience,” (See Appendix C). In practice, technicalities 
persist in facilitating effective sheikh control and ownership, depending on how managerial 
functions are interpreted or defined. The notion of “interests” as well as what would be in the 
best interest of the emirate and how the law in each emirate is determined are just a few of the 
many technicalities that can be used to bolster the existing authorities. 
 In essence, the manifestation of resource nationalism has expressed itself in seven 
independent but identical manners with each of the emirates having a sheikh at its head ruling a 
small dominion that is a part of a larger federation. Each head sheikh can be regarded in a similar 
fashion to that of the King of Saudi Arabia in that they are the living embodiment of each 
emirate and the pinnacle of what each member of the emirate should be like. Given that there are 
seven emirates with seven different sheikhs there are seven different personalities to address. 
Consequently, depending on the managerial functions of each of the seven sheikhs infrastructure 
can vary drastically from one emirate to another. An example would be with Dubai being a 
wealthier and more developed emirate than Umm Al Quwain. NOCs are present in the UAE but 
are again broken down between each emirate. ADNOC for instance hails from Abu Dhabi while 
ENOC hails from Dubai and whereas traditionally the NOCs have limited their activities to their 
host emirate there is evidence of activities starting to extend beyond host boundaries such as with 
ENOC having minor presence in Abu Dhabi
125
. In attempting to forge unification in union of the 
components of resource nationalism, programs such as Emiratization were implemented. 
Emiratization has had a bilateral relationship with resource nationalism in the UAE in that it 
affects the direction of the framework while also being affected by its vivification. At present, 
the program has been able to limit all inhabitants of the UAE to access the benefits of natural 
resource wealth with a striking highlight of the bidoon being referenced. Consequently, resource 
nationalism in the UAE has contributed to developing tensions in the country. There is particular 
emphasis placed on ethnicity in this respect. The notions of nation and nationalism are not 
excluded though. Rather, the two have suffered greatly as a result of the emphasis and definition 
placed on ethnicity. Nonetheless, the manifestation of resource nationalism in the UAE is 
consistent with the state interpretation but is subject to extreme technicalities that can potentially 
negatively impact the country in the future. The model can improve but this would depend on a 
new and more progressive definition of Emiratization. 
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Correlation and Impact: 
 The case studies have demonstrated that there are momentous outcomes that can result 
from the manifestation of resource nationalism and its differences from theoretical interpretation. 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have all experienced ethnic tensions resulting from the 
framework implementation. While the relationship between resource nationalism and ethnic 
tensions is not exclusively positively correlated in theory, it has created the atmosphere to do so 
within the case studies. Resource nationalism is not the cause of ethnic tensions, but its 
implementation and concept definitions do create a prejudiced environment in the Persian Gulf, 
where prejudice is found on national and regional levels. It functions more so as an intensifier or 
aggravator, with the ability to incite and worsen tensions to varied degrees through numerous 
manners depending on whom or what receives the petroleum revenue. Hence, the tensions 
present in the littoral are not necessarily coincidental alongside resource nationalism. The impact 
on international relations is astounding, with themes of security and economy being important 
ones. The effect on identities is also striking, for example with khodmoonis in the UAE forsaking 
their background for economic gains and/or out of fear of other consequences such as 
membership withdrawal or expulsion. The findings are undoubtedly fascinating because they are 
brought about by resource nationalism, which was initially implemented to limit the access of 
foreign powers to domestic natural resources and their sales for the purpose of reducing a 
perceived economic discrimination but instead resulted in all countries being rentier states with 
partisan environments and tensions. 
 
Extensions of Resource Nationalism: 
The manifestations of the framework covered have described ethnic tensions that have 
resulted or worsened as a result of implementation. Other areas that were affected included the 
notions of the state, nations, and nationalism. Ownership is a fundamental underlying source of 
pressure for such tensions and collateral effects. Resource nationalism though is an extremely 
dynamic framework that has many applications as well as products. Influential entities produced 
are vital to review, especially with the case studies. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which are a 
noticeable product of resource nationalism and its conceptual advancement, are extremely 
powerful economic entities. All countries in the Persian Gulf possess SWFs including the case 
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studies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The influence of SWFs from this region like many 
others goes beyond domestic developments, populace sustainment, and cultivation, reaching high 
profile international presences that have the potential to affect global markets. 
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Resource nationalism through its interpretations and voluminous manifestations has 
increasingly been leading countries implementing the concept as state policy to create economic 
measures that bolster assured funds to the state. The economic measures moreover address the 
apparent understanding of resource nationalism in that the claims of the government over the 
natural resources located within its jurisdiction are solidified since the ensuing economic 
proceeds derived from the sales of natural resources are directed immediately to the government. 
Increasingly, economic bodies directly associated with the state have been developed from the 
understandings of resource nationalism, more frequently appearing as sovereign wealth funds. 
Comprehending SWFs are hence crucial to grasping future development with resource 
nationalism since the evolution of the paradigm across its interpretations around the world have 
SWFs appearing in state form. SWFs however like resource nationalism have an amorphous 
conceptual definition with no designated meaning. 
SWF is an original terminology used to refer to state-owned or associated investment 
funds that are composed of financial assets. Typically, the investment portfolio includes 
properties, stocks, bonds, and other companies. The term is credited to Andrew Rozanov in 2005 
who used it to build off of the shifting from traditional reserve management to sovereign wealth 
management in the financial sector, investigating the entities that held state affluence (Rozanov 
2005: 1). Yet, while the term SWF was first used in 2005, the concept stretches back centuries 
earlier. The roots of SWFs can for example be traced to Texas, USA in 1854 with the 
establishment of the Permanent School Fund (PSF), which was a fund that was designed to 
provide financial benefits to primary and secondary schools
126
. The successful installation of the 
PSF in Texas triggered its follow-up known as the Permanent University Fund (PUF) and had 
the same purpose of granting financial benefits to the educational sector but on a university level. 
The establishment of the PSF and the PUF came following the integration of the Republic of 
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Texas into the USA
127
. Of course, while citing the PSF and PUF as origins of SWFs the 
unstructured boundaries of what distinctly characterizes a SWF apart from other financial or 
economic bodies is illustrated as well. At times, especially when investigating the beginnings of 
a concept, it is difficult to distinguish between separate models when many different models can 
be traced back to the same foundation but have developed in varying directions. SWFs are no 
exception to this observation. It can be challenging even at present to consistently identify SWFs 
are separate economic bodies from other entities such as central bank reserves. The 
responsibilities of SWFs sometimes become blurred with the traditional functioning of other 
economic areas of the country. For example, the domestic investments conducted by SWFs, as 
was the case with both the PSF and the successor PUF in Texas, could be interpreted as central 
government investments via bank reserves. In this vein however the investments can also be 
viewed as coming from organisations that are associated with the government, which in turn 
create a strong argument for SWF features to be exhibited. Another instance would be that 
frequently SWFs act as the voice of governments when making international investments. Before 
the SWF concept was proposed, such a function would be demonstrated from other political 
and/or economic organisations with connections to a government. It should be noted though that 
while SWFs typically maintain links to a government they do not necessarily need to be 
exclusively associated with a government as they are independent funds. 
Interestingly enough, the evaluation of Rozanov that led to the mainstream usage of 
SWFs comes at a time in which the SWFs of the Persian Gulf are gaining significant ground on 
the international financial scene. In fact, some of the largest SWFs in the world hail from the 
Persian Gulf region such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), and the Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA). A parallel to note at this point would be that some of the Arab states of the 
Persian Gulf established SWFs close to the time of their state foundation and/or independence, 
which is a similarity that is shared with the integration of an independent Texas into the USA. 
While Texas did not remain an independent state separate from the larger country it joined, the 
SWFs were established close to its incorporation into the USA. 
 Rozanov, who devised the terminology of SWFs, defined it as the following, “…by-
products of national budget surpluses, accumulated over years due to favourable 
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macroeconomic, trade and fiscal positions, coupled with long term budget planning and spending 
restraint. Usually these funds are set up with one or more of the following objectives: insulate the 
budget and economy from excess volatility in revenues, help monetary authorities sterilize 
unwanted liquidity, build up savings for future generations, or use the money for economic and 
social development,” (Bazoobandi 2013: 1 and Rozanov 2005: 1 – 4). The description proposed 
in 2005 however reached further refinement since then given additional research and the fact that 
SWF presence was on the rise with over 30 new funds created since the concept was demarcated 
by Rozanov. In 2008 The International Working Group (IWG) of SWFs established by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in conjunction with SWF managers proposed that a 
definition of SWFs would be understood as, “… special purpose investment funds or 
arrangements that are owned by the general government. Created by the general government for 
macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial 
objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial 
assets. SWFs have diverse legal, institutional, and governance structures. They are a 
heterogeneous group, comprising fiscal stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve investment 
corporations, development funds, and pension reserve funds without explicit pension liabilities,” 
(Bazoobandi 2013: 2 and IWG of SWFs). By 2013 there were far more descriptions of SWFs 
given the interest and research invested in the concept. The SWF Institute for example defines 
such funds as a “state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from 
balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of 
privatizations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from 
resource exports. The definition of sovereign wealth funds exclude, among other things, foreign 
currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or 
monetary policy purposes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the traditional sense, government-
employee pension funds (funded by employee/employer contributions), or assets managed for 
the benefit of individuals. Some funds also invest indirectly in domestic state-owned enterprises. 
In addition, they tend to prefer returns over liquidity, thus they have a higher risk tolerance than 
traditional foreign exchange reserves
128”. 
 With competing definitions already in place and a debate between financial analysts and 
academics still raging, how can SWFs be understood with even more definitions being devised? 
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In essence, the many existing and forthcoming definitions of SWFs demonstrate commonly 
found characteristics. Therefore, SWFs can be viewed firstly as economic entities that are owned 
and financed by their respective governments. It must also be noted that SWFs are either 
commodity (CSWF) or non-commodity based (NCSWF). Since natural resources fall under a 
commodities branch and SWFs can possess hard natural resources as state affluence such as 
precious metals, with regards to the case studies all are exclusively commodity-based off of oil 
and gas. A second observation would be that SWFs are also typically managed by separate 
organisations aside from the central banks, although this does not always need to be the case. 
Moreover, SWFs are financed from government surplus revenue, “after planned government 
spending and/or off-budget expenditures are paid from the government commodity or non-
commodity export incomes, the surplus is deposited in the SWF’s account,” (Bazoobandi 2013: 
3). Additionally, a characteristic held across all SWF boundaries would be to safeguard the state 
economy from income volatility. While this aim may not be achieved in every scenario as will be 
reviewed with the case of Iran, the intention for SWFs to do so is steadfast. Insulating the state 
monetary system from surplus liquidity to control the inflationary effects of surplus liquidity 
would also be characteristic of SWFs and can be illustrated for example in the case in which a 
state monetary system is protected against the inflationary effects of having less oil because the 
country exports oil as its natural resource to gain revenue (Ibid). Economic diversification would 
also be purposeful for SWFs so that there would be no singular dependency for governmental 
income as is especially visible with rentier states and commodity-based SWFs. A supplementary 
feature of SWFs would be to use surplus income revenue to transfer novel technologies and 
services (i.e. expertise) to the population to facilitate economic and social developments within 
the state. In this vein, SWFs are to expand state economic wealth and business dealings that 
would be profitable for providing accessible funds to the population as well as expand the 
possibility of future state dealings. SWFs characteristically possess highly diversified investment 
portfolios that generate assets from outside state boundaries, but this does not always need to be 
the case. Finally, a common characteristic that would be representative of SWFs would be to 
accumulate funds to be used for future generations. 
A report conducted by the International Financial Services London (IFSL) concluded that 
SWFs assets would be an estimated $10 trillion by 2015 in part due to the rising oil prices and 
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the Asian countries’ growing trade surplus129. The IMF confirmed the rise in SWF assets in their 
findings as well and valued the estimated total between $6 – 10 trillion by 2015 depending on 
political and economic outcomes
130
. In 2008 SWF assets rose 18% over the previous year to 
amount to a total of $3.3 trillion
131
. By 2010 the IFSL reported that SWFs were around 2.5 times 
bigger than hedge funds and that their assets held a figure of $1.2 trillion above assets under 
management of private equity funds (Bazoobandi 2013: 1)
132
. It seems that while the global 
financial crisis did have an impact on the rapid growth rate and amassing of assets by SWFs the 
general trend was upwards, which is projected to continue into the future. After all, SWF 
donations in excess of $70 billion from 2008 contributed to the financial bailout of Western 
banks with some of the larger payments coming from Persian Gulf SWFs (Bazoobandi 2013: 
28). 
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Product of Resource Nationalism: 
With the importance of SWFs covered, its relationship with resource nationalism is 
seemingly absent or tangential at best. However, this is certainly not the case as both SWFs and 
resource nationalism share a near symbiotic relationship in that the former can a product of the 
latter, if a policy of resource nationalism has been implemented first. With respect to the case 
studies, all have implemented a policy of resource nationalism before establishing SWFs. Indeed, 
the financial basis for SWFs to form under the case studies as CSWFs would be due to the 
generation of monies from oil and gas under the varied models of the framework. Should SWFs 
be formed independently from resource nationalism, this would be either due to the lack of 
commodities and natural resources that would be able to generate funds to make a CSWF or with 
a set of funds set aside for the specific formation of SWFs, such as with NCSWFs. As of 2013, 
six out of the top ten SWFs are of NCSWF origin
133
. 
Like with all investment vehicles, there are different interpretations and practices that 
come. Therefore, when SWFs are coupled with resource nationalism there will be naturally be 
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differences between each of the case studies. Operations of SWFs are hence tied to resource 
nationalism and major CSWFs of the case studies will be covered. 
 
Iran: 
 The Iranian SWFs have only recently garnered any form of attention, notably with a more 
liberal political regime of Mohammad Khatami establishing the Iran Foreign Exchange Savings 
Account (IFESA) in 1999 (Bazoobandi 2013: 106 and Bazoobandi 2011: 181). One of the major 
purposes of establishing the SWF was to insulate the fluctuating Iranian economy in an attempt 
to provide economic growth, protect against income volatility, and domestic economic stability 
(Bazoobandi 2013: 109). After all, IFESA was established as an oil stabilization fund and was an 
important step to managing Iranian natural resource funds (Ibid: 107). Therefore, given that 
IFESA was approved through the Iranian Majles as an oil stabilization fund (Ibid), it can be 
regarded as a CSWF and a product of resource nationalism given that natural resources, 
specifically with reference to Iranian oil and gas, are nationalized according to the Iranian 
Constitution (see Appendix A). But petroleum had been discovered in Iran long before the 
establishment of IFESA, which entailed that any SWF functions were the responsibility of 
NIOC. Hence, IFESA was formed quite late compared to other regional SWFs (Bazoobandi 
2013: 107). Moreover, the international presence of IFESA is lacking due to the fact that the 
goals of IFESA were domestically oriented rather than global (Ibid). Given that there is a large 
population in Iran, especially compared to the GCC countries the task of managing the petroleum 
revenues has been considerably more difficult than the Arabian CSWF counterparts that are 
tasked with managing immense wealth with a smaller population (Ibid). Moreover, by the time 
IFESA was formed the Iranian Revolution had already transpired with a consequential limitation 
of access to global markets, particularly with Western finances, which was not the case with 
Saudi Arabia or the UAE for instance (Ibid). Limited international activities and investments are 
a crucial difference between IFESA and other GCC CSWFs (Ibid). 
 In 2011 the National Development Fund of Iran (NDFI) was formed with the purpose of 
replacing IFESA, which now holds all the previous monies that were under IFESA (Ibid). This 
CSWF was formed during the successive presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who gained the 
position after Khatami. The NDFI was formed on the argument that the previous CSWF of 
IFESA was corrupt (Ibid: 120 – 123), lacked transparency, and failed at diversifying the reliance 
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of the Iranian economy off of petroleum (Ibid: 122 – 116). Regardless of any political 
motivations behind the relabeling of the oil stabilization fund from IFESA to NDFI, the purpose 
and functions of the CSWF were to remain the same. Perhaps due to the fact that there was 
mismanagement and scandals stemming from IFESA and that it was under a different regime, it 
would be at least perceivably beneficial from a superficial standpoint to establish a separate fund 
with a different name. The functioning of a CSWF would not be transferred to the already 
established NIOC due to the lack of transparency and presence of corruption in the company. For 
example, in 2012 a senior inspector for Iranian oil affairs revealed that there was a loophole in 
the legislation that had presented challenges to the Iranian Majles for over three decades, of 
course, this is with implicit reference to corrupt activities occurring in the organisation (Ibid: 
109). The NDFI has not been established for very long but at least structurally seems to have 
more transparency than both NIOC and its predecessor CSWF of IFESA. It moreover has 
committed to the active role in expanding Iranian financial affairs to global markets. This is 
explicitly referenced through the government with a dedication of up to 40% of the CSWF to be 
used for the purposes of expanding to international markets (Ibid: 125). Since its inception, 
NDFI has apparently experienced growth from $49.9 billion USD at the beginning of 2013 to 
$61 billion USD by the end of 2013
134
. Of course, the NDFI has not been active long enough to 
assess whether it is a more successful CSWF then IFESA and operating with efficiency as well 
as transparency but it certainly a better option given that there is active government participation 
in at least the rhetoric of expanding the Iranian economy beyond its domestic boundaries and to 
engage more productively on international markets. 
 The Iranian experience with SWFs is limited but has already been characterized as being 
extremely weak with no international presence or investments. There has also been a lack of 
economic stabilization and a nonexistence of protecting the domestic economy in any sense of 
previously stated goals such as the purpose of protecting against income volatility and 
developing the domestic economy away from its reliance off of petroleum. Furthermore, 
regardless of transparency levels, which have been opaque at best, there has been rampant 
corruption throughout all levels of the CSWF that prevent any reasonable potential for the entity 
to project itself onto international markets let alone address the needs of its own population. In 
this vein, there is moreover limited access to international markets given the poor relationship 
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Iran has with Western countries and sanctioning has certainly taken its toll; with a potential to 
increase its effects on the country. The large and growing population of Iran presents additional 
levels of complications to the management policies and weak management systems that are in 
place in the country (Ibid: 126). The lack of supervision once again creates another layer of 
complications that contributed to inefficiencies in the past (Ibid). Hence, regardless of whichever 
SWF may be in place in Iran, there are structural and societal issues that must be addressed and 
resolved to a great degree in order for there to be any economic success with such a financial 
entity employed. 
 
Saudi Arabia: 
 The Saudi Arabian experience with SWFs is very different than that of Iran. The Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was established in 1952 and has been the main CSWF of the 
country until the Public Investment Fund (PIF)
135
 was founded in 2008 (Ibid: 55). The SAMA 
unequivocally acts on an imperative scale than that of its 2008 counterpart given that it is also 
the central bank of the country (Ibid). Its dual purpose of central bank and SWF has 
responsibilities that include regulating the banking system of the country and monetary 
stabilization (Ibid: 56). However, since a functioning of the SAMA is being the central bank of 
the country and is not specifically designated as an SWF, there has been debate as to whether it 
is in fact or not (Ibid). From the definitions of SWFs however, it can be concluded that the 
SAMA is a SWF in that the major source of wealth for the entity is commodity-based, which 
means that it is a CSWF and that its purpose of wealth accumulation is to stabilize the Saudi 
Arabian economy from economic shocks given the volatile nature of petroleum pricing (Ibid: 
57). The SAMA has been active in managing high government expenditures for decades rather 
than financing international investments outside the boundaries of the country (Ibid: 61). As a 
result, other GCC SWFs have taken a competitive lead over Saudi Arabia, but this does may not 
necessarily continue into the future. 
 The SAMA international investment material has been difficult to obtain as the country 
may be concerned about political implications from investments made abroad and prefers to 
avoid high profile activities (Ibid: 69). Certainty, given the political weight Saudi Arabia holds in 
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the international system, particularly with respect to the Persian Gulf region, this is an 
understandable stance. But what can be gathered at present however would be that the SAMA 
has been characterized by conservative investments that while not boosting or elevating the 
organisation to levels comparable to those of other GCC SWFs have protected its assets from 
economic shocks and significant losses as was evidenced with the global financial crisis of 2008 
(Ibid: 71). Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the USA have had long standing relations since before 
the exportation of petroleum and have been amicable ever since with the establishment of Saudi 
Aramco for example, which has also had a greater impact on political relations that affected 
international politics. The importance of such a relationship meant that Saudi Arabia tied and 
held much of their assets in USD and while the USA has been increasing in economic power so 
have Saudi Arabian investments, steadily rising in a positive correlation with that of the USA. 
The strong base of USD coupled with its accessibility to international markets, inclusive of the 
lucrative Western ones, have only bolstered the SAMA to a position of firm strength (Ibid). Ties 
are likely to remain amicable between the two countries, which is definitely to the benefit of not 
only Saudi Arabia but its SWFs as well. There also is seemingly to realistic alternative at present 
to the USD in petroleum markets, which is the commodity in which the SAMA is able to 
generate much of its revenue (Ibid). Also, the currency is a preferable standard on financial 
markets as opposed to other currencies from developing economies such as the Brazilian Real or 
Indian Rupee. 
 Yet, while there are benefits to maintaining a conservative investment strategy, there is 
an unlikely path towards developing a diversified portfolio, especially one that could be 
competitive with other GCC SWFs (Ibid). Steps towards diversification have not occurred 
already and are a key reason to why Saudi Arabian SWFs are behind other GCC counterparts in 
doing so (Ibid). However, Saudi Arabia has maintained consistent with its conservative 
management policies that provide less of a risk to the SWF of experiencing potentially massive 
losses that would have deeper repercussions. While SWFs may be able to take investment hits 
and take risks at a higher level than other traditional means of monetary management, it does not 
mean that the entity is impenetrable or exception to experiencing economic shocks that may 
occur. Ultimately, keeping a conservative stance may be best for the country as the CSWFs 
continue to develop positively. The question remains though as to how long this situation can 
remain. 
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United Arab Emirates: 
 The UAE SWFs have experienced a lengthy history in the short existence of the 
federation. Considering the political structure of the UAE as a federation, SWFs were founded 
independently in emirates before the formation of the country. Abu Dhabi for example created 
the Abu Dhabi Investment Board in 1967, which was designed to manage the increasing 
excesses of oil revenue (Ibid: 73). Following the formation of the UAE in 1971, the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Administration was created to manage the same functions that the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Board did, but with greater independence from the department of finance (Ibid). 
Afterwards, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) was created in 1976 and assumed all 
the previous responsibilities of its predecessors in addition to having even more independence 
from the department of finance (Ibid). ADIA, like many CSWFs, generates its funds from natural 
resources that are abundant in the form of oil in Abu Dhabi. ADNOC is the primary funder for 
ADIA although the latter maintains a diversified portfolio of investments that extend far beyond 
its domestic boundaries and natural resource industry. 
 By 2011 there were six major SWFs that were controlled by Abu Dhabi alone (Ibid: 75), 
one of the splinter groups from ADIA formed in 2007 would be the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Council (ADIC) and was designed to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns across the entire 
capital structure while preserving capital
136
. ADIC invests globally, which is defining of UAE 
SWFs, and there is a special focus for developing the economy of Abu Dhabi. For example, 
financial institutions such as the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD), Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank (ADCB), Union National Bank (UNB), and Al Hilal Bank are all entities that are under 
ADIC
137
. Other industries have also been developed such as with the Abu Dhabi National 
Insurance Company, Abu Dhabi Aviation Company, and Abu Dhabi National Chemicals 
Company
138
. Mubadala Development Corporation (MDC) is another product of ADIA whose 
mission statement states that the purpose of the organisation is “… mandated to strengthen Abu 
Dhabi’s growth potential, and to help the Government meet its socioeconomic targets. While the 
company’s investments are designed to generate sustainable profits over the long-term, they also 
deliver strong social returns to Abu Dhabi and the UAE. Focused on investment and 
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development across multiple sectors, [the] portfolio is valued at more than $60.93 billion USD. 
Mubadala is an active investor in sectors and geographies that hold exciting potential and 
tangible returns, working in partnership with a number of world-class organisations
139.” An 
important feature to note would be that Mubadala does have a heavily diversified investment 
portfolio that does provide a solid foundation for steering the domestic economy away from its 
reliance off of petroleum. Industries include aviation, financial services, healthcare, logistics, 
metals, mining, real estate, renewable energy, and semi-conductor production
140
. MDC is 
currently active in over 20 countries and is projected to become more active in the future
141
. 
 SWFs in Abu Dhabi and the other emirates was a strategic entity to develop in that like 
many other GCC countries there is double-digit inflation that affected traditional hand-out 
payments to the citizens of the country (Bazoobandi 2013: 75). Through developing a SWF to 
transfer Emirati petroleum revenue to other types of financial assets there is a platform from 
which the public and future generations will be able to build from (Ibid). A feature to note with 
the SWFs of the UAE would be that according to the federal constitution (See Appendix C), the 
natural resources and associated wealth that are located within the boundaries of each emirate is 
the property of that emirate (Ibid: 74). However, it is apparent that the institutions developed are 
accessible to the greater Emirati population despite being managed by separate emirates. 
Another important UAE SWF to briefly explore would be Investment Corporation of 
Dubai (ICD), which is outside the petroleum giant emirate of Abu Dhabi. The SWF was formed 
in 2006 and as of 2012 one third of the companies that ICD holds investments in is in the 
financial sector, such as Dubai Islamic Bank
142
, some being in the industrial sector, such as 
DUBAL, others in the real estate sector with EMAAR properties as a highlighting instance
143
, 
and only one being in the energy sector – ENOC144 (Bazoobandi 2013: 102). Indeed, a diverse 
set of investments held by ICD contributes to a constructive move towards economic 
diversification. However, the investment strategy of ICD, along with other UAE SWF 
counterparts, was susceptible to the global financial crisis of 2008 and experienced extreme 
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shock that demonstrated the vulnerability of producing numerous and flashy investments 
(Bazoobandi 2013: 103 – 104).  
But, while a more conservative change in tactics may appear beneficial to the future of 
SWFs in the country, it does have its drawbacks. For example, the models presented in the UAE 
were steering in a direction that was going to eventually be away from a heavy reliance on 
petroleum. Also, extreme diversification placed the UAE as a leader in the SWF scene, with 
other traditionally economic powers in the region such as Saudi Arabia being left behind; which 
undoubtedly granted UAE economic prestige that it was previously lacking. The unconventional 
and creative investment strategies from the various SWFs also enabled the UAE to gain ground 
on areas that were previously unexplored. Therefore, while there was certainly a trade-off in 
stressing the investment hits that would be able to be taken by SWFs it was far from a gamble. 
Rather, it can be viewed as strategic expansion albeit with potentially significant risks; as was 
played out with the Emirati investment vehicle shocks from the financial crisis of 2008. At 
present, the UAE SWFs are currently the strongest out of the case studies and have garnered 
significant international attention as well as presence. Yet, without its connection to resource 
nationalism via commodities wealth being injected to the initial formation, maintenance, and 
continuity of the SWF, the entities would cease to exist and the economy of the UAE would not 
be as powerful. 
 
The Enduring Legacy of Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
SWFs are increasingly becoming politicized with more associations with the state and 
central government being present. The relationship will assuredly continue and advance or 
convolute the dynamism of resource nationalism depending on the perspective. SWF 
associations with resource nationalism and its many interpretations are clear though, influencing 
even the fundamental elements that comprise the concept. For example, when viewing the 
Arabian SWFs a degree of nationalism can be seen with the decision-making processes and 
international investments made in order to bring international attention to the region in addition 
to establishing and introducing domestic Arabian names into the global financial system (Ibid: 
166). Investment strategies of SWF institutions from the UAE such as ADIA, IAD, and MDC 
vivify such a claim. The investment models are so successful in fact that other countries in the 
region such as Kuwait with the KIA have based their SWF investment strategies off of the UAE 
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expansion (Ibid). While SAMA has remained behind other GCC states in their CSWF value and 
investment expansion, there is a posited rise for Saudi Arabian presence given their interstate 
competitiveness with regional actors. Expansion however does not occur without its risks. In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis Persian Gulf CSWFs suffered greatly, incurring massive 
losses with poor business deals (Ibid). The rates at which SWFs expand consequently are lower 
than previously experienced and rates are not expected to spike upwards in the near future given 
the costly lessons that have been incurred onto the Arab CSWFs. A less reckless and more 
cautious approach to making investments have become incorporated into the investment 
strategies for the time being although the more reputable and flashy investments may be acquired 
in the future, once again capitalizing on a high risk investment appetite with the assumption of 
consistent petroleum funds being injected into the SWFs; once again having the lifeline feed of 
resource nationalism connect. 
SWFs will indeed proliferate into the financial scene of the future and therefore will 
become increasingly important as such. Symbiotically, resource nationalism too will become 
important, particularly with understanding at least the initial source wealth for the founding of 
such entities as SWFs. After all, there are continued injections of natural resource revenue into 
CSWFs, particularly when they are in need of quickly accessible capital. Hence, when discussing 
SWFs, chiefly CSWFs, it is almost expected to address resource nationalism as well with the 
only factor of implementation being the determinant. SWFs are extremely powerful economic 
entities and are not only intimately connected with natural resources in the case of CSWFs but 
also with the population of the state that funds it. Power can be projected beyond domestic 
boundaries to the international system and create significant presence. Of course, the entitled to 
the wealth and its distribution are just some of the issues that must be addressed in order for 
SWFs to maximize the effect(s) their existence. Nonetheless, it is without question that there will 
be continuous appeal for producing and advancing SWFs in the future. 
 
Conclusion: 
This chapter has expounded on resource nationalism in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 
The process through which the framework has taken root in the case studies and expressed has 
been covered. State interpretations from an idealistic point of view were presented along with 
commonly found characteristics of resource nationalism interacting with petroleum, namely 
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NOCs. But, the theoretical realm and idealism are not able to capture the veracity of 
implementing and utilizing a framework as dynamic as resource nationalism. Therefore, the 
manifestations of resource nationalism were reviewed, which envelops issues such as ethnic 
tensions. SWFs were also covered as a product of resource nationalism, which in the case of the 
Persian Gulf states was revealed to have an incontestable relationship with the framework given 
that hard commodities were the basis for all revenue generated for the initial formation of the 
entity. Indeed, resource nationalism stretches beyond its superficial observations and is complex. 
However, the analysis in this chapter did not adequately address the complexity of security 
issues and concerns associated with resource nationalism. While effects of employing the 
framework as policy was covered in addition to the state interpretations and manifestations as 
well as the association with ethnic tensions, issues such as the point to which conflict and 
violence ensures was not elaborated. Hence, the subsequent chapter will investigate 
supplementary aspects of resource nationalism that fit within the security niche and even further 
explores the complexities and dynamism of the framework. 
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Chapter 4: Energy Security and the Geopolitics of Petroleum 
 This chapter will examine additional domestic and international impacts resource 
nationalism can have when utilized. Firstly, geopolitical aspects such as select pipeline politics 
and projects will be covered. Next, ownership disputes over deposits and additional tensions 
surrounding petroleum in the Persian Gulf will be discoursed. Afterwards, energy security 
themes will successively be analysed starting with resource wars, given the centrality of natural 
resources to the region. Given that resource nationalism is a dynamic framework that can be used 
for more purposes than simply management of natural resources, some of its other functions will 
be explained in context of energy security. Namely, this would be with reference to the 
framework being used as interstate warfare and the promotion of militarization in the case 
studies. The subsequent section will be concerning the proliferation of auxiliary risks in the 
Persian Gulf. One such risk would be nuclearization, which shares close ties with all 
interpretations and manifestations of resource nationalism. Consequential sector privatization 
and further security parameters will be then be factored. This is followed by a conclusion, which 
will summarize the main findings of the chapter and lead to the subsequent chapter concerning 
theoretical shortcomings of resource nationalism and management tactics of such for the case 
studies. 
 
Pipeline Politics and Project Histories: 
 The Persian Gulf region, being the singular largest concentration of petroleum deposits in 
the world, naturally has been developed over the years to include an elaborate network of 
pipelines and other oil and gas transportation means (Figure 4.1). Shipping lanes are indeed used 
for the importation and exportation of petroleum and its by-products. A key geographic feature 
to note would be the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, which forms a strategic 
chokepoint (Figure 4.2). Iran in this sense can potentially command significant influence. It 
maintains more shoreline on the Persian Gulf than any GCC country. One pillar, half of the 
chokepoint, is within its territorial integrity. While the other pillar of Al Musandam on the 
Arabian Peninsula, an exclave of Oman, has a joint security agreement with Iran to share its 
responsibilities. Additionally, the Strait of Hormuz is extremely narrow and shallow in depth, 
which limits activities occurring in the area (Figure 4.3). Iran has been reliant on the strait for 
much of its petroleum exportations. But as far as pipeline politics is concerned, Iran has played a 
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very passive role and has not actively sought to diversify much of its dependency away from the 
Persian Gulf despite possessing the strategic geography to do so, such as through the Caspian 
Sea to the north. 
Saudi Arabia though exhibits a similar dependency but since the majority of the domestic 
economy is based on the sales of petroleum and has unrestricted access to international markets, 
the country is in an even more sensitive position of being reliant on the strait for generating 
palpable revenue. Yet, given the sheer quantity of oil in Saudi Arabia coupled with its strategic 
positioning, a reliance on the exportations exclusively through the Strait of Hormuz is a natural 
geographic boundary that would be of interest for the country to circumvent. Among the reasons 
for circumvention would be that petroleum would be able to be shipped more quickly to foreign 
markets to the west, there would be a lessened reliance on the Persian Gulf waterway for 
exportation, and circumvention would begin to capitalize on the strategic position of the country. 
While complete evasion of the Persian Gulf for transportation was unrealistic, diversification of 
transportation routes certainly was not and had been perceived as early as 1945 in Saudi Arabia 
with the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) (Kandiyoti 2012: 63, Figures 4.1 
and 4.4). The Tapline was completed in 1950 and provided an active feed of oil from the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia through Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon to Sidon on the Mediterranean Sea 
(Kandiyoti 2012: 63, Figures 4.1 and 4.4). Initially, the project was to go through the British 
Mandate of Palestine; however, the establishment of Israel prompted the Tapline to seek an 
alternative route through the Golan Heights in Syria (Kandiyoti 2012: 67). Once active, oil 
flowed from Persian Gulf to Mediterranean Sea and although originally estimated to set forth 15 
million tons of crude per year, additional pumping stations in Sidon facilitated upwards of a 25 
million tons of crude per year by 1957 (Ibid: 63). But, a Mediterranean-bound pipeline from the 
eastern Arabian Peninsula was not without its difficulties in operations. Naturally, being without 
direct access to ports on the Mediterranean Sea, Saudi Arabia was reliant off its neighbours for 
support. However, not much was given, instead heavy taxes and an area subject to violent 
Levantine geopolitical conflicts weighed down on the benefits of having the Tapline active (Ibid: 
68 – 69). Being a stationary pipeline that is transporting precious crude in a conflict-prone region 
is also conducive to potentially regarding the Tapline as a soft target (Ibid: 69). Costly 
maintenance issues, which even shut the pipeline down on numerous occasions for repairs, 
additionally worked against the transportation route that eventually led to its closure in 1990 
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(Ibid: 70). Reactivation of the pipeline would not be cost-effective given that around the time of 
its cease of operation, the Tapline was dated in its construction technique while also possessing a 
small diameter for petroleum output. Despite its ultimate failure as a project, the Tapline was a 
serious move towards diversifying trade routes away from the Persian Gulf.  
While the Tapline may have initially been created for purely economic reasons, there is 
indeed more strategic logic to initiating another move towards alternative transportation routes 
that capitalize on Saudi Arabian positioning, such as with the Red Sea
145
 as already illustrated 
with the port of Yanbu (Figure 4.5). Renewed pipeline ventures to the west in the direction of the 
Mediterranean Sea in addition to other port projects are always viable, albeit expensive, options 
for Saudi Arabia to traverse. However, expanding operations may prove more beneficial in the 
long term since petroleum shipping would be less susceptible to any potential disruptions that 
would occur at the Strait of Hormuz. Of course, relying on the Suez Canal in Egypt is an 
additional dependency to be concerned with, but that condition had already been factored when 
weighing risks of transporting product to foreign markets positioned to the west of the country. 
The Suez Canal also has historically experienced a more stable trade than the Strait of Hormuz, 
although both are disposed to geopolitical tensions. Yanbu in the meanwhile provides Saudi 
Arabia with one of the three primary export terminals of the country, with the other two of Ras 
Tanura and Ras Al Juaymah being based on the Persian Gulf
146
. Of the terminals based on the 
Persian Gulf, Ras Tanura is larger having a 6 million bpd capacity and is the largest offshore oil 
loading facility in the world; approximately 75% of Saudi Arabian exports are loaded at the 
facility (Ibid). Ras Al Juaymah has a capacity of up to 3.6 million bpd and is smaller than Yanbu, 
which has a 4.5 million bpd capacity and a 2 million bpd natural gas liquids (NGL)
147
 loading 
capacity
148
. Reportedly, Yanbu has not yet been used to full capacity but would be of significant 
interest for the country to do so rather than focus more than 75% of the export terminals and 
capabilities on the Persian Gulf (Ibid). By doing so, Saudi Arabia has firmly entrenched itself to 
focusing on the Strait of Hormuz when it can certainly capitalize more than it has already been 
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doing so by shifting westward (Ibid). There are apparently moves towards developing Yanbu 
further though with upgrades at refineries to occur in 2013 (Ibid). 
 Other attempts in the region to skirt the Strait of Hormuz would be with UAE 
endeavours, notably with the developing of pipeline networks to Fujeira along with a newly 
created export terminal that grants immediate access to the Gulf of Oman to foreign markets 
(Figure 4.5). One project developed for the sole purpose of avoiding the Strait of Hormuz would 
be with the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) that links the rich fields of Habshan to 
Fujeira (Figure 4.6). Unlike Saudi Arabia, the development of the ADCOP is not running outside 
state boundaries and therefore does not make the UAE reliant off any neighbours when 
transporting its crude
149
. ADCOP has a sizeable capacity of 1.5 million bpd and cushions the 
UAE to a great degree against any potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz (Ibid). Additionally, 
Fujeira significantly assists in creating an avenue in which the UAE would be able to evade 
exportations via the chokepoint. It is already one of the largest bunkering ports in the world and 
expanding the capabilities of the export terminal to include facilities subsea loading lines and 
deepwater tanker loading stations would make it a formidable station (Ibid). There is moreover a 
planned refinery to be built that would provide fuel for both domestic as well as international 
markets and has an estimated capacity of 250,000 bpd (Ibid). Coupled with other expansion 
projects, the emirate is rapidly becoming a node for a developing network alternative to being 
reliant and at the mercy of a chokepoint. 
 The UAE has also sought the development of additional projects that would direct more 
traffic through its developing network. For example, the UAE and Oman have agreed to 
construct a jointly-operated refinery that would have an expected capacity of 200,000 bpd (Ibid). 
Qatar has also experienced dealings with the UAE to assist in satisfying growing international 
demand for natural gas. The Dolphin Gas Project is a pipeline that connects Qatar directly to the 
UAE onward to Oman, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and linking to international markets (Ibid 
and Figure 4.6). LNG trade from Qatar is lucrative to say the least and the UAE has also been 
increasing its role in that sector as well, with more experience being gained from the Dolphin 
Gas Project. However, natural gas from domestic UAE reserves are high in sulphur content, 
which affects the ease processing given that the material is highly corrosive and can cause 
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damage when processing
150
. Due to the difficulties of managing natural gas of such quality and 
with higher quality oil deposits as an alternative, the UAE flared its gas fields for decades rather 
than undertake the more expensive process of gas refinement and LNG sector development. Yet, 
progressions in technology have facilitated the improvement of pipeline structure and integrity, 
which draw the UAE to develop its reserves to satisfy domestic demand. 
While the UAE does not have any real option of directly accessing markets via the 
Mediterranean Sea without losing considerable profit, it is certainly maximizing its positioning 
of geography, just as Saudi Arabia had, for eluding Persian Gulf dependency. By positioning 
itself to a developing transportation alternative that is moreover cooperative with its neighbours, 
the UAE can categorically benefit from its efforts. It should be noted that Persian Gulf 
dependency would only be lessened and not necessarily eliminated. However, the purpose was to 
access international markets more freely and steadily, which would not place at least the UAE 
under Iranian influence with the Strait of Hormuz. After all, Iran does hold significant weight in 
the Persian Gulf, especially at the chokepoint, and should not be therefore underestimated. 
Similarly, options for skirting the Strait of Hormuz should not be dismissed as well, which is 
why countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE should not be underestimated too. Capabilities 
indeed are present on both sides of the waterway. In the meanwhile, pipeline politics demonstrate 
a growing discomfort of countries on the Arabian Peninsula of being reliant exclusively on the 
Persian Gulf for imports and exports of petroleum. 
 
Ownership Disputes and Petroleum Tensions: 
 Predominantly, the states of the Persian Gulf respect the territorial integrity of each other 
when it comes to petroleum reserves. There are not many high-profile international disputes over 
ownership rights to oil and gas as there is a principle of mutually respected boundaries indicating 
recognized sovereignty. An exception to this case though would be between Iran and the UAE 
concerning three islands in the Persian Gulf, namely, the Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser 
Tunb (Figure 4.3). 
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Interstate Rivalry and Dynamics of Strategic Geography: 
 In order to understand the contest, it is necessary to understand a brief history of the 
islands. Firstly, from a historical perspective the earliest claims that the UAE can make to the 
islands would be as a collateral legacy of the Al Qasimi royal family of Sharjah
151
. Prior to the 
Al Qasimi influence exerted on the Persian Gulf from Bandar Lengeh starting in 1747, there 
were no claims challenging Persian authority over ownership of the islands. The Al Qasimi 
confederacy straddled opposite shores of the Persian Gulf and commanded influential naval 
capabilities to such an extent that the British Empire intervened to subdue activities launched 
against their newly developing presence in the region. When transferring power from an Al 
Qasimi sheikh to his successor, there was a view that territorial dominion would also be passed 
down (Ibid). One such claim to territorial possession would be the Abu Musa Island (Ibid). 
However, hereditary tribal possession, while de facto was influence and authority to a degree 
over the property of a de jure established sovereign state that did not belong to the Al Qasimi 
confederacy, was according to the practices of the family inherited property (Ibid). When 
Sharjah became an established emirate in 1820, the Al Qasimi confederacy still stretched across 
opposite shores of the Persian Gulf but did not incorporate the portion of the tribe that still 
inhabited Persia. However, Abu Musa came under the effective dominion of Sharjah via the 
British Empire although Persian sovereignty over the island was not challenged and even 
recognized by the latter (Ibid). Sharjah had even contracted red iron oxide concessions in 1897 
from Abu Musa via Persian contractors based in Bandar Lengeh (Ibid). The island had also been 
traditionally grouped under the Hormozgan province of Persia (Ibid). However, given the rise of 
British influence in the Persian Gulf and that the Emirate of Sharjah along with its neighbouring 
emirates on the Arabian Peninsula were a British protectorate, the island increasingly fell under 
Sharjah influence with superior British military power contractually backing the emirate through 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 
However, in order to understand Abu Musa Island it is necessary to comprehend further 
composition of islands in the Persian Gulf, such as neighbouring Sirri Island, which was never 
claimed by any other force in the region other than Persia. In terms of nomenclature, the name 
“Abu Musa” had been intertwined with the names of other islands that included Sir Bani Yas, Sir 
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Bu Nayar Sirri, and Sirri which was also known as Sir Bu Sur, with Abu Musa being formerly 
known as Sir Bu Musa (Ibid). Etymology for Sir Bu Musa is likely to be related to the Dastur 
inhabitants
152
 that operated throughout Persian Gulf islands that included Greater Farur and Sirri 
to Dalmah off of the Abu Dhabi coast
153
. A pearl bank close to Dalmah had been called Hawad 
Bin Musammih, which was a name likely derived from musaqqam translating to “one who is 
financing a pearling fleet” (Ibid). Naturally, there is a suspected link between “Bin Musammih” 
and “Bu Musa”, especially given that it was not unusual to have pearl banks named for a group 
from another area such as Dhahr Al Yas being named off of Dalmah Island despite being far 
from Sir Bani Yas Island itself or the Abu Dastur pearl bank being made to an area that was 
tracing back to Sirri Island (Ibid). Another theory points out that the island in local dialects is 
known as Bu Mouf
154
 and Gap Sabz[u]
155
, which suggests from the Persian language translation 
that there was at least one source of freshwater on the island (Roshandel in Potter, L. and Sick, 
G. 2002: 138). Regardless of etymology the continued presence of Persians to the region only 
bolstered Persian claims to the area while Arabian ones were essentially non-existent and only 
came to front starting from a status of British Empire presence to the region. What is to 
essentially be gained is that Abu Musa Island has had an extensive history of interaction with 
Persians hailing from not only islands of the Persian Gulf but also the mainland of what is now 
Iran. On the converse, there has certainly been less influence and interaction when compared to 
those of Iran. There is also indeed the question as to why only the Abu Musa Island has been 
claimed rather than also including the Sirri Island that is only 24 miles away from the former. 
 The Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands are additional points of dispute between Iran and 
the UAE. Before delving into the historical associations and interactions of the islands in the 
waterway, the term “tunb” should firstly be evaluated. “Tunb” or “tonb” is a Middle Persian 
word denoting a jut of landmass, such as a hill. With reference to an island, it is a jut of landmass 
stemming from a body of water
156
. The word is still found in topographical names in Iran. Such 
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examples would be with Tunb-e Seh in Tangestan, Bushehr, Tonbanu on Qeshm Island in 
Hormozgan as well as Tunb-e Siyak, Tunb-e Jaki, and Tunb-e Bongeru, all found in Bandar 
Lengeh, Hormozgan (Ibid). There is a claim that supposedly contradicts the Middle Persian 
usage of the word “tunb” to instead be with reference to the Arabic “tunub”, which denotes 
“habitat or place of settlement” and is written as well as subsequently pronounced with a harder 
Arabic letter (ط) /tā/ that is absent from the Persian language. However, while the original 
spelling of “tunb” in Persian was with the harder Arabic letter, it does not address that Middle 
Persian was written with a separate alphabet used by the Sassanid Persians, who ruled Persia 
before the arrival of Islam to the Iranian Plateau. Indeed, the etymology of the Tunb Islands is 
certainly more straightforward than that of Abu Musa Island and is more undeniably rooted in an 
Iranian context. 
 Historically, it has been reported that the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands have been 
largely uninhabited, partially due to the lack of resources on the island such as freshwater (Ibid). 
The Lesser Tunb in particular has received less attraction than its counterpart, which did serve as 
host to deer and gazelle at periods of time that were able to feed on grass patches on the island 
(Ibid). Additionally, the Greater Tunb seasonally attracted fishermen from both sides of the 
Persian Gulf, particularly those from the Arabian shores, but was only recorded of doing so from 
1864 and was moreover viewed as an antagonizing move against the Al Qasimi tribe hailing 
from mainland Iran (Ibid).  Regardless of however many inhabitants there may or may not have 
been on the islands, the historical association has been with Iran, just as the Abu Musa Island 
has, and only experienced claims otherwise from an Iranian-originating tribal confederacy whose 
influence expanded onto the Arabian Peninsula. 
At the time of British withdrawal from all territories east of the Suez Canal, the Trucial 
Coast found itself positioned for independence (Macris 2010: 156 – 157). On November 30, 
1971, before the Trucial Coast formed the federal union of the UAE, the Iranian Navy asserted 
its position on the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands (Roshandel in Potter, L. and Sick, G., eds. 2002: 
138). Despite an agreement between the emirate of Sharjah and Iran, Sheikh Sagar of Sharjah 
even greeted the Iranian Navy on the Abu Musa Island and even toured the Iranian Artemis 
destroyer (Figure 4.7), there was little resistance met by armed inhabitants of the Tunb Islands, 
reportedly being of Ras Al Khaimah backing (Rubin 2002: 44 – 45). The Iranians were ordered 
to not fire a single shot during the landing and were present in absolute control over all islands 
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by the end of the day (Roshandel in Potter, L. and Sick, G., eds. 2002: 138). The aftermath 
resulted in the newly formed UAE labelling the landing of the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands as an 
invasion. It has been a source of friction between the two countries ever since but Iran has 
maintained its position on the islands throughout the decades. A MOU was drafted between the 
two parties with British mediation but after nine years the UAE had brought a case for the 
islands to be brought into Emirati territory to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 
1980 during the Iran-Iraq War, however, the case was dismissed
157
. The UAE additionally 
attempted bring the dispute before the International Court of Justice, but Iran refused to attend on 
grounds that it would not put any of its sovereign territory into question or debate as the Abu 
Musa and Tunb Islands have always belonged to Iran
158
, especially since it never renounced 
possession of the islands (Ibid; Ehteshami and Zweiri 2009: 103). Moreover, on a number of 
GCC conferences, collective conclusions have been made that the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands 
are occupied Emirati territories by Iran and should thusly be returned to the UAE
159
. 
 For such small islands in the midst of a vast gulf, there is indeed an intense amount of 
pressure surrounding the issue and begs the question as to why the topic is so problematic. As far 
as strategic geography is concerned, the Abu Musa Island is positioned close to the mouth of the 
Strait of Hormuz and also crosses strategic trade routes to the opening (Figure 4.3). The island is 
also close to other neighbouring Iranian islands, such as Sirri Island. The Greater and Lesser 
Tunb Islands are both within Iranian maritime boundaries, being close to the shores of the 
country. Strategic geographic positioning likewise applies as the two are close to the opening of 
the strait in addition to inbound and outbound channels of the Persian Gulf (Ibid). Certainly, 
petroleum traffic through and/or close to these areas make the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands 
coveted spaces in the waterway. Additionally, the Mubarak offshore oil field of Abu Musa Island 
is also of interest (Figures 4.8 – 4.10). It is suspected of being able to produce between 10,000 to 
17,000 bpd (Roshandel in Potter, L. and Sick, G., eds. 2002: 138) but has been reported of 
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outputting upwards of 60,000 bpd according to Crescent Petroleum, which was the first company 
to explore and gather oil from the Mubarak field via Buttes Oil and Gas Company, which itself is 
a subsidiary of Crescent Petroleum
160
. While both countries have prodigious petroleum reserves, 
making the Mubarak field appear smaller in comparison to other deposits found in Iran
161
 and the 
UAE
162
, the island plus its demarcated surrounding waters are of potentially significant strategic 
interest as far as geography is concerned. It is in fact from such strategic islands that Iran was 
able to launch intercepting boats and helicopters to attack the shipping of both Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia while also attacking UAE offshore petroleum fields from 1986 to 1988
163
. Iranian 
payments to Sharjah for oil concessions from the Mubarak field that were a part of the MOU had 
also ceased by around 1984, most likely as a response not only for the support many Arabian 
states of the Persian Gulf gave to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War but the financial drain 
experienced as well. Crescent Petroleum has since then continued operations on the Mubarak 
field that have produced over 100 million bbl from its initial operations in 1971
164
. 
Resource nationalism seamlessly ties into the dispute over the Abu Musa and Tunb 
Islands. The components of the framework have each been expressed on all parties involved with 
the clash. The states of Iran and the UAE have both laid claim to the islands on the basis of 
sovereignty, meaning for the latter that the Iranian presence on the islands are an invasion onto 
its sovereign domain while the former sees the islands as a part of its own sovereign territory that 
was never given up or lost. Consequently, governmental assertions to territories as well as the 
natural resources surrounding them are tied to the state component. With respect to the state 
component on the scale of resource nationalism in Iran and the UAE, both countries have 
implemented and emphasized the component equally. Nationalism therefore is undoubtedly at 
play with both Iran and the UAE for assertion of ownership over the islands as one views the 
other as making illegitimate claims to the territories. Especially considering a newly formed 
UAE, an elemental level of idealism can certainly be seen. The primordial mind-set of the 
Emiratis though, an approach evidenced through societal components such as rights to 
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citizenship, does not support their position and can be dismissed by not only the Iranians but by 
other onlookers of the international system as well. After all, primordialism is based on 
continuity of existence and therefore authenticity, but there were certainly instances in which 
some or all of the islands in question at various points in history were seemingly deserted and 
therefore depopulated. While this may apparently damage Iranian claims to the islands, the fact 
remains that the resettlements were consistently from Iranian background and can be argued that 
while there may have been instances of desertion it would only be due to the lack of resources 
for sustaining human life for a consistent and continuous period of time. Nonetheless, as far as 
authenticity by continuity is concerned, the Emiratis undoubtedly are lacking since the country 
only originated in 1971 and any historical claims to the islands are preceded by Iranian ones. 
Despite the lack of historical establishment in the area, the UAE continues to assert to a degree 
that their claims to the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands do have a historical basis extensive enough 
to possess the islands. With respect to the nationalism component on the scales of resource 
nationalism in Iran and the UAE, both have high and equal value stresses placed on it. 
In terms of nation, according to the definition proposed by Smith (2010: 13), the 
description is valid and applicable for both Iran as well as the UAE. But, ultimately it is not the 
strongest exclusive means in which to observe resource nationalism with the Abu Musa and 
Tunb Islands for the UAE. For example, while there may be a shared history, on various levels 
the notions of common myths, perceived homeland or territory, as well as common laws and 
customs for all members will differ and consequently affects the degree of success of utilizing 
the nation concept. Nationhood can be asserted on grounds of multinational composition though, 
such as with Iran viewing the cultural communities on its shores as a regional difference of the 
country facilitated by the change in geography, which is inclusive of multinational coexistence. 
This approach is repeated on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf with countries of the GCC, 
such as with Oman, which possesses a varied geography as well as multinational population 
base. But this is not applicable to the UAE given that there are guidelines for what in fact 
constitutes an Emirati, meaning that there is a uniform requisite for national membership. Taking 
into consideration the makeup and historical associations of the islands, the Emirati claims are 
again weakened. In short, nation is present in both Iranian and Emirati implementations of 
resource nationalism in this instance; however the former has a more successful emphasis on the 
concept while the latter cannot. There is also the element of political referent, which of course is 
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a factor that is capitalized by the Iranians as it is more so in favour of Iran given that it was not 
colonized, did not ever lose or give up claims to the islands, and the nation(s) residing on the 
Abu Musa and Tunb Islands have historically looked towards Iran as a representative political 
authority. Conversely, while the UAE did not exist prior to 1971 and had political representation 
by the British prior to its independence, there may have indeed been communities that may have 
looked towards the Al Qasimi tribal confederacy as the political referent. But it should not be 
forgotten that the Al Qasimis were of mainland Iranian origin and have themselves looked 
towards Iran as a political referent, even with the British Empire presence in the Persian Gulf 
during colonization. Such evidence would be with the concessions of red iron oxide in 1897 
being licensed from contractors based in Bandar Lengeh
165
. Furthermore, there was no formal Al 
Qasimi political authority that was ever established, rather, there were dominions that were later 
on successive emirates
166
 that were divided between factions of the family. The sheer diversity in 
the Persian Gulf on territories such as experienced with the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands do have 
a factor of nation as a component of the framework at play, but it is not the most stressed weight 
on the scale of resource nationalism in both Iran and the UAE. 
Rather, ethnicity carries significant weight and is more stressed upon in the usage of 
resource nationalism, with particular reference to the UAE. One reason that ethnicity would be a 
more successful concept for the UAE to emphasize would be that there is no necessary 
requirement for having political referents (Smith 2010: 12 – 13). While it is not necessary for 
ethnicity to lack political referents, the UAE can interpret the concept of ethnicity in such a 
manner that it would bolster UAE claims to the islands over its claims using the concept of the 
nation. This would indeed be able to address the issue of political representation and notation. 
Additionally, the ethnic community does not need to be in physical possession of a historic 
territory (Ibid). Given that history will work in favour of Iran over the UAE, this is yet another 
reason why the ethnic component is more stressed upon. Additionally, recognition of ethnicity 
does not necessarily require a public culture to be evolved and there also does not necessarily 
need to be a degree of self-determination. This can work in favour of the UAE since there can 
arguably be a public culture that exists within the Persian Gulf littoral and there is no real degree 
of self-determination exercised by the population that inhabited the islands. However, since 
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ethnic groups are majority Persian, there is already an association that will be inclined towards 
aligning with Iran. However, the UAE is composed of Iranian groups inclusive of Persians but 
despite possessing a multi-ethnic society, is not accommodating towards such an identity or 
admission, which can affect the population on the islands feeling unable to connect with the 
UAE. Evidence of preference for a single ethnic group in the UAE would be through the 
Emiratization program, which is effectively equated with being Arab and if not, then one must 
go through a process of Arabization in order to be considered a member of the group rather than 
accommodate a multi-ethnic society at the intersection of regional trade routes. Therefore, 
according to the logic of the Emiratis, if there were any Persians on the island, they were either 
illegal or invited immigrants and do not have grounds to possess citizenship if they do not have it 
already. Given that Iran is encompassing of both Arabs and Persians along with many other 
ethnic groups to be a part of the country, citizenship is accessible without a requisite or 
preference for a particular group (with no real importance placed on ethnicity). Therefore, while 
the UAE emphasizes the ethnic component more than the national component, there are many 
assumptions that are made. Moreover, the Iranian interpretation is more accommodating to a 
multi-ethnic status. 
 It should be noted at this point that while the application of resource nationalism to the 
Abu Musa and Tunb Islands have been on territorial grounds and not hydrocarbons, natural 
resources are undeniably associated with the islands and are equally pertinent to the review 
covered. For example, the de jure status of the Mubarak field implies that while the Abu Musa 
Island and designated maritime circumference boundary denotes Iranian possession along with 
the petroleum reserves, the emirate of Sharjah receives payment from the gathering of oil and gas 
from the deposit and even carries out operations for extractions
167
. Freshwater and other natural 
resources, inclusive of land, are of Iranian possession though and have not been dealt through 
any type of concession, deal, or agreement, such as with the Mubarak field. Also, political 
recognition should be present when there are sovereign territories and natural resources at stake. 
While the UAE can argue that control was asserted over the islands by the Al Qasimis, who were 
a precursor to some of the emirates that were incorporated into the UAE, Iran can in turn note 
that recognized control was hailing from Iran with a vital point of the 1897 red iron oxide 
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concessions being highlighted
168
. It can be argued that without such legally binding dealings, the 
Al Qasimis would not have been able to mine the materials in the first place. 
 In sum, Iran and the UAE both place a constant emphasis on the notion of the state when 
utilizing resource nationalism towards the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands (Figure 4.14). Both 
countries have used governments from mutually recognized sovereign states to lay claim to the 
territories as well as the natural resources surrounding them, notably the Mubarak field of Abu 
Musa Island. Nationalism in turn has also run high with both parties placing a great deal of 
emphasis on the notion (Ibid). The major differences in the application of resource nationalism to 
the issue would be that while emphasis is placed on ethnicity in the UAE model, it is also placed 
on the Iranian model as well. A feature of the Iranian model to note would be that emphases 
placed between ethnicity and nation, given the closeness of definitions of the two concepts, 
provides the ability to oscillate. This entails that there are equal stresses on the two concepts for 
the Iranian model to compensate for the occasional vagueness of definitions and can interchange 
when convenient (Ibid). However, the UAE is unable to perform the same oscillation as Iran 
given the problematic nature of nation interacting with the country and instead must place more 
stress on the notion of ethnicity (Ibid). 
 
Intrastate Petroleum Anxieties: 
 Aside from the maritime-bound ownership disputes in the Persian Gulf, there are also 
intrastate petroleum tensions that exist in the case studies as well. Resource nationalism is 
vividly illustrated throughout the Persian Gulf in this context and the case studies prove 
fascinating examples. 
 In Iran, the majority of onshore petroleum reserves are in the south-western province of 
Khuzestan (Figures 4.11 – 4.13 and 4.15 – 4.18). However, it is also an area in which there is a 
significant presence of an Arab minority (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2009: 102). While Iran 
maintains a multicultural identity, there are concerns over continued stability in the province 
given the tumultuous history of conflict and attempts from Arab countries to undermine Iranian 
presence in the region. With instances such as calling for a unilateral name change of the Persian 
Gulf and the Iran-Iraq War, suspicions of international involvement run high. Importantly, Iran 
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views attempts to lessen its influence in the region as a move towards Arabization since there are 
no other regional players that have ethnic commonalities with the population of Khuzestan aside 
from the Arab countries. Should there be such a shift in the Persian Gulf, there are indeed 
security concerns that would be raised with the Arab minority in the province that would have 
serious repercussions on the Iranian petroleum sector as well as presence in the region, should 
the area fall under external influence or lose Iranian governmental authority. Moreover, 
regardless of the commonalities of religion and acceptance into mainstream Iranian identity, 
there have been calls for autonomy from the province, which have been closely observed and 
addressed by the Iranian government (Ibid). Correcting the perception of Arabization therefore 
has been a priority of the country in addition to asserting its multicultural identity without losing 
any of its population (Ibid). In the south-eastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, gas fields 
fall under the majority ethnic group of the Baluch (Figure 4.11), which despite being an Iranian 
group
169
, is of a separate linguistic background
170
 and religious conviction, following Sunnism 
rather than the dominant Shi’ism of the country. In Sistan and Baluchistan there have been more 
violent movements and demands for independence than in Khuzestan, with notable instances of 
the Baluch separatist group Jundullah committing acts of terrorism against the civilian 
population of Iran
171
. Ethnically, the Baluch are also spread across international borders to 
neighbouring Pakistan, which likewise has security concerns with its own Baluch population. 
Organisations such as Jundullah (Ibid) and the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA)
172
 have similarly 
terrorized and committed atrocious acts against civilians in Pakistan as well (Ibid). Ethnic 
tensions, separatist movements, and terrorism are issues that each in isolation would be concerns 
for any state to address. However, such traits are seemingly even more exaggerated, such as with 
Khuzestan as well as Sistan and Baluchistan, with the promise of rapidly accessible natural 
resource wealth being present. The role of resource nationalism with respect to Iranian intrastate 
petroleum tensions is straightforward, with all components of the framework being touched 
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upon. It should also be noted that there is additional scope for strains to become even further 
aggravated. 
In Saudi Arabia, petroleum reserves are concentrated in the Eastern Province (Figures 
4.1, 4.15, and 4.19). Yet, it is also an area in which there is a significant presence of a Shia 
minority (Figure 4.20). Given the Saudi Arabian interpretation and manifestation of resource 
nationalism, there is widespread resentment for the perceived imbalanced receiving of petroleum 
wealth to the population, particularly in the Eastern Province, in addition to the historical and 
tribal revulsion for the Al Sauds. There have been a number of clashes with the Shias in the 
Eastern Province, with notable instances in 2012 being with the targeted destructions of pipeline 
infrastructure in Qatif and Awamiyah (Ibid). Iranian television initially reported an explosion 
from an oil pipeline in Awamiyah as well as a fire near an oil pipeline between Awamiyah and 
Safwa hours after the incidents occurred
173
, but these events were promptly denied by the Saudi 
Arabian authorities
174
. However, targeted petroleum pipeline attacks did in fact occur and 
suspicions were raised of foreign influence extending into the country from Iran due to the 
common religious denomination of Shi’ism being shared with the minority (Figure 4.21). The 
role of resource nationalism in exacerbating Saudi Arabian intrastate petroleum tensions is 
obvious, with the Shia population being able to lay claim to natural resources located within their 
territory for the purposes of ownership and/or control. Moreover, given that religion is a factor 
that can influence the framework, there is a serious issue for the ruling authority to resolve since 
the state is defined as an absolute monarchy, which adheres to a particular interpretation of a 
religion that has many interpretations. 
 In the UAE, intrastate tensions with petroleum reserves do not currently exist. However, 
the potential for ethnic tensions to magnify and challenge currently existing norms is staggering. 
The current oil and gas reserves as well as greater petroleum infrastructure, which is inclusive of 
pipelines, ports, terminals, refineries, and processing plants (Figures 4.8 – 11, 4.15, and 4.22) are 
all subject to stability should the currently existing tensions not reach the stage of violent 
expression. However, populations of the UAE such as khodmioonis and Shias can feel 
discrimination from Emirati society with policies such as the Emiratization program. Eventually, 
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tensions can rise to a point in which there would be a contrary move towards resource 
nationalism such as with the Eastern Province and Saudi Arabia. 
Ultimately, in Iran the intrastate tensions with petroleum reserves amount to fears and 
security concerns rather than serious issues that are crippling or hindering the state. The identity 
of the population is steadfast in encompassing a multinational, multi-ethnic, and multicultural 
composition, which addresses all components of resource nationalism soundly. Saudi Arabia 
though does have a serious issue to address in the country, with special attention to the Eastern 
Province and the Shia minority that inhabits the immediate area surrounding the petroleum 
reserves. State identity is not inclusive of the Shias and consequently creates a significant out-
group that affects prospects for continued petroleum stability. While the UAE at present does not 
have any immediate concern to address a tense intrastate petroleum situation, there is a tangible 
possibility for the country to take a path similar to that of Saudi Arabia, should communities 
such as the khodmoonis and Shias be regarded as out-groups. State identity is vague in the UAE 
and shifts depending on the emirate as well as economic, social, and religious factors. In short, 
the absence of immediate tensions does not signify that there will not be a development of them 
in the future. 
 
Resource Wars: 
 It is evident that conflict surrounds natural resources. The applications of resource 
nationalism in the case studies have already implicitly referenced such an observation but have 
not explicitly evaluated the view. The idea of conflict surrounding and/or over natural resources 
gained traction in the 1980s with the geopolitical contest between the US and USSR over the 
control over fuel and mineral deposits in regions such as southern Africa and the Middle East (Le 
Billon 2012: 12). The term “resource wars” was used to illustrate competition for the possession 
of natural resources as well as struggles against large-scale resource exploitation actions (Ibid). 
The term “resource conflict” has also been proposed to understand the case in which conflict 
occurs over a natural resource for its own sake (Ibid). An integral fundament of resource 
nationalism is the claim to natural resources for the purposes of ownership and/or control. 
However, the execution of the claim is subject to amplification and can indeed be gained via 
conflict and warfare. Hence, resource wars are a relevant notion to resource nationalism, which 
can facilitate them depending on the interpretation and manifestation of the framework. 
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 Within the case studies, there is a distinct intrastate function that resource wars retain. 
Iran for example must address tensions and separatist movements in Khuzestan as well as Sistan 
and Baluchistan. Saudi Arabia deals with its Shia population and the UAE may not currently 
possess severe petroleum anxieties, but there is always reservation for that to occur in the future. 
Effectively, when a domestic group lays claim to natural resources in the boundaries of the state 
for the purposes of ownership and/or control and is willing to conduct warfare in order to achieve 
the goal of proprietorship, the state will be competing with itself should the internal forces 
determine that there is no governmental legitimacy over the natural resources. There is also an 
additional dimension to the geographic landscape of resource wars to consider. For example, in 
Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea the government has claimed that all hydrocarbons are property of 
the state and will be extracted with priority (Karayianni in Akiner ed. 2004: 150). The NOC 
SOCAR was formed to manage the concessions and proceedings of a lucrative contract attracting 
significant international investments (Ibid). Of course, this comes in conflict to other groups that 
depend on the Caspian Sea fisheries for their traditional livelihood; such was the case in the 
capital city of Baku as well as other port cities like Lankaran. While Baku may have acquiesced 
to the governmental procedures of prioritized petroleum extraction, the port city of Lankaran did 
not. The south Caucasus port city of Lankaran is also host to the Talysh ethnic group, which are 
traditionally an agrarian community that depended on the cultivation of the Caspian Sea for 
economic continuation (Nuriyev 2007: 226). During the initial phase of independence in 
Azerbaijan as a result of the dissolution of the USSR, the Talysh of Lankaran staged a major 
secessionist movement in 1993 to form a Talysh-Mugan Republic led by Alikram Humbatov 
(Ibid: 226). The rebellion ultimately failed and led to Humbatov fleeing to Iran, only to be later 
extradited to Azerbaijan and imprisoned (Ibid: 226). But the break with the traditional passive 
lifestyle to outright destructive rebellion is a reminder to the Azeri government that although 
petroleum can be nationalized via NOCs, the population must also view the proceedings with 
legitimacy as well or potentially suffer dire consequences. After all, the Talysh occupy strategic 
Caspian Sea terrain, which can influence oil and gas extractions, trade routes, as well as Azeri 
maritime integrity. The Caspian Sea experience in Azerbaijan with the Talysh is similarly 
applicable to all the case studies of the Persian Gulf that share a common history of various 
nations and ethnicities that have maintained their livelihood off of fishing. The dimensional 
complexity of multiple natural resources occupying the same space presents a platform for 
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resource wars. A conflict of interest can arise, which can contribute to or exacerbate currently 
existing tensions to the point that violence would erupt (Le Billon 2012: 72). While it is unlikely 
that any of the case studies will experience a secessionist movement based on traditional 
livelihoods connected to the Persian Gulf, a point can be made on the grounds of perceived 
imbalanced receiving of petroleum wealth. Traditional livelihoods were eroded in favour of a 
more efficient manner in which to generate wealth to the state and population. However, should 
there be a polarization in the distribution of windfall that can be argued to not favour a portion of 
society; disproportion can foment antipathy (Ibid). Opposition can view natural resources as the 
means of securing the economic independence of a future state (Ibid). Ethnic groups can also 
alternatively seek greater access and benefits from natural resources than other groups that 
compose the state, such as in Iran with the provinces of Khuzestan as well as Sistan and 
Baluchistan; which do not necessarily constitute secessionist movements in expressing 
occasional aversion. 
 The interstate element of resource wars is equally direct in understanding and was the 
initial setting for the term gaining popularity. Competition over natural resources between states 
for example could be arguably demonstrated between Iran and the budding UAE over the Abu 
Musa and Tunb Islands with the Mubarak field at stake. However, interstate conflict over such a 
small reserve with so many others in the surrounding region seems to be trivial. Yet, the point 
can be asserted since the quantity of resource(s) is not the matter of question. Another would be 
with Iran effectively siphoning Iraqi oil via Khor Al Zubayr in the south with a network of 
domestic Iraqi smugglers
175
. Interstate resource war can also be between states and non-state 
actors from international boundaries, such as with Iran and the Pakistani Baluch separatist 
movements. Outside the Persian Gulf region could be seen with the USSR combating the United 
Front in Afghanistan, where there are significant deposits of rare earth and other previous 
minerals (Ibid: 109 – 111). Needless to mention, competition and conflict are magnified when 
dealing with interstate resource wars that have collateral implications for resource security. 
However, resource wars are more so a consequence of implementing resource 
nationalism rather than utilizing the framework. It is a response against the claims a government 
and/or ethnic group make over natural resources located in a designated territory. After all, 
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should there be no claims of ownership over natural resource deposits there are no parties that 
will be able to contest over them, which negates conflict.  
 
Resource Nationalism as Interstate Warfare: 
 The dynamism of the framework does enable it to have other applications to international 
relations though. A developing and more clandestine usage of resource nationalism would be for 
conducting interstate warfare. In this sense, warfare is not limited to the physical means of 
violence but rather other conceptual forms of conflict. This is attractively illustrated between the 
case studies in the Persian Gulf. The basic structure of resource nationalism from all 
interpretations and manifestations provide that there are NOCs, of which NIOC, Saudi Aramco, 
and ADNOC are the largest from each case study. SWFs have also been produced from resource 
nationalism via NOC wealth that was distributed for the formation of the economic bodies; NDF, 
SAMA, and ADIA are the largest from each case study. When considering the usage of resource 
nationalism as interstate warfare, NOCs should be thought of as the mediation or base source of 
wealth while SWFs would be the investment vehicles. Petrodollars from these bodies are used to 
influence international relations through key elements such as the promotion of religious 
ideology, expansion of economic rivalry, political conflict, and proxy warfare. 
 The promotion of religious ideology is most evidently visible with Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
On intrastate levels both countries demonstrate extreme implementations of religion in the 
political systems. Iran predominantly follows Shia Islam and has consequently established itself 
as an Islamic Republic from 1979, with additionally appointing a religious Supreme Leader as 
the declarative absolute head of state. While there have been strides towards implementing a 
democracy in the country, although Iran may not admit to such moves, there are popular 
elections for the voting of a president. In this vein, it should be mentioned that despite popular 
procedures that may be in place, Iran remains at best a pseudo-theocratic state. Saudi Arabia in 
turn is declared to predominantly follow Sunni Islam and has implemented an absolute monarchy 
with substantial theocratic influence. There is no constitution and is instead adoptive of the 
Quran as the guide for state rule. Sharia is arbitrarily implemented in both countries, with both 
possessing disorganized legal systems. When concerning the promotion of religious ideology to 
other states, Iran has projected its ideas to countries such as Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. 
Saudi Arabia has likewise has exported its religious ideology to countries such as Afghanistan, 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Syria. Exportations of religious ideologies can be readily 
identified in some cases through religious symbols. Commonly found Shia symbols for example 
would be depictions of the Imam Ali, portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini or Khamenei as well as 
the Hezbollah figure of Hasan Nasrallah in addition to the flag of the political party. Conversely, 
a commonly distributed Sunni symbol would be a black flag with a stylized shahada. Petroleum 
wealth generated to NOCs and distributed via SWFs, although less so in the case of Iran due to a 
weak NDF, assists in the mass dissemination of religious ideology. Charities, mosques, religious 
schools, scholarships, and other academic institutions are some of the ways in which petroleum 
wealth has been able to contribute to the promotion of religious ideology from Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. Resource nationalism therefore is the origin for the assistance of such advancement since 
it is the core essence of which petroleum in Iran and Saudi Arabia is managed. The NDF may not 
act as a strong vehicle for investment or the promotion of religious ideology to the international 
system since it is more occupied with domestic sustainment but NIOC certainly does have a role, 
especially considering that the Iranian economy has been dependent upon petroleum revenue for 
decades. In contrast, both Aramco and the SAMA will be more observably tied to any funds 
distributed for a transaction since Aramco is responsible for the majority of revenue generation 
in the country and the SAMA is the entity that is responsible for the production of the Saudi 
Arabian riyal. According to the frame, only SAMA produces Saudi Arabian currency, therefore 
should there be no SAMA there would be no currency and hence no funding for activities; that 
is, of course, until an alternative is formed. But until this function has been performed, the logic 
stands. With the Muslim holy sites of Mecca and Medina coupled in the kingdom for annual 
pilgrimages, Saudi Arabia has unquestionably had more opportunity to impact the Muslim world 
than Iran has. Moreover, majority of the Muslims in the world are followers of the Sunni 
interpretation, with major schools categorized as Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i. But in 
spite of the immense global influence Saudi Arabia has exerted onto the Sunni world, Shi’ism 
has also gained traction as well as strategic political influence. Iraq and Bahrain for example are 
countries in which majority of the population is Shia. But Lebanon is host to Hezbollah in a 
country that has major populations of Maronite Christians and Sunnis. Similarly, Syrian Alawites 
lean towards the Shia schools of thought and are currently the ruling authority in the country but 
have a majority population of Sunnis. Pockets of Shi’ism also exist throughout North Africa, the 
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Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia; areas of which the majority of followers 
are Sunni. 
 Economic rivalry is also prevalent throughout the entire Persian Gulf region, but is 
exacerbated with resource nationalism and expressed with the economic heavyweights of Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. One of the most vivifying instances of competition between the two states 
would be with the proposed currency unification of the GCC. The regulatory body was to be 
known as the Gulf Monetary Union (GMU) and to be headquartered in presumably the financial 
heart of the area. However, the project did not come to fruition with the exiting of UAE from the 
GMU with the announcement that the financial headquarters would be in Riyadh rather than Abu 
Dhabi (Antoniades in Kamrava (ed.) 2012: 175). While Saudi Arabia may possess more oil 
reserves than the UAE, the international business strategy of the latter is certainly enviable. In 
this vein, another instance would be with the early SWF portfolio diversification of the UAE that 
was enabling the country to gain considerable international financial presence. Saudi Arabia had 
the potential and capabilities to perform a similar expansion, however, the conservative 
reservations to diversify and lack of entrepreneurism contributed to the country becoming a 
follower in the trend. Projections of further economic growth in the UAE can be attributed to the 
developing ports in Fujeira that provide an alternative area for Strait of Hormuz reliance. Of 
course, the entire shifting of the current petroleum trade infrastructure to such ports is unlikely to 
occur, but the UAE is once again capitalizing and building on something that will prove to have 
economic benefits. Fujeira ports indeed will attract further international curiosity and investment. 
In both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the centripetal role of petroleum wealth and resource 
nationalism is the foundation and heart in which economic activities are able to be promoted. 
Iran is the weakest out of the economies and does not participate in the international competition 
between those on the converse of the Persian Gulf. Rather, the country is constrained and limited 
to managing its own dire domestic economic matters. Sanctions have certainly taken a toll on 
Iranian economic competitiveness and even a dynamic of resource nationalism would not be able 
to enable the country to skirt around them. 
 Political conflict is existent between all states due to the nature of politics, but is more so 
intensified with an additional layer of complexity to address. Foreign interference in another 
state is not a novel historical occurrence. Indeed, petrodollars have been utilized to fund political 
agenda in the Middle East, such as with Iran supporting the Assad regime in Syria. Other 
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manpower and services such as military consultants have also been directed to the Levant in an 
attempt to expand Iranian state influence. However, petrodollars have also been responsible 
countermeasures, such as with coup d’états, insurgencies, armed resistances, or revolutions. In 
Syria, Saudi Arabia for example has been responsible for the spreading of extremist ideology 
such as Sunni radicalism and Wahhabism. There are other players that have also contributed to 
the training and sustainment of armed rebels in Syria, but Saudi Arabia is a major participant. An 
interest for Saudi Arabia to support an alternative political agenda in Syria would be that it 
becomes more anxious with growing Iranian influence in its neighbourhood. In Bahrain, Iran has 
also supported the move for greater freedoms in the kingdom, albeit simultaneously supporting 
the common bond of Shi’ism as well. Certainly, a Shia Bahrain would have inclinations to 
supporting Iranian political agenda more so than others in the Sunni neighbourhood. Similarly, it 
would be more so in Iranian interests to have a Houthi Zaydi Shia tribe seize power in Yemen, 
which would likely be inclined to supporting Iranian agenda given the common religious 
background, and would also greatly antagonize a bordering Saudi Arabia. While the entire credit 
for interstate political conflict cannot be attributed to resource nationalism alone, the profits 
generated from oil and gas sales do contribute to parties being able to achieve goals. Such a 
description signifies that there can also be a functional usage to a degree of the geopolitical 
expediency form of resource nationalism in which authorities use resources to secure foreign 
policy objectives (Nurmakov in Overland et al. 2010:  20 – 21: 20 – 21). While contracts may 
not necessarily be highly vulnerable to license revocation, there are indeed objectives that are 
intended to be achieved. 
 Proxy warfare, which has been described as when an external power intervenes in a 
situation indirectly, is visible between all case studies (Mumford 2013: 15). Proxy wars can be 
fought through multiple means, such as with manpower (Ibid: 61), material like ammunition or 
military vehicles (Ibid: 63), and non-military assistance like soft power (Ibid: 66 – 67). Bahrain, 
in this manner, can be viewed as a struggle between the competing external powers of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, although the UAE does contribute to a minor extent in the conflict from the PSDF. 
Syria and Yemen can also be regarded in the same manner as Bahrain as a proxy war between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The aspect resource nationalism takes via the NOCs and SWFs would be 
through the notion of combating proxy wars with financial assistance (Ibid: 65). The transferred 
or spent funds to a warring faction in a conflict that are not explicitly for humanitarian or 
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developmental reasons and can be seen to be for the purposes of a greater strategic motive, then 
proxy warfare has been achieved and with the bolster of the framework (Ibid).  
Essentially, resource nationalism can be concealed or used with stealth in order to engage 
in interstate warfare. The term “warfare” extends beyond conventional understanding to be 
inclusive of more creative means, such as economic warfare. Resource nationalism has led and is 
currently propelling greater Persian Gulf competition, which is particularly evident between the 
case studies. It is also a catalyst to militarization because states do require a certain degree of 
protection and capabilities for the safeguarding of natural resources since the materials have been 
previously attacked, such as with the Kuwaiti oilfields during the Persian Gulf War, or 
underhanded when nationalization of them occurs, namely during the Mossadegh period in Iran. 
Indeed, the dynamic usages of resource nationalism extend far into international relations and 
have the potential to impact areas outside of its domestic implementation.  
There is of course the notion of sustainability of regional influence to address with the 
case studies given that energy prices fluctuate and consequentially the degree to which a country 
can project capabilities can also be affected. For example, Iran maintains influence in Syria 
through a number of hard and soft power avenues that is bolstered with funds generated from 
natural resource sales. However, should there be factors such as a decline in demand or 
economic sanctions, the financing of operations can be affected. At the current level of energy 
prices, sustainability into the distant future in this case does not seem likely. Similarly, this 
model applies to influence exerted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
 
Militarization of the Persian Gulf: 
Natural resources have many characteristics that shape the patterns of conflict and 
violence (Le Billon 2005: 2). Such properties include the ability for the materials to provide 
wealth, energy, and sustainability. Often, energy and security as themes entail a degree of 
militarization, even at the most superficial of levels. Resource nationalism can be viewed as a 
stimulant for militarization and is particularly relevant with the case studies. Additionally, there 
would be a need for militarization in the Persian Gulf regardless of the framework but resource 
nationalism has acted as facilitator for the activity. 
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Resource Nationalism as a Catalyst to Militarization: 
 The framework follows logic that if there is resource nationalism then there are natural 
resources. If there are natural resources then there can be militarization. Consequently, if there is 
resource nationalism there can be militarization. When applied to the Persian Gulf, the first 
premise has already been established. The second premise then needs to be confirmed, whether 
there is a positive correlation between natural resources and militarization or not. Competition 
over ownership to contested natural resources is one reason why the military option would seem 
attractive. Between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE there is certainly competition for militaristic 
capabilities. Rentierism that is existent in all the case studies inclines the countries to seek 
foreign suppliers to source the armed forces for land forces, airpower, and naval power. All 
countries have advanced their equipment to varying degrees that reflect on state defence strategy 
as well as for the future safeguarding of natural resources. Before delving into some details of 
Persian Gulf military development, it should be noted that all purchases, research, development, 
and production occurs with the backing of natural resource revenue generated by the 
interpretations and manifestation of resource nationalism in each case study. In this vein, it 
should be mentioned that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are members to some of the largest 
importers of foreign hardware in the world, which exemplify the rentier status of purchasing all 
the equipment desired for defence (Figure 4.23).  
Iran though uses a different strategic approach for militarization since sanctions have 
prevented the country from receiving high-tech foreign gear. Prior to the international sanctions 
though, Iran was equipped with a large and impressive military during the period of Mohammad 
Reza Shah but went into decline following the 1979 revolution. Yet, with the US military 
tactically positioning military bases around Iran, the country felt pressured into developing its 
own equipment in an attempt to become self-reliant for at least defence capabilities. The bid for 
resurgence additionally connoted that Iran would need to develop a change in strategy for 
engagement since a brutal war with neighbouring Iraq had taken a severe toll on the Iranian 
military standing and population. Light arms manufacturing led to heavier industries and 
eventually to the missile productions
176
. A spike in Iranian investment to the local industries for 
military production led to a development of the domestic military sector. Some of the major 
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companies producing Iranian equipment would be the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO)
177
, 
Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA)
178
, and the Iranian Space Agency 
(ISA). However, while the domestically produced Iranian equipment is nowhere near the 
superiority of its Western counterparts, the point of self-defence capabilities and reliance has 
been asserted. Military industrialization has begun to occur in Iran and each year subsequent 
productions and newer generations of equipment appear. But, it should be noted that there are 
cases in which the Iranian media has falsely reported on the progression of the domestic industry, 
notably with the embarrassing release of the Qaher-313 stealth fighter jet that was revealed to 
have been state-sponsored fabrication
179
. Additionally, while tests conducted on missile 
development may have been successful, such as with the Bina rocket, other tests have been 
revealed to have been exaggerated
180
. Moreover, the future of Iranian missile development has 
been potentially affected by influencing the scientific methodology of verifying tests with the 
manipulation and denial of consistent access to solid fuel rocket components like powdered 
aluminium
181
.  
 Saudi Arabia alternatively is not subject to international arms sanctions and is one of the 
largest importers of foreign weaponry and related systems in the world (Figure 4.23). Significant 
purchases peaked in Saudi Arabia between the 1980s and 1990s with the Al Yamamah arms 
deals delivering equipment such as the combat helicopters, missiles, Tornado jetfighters, and 
other military vehicles
182
. The aforementioned series of deals is of particular significance since it 
specifically details that Saudi Arabia in exchange for arms will supply oil
183
. There have been 
reports that Saudi Arabia has shipped upwards of 600,000 bpd to the UK in order to fulfil 
contractual obligations. BAE Systems alone is reported to have profited over $70 billion USD 
from the 1980s to 2006 over the arms deal and has stated that it would be able to profit over 
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another $70 billion USD from subsequent deals
184
. After a period of relaxed military purchasing, 
there are once again signals of future procurements. This is not to say that Saudi Arabian 
purchases were of less significance in quality but rather that the quantity was less. In 2013, 
multi-billion USD deals for the delivery of Eurofighter Typhoons were being discussed
185
. In 
spite of large foreign purchases though, the domestic military production capabilities are 
deficient. In the 1970s where was a joint attempt with Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE to establish an 
industrialization organisation that was to combine Arabian Peninsula petroleum revenue with 
Egyptians to create an arms industry that would be mainly based in Egypt
186
. However, the 1979 
Egyptian peace treaty with Israel cemented the ultimate failure of the project (Ibid). Later, small 
arms manufacturing facility was set up in Al Kharj to produce light weapons as well as 
ammunition under license (Ibid). Following upgrades in air defence systems into the 1990s, 
Saudi Arabia was still reliant off of foreign arms suppliers (Ibid). A lack of skilled labour, 
technical expertise, and an overall shortage of capable manpower coupled with uncommitted 
attempts at producing a self-reliant domestic military industry hindered any real development of 
the sector and keeps the country even more so reliant on foreigners. Moreover, the Saudi Arabian 
military has focused its efforts into developing a conventional military with orthodox 
capabilities, which may not be the best means in which to engage mobile guerrilla forces that 
operate in the region. Regardless, all purchases made for military equipment in Saudi Arabia 
have substantial funds generated from the interpretation and manifestation of resource 
nationalism. 
The UAE, following in a similar pattern as Saudi Arabia, has purchased an impressive 
arsenal in the past decade
187
, including shipments of advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
such as the Predator
188
 and multirole jetfighters that include the F-22 Raptors
189
 from the USA. 
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While the fleets and purchases may be smaller in size than in Saudi Arabia, the UAE is a smaller 
country with a smaller population. Nevertheless it still remains one of the largest importers of 
foreign equipment (Figure 4.23) and is projected to rise even further with additional orders
190
. In 
2005 the UAE finalized a $15 billion USD decade-long program that was designed to upgrade its 
military and defence capabilities
191
. The same year, a new delivery of F-16E/F Desert Falcons 
arrived, which was the first instalment of a $6.4 billion USD contract (Ibid). In 2010 and 2011 
the UAE raised its defence budget up to $14 billion USD in the positive trajectory for state 
military spending (Ibid). But with many deliveries of high tech equipment coming to the 
Emirates, it should be noted that the UAE does not purchase every piece of equipment that is 
available within its defence budget. For example, in 2013 a multibillion USD contract for the 
acquisition of Eurofighter Typhoons was rejected
192
. While the Typhoon is a modern aircraft to 
possess, the UAE felt that it was ultimately unnecessary as an addition to the air fleet. There has 
been speculation that the deal collapsed on the basis that there were schismatic political 
differences between the UAE and the UK, with the latter apparently not taking a stance firm 
enough on the nuclear program in Iran in addition to being reluctant on intervening in Syria 
(Ibid). However, it could also be that the defence strategy of the UAE would not be coinciding 
with the proficiencies of the aircraft. It could also be that the UAE would prefer to reserve the 
monies for alternative developments, such as with the domestic military production sector. 
Developments at present include medium-range UAVs, namely the Yabhon series from ADCOM 
Systems in Abu Dhabi
193
 that are primarily used from reconnaissance but are projected to 
eventually be able to be outfitted with missiles that can deliver payloads. Strata, also based in the 
UAE, is an aerostructure manufacturing plant that is entirely owned by MDC, which has 
established partnerships with leading aerospace companies to expanding its operations from Abu 
Dhabi to Al Ain with an initial contract of $1.3 billion USD
194
. Caracal is another noteworthy 
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company in that it is the first light arms manufacturing company in the UAE and the first 
established foundation for the production of advanced light arms in the GCC
195
. Other domestic 
companies in addition to the aforementioned seem to illustrate the UAE strategy for economic 
diversification. The defence products are moreover regularly showcased at the prestigious 
International Defence Exhibition (IDEX) in Abu Dhabi, which is one of the largest exhibitions of 
its kind in the world and attracts a sizeable international clientele. It seems that the UAE is more 
concerned with economic progression rather than projecting an international military presence. 
Strike and defence capabilities are present, but not extremely aggressive in either standing. The 
monies used for the military purchases as well as domestic developments are rooted in 
petrodollars from the interpretation as well as manifestation of resource nationalism. Indeed, 
even SWF products of the framework have become involved as evidenced by the relationship 
between MDC and Strata. 
 While the influence of resource nationalism in all the military budgets and local sector 
developments of the case studies has been covered, it seems that the catalyst role of the 
framework can be further elaborated. Essentially, in the Persian Gulf resource nationalism 
created a stimulus for Iran to become self-reliant for its military production, especially as a result 
of international sanctions. Petroleum funds were directed to the military for conserving the 
integrity of the state, which led to the development of the Iranian military industry. Saudi 
Arabian resource nationalism in turn enabled the kingdom to vie for power with its own defence 
capabilities and prompted other countries to capitalize on their interpretation and manifestation 
of the framework as well, namely the UAE. While critics may argue that such actions can be 
attributed to a realist lens and explained as arming the state because others are doing so or that 
there is a Persian Gulf arms race, but this an oversimplification of the matter and disregards 
crucial components to the militarization of the case studies. It is without question that should 
resource nationalism have been absent then the region militarizing could not have taken the same 
path since the petrodollars would have been managed more so by foreigners since NOCs arose 
out of an implementation of the framework. Thusly, there would have been a reduction in the 
profitability of the petroleum revenues directed towards the central government, which would 
have greatly abridged its spending capabilities. Militarization may not therefore have been able 
to occur, since the amount of monies needed to do so would have been too much for the state 
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since all the case studies have been heavily reliant in a rentier fashion on natural resource 
windfall. Any funds earned would have likely spent on the sustainment and continuation of the 
state rather than defence purposes. Certainly, without resource nationalism the scale of purchases 
would not have been a viable option for any of the case studies. In sum, militarization can occur 
when natural resources are present but is dependent on the geopolitical situation. Between Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, militarization was prompted by resource nationalism, which 
facilitated the region to begin its shift towards a more protected area. 
 
Resource Nationalism and the Inherent Need for Militarization: 
 Resource nationalism also entails that there is an intrinsic need for a degree of 
militarization given that states, nations, and/or ethnic groups reserve the potential to claim 
natural resources and could active seize the resources without resistance, should there be no 
protection over the commodities. In this vein, natural resource stability can be subject to 
volatility, which in the case of oil and gas can be reflected in high prices. In the Persian Gulf, 
there are impressive deposits of petroleum that do not necessarily have the sufficient degree of 
security necessary to safeguard the materials. It should also be mentioned that there is only a 
theoretical boundary in the waterway that separates one side of the littoral and its natural 
resources from the other, which can certainly be violated, especially if one side is severely 
deficient in defence capabilities when the other is not. Competition over ownership and the 
ability to assert control over the claims of ownership as well as protect it against others are key 
drivers for eventual militarization. 
 A vivifying example of the need for militarization would be with Iran. The country is 
already surrounded by US military bases (Figure 4.24), which is reason enough for Iran to ramp 
up military capabilities in case the former ally chose to expand influence into the country. After 
all, the neighbouring countries to Iran of Afghanistan and Iraq have already been assaulted, 
which have undoubtedly raised fears in the country to increase its martial presence. However, the 
upsurge has also escalated Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf over the oil and gas reserves as 
well as shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz. The US and UK have increased presence 
around the strait as a result of Iranian threats to disrupt lane passages and petroleum shipments 
(Figure 4.25) but there are indeed Iranian strike capabilities that should be realized. One 
geographic point of interest would be at the mouth of the strait off the village of Kuhestak where 
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there is a strategic battery of HY-2 missiles that could be used to attack personnel (Figure 4.26). 
Closer inspection reveals that aside from launch pads there are a number of alert and hardened 
shelters, firing stations, as well as support and acquisition sections that are prepared to not only 
deliver payloads but receive retaliation as well (Figure 4.27). The site was already active during 
the time of the Iran-Iraq War but was not utilized at the time since Iran believed that it would not 
be able to withstand an American assault with the remains of the limited equipment it had 
rationed for the during of its ongoing conflict with Iraq. However, Iranian missile developments 
and the paradigm shift in engagement tactics to be more in terms of asymmetric warfare have 
changed the dynamics of a potential confrontation.  
 The backdrop of the Persian Gulf islands since the Iran-Iraq War has also changed 
dramatically in tandem with the Iranian military developments and alteration in strategy. The 
Abu Musa Island has been heavily modified with fortifications between 2006 and 2010 (Figures 
4.28 – 4.39). The abandoned Skyguard system and HAWK batteries saw a reactivation (Figures 
4.28 – 4.31). Another adjustment would be the creation of geographic hindrances such as 
multilane dugouts with high-terrain firing positions for the local operatives in case of an 
amphibious assault (Ibid). Additional defences on the island include D-30 howitzers, 23 and 35 
millimetre (mm) anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) stations, tanks, hardened bunkers, and anti-ship 
missile (AShM) launch pads (Figures 4.32 – 4.37). The amount of bunkers on the island may be 
inflated though via satellite imagery to give the illusion that there are more capabilities present 
on the island (Figure 4.38) but this factor does not change the view that the Iranians are 
increasing their entrenchment on the island. While the gunshot ranges of the D-30 and 155 mm 
form a barrier around the island (Figure 4.39), the AShMs pose a greater threat. If HY-2s for 
example were to be positioned on Abu Musa, all of the UAE ports would be at risk
196
. The 
Greater Tunb Island is outfitted with guard posts and a cement wall encircling the entire island, 
save for a select number of entry points (Figure 4.40). There are also D-30 howitzers, 23 mm 
AAA stations, hardened shelters, and possibly even underground facilities that would buttress the 
area against an attack as well (Figures 4.41 – 4.43). The Lesser Tunb Island has taken an airstrip 
that runs through the top of the island and additionally constructed a military bunker complex to 
support the current D-30 howitzers and 23 mm stations already in place, further reinforced by 
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hardened shelters and bunkers (Figures 4.44 – 4.48). Already, shipping lanes that cross through 
these islands would be subject to petroleum transportation disruptions, even with international 
interference to prevent such an action from occurring. Further reinforcement of the archipelago 
also is present on nearby Sirri Island, which in common form has been outfitted with 
communications towers, AA weaponry, 23 and 35 mm calibre stations, a Skyguard, and 
hardened bunkers (Figure 4.49 – 4.55). Closer to the mouth of the strait would be Qeshm Island, 
which is the largest of the Iranian islands in the waterway. Air defence systems, a naval base, and 
two launch zones paired with the commonalities inclusive of AAA sites, hardened shelters, 
AShM revetments, and 23 mm stations (Figures 4.56 – 4.60). The special features of Qeshm to 
note aside from its size and proximity to the strait would be the launch zone that is positioned 
behind a hill, which signifies that there must be a presence of independent targeting stations in 
order to not be impeded by the steepness of the hill (Figures 4.61 and 4.62). Off the coast of 
Qeshm would be Larak Island, which additionally possesses all the shared equipment on the rest 
of the archipelago, with a strategic placement of AAA sites and AShMs close to the mouth of the 
strait that could alone affect trade (Figures 4.63 – 4.67). 
 Strategic deployments in mainland Iran have also changed the theatre of potential 
conflict. A select arsenal of foreign-supplied missiles stationed around the country would be the 
HQ-2s, HAWKs, S-200s, 2K12s, and Tor-M1Es (Figure 4.68). The S-300 launchers or similar 
create a defence buffer that extends over the median division of the Persian Gulf (Figure 4.69). 
However, the S-300s have reportedly not been supplied to Iran from Russia as a result of the 
sanctions
197
. Yet, the Iranians claim to have made a domestic variant of the S-300 called the 
Bavar-373
198
. While the production of a launcher could be possible, it is the software of the S-
300 system that makes it formidable, which is also a detail that is not commented on by the 
Iranians. S-400s and similar launchers have not been banned for export by the Russians as of yet 
and could extend further over the median line to include every country in the GCC within its 
striking distance (Figure 4.70). Within the case studies the onshore oil fields and pipeline 
infrastructure in Saudi Arabia would be subject to particular risk in addition to the fields and 
pipeline infrastructure of the UAE. The mobility of the S-300s and S-400s as well as the setup 
time make such launchers a potential risk for the GCC and petroleum trade. Other domestically 
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produced series of missiles would be the short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)
199
 such as the 
Zelzal-1 and Zelzal-2, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)
200
 such as the Sejjil and 
Ashoura, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
201
 such as the Shahab-5 and Shahab-
6 pose subsequent concerns
202
. Such missiles
203
 could be used to disrupt shipping in the Strait of 
Hormuz with Iran being able to fire onto tankers, trade vessels, and other naval ships
204
. Other 
asymmetric means of engagement would be using rapid patrol and naval attack craft as well as 
midget submarines (Ibid). The islands have been used in the past to intercept Kuwaiti and Saudi 
Arabian shipping and UAE offshore platforms, which also means that the further modifications 
to the archipelago since 1988 would mean that it could be done again but with increased 
devastation (Ibid). 
 The assault and defence aptitudes that enable Iran to assert its claims and control over 
natural resources in the Persian Gulf have not gone unchallenged by its neighbours though. 
Should the country have been unopposed then the theatre of the waterway would indeed have 
taken a different contour. The case studies of the GCC have particularly invested sizeable funds 
in their defence capabilities that simultaneously enable them to assert control over claimed 
natural resource reserves. Without a proper defence in place, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
would be vulnerable. While the strategies of the two are more in conventional terms than Iran, 
engagement is certainly deterred with the developments in place. 
In terms of counterattacking any potential missile strikes from Iran with analogous 
ballistic missile defence (BMD), Saudi Arabia has established notable sites at Al Watah (Figure 
4.71), Al Joffer (Figure 4.72), and Al Sulayyil
205
 (Ibid). All complexes possess at least DF-3A 
MRBMs (Figure 4.73), which are likely downgraded models
206
 (Figure 4.74). While the DF-3As 
are not very accurate they nonetheless are substantial enough, even in relegated format, to create 
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a daunting defence. Also, training and familiarity with the operations of a missile defence can be 
provided (Figure 4.75 and 4.76). Al Sulayyil is of particular interest because of its operational 
capacities stretching back through to the late 1980s and possesses the capacity to expand its 
batteries to include more devastating hardware
207
 (Figures 4.77 – 4.79). The current layout of the 
site has not changed in some time, which signifies that it is already at a fully developed stage 
(Figure 4.80). The Al Joffer complex north of Al Sulayyil is of a similar structural plan to the 
latter, which included hardened bunkers, administrative and support facilities, as well as a 
launcher (Figure 4.81). The strategic positioning of Al Joffer in the heartland of Saudi Arabia 
makes the site a geographically central defence complex. Another interesting site would be 
Rawdah, which is underground and has two garrisons with a number of hardened bunkers 
reinforcing the launchers (Figures 4.82 – 4.84). The UAE has also taken strides to develop a 
formidable missile defence system and in 2008 purchased advanced Patriots and related support 
services for the system, which is an upgrade from the previous HAWK systems
208
. As a result of 
the Iranian threats over the Strait of Hormuz, the UAE was prompted to purchase additional 
missile systems amounting to nearly $3.5 billion USD (Ibid). It was also the first country out of 
the USA to acquire the coveted Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which 
were agreed to be sold at nearly $4 billion USD
209
. The shield developments and quantity of 
missiles in the UAE are far less than in Iran and Saudi Arabia, but the quality is ultramodern. 
Capabilities for the Arab countries therefore are present but not able to be entirely preventative 
of a potentially successful attack from the Iranians. After all, even the Iron Dome deployed in 
Israel is unable to intercept all the Fajr-5s fired from Palestinian territories
210
. 
The armament of the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands demonstrate a pragmatic notion of 
applying militaristic backing to the claims of resource nationalism. With the Mubarak field, the 
Iranians would be able to cut off petroleum supplies to the UAE and the risk of retaliation at 
present would be more costly to the Emiratis. Therefore, if the UAE would desire to take the 
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field by force, it could attempt to do so but would not be able to succeed without at least 
assuming a heavy burden of costs. Hence, the backing to resource nationalism from Iran over the 
Mubarak field is more resilient than that of the UAE. However, the UAE is not unprotected over 
its own natural resources and is able to defend itself from a potential asymmetric attack by Iran 
as well as other forces. This similarly applies to Saudi Arabia. 
Militarization occurring in the Persian Gulf as a result of resource nationalism does not 
necessarily signify that the process is negative of a destabilizing nature. Rather, the region 
inclusive of the case studies is upgrading its defences that can result in stability. In order for a 
steady, controlled, and regulated global output of pivotal natural resources such as oil and gas, it 
is in the interests of the international system to  have a more stable Persian Gulf. In this manner, 
unpredictable shocks to petroleum prices are less likely to occur. The militarization of 
safeguarding natural resources has been described in a broad sense as “the growing inclination of 
energy producers and consumers to base decisions about their behaviour in global energy 
markets on political and strategic calculations as well as on commercial and economic 
considerations,” (Leverett in Moran and Rusell 2005: 211). With the prodigious amounts of 
natural resources in the waterway and only a theoretical line running a median, there is a chaotic 
atmosphere present that does require strategic decision-making. Indeed, there is latitude for slant 
piping operations, disruptions, and disputes to occur. After all, hydrocarbons and pipelines 
whether protected or not are soft targets and with the presence of a chokepoint, tensions will 
undoubtedly increase in a multistate littoral. Therefore, it is only logical to militarize and has 
been brought to vivification as a result of the interpretations and manifestations of resource 
nationalism. 
 
Armed for Prosperity: 
At present, Iran has growingly been forced to become more independent in its military 
production as a result of international sanctions. There have been notable developments with 
missile production, drones, and a shift in engagement strategy to focus on asymmetric and 
unconventional warfare capabilities rather than conventional. The country is surrounded by US 
military bases and allies, which undoubtedly has prompted Iran to develop its domestic arsenal 
or face the consequences of a potential invasion similar to bordering countries of Afghanistan in 
2001 and Iraq in 2003. Saudi Arabia has created a massive arsenal, which includes future 
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contracts worth billions of USD. However, the rentier status of the kingdom in addition to its 
access to international markets coupled with petroleum funds, the country has not produced any 
domestic military research or production. The UAE similarly has amassed a sizeable arsenal, 
with advanced drones such as the Predators and ultramodern fighter jets such as the F-22 
Raptors. Again, the UAE like Saudi Arabia has access to international markets and has 
purchased its equipment from abroad. While there may be small-scale production for firearms, 
notably with Caracal
211
, and drone production with ADCOM Systems, none of the engineers or 
researchers is of Emirati origin and remains reliant on foreigners to research as well as produce 
the products. Larger capabilities are required in order for the country to have comprehensive 
production. But, there is potential for the domestic UAE defence industry to do so. The UAE 
also seems to be willing to adjust strategy to become more mobile with the introduction and 
activation of the THAAD system. With the developments that have already occurred and the 
economic as well as political directions of the Persian Gulf, expansion of capabilities from all 
parties is a logical future to infer and forecast. 
 The militarized stances of the countries address security concerns such as the current 
petroleum transportation infrastructure that is already vulnerable. Robert Ebel of the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed in 2003 that, “Pipelines are very soft 
targets… They’re easy to go after. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out where you can 
do the most damage, both physical and psychological, with the minimum amount of effort.” 
(Klare in Moran and Russell 2009: 46). He continues, “… the production and transport of oil will 
become even more dependent on an infrastructure that is already vulnerable… [therefore] the 
need to protect the production and transportation infrastructure will grow [as well]. Infrastructure 
and asset protection, or the physical protection of refineries, pipelines, loading facilities, offshore 
fields, and sealines of communications; regime protection, or military support for governments 
that facilitate the export of their country’s oil reserves to foreign markets; and access assurance, 
or military moves intended to ensure uninterrupted access to key oil-producing regions, such as 
the Persian Gulf,” (Ibid: 47). Following this, indeed there was a rise in security and to ensure that 
capabilities were known, military exercises from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were all 
conducted at varying points during the year to demonstrate combat readiness. Despite the 
showcasing, the case studies are unwilling to engage in direct state versus state warfare. This has 
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contributed to the region and natural resources reaching a point of increased stability, no matter 
the aggressive rhetoric and exchange of tensions. Resource nationalism has addressed resource 
vulnerability and provided the context in which countries have raised defences to stabilize 
output. Without devoting efforts to focus on reducing resource vulnerability, there would be a 
greater potential for international conflicts to result from competition over the access to key 
resources (Le Billon 2005: 3). Instead, the regional scene is armed but for the sake of prosperity, 
being that both sides of the littoral can gather respective resources to generate windfall. In terms 
of security strategy, militarization has at least in the short term been successful for all sides that 
have been able to maintain respective territorial integrity inclusive of natural resources. It should 
also be mentioned that while the US has historically intervened in the shaping of Persian Gulf 
affairs and acted as security guarantor for the Arab countries of the region, this is not necessarily 
a trend that may continue persistently. Factors such as a shift of regional strategy, change in 
presidency, or other political processes could change the degree of support that the US would be 
able to provide to the Arab countries. Therefore, while the role of US as security guarantor for 
the Arab countries will continue for some time, it is not perpetual.  
  
Risk Expansion via Resource Nationalism: 
 Militarization is not the only means to which resource nationalism can consequently 
affect the overall security of a region though. Indeed, risks have been expanded as a result of 
resource nationalism with oil and gas revenues that have been able to trigger nuclearizations in 
the Persian Gulf. Nuclearization in the Middle East has been forecasted for some time
212
 and has 
increasingly become an issue of examination for the international system
213
, but this was done in 
the wake of resource nationalism already manifesting from each state interpretation.  
 The nuclear program in Iran, suspicions of nuclear trade in Saudi Arabia with their close 
relationship to Pakistan
214
, and nuclear ambitions of the UAE with the Masdar Institute
215
 are all 
bound to resource nationalism. The nuclear program in Iran stretches back to the early years of 
the Pahlavi regime (Patrikarakos 2012: 34) but was not attending enough site upkeep throughout 
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the dynastic reign to produce any real serious program developments that would be able to enrich 
uranium for weaponization. Moreover, the country was reliant on foreign support for the 
program. However, with the rise in nuclear black markets
216
 and a newfound ambition to possess 
the technology, Iran was able to reactivate progress with the development of domestic 
reactors
217
. The nuclear history of Saudi Arabia stems from 1988 with the introduction of the 
Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) to the King Abdulaziz City for Science and 
Technology (No Author 2008: 40). The program was initiated with the intent of providing an 
alternative source of energy to the public (Ibid: 41). Despite being recognized by the 
International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) as having, “no nuclear ambitions or facilities” 
and not developing facilities, proliferation fears still exist due to potential black market 
purchases and a close relationship with nuclear Pakistan (Ibid: 42). Undeclared nuclearization is 
credited to fears of Iranian nuclear ambitions only a gulf away. Critics have pointed out that the 
DF-3As possessed by the kingdom even at a downgraded level are capable of nuclear warhead 
delivery, which could demonstrate intent, but possessing missiles alone does not signify further 
action of acquisition for other materials. The UAE has additionally entered the nuclear scene 
with the creation of the Masdar Institute. This illustrates the dynamic power of resource 
nationalism since the institute is wholly owned by the CSWF of MDC. The UAE developed its 
ambitions with the assistance of South Korea, which proposed a more budgeted and matured 
technology to the Emiratis over other international proposals (Luomi in Kamrava (ed.) 2012: 141 
– 142). The partnership blossomed to other closely developed deals that entailed the UAE 
delivering over 1 billion bbl of crude to South Korea (Ibid). Emirati ambitions with the Masdar 
Institute are to ensure that the surrounding city is a zero carbon emissions zone that will be able 
to provide an alternative and additional source of energy for domestic usage. 
 Potential weaponization aside, resource nationalism heightens the risks of nuclearization 
between the case studies since it reserves the potential for claims over natural resources such as 
uranium and could nationalize the material. The performance of such an action could provide the 
new resource nationalism model with lessons learned from a pre-existing interpretation within 
the state and between the case studies there is certainly valuable data to erudite. Of course, given 
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the expenses of maintaining a nuclear reactor, there would be at best limited economic benefits 
for the state. However, there is a significant psychological gain of esteem for the population 
since the country assumes international prestige with nuclearization given that there are only a 
select number of states that retain the technology and expertise to do so. Moreover risks could be 
that while nuclearizations do not need to be geared towards weaponization and can instead be 
used as an alternative energy source, should one state be nuclear and others in the vicinity not, 
there can be a situation in which a more prominent country of high scientific endeavours gains a 
point of leverage over another. Hence, nuclear proliferation is consequently being seen across the 
Persian Gulf with countries of the GCC having projects underway to secure competition rather 
than experience subordination to Iran. Littoral nuclear competition though is not resultant from 
resource nationalism in Iran, Saudi Arabia, or the UAE. Rather, the implementation of the 
nuclear programs was resultant from the framework. Resource nationalism has already been 
described as potentially initiating regional competition such as with a littoral setting; however, 
the context with regards to nuclearization is not applicable. As a result of the risk expansion, 
resource nationalism has successfully raised international awareness to the region and convinced 
other international actors to become involved with issues in the littoral that are directly tied to 
natural resource concerns as well as other issues, including nuclearization, which are tied to 
funds generated by the framework. Expansion does not entail tumult though; it simply means 
that there are additional levels of concern that have developed. 
 
Sector Privatization and Security: 
The result of state interpretations and manifestations of resource nationalism in 
conjunction with the risk expansion has resulted in the effective privatization of the petroleum 
sector in each of the case studies, albeit to varying degrees. Consequential security issues have 
also been raised in this vein. While it is contrary to the purpose and existence of resource 
nationalism, it has occurred due to the interpretation and manifestation of the framework as well 
as the political structures of the case studies. 
In Iran, effective privatization has taken hold through political means and manipulation 
of the political system. There is no real military role involved in the siphoning of central 
government funds. Privatization of the natural resource sector and any funds generated from the 
sales of such an industry are not allowed. Although it has occurred via exploitation of supposed 
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loopholes in the constitution despite the articles being very clear. Certainly, this is evidence of 
outright corruption and disregard for the constitution in addition to institutionalized deficiencies 
of management. Moreover, in practice there are limited accessibilities by the population to 
natural resource wealth. In Saudi Arabia, there is a stark difference in that effective privatization 
has been able to occur with the King conceptually and technically being owner to all properties, 
inclusive of natural resources, in the country. There is additionally military backing to the 
position since the armed forces of the country are foremost in his service. There is no 
constitution present in the country, which means that unlike Iran there can be no claims of 
contradiction in this sense and privatization of the industry has occurred via Aramco and practice 
of the idea that the King is the living embodiment of the state. Therefore, if there is any 
disagreement with the King over the matter of natural resources in the country, unilateral 
militaristic force can theoretically be applied. In the UAE, privatization has taken a unique form. 
Conceptually, there are seven emirates within the federation that each possess a sheikh as the 
managerial head of a respective area that are supposed to distribute funds in the area and that 
does not mean that natural resources are personal wealth. The constitution of the UAE 
additionally states that all natural resources are not only public property but that it therefore does 
not belong to a single individual or family. 
Since the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, the UAE has seen a spike in private military 
and security companies (PMSCs) and is host to a number of prestigious establishments, such as 
Aegis
218
, Defion Internacional
219
, DynaCorp
220
, Erinys International
221
, Halliburton
222
, ISI 
International
223
, and Unity Resources Group
224
. However, one of the more interesting 
establishments would be Reflex Responses (R2)
225
, which is headquartered in Abu Dhabi. R2 
inherits a formidable reputation from Eric Prince, who was the founder and former CEO of 
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Blackwater, and has formed the PMSC with the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi. R2 maintains an 800-
personnel military garrison (Figure 4.85) close to the Sweihan Air Base in Abu Dhabi (Figure 
4.86) and coinciding with the militarization of the emirate, including Mihad Air Base (Figure 
4.87). Political neutrality of the UAE was seemingly intact despite the formations of such 
companies, yet resource nationalism manifested with a fascinating characteristic that has not 
appeared in other countries utilizing the framework. Essentially, while there may be cases in 
which state militaries have been structured in such a manner to support privatization of natural 
resources in regimes, the sheikhs of the UAE have employed mercenaries that serve a dual 
purpose of safeguarding the country as well as protecting the sheikhs themselves. Therefore, 
should the sheikhs determine that natural resources in the country were to be effectively 
privatized and there be a disagreement with the population over such an action, there would be 
PMSC backing at the very least to the claims of the sheikhs. This significance of such a move is 
extraordinary and given that none of the PMSC employees are Muslim or from the Middle East, 
should conflict occur the implications would be astounding with non-Muslims and non-Middle 
Easterners asserting authority over a domestic population that is comprised of Muslims and 
Middle Easterners. Essentially, the rise of PMSCs in the UAE has enabled a sheikh to exercise 
privatized control over state resources, while also maintaining the ability to suppress any of the 
factors that influence resource nationalism such as ethnicity or nations or nationalism that may 
pose a perceived threat to their rule. Further implications on the psychological effects and future 
political behaviour of the sheikhs are staggering. 
While the UAE may serve as a model in many aspects for other countries, it is unlikely 
that states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia will follow suit with regards to the PMSCs. Moreover, 
larger states may not be able to achieve the same degree of effective privatization using PMSCs 
like the UAE given factors that are inclusive of the geographic size and large populations. 
Nonetheless, such a model can flourish in smaller countries such as Bahrain and Qatar. However, 
it should also be noted that the UAE has thus far been acting benevolently with the population 
and not used the PMSCs to abuse or malevolently control the population. In the meanwhile, the 
UAE has provided an exceptional feature to the progression of resource nationalism. 
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Conclusion: 
In sum, many of the drivers and motivations for energy security are based in fears and 
suspicions, which can facilitate resource wars and the need for the militarization of energy 
reserves. Resource nationalism has been demonstrated to serve as a catalyst to militarization and 
enhances the inherent need for it. It has also been revealed to be utilized as covert interstate 
warfare, with the promotion of religious ideology, political conflict, economic rivalry, and proxy 
warfare being select themes. Between the case studies, risk expansion via nuclearization has also 
been covered and highlights the dynamism of the framework. The manifestation of resource 
nationalism has also effectively created privatizations in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which 
although is contradictory to the essence of the framework has been able to occur in varying 
degrees but with potential consequences. Indeed, while resource nationalism does commonly 
hold the view that it is seemingly invulnerable, it does have flaws. Focusing on the deficiencies 
would be beneficial in order to understand the weak points of the framework so that potential 
solutions can be provided as well as reduce the intimidation brought on by host countries 
utilizing resource nationalism.  
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Chapter 5: Deficiencies of Resource Nationalism Framework and 
Natural Resource Management in the Persian Gulf 
 
The chapter will initiate with a review of select benefits for implementing resource 
nationalism as state policy and will be subsequently followed by a segment on the interactive 
relationship that natural resources shares with parties such as the state, nations, and ethnicities. 
Given that there is certainly a theoretical perspective to resource nationalism before it is vivified 
and brought into actuality, there are natural flaws and counters to the concept. A number of such 
limitations will be evaluated followed by a section of reducing the inherent problems of resource 
nationalism coupled by the management of practical deficiencies. A brief note on the prospects 
of the future continuation of resource nationalism will then be covered before the conclusion that 
will lead to final reflections on resource nationalism. Custom policies and policy 
recommendations will not be covered. Rather, a more conceptual route will be traversed given 
that policies can be sensitive to external as well as internal factors that would alter the 
effectiveness of potential dogmata given the variability of conditions involved. For instance, the 
demographics of a country could change in such a manner that it would influence resource 
nationalism models already implemented within a state. In essence, the consistency of conditions 
that would theoretically make a constructive and successful policy is subject to unpredictability. 
 Given the breadth of applicability of resource nationalism outside of the Persian Gulf 
region, other members of the international system will be drawn upon in this chapter. Certainly, 
the case studies will be touched upon along with the greater basin area. However, examples in 
other parts of the world will also be covered since resource nationalism stretches beyond the 
Middle East. In this vein, the chapter will not be investigating oil and gas exclusively, as was 
covered in previous chapters. Instead, it will also be inclusive of other industries and natural 
resources. Naturally, it is vital when evaluating resource nationalism to cite additional 
experiences of managing natural resources regardless of resource equivalence. Indeed, utilizing 
the experiences of other entities implementing resource nationalism and with varied materials 
would strengthen any research endeavour undertaken to understanding the concept. 
 
Review of Benefits for Undertaking Resource Nationalism: 
A summarized revisiting of perceived advantages for entities utilizing the concept is 
valuable as a common ground perspective can be taken in order to investigate empirical as well 
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as theoretical shortcomings and flaws with resource nationalism. A first perceived benefit to 
remember would be that resource nationalism is viewed by many developing economies as a 
means for the state to proceed towards industrialization. Naturally, in order for a state to 
industrialize the existing local industries must in turn be cultivated and protected, similar to 
natural resources within a country as they are used and guarded. Also, resource nationalism 
brings a perceived asymmetric relationship between IOCs and developing countries to something 
more level. A commonly featured instrument found by implementing resource nationalism would 
be with the creation of nationalized companies, such as NOCs, which enhances nationalism 
because it is the nation that will be bringing foreign entities to a position of bargaining rather 
than perceived exploitation. Host countries also would prefer to have the right to control and 
dictate what prices their natural resources can be sold for in international markets since it is a 
material or set of materials that are located within the borders of their own country. The creation 
of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) can arguably be seen as a 
collective effort for countries that export petroleum as a large generation of GDP to assert 
control over their own natural resources through an international consortium to additionally seal 
state policy in a global setting. While there are membership requirements, the absence of 
countries with developed economies that possess significant petroleum reserves such as Norway 
and to a lesser extent Russia demonstrate that there could be a lack of incentive to join the 
organisation because of state confidence rather than state insecurities. Indeed, the makeup of 
OPEC is with emerging economies such as those of the GCC as well as with founding members 
such as Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela. Its most recent member would be Angola, which joined OPEC 
in 2007
226
. The developing economy status commonality shared between all members of the 
organisation gives potential insight to state timidity when concerning the continued 
strengthening of respective economies. Since the inception of OPEC, none of its members, both 
former and current, have yet achieved full-fledged industrialization. While some member states 
have made attempts to do so such as with Iran and its domestic military industry, Nigeria and its 
traditionally developed agricultural sector (Ariweriokuma 2009: 17) as well as satellite 
development projects
227
, Saudi Arabia and its increasingly structured financial system, the UAE 
and DUBAL, most member states are experiencing difficulties in diversifying state economies 
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away from the petroleum sector and its associated industries. Should a diversifying step away 
from petroleum be taken, such as with Angola and its mining industry
228
, reliance on natural 
resources is still pervasive and preventing industrialization routes or truly diversified economies 
from taking shape. In the case of Nigeria, the situation was reversed with the high level of 
petroleum revenue returns and an immense flow of monies to the central government prompting 
rapid development of the oil and gas sector (Ariweriokuma 2009: 35 and 295). This in turn 
damaged other industries such as the traditional agricultural sector as well as the solid minerals 
one (Ibid). The disastrous governmental focusing exclusively on swift returns from the 
petroleum sector limited the development of other sectors and impeded on future economic 
diversification courses (Ibid). Indeed, it is a viewpoint that members of OPEC are sharing similar 
experiences across the membership spectrum with the petroleum element, regardless of resource 
nationalism interpretation, manifestation, or political structure. In this vein, the establishment of 
relations between each member state can be viewed as an observational one in which members 
are waiting for one to industrialize so that frameworks and pathways can be learned. Certainly, 
for a developing economy to have closer ties and relations to an industrializing one through 
economic consortiums such as OPEC would enable a more streamlined transition for the 
developing economy to boost itself to the next level. However, OPEC members along with other 
petroleum exporting countries are reliant off of exportation costs, which are dependent upon a 
number of sensitive factors. After all, petroleum prices do fluctuate and an economy based 
mainly off of such resources are subject more to the sensitivities such as international demand 
and its capability of payment rather than idealistic conditions in which the host country 
determines a price at which a return is given. It is also granted that other petroleum exporting 
countries with developing economies such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are not in OPEC but 
the point of an industrialized country not being member to the organisation is indisputable. 
Aside from economic incentives, there are also a number of other drivers that account for 
perceived benefits for implementing resource nationalism. For instance, a political driver would 
be that emerging economies desire an international presence to be recognized and interacted with 
by other members of the system. Such a driver is particularly crucial for new countries to the 
international system like South Sudan, which is rich in natural resources aside from petroleum 
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such as precious metals and hardwoods
229
. Additionally, whether intentional on behalf of a 
government or not there is also a global awareness of democratic political structure that is 
highlighted with resource nationalism given the inherent collective nature of the concept. 
Facilitating group participation can certainly be viewed as an asset since communication would 
be present across a variety of groups and identities for access to and management of natural 
resources. Another set of motivations would be socio-cultural and technological, which are 
synergetic in their relationship. In a technological aspect, one of the foremost effective products 
from the driver would be the development and accessibility of communications tools. Such 
mechanisms are able to not only facilitate the exchanging of information and building of 
infrastructure but can also effectively convey messages between groups, which may have 
previously been convoluted or absent. Reciprocally, a socio-cultural driver that is impacted by a 
technological one such as the implementation of communications towers would be that a 
growing intolerance of extremes of wealth and poverty are becoming more popular ideas that are 
expected by populations to be resolved and diverted.  
Admittedly, this is in a utopian and idealistic point given that the idea of mounting 
intolerance for economic extremes in society does not always have operational addressing and 
can even be ignored in some societies. But, it can be at least asserted that businesses that operate 
within a host country utilizing resource nationalism are having greater expectations to maintain a 
constructive presence in the area of operations. Should a contracted foreign company not comply 
with the expectations of the population or the regulations set forth by the central government, it 
can surely be replaced given the distaste for negative publicity that could affect future operations 
and reputation of the company in the host country in addition to the host country being 
potentially perceived as weak and/or irresponsible should it not address unsatisfactory behaviour. 
With resource nationalism as state policy, it is certainly more feasible that a central government 
would be able to outsource services to competition provided by other companies; particularly 
with markets in Asia supplying competent services that would be viable options as replaceable 
alternatives to incompetence. The notion also enables the government to exercise unilateral 
power such as the threat of operational license revocation. Nations and ethnicities within the host 
country could also further backlash against foreign companies through manoeuvres such as 
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demonstrations. A supplementary driver would be the psychological, which is intimately tied to 
all aforementioned motivations for a developing economy to implement resource nationalism. 
The psychological driver is a product of the concept and has a number of features. The 
expressions of include state patriotism, national pride, and the promotion of charitable 
international presence. 
However, despite the perceived benefits of utilizing resource nationalism the undertaking 
of the concept does not necessarily entail successes or a betterment of state conditions. Rather, 
success is dependent on numerous factors that actively interplay with the components of resource 
nationalism; namely, the state, nation(s), nationalism, and ethnicity on international as well as 
intrastate terms. State interpretations, manifestations, and maintenance of resource nationalism 
models also hold significant roles in any potential positive impact that the concept would have. 
Within the case studies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE there were certainly benefits as well 
as liabilities and further complexities that occurred with the usage of the concept that differed 
from country to country despite all of the case studies being from the same region. Certainly, it 
was the varied elucidations of resource nationalism that provided differing degrees of successes 
and disasters in each of the countries undertaken in the study. Measuring success, of course, can 
be subjective. Therefore, in order to provide a more objective and balanced view of the 
successfulness of resource nationalism, the weighing of benefits versus burdens must be scaled. 
Hence, a comparison of natural resources as both a hex and commendation must be covered. 
 
The Enigmatic Paradox of Natural Resources:  
From the benefits revisited it is important to note the dualistic nature of resource 
nationalism as simultaneously constructive and adverse with both favourable as well as 
unfavourable consequences. Select disadvantages will be covered in a global context followed by 
an advantageous review of the benefits of possessing natural resources in the state economy for 
the generation of revenue. 
 
Natural Resources as a Curse: 
There has been a significant amount of research produced that discusses and views 
natural resources within developing economies as a curse. Given the substantial literature on the 
theme, only a selection of the vast research efforts that have investigated the resource curse will 
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be covered, which will grant a setting from which a point of contrast to natural resources as a 
blessing can be made. 
When discussing natural resources as a curse, it is crucial to observe whether the state is 
dependent on the generation of revenues from natural resource for the majority of the GDP. 
Should the state demonstrate that the economy is in fact exhibiting traits of dependency on 
natural resources for economic sustainment then an avenue leading to a resource curse is most 
likely being traversed. Dependency on raw commodities within developing economies can 
coincide with state formation and en route with a curse can cause devastating damage. 
Institutional development, rates taxation (Daniel, Keen, and McPherson, eds. 2010), 
administrative operations, the allocation of resources, and policymaker behaviours are all 
consequential deficiencies that can be encountered with a state that exhibits resource dependency 
(Karl 1997: 46). Naturally, this extends across the boundaries of petroleum and is an applicable 
assertion for countries with other tangible resources as well such as metals, diamonds, and ore. It 
could also be the case that the temptation of rapid funds causes an overlooking of capital-
intensive operations. Hydrocarbon and mining operations for example are niche industries that 
require specialist labour and technologically complex equipment. On state levels, operations are 
typically large in scale and will be capital-intensive to initiative, maintain, and continue services 
(Ibid: 47). Meeting quota effectively would be an additional multiplier to the costs required for 
the industry. Therefore, the enticing financial gains of focusing on natural resources as the core 
generator of capital is certainly at a cost higher than superficial observations may lead on. In a 
resource curse, the mobilization and direction of state energy towards such a focus on raw 
commodity collection takes away from other sectors that while may not be immediately 
profitable may set foundations for industrialization and at least economic diversification to 
occur. 
State development can be further impeded with a dependency on materials coupled with 
the usage of resource nationalism in that ethnic tensions can be promoted. There are numerous 
examples that stem from Sub-Saharan Africa, such as with the DRC and the gold industry (Le 
Billon 2012: 111) that illustrates such a claim. In the former Zaire, of what is now the DRC, the 
central government was dependent upon exportations of natural resources for the majority of its 
GDP. The interpretation of resource nationalism in the developing economy of Zaire was similar 
to the extreme example of Saudi Arabia in that the living embodiment of the state was the head 
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of state, but was more stringent in its manifestation with rigid boundaries placed on ethnicity and 
political cabinet. The despotic dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko
230
, who was of Ngbandi descent, 
amassed fortunes that were allegedly derived from the mining of natural resources in the 
country
231
 after displacing the Congolese nationalist government of the ethnic Tetela, Patrice 
Lumumba. Following a brutal and corrupt reign, Laurent-Desire Kabila, of Luba and Lunda 
tribal descent, staged a rebellion against the Sese Seko regime and was able to succeed in the 
coup d’état using gold revenue generated from eastern Congolese territory (Le Billon 2012: 111). 
The “war economy” of Kabila was not only limited to gold and included other natural resources 
such as coltan (Ibid). While the core of the conflict in Zaire was not motivated by ethnicity as a 
primary driver and the dispute was more so about the abhorrence towards the manifestation of 
resource nationalism that was in place in the country, there was undoubtedly a role that ethnicity 
held in the conflict. The aftermath of the removal of Sese Seko from office not only hindered 
state development but the DRC remains a shattered country in catastrophic condition. The 
dependency on raw materials has continued, the currency has kept a low value against other 
international currencies, inflation rates are high, and the country ranks as one of the lowest GDP 
per capita PPP rates in the world
232
.  
In the Caucasus, the Republic of Azerbaijan and its hydrocarbon reserves have caused 
ethnic tensions in the southernmost areas of the country with the Talysh in Lankoran (Nuriyev 
2007: 226) that have had their fisheries and traditional lifestyles eroded by explorations 
occurring in the Caspian Sea. Revulsion towards the ruling Nakhcevan clan in the country 
devolved the situation to violent civil war (Ibid). A movement for the establishment of a Talysh-
Mugan Republic was initiated by Alikram Humbatov in 1993, which was a secessionist 
undertaking that was in stark contrast to the historically passive lifestyle of the Talysh (Ibid). 
Crushing economic hardships served to manage Talysh separatism and restore stability in 
addition to Iranian cooperation with the Azeri government in the handover of Humbatov, it 
would be more correct to assert that the rebellion is not necessarily forgotten but rather 
temporarily suspended as there is always a chance for revolt and insurgency to return (Ibid: 227). 
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The intense loathing on behalf of the Talysh that still remains in the meanwhile is a constant 
threat for the government to consider when conducting operations in the southern Caspian Sea 
boundaries of the country (Ibid: 227). 
Central Asia may experience its ethnic tensions over natural resources between 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with the hydroelectric dams
233
 and power grids
234
 being set up in the 
on the Vakhsh River in the latter. The implications of damming in Tajikistan may affect the 
lucrative agricultural sector of Uzbekistan with cotton fields being unable to produce quota. 
Tajikistan though has argued that the project is for national energy and therefore is a state project 
that can be associated with resource nationalism given water is the pivotal material that powers 
the dam. Uzbekistan however also maintains a degree of resource nationalism with its cotton 
fields in that the agricultural cash crop accounts for a significant amount of revenue that is 
generated to Uzbeks. Hence, the grounds for conflict can indeed be viewed as set. A point to 
mention would also be that both countries are developing economies that are struggling 
economically and have natural resources as the main generator of state funds. 
The lacking of frameworks for the development of full economic potential in each of the 
aforementioned examples demonstrates natural resources having detrimental effect on diverting 
focus away from pathways for the stabilized foundations of economic diversification and future 
industrialization in favour of the allure of quick money. Another mind-set frequently overlooked 
would be that states that are dependent upon natural resources are ultimately relying on materials 
that can be depleted (Karl 1997: 47). Cash crops and other agricultural resources are renewable 
though and can be regenerated or cultivated at a regulated rate whereas there is a limited set of 
raw commodities such as metals, coal, and petroleum that are gathered in mining and petrostates. 
The Hubbert Peak
235
 will therefore already be a marker from which a mining economy or 
petrostate will be working towards from the initial decision to export the natural resources 
regardless of whether resource nationalism is utilized or not. However, given that resource 
nationalism provides a sponsor with perceivably more benefits, it is more often the case that 
some form of the concept will be used. Indeed the inclusion of renewable sources of wealth such 
as with cash crops to the pre-existing raw commodities sector may prove to be more beneficial in 
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laying the grounds for diversification and long-term returns despite the allure of a massive rapid 
capital injection being absent. 
 Extreme capital intensity in any case carries undesirable effects. One is historically linked 
in that exporters of natural resources such as oil have typically had exceptionally high levels of 
foreign ownership and/or control (Karl 1997: 47 – 48). A reason for this would be that the 
required amount of capital and technology was not possessed by the host country (Ibid). 
Simultaneously, especially with a high level of foreign ownership and/or control there comes a 
characterization of the industry hiring low numbers, if any, from the host population (Ibid). 
Naturally, the setting for resource nationalism to take hold is set and can be utilized, however, 
should demands from the host population be met if foreign companies believe that profit margins 
will not be significantly affected in any case, then the concept may not take hold. Rather, 
collective bargaining with the population would result in a landlord-peasant relationship with 
foreign companies gaining more interests than the host country (Ibid). In this sense, natural 
resource development in a developing economy can result in a, “foreign-controlled, high-wage 
economy, characterized by some strong unions and high unemployment,” (Ibid). 
 
Natural Resources as Benediction: 
 There are however desirable effects that natural resources and its exportations may bring. 
After all, the contrapositive to natural resources being malediction would be that the materials 
are in fact advantageous. Some countries that have utilized resource nationalism in conjunction 
with natural resources for the development of the state and industrialized as a result of the 
interpretation of the concept can be found in Nordic countries. 
 Finland and Sweden have jointly been cited as cases in which raw commodities have 
revolutionized previously poor and underdeveloped economies into globally present forces. 
These countries are grouped together due to the common resources of timber and iron ore being 
raw sources of materials that were used for the benefit of the state. The remarkable 
transformation from underdeveloped economies to full-fledged globally competitive ones is a 
track that owes much to natural resource exportations. Prior to the lucrative raw commodities 
industries, agricultural economies were in place for both countries. Land ownership reforms, new 
agricultural production techniques that included implementing technologies such as ploughs, and 
the adoption of a new staple crop of potatoes in place of beets and turnips provided room for 
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Nordic countries to industrialize. Exportations of cereals for example occurred within two 
decades of the adoption of such principles and were significant since Sweden as a case study was 
a net importer of grains before the implementation of reforms (Blomstrom and Koko in 
Lederman and Maloney eds. 2007: 218). Education improved in both countries and was 
paralleled to the growth of nascent technology industries. The increased quality and availability 
of public education enabled both Finland and Sweden to independently research as well as 
develop technologies that would prove to eventually create a further diversified economy. An 
example would be with the timber industry. Forestry requires technologies that would enable 
operators to saw through trees, gather and transport logs, create pulp and paper, as well as a 
number of other services. Transportation, machinery, chemicals, in addition to skills and 
knowledge for the fields are a scattering of what is required for the related industries of a 
domestically maintained natural resource sector such as timber that was followed by Finland and 
Sweden. Additional applications of academic fields such as chemistry for the creation and 
advancing of other industries is a logical conclusion that was reached by the case studies. 
Industrial sector diversification continued with the pioneering of information and 
communications technologies (Ibid: 214). For example, the Finnish Nokia and Swedish Ericsson 
were leaders in the telecom industry until both were sold to foreign companies (Ibid). However, 
it should be noted that a reason for the development of the economies to such an extent from 
developing stages would be indebted to the windfall generated from natural resource sales. Both 
Finland and Sweden maintain a sizable portion of their economic assets to natural resource 
sectors but neither are exclusively reliant or dependent on the raw commodities sectors. 
Furthermore, despite the sales of highly regarded companies such as those in the telecom 
industry, both Finland and Sweden remain competitive economies that maintain high standards 
of living for the population
236
, which are envied by many other countries around the world. 
Indeed, diversified economies are beneficial to possess and the promotion of which can occur 
with the assistance of natural resource wealth coupled to education. 
When discussing the benediction of natural resources upon a society, particularly one that 
utilizes resource nationalism, it is without question that Norway is an iconic and exemplary 
country. Not only is Norway within the neighbourhood of the Nordic countries already 
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discussed, its raw commodities are petroleum; with the major reserve of Ekofisk being 
discovered in 1969 (Bayulgen 2010: 187) and concessions as well as exploration rights being 
granted in the years preceding its discovery (Stennstadvold 1977: 2). Fearful of foreign 
dominance in the industry, the country implemented a “Norwegianization” of all hydrocarbons in 
the North Sea as property of the state for the benefit of the population following a framework of 
resource nationalism (Bayulgen 2010: 188 – 189). Early diversification of the economy as well 
as the promotion of a proactive Norwegian role in the harvesting of raw materials was supported 
by the government (Ibid: 189). The goal was essentially to facilitate domestic Norwegian 
competence for hydrocarbon activities that would, “over the long run reduce the role of the 
foreign oil companies to that of consultants, developers, and minority partners,” (Andersen and 
Arnestad in Bergesen and Sydnes eds. 1990: 55). The government initially began pursuing the 
objectives of resource nationalism by gradually asserting managerial, operational, financial, and 
outright ownership control of the petroleum industry (Bayulgen 2010: 188). Within two decades 
of major hydrocarbon extractions, Norway experienced a recession when oil prices collapsed in 
1986 (Ibid: 191). However, the country relied on windfall that was reserved for future 
generations and was able to persevere though a series of adaptive petroleum policies that were 
more favourable to foreign companies than before the decline in oil prices. The educational 
sector in particular had been a saving grace for the Norwegians since there was a capable 
population that had expanded to other budding industries, which was also a state policy that was 
in place from the 1970s (Ibid: 187 – 188). Able to attract reasonable assets and ventures due to 
an incredibly different investment environment than other petroleum states in the world such as 
those found in the Middle East, Norway was able to cleverly allocate wealth accumulated from 
the sales of natural resources to manoeuvre through a global decline in oil prices ultimately to 
emerge as a country that is consistently regarded as one of the highest living standards on 
earth
237
, which kept in tradition from the mid-1960s when the country was ranked seventh in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coupled with the virtual 
abolition of poverty (Bayulgen 2010: 185). Although Norway has certainly had less maturity and 
interaction with resource nationalism than both Finland and Sweden, it is incontestable that the 
experience of Norway is extremely valuable and archetypal for other countries. The Norwegian 
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process of development followed in the same model that was implemented by both Finland and 
Sweden, with oil windfall generated to the central government and allocated to the country for 
constructive as well as industrializing purposes. Economic diversification was also an additional 
goal for the distribution of wealth across the sectors. Excess petroleum revenues have also been 
explicitly set aside for the purposes of sustaining, benefiting, and developing future generations. 
At the writing of this work, all Norwegian citizens are positioned to technically become 
Norwegian crown millionaires
238
. 
In summary, all countries cited in the Nordic region that have implemented resource 
nationalism in conjunction with domestic reserves of raw commodities have gradually upgraded 
their pre-existing economies to a stage that gave rise to other industries that provided economic 
diversification for the country. Financial services, mobile technology production, machinery 
fabrication, fisheries, agricultural production, and shipbuilding were some of the industries that 
were coupled with the natural resource wealth that boosted the standing of Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden in the international system as well as global economy. Philosophically, it is not 
necessarily required for resource nationalism to be implemented in order for natural resources to 
afford benediction. However, the model was cited with the Nordic cases to richly illustrate 
beneficial outcomes of natural resources being utilized for economic advancement in developing 
economies that exist within the same region paralleled to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the 
Persian Gulf. 
 
Delicate Boundaries: 
 There exists a borderline between natural resources as a curse and as a blessing that is 
linked to the political structure and behaviour of the state. The delicate boundary in this sense 
would be for example between a dictatorial petrostate that is inherently abusive in its structure 
and a liberal regime that uses natural resources for the purposes of generating collective state 
wealth that is constructive.  
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 In the case of Venezuela, the oil industry started its radical development in 1908 under 
Juan Vicente Gomez and came at a time when the agricultural industry was the traditional source 
of income. This year is regarded as the birth of the Venezuelan oil industry although knowledge 
as well as usage of oil dated to pre-colonial times in which indigenous populations used 
materials from naturally occurring oil seeps for mainly medicinal purposes
239
. Gomez seized 
presidential power with the leaving of Cipriano Castro from office to Europe for medical 
treatment (Karl 1997: 76). The societal structure in the country included a figure known as a 
caudillismo or caudillo (Ibid: 74 – 75), which was a synonymous role to those of amirs in the 
medieval Islamic period. Basically, the caudillo was a character that commanded authority 
within a particular division of territory and was based on military power and force (Ibid). The 
structure was inherited from the colonial times of the Spanish and affected political stability in 
the country with caudillos warring against each other for the expansion of their personal 
influence, which was expected in a society made up of strongmen (Ibid). Federalism and 
centralism therefore were theoretical forces that were in constant clash with each other via 
presidential forces versus caudillos, respectively (Ibid). Gomez was able to manoeuvre the 
caudillos into submission through a series of political moves and legal implementations that were 
backed by his own personal connections and willingness to use force. The political apparatus at 
the beginning of Gomez coming to power was minimalist in every sense and relied on personal 
authority and informal justice. The state additionally had limited jurisdiction in the country with 
no effective match against caudillo authority. Indeed, if Gomez were to succeed and remain in 
power it would be in his interests to have the caudillos submit. 
 When in the seat of presidency, Gomez utilized foreign investors and companies to enrich 
the state, maintain his own rule, and have his friends as well as cabinet profit from the oil 
windfall; from which Gomez was also no exception (Ibid: 77). The caudillos were allured by the 
promise of payment from the state in addition to have more unruly ones cease hostilities through 
personal friends and connections of Gomez (Ibid: 79). In the case that loyalties could not be 
bought, the eventual threat of an increasingly centralized power base would moreover be able to 
exact compliance. One of the most significant implementations under Gomez would be the 
Petroleum Law of 1922, which was critical in reshaping the political landscape and traditions of 
the state (Ibid: 78). A primary function of the Petroleum Law of 1922 was to enable the state to 
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assert absolute authority over all land in the state, which enabled the granting of concessions 
(Ibid). While concessions for oil could have been granted prior to the law, the caudillismo rules 
held that a caudillo could effectively tax the government on any operations occurring within the 
territory of the caudillo (Ibid). Given the numerous complexities that would arise from dealing 
with many caudillos and varying taxation requirements under such a convoluted and unstable 
system prompted oil companies to provide Gomez not only with the drafting of the Petroleum 
Law of 1922 but also assisted in the effective shifting of power from a federal state to a 
centralized one, although weak in the initial stages of the transferal of power (Ibid: 78 – 79). 
Private landowners and landownership was tightly controlled by the government, which granted 
a more efficient flow of product to foreign companies as well as funds to the central government. 
Moreover, it was quicker and easier for companies to achieve success in Venezuela with a 
central government in place rather than a multitude of personalities. Gomez fully utilized the 
support of foreign investments to create modern infrastructure throughout the country and assist 
in the development of Venezuelan “stateness”, including what it meant to be a Venezuelan with 
roads connecting peoples that were previously not in contact with each other. The consequential 
rise in nationalism in the country was interestingly enough initiated by oil companies and 
propagated by the Gomez administration. State expansion and concentration of power in the 
central government with the president being the head authority of the country assisted Gomez in 
consolidating power. The creation of jobs in other areas of the country under the leadership of 
Gomez gained him considerable support from the local population. However, not every citizen 
was appeased with the government as there was a degree of corruption and nepotism that was 
exercised in the country. The Generation of 1928 (Caballero 2003: 290 – 291) student protests 
for example condemned the brutal campaigns of Gomez against those who did not concede to his 
rule and direction of state development as well as calling for further democratic installations in 
the political structure of the country. Under pressure from the population and a desire to maintain 
stability in the country, Gomez acquiesced to the expiration of his post from presidential office 
but had his associate of Juan Bautista Perez in place following a decision from the Venezuelan 
Congress (Ibid: 259). Perez proved to act as vicar of Gomez in the seat of the presidency, with 
the latter continuing his rule from his residence in Maracay. Returning to power in 1931, Gomez 
ruled until his death in 1935 (Ibid: 339). Following his death, a series of presidents assumed 
power in Venezuela until eventually a state policy of resource nationalism was implemented with 
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the nationalization of the oil and gas sectors under Carlos Andres Perez. This was coupled with 
the creation of the NOC Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in 1976, which continues 
operations in Venezuela to the present day
240
. 
 Gomez, using oil windfall stemming from foreign investments, ruled as a benevolent 
dictator and generated significant wealth to a centralized government that was left as a 
recognized absolute authority in the country with a united and cohesive state military. The 
previously existing federalist model that had traditionally been in place in the country with 
caudillos was subdued and as a result of its jettison, civil wars and political insurrections 
launched by the personalities were eliminated as well. In place, the precursor to the modern 
Venezuelan democratic state was constructed albeit unintentionally by Gomez. The foundations 
laid for democratic frameworks to take hold and develop in the country after his death were used 
for the production of the state political atmosphere. A unified political system was also met with 
a newly unified national identity that is also still adhered to at present. This was facilitated by the 
economic fervour that was rampant throughout the country under Gomez, such as with the 
building of roads and creation of jobs that enabled various peoples from the country to interact 
with each other on a level that they had never been able to beforehand. Further economic 
benefits from the windfall injection included the payment of the entire Venezuelan debt, an 
increased currency standard, and institutional setups such as with the state military. Fiscal 
spending was not rash and enabled the country to manoeuvre through economic hardships such 
as the Great Depression in the USA, from which a formerly major investor in Venezuelan oil 
was not able to spend on the same level as it did in previous years. As a cushion space against 
being exclusively reliant on oil wealth, there was somewhat of a preservation of the agricultural 
sector that had existed before the development of the oil industry. But, further economic 
diversification was not pursued and the creation of alternative sources of state wealth did not 
materialize. Little was achieved in the public education sector and there was a negative 
association that Gomez held with being connected to the USA as an extension of American 
presence in South America. Majority of the wealth also did pass through Gomez and his political 
elite, after all, upon his passing he was the richest man in the country. He additionally ruthlessly 
crushed opponents via secret police and/or state defence force that was funded with oil wealth 
that was generated from the reserves in the country. Yet, given that Venezuela was a caudillo-
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ruled minimalist state of federalist composition with an ineffective central government that was 
unable to match caudillo resistance, credit to Gomez must be given; especially under his 
guidance in which the presidency reached unforeseeable power. It also may have been 
zeitgeist
241
 and was culturally more acceptable during the period of Gomez rule to utilize force as 
he was inheriting a federalist caudillo-influenced system that was frequented with warring 
personalities. Gomez was not a megalomaniac with short-term goals and visions though. Rather, 
he was an extremely shrewd and tactful politician that held long-term visions that were 
manifested with such actions as the Petroleum Law of 1922, caudillo submission and removal 
from society, the reshaping of a political system that was to evolve over generations, and the 
astuteness to nominally relinquish power to Perez until he was able to in title resume the 
presidential office. None of this would be able to be achieved without oil-inspired development 
and funds gained from foreign investments. 
 Arguably an interpretation of resource nationalism that is more associated with Saudi 
Arabia than the other case studies in that the head of state is the living embodiment of the 
country through which all natural resources and associated funds are claimed by the ruler. 
However, Gomez behaved differently than all the kings of Saudi Arabia. While he did broker 
concessions directly with foreign companies and was constantly accessing the windfall to be 
used for his personal benefits as well as cabinet, it seems to be more so from a managerial role 
and a blurring of the dividing lines between personal and regime interests with autonomous 
bureaucratic logic (Karl 1997: 77). What is then to be gained from the Venezuelan example 
under Gomez? Essentially, patterns can be avoided and natural resources are not necessarily a 
predetermined curse for the state or a blessing for it either. It depends on the construction of 
frameworks and pathways taken following their development. Other factors such as political 
structure and characters involved can influence the direction of successes and/or failures but 
neither are absolute determinants. Gomez did not rule in a compassionate democratic sense but 
was also not a destructive dictatorial petrostate given that constructive efforts were made albeit at 
a cost of having an autocratic ruler that determined where funds should be directed for future 
growth to occur. It could be argued that resource nationalism may not have been a present policy 
that had manifested itself in Venezuela under Gomez given that the presence of a NOC was 
absent and that there was also no process of nationalization that occurred on any level. It can be 
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counterclaimed that the Gomez period was a rudimentary or primitive interpretation of the 
concept. While NOCs were missing, concessions were brokered albeit often with Gomez directly 
intervening himself and while there was no official political nationalization of natural resources 
that occurred, natural resources were explicitly deemed property of the state. Gomez facilitated 
statehood and the idea of nation in Venezuela, there was a political structure that was left in his 
legacy and refined in subsequent generations with frameworks that were paved in his era. He 
cultivated the ideas of statehood and nationalism to be complementary ideas in the country rather 
than competing. Hence, Gomez just as other monarchical figures existing in other temporal 
frames and geographies, such as with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, can be regarded as the living 
embodiment of the state. Therefore, resource nationalism can undeniably be regarded as existent 
during this period and demonstrates a delicate aspect of the concept. 
 
Further Shortcomings of Resource Nationalism: 
 Controversial rulers utilizing resource nationalism for personal gain is one of the many 
potential shortcomings of the concept. Naturally, as a theory there will be vulnerabilities since no 
theory is infallible. Consequently, there will be empirical results of utilizing resource nationalism 
that will have faults as well. 
 A major citation when discussing potential flaws with resource nationalism would be 
rentierism, which is the case in which states derive majority of their national revenues from 
selling state-owned resources to foreign entities (Ayubi 1995: 227). Rentierism has also been 
described as collecting “un-earned” income, since natural resources were already present as a 
raw product (Ibid: 227). Indeed, when overviewing resource nationalism, especially within the 
context of developing economies, the notion of rentierism is a very viable pathway that may be 
taken. Already, many interpretations of resource nationalism have manifested themselves in such 
a manner that the state was ultimately in a position of rentierism. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE have all experienced rentierism and have yet to emerge from the status. Other countries that 
have utilized resource nationalism inside the Persian Gulf region, such as Qatar, and similarly 
outside the region, such as Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, have also yet to overcome rentierism. 
 An extension of rentierism that is more applicable to industrialized or developed 
economies would be Dutch Disease, which has been described as the phenomenon in which an 
economic boom in the natural resource sector of a country transforms into a decline of other 
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industries such as manufacturing and agriculture (Overland, Kendall-Taylor, and Kjaernet in 
Overland et al., 2010: 5 – 6). A major symptom of Dutch Disease is the loss of competitiveness 
in the non-hydrocarbon economies (Lewin in Najman et al., 2008: 33). Aside from the 
Netherlands, which is the case study from which the concept is derived, Kazakhstan and to a 
lesser extent Russia are both countries that have utilized resource nationalism and have exhibited 
symptoms of Dutch Disease, particularly after the fall of the USSR. Kazakhstan for example was 
a flourishing Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) that maintained production facilities that were 
inclusive of light manufacturing capabilities and held the prestigious Baikonur, which was used 
as a launch station for the Soviet space program
242
. Following the dissolution of the USSR, there 
was an overall decline in the industries allocated to Kazakhstan from its Soviet inheritance. 
Economic woes and a weak central government prompted a strengthening of the entire state 
infrastructure. To strengthen the government and in an attempt to resolve economic anguishing 
in the country, concessions and exploration rights were signed with foreign companies for the 
extraction of Caspian Sea hydrocarbons in addition to the oil and gas wealth being nominally 
nationalized. Indeed, implementing resource nationalism with the numerous oil and gas reserves 
in Kazakh territory of the Caspian Sea was seemingly beneficial to the small population. The 
Tengiz oil and gas field was one of the largest finds in recent history, which was first discovered 
in the USSR in 1979 (Yessenova in Najman, Pomfret, and Raballand eds. 2008: 194). It was 
untouched however until 1993 due to the lack of Western technology in the Soviet Union, which 
could not extract the reserves using its own domestically produced devices (Nanay in Kalicki and 
Goldwyn eds., 2005: 129). Therefore, regardless of any industrial progression in the country, for 
a short term solution and capital injection, pursuing the exploitation of natural resources with 
foreign investments was logical. This would be particularly applicable to the refining of Kazakh 
crude, which contains excessive amounts of sulphur (Ehteshami in Akiner ed. 2004: 68). The 
significance of this additional element would be that it contributes to the oil becoming of an 
inferior quality and is an additional cost to separate from the crude. Hence, in order for 
Kazakhstan to generate funds that will rival those found on the converse of the Caspian Sea in 
Azerbaijan for example, which is in possession of high quality hydrocarbons from the South 
Caspian Sea Basin (Auty in Ibid: 113), it is necessary for the country to output more product 
given that a lower price will be paid for inferior product. Resource nationalism therefore was 
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used to enable Kazakhstan to assert more influence over domestic hydrocarbons, especially 
given the output required to compete with high quality southern basin crude. The move to 
resource nationalism was particularly important in 2000 with the discovery of the Kashagan oil 
field, which claimed to be the largest discovery in the world in the past 30 years (Kalyuzhnova 
2008: 80). Kashagan has also been named one of the largest fields in the world and the largest 
outside the Middle East (Kalyuzhnova 2008: 80). Naturally, with the immense reserves in the 
country and a flow of capital coming to the central government other industries declined or 
eventually vanished altogether in the country. Previously domestically produced products were 
replaced with the purchasing and importing of foreign ones. Kazakhstan lost any potential 
competitiveness in all sectors aside from its hydrocarbon sector. Dutch Disease took hold in the 
country and can be cited as a result of utilizing resource nationalism. 
Similarly, the previously heavily industrialized and diversified economy of the Russian 
Federation has suffered symptoms of Dutch Disease derived from its rentier status. Prior to 
resource nationalism being implemented, Dutch Disease was already evident in the country with 
the privatization of Russian petroleum. IOCs were favoured over domestic Russian companies 
for the development of oil and gas fields with highly qualified personnel and technologically 
superior equipment being readily available as opposed to the inexperienced personnel and 
technologically inferior domestic Russian products. A decline in the overall competitiveness and 
industrial diversity in Russia suffered as a result of the IOC deals and the heavy investments 
made by Russia to the petroleum sector. Oil and gas reserves had long been extracted from 
Western Siberia (Labban 2008: 113) along with other natural resources in the area, such as 
diamonds (Tichotsky 2000). However, the ease of extraction of petroleum in addition to the 
sheer immensity of the reserves was far more appealing for state focus than other natural 
resource sectors. From 1998 to 2006 crude oil production sharply climbed in Russia from close 
to 6,000 bpd to over 9,000 bpd (Labban 2008: 114). By 2006 the generation of foreign revenue 
from the sales of oil and gas alone amounted to figures upwards of 65% in the country (Ibid). 
Factoring in mineral extractions would increase the figure higher. The raw materials windfall 
coupled with the nationalized oligarchic system in place in the country with little economic 
diversification have entrenched Russia to a position of rentierism. Other industries that 
previously existed in the country from the Soviet inheritance declined and have not been 
internationally competitive. A notable exception of course would be the military industry, which 
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is competitive on an international scale and is a global leader in arms exportations
243
 (Figure 
5.1), but lacks in quality compared to equipment manufactured by other countries such as the US 
and is flourishing in a status that is preventing other countries such as Iran from effective 
military industrialization
244
. 
Resource nationalism then took hold in Russia, being notably steered by Vladimir Putin 
in 2006, who saw the concept as a means to a more successful state and was not favourable to the 
privatization of the petroleum sector that had been existent in the country. Hostilities ensued 
between some oil oligarchs and Putin, which resulted in the latter meeting more success. One 
instance of the exultations of Putin in this conflict would be with the subsequent jailing and 
exiling of the owners of Yukos, which was a petroleum company that went bankrupt in 2006 
(Blank 2006: 2) and served as an example to other oligarchs that considered clashing with the 
regime. Putin further assisted in implementing resource nationalism through actions such as legal 
formalizations that was directed from the Kremlin and Duma, which banned foreign companies 
and Russian ventures with more than 49.5% of foreign investments from developing strategic 
petroleum reserves, where “strategic” is defined as a field that had more than 511 m barrels and 
more of crude oil or 50 billion cubic meters (BCM) and more of natural gas (Blank 2006: 3). 
Moscow then implemented a series of taxing policies that created an environment of investment 
apprehension for attracting foreign monies. However, even after resource nationalism was 
implemented in the country, Dutch Disease is still evident and Russia is dependent upon sales of 
raw materials for the majority of its GDP. Rather than facilitate domestic Russian companies to 
upgrade their equipment and develop research to eventually compete with IOCs, such as was the 
case with Norway, the interpretation of resource nationalism that was manifested kept Russia in 
a status of rentierism and Dutch Disease. 
 
Redefining Rentierism:  
 The case of Russia provides an interesting direction for the conceptualization of 
rentierism, which has conceptual implications for resource nationalism. Russia commands 
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significant global influence and exercises its international power beyond the boundaries of the 
former Soviet Union such as with its contributions to the Al Assad regime in Syria. The 
economy is certainly not self-sufficient or self-reliant as its low economic diversification 
theoretically limits its power as a rentier state to a subservient economy that is dependent upon 
foreign investments. However, Russia is able to project its global standing to the point of 
influencing geopolitical outcomes despite being a rentier state. Therefore, perception of 
rentierism being attached or associated with weakness or reticence can in fact be dismissed. 
While there has not been an explicit referencing or understanding of rentierism as having a 
correlation with state power, particularly an affinity with weakness, the term has been used quite 
often with respect to developing economies that are in a “renter” position with other “landlord” 
states, such as those with powerful and developed economies. Although Russia maintains a 
renter status, it is a powerful state nonetheless. It has expressed symptoms of Dutch Disease, yet 
remains a worldwide commanding authority that is able to counter other industrialized 
economies such as those in Western Europe. However, Russia has also been demonstrated in to 
being an irresponsible state that is capable of formidable aggression and ferocious belligerence, 
as evidenced with the intervention in the Karabakh War in the 1990s (de Waal 2003 and Nuriyev 
2007: 164) and the 2008 invasion of Georgia
245
. This is not to say that Russia should be regarded 
as a successful rentier state but rather one that illustrates the potential for a rentier state utilizing 
resource nationalism to project significant international force and exercise leverage, albeit at the 
potential cost of appearing reckless towards international security. Similarly, the case studies are 
able to do so through means such as proxy warfare but differ than the Russian model since the 
domestic military production capabilities are much lower. What then is the element of redefining 
rentierism that is involved with a potential fault in resource nationalism? Essentially, the flaw 
would be having resource nationalism assist in the production of a globally-capable rentier state 
with military competencies that is irresponsible in its domestic and/or international behaviour.  
 Petroleum revenue generated from the exportations of raw materials are not directed 
towards the development and betterment of the population, rather Russia maintains an unstable 
and moreover undesirable model of nominal resource nationalism in a predominantly oligarchic 
structure. Extremes of wealth and poverty exist in the country with over 30% of state funds being 
                                                 
245
 King, C. (2008). “The Five-Day War” in Foreign Affairs (November/December). Available online: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64602/charles-king/the-five-day-war (Last Retrieved: October 15, 2013). 
215 
 
held between 110 Russian citizens
246
. Moreover, the corrupt and disorganized infrastructure of 
the country has not focused significant funds towards sectors such as education, which is in stark 
contrast to Nordic countries that are in the geographic vicinity of Russia and is a keystone that 
has assisted in the diversification as well as development of Nordic economies. Other 
institutionalized deficiencies that are existent within the country would be the lack of public 
services for the population such as health care.  
In sum, having a world power with such frameworks is potentially dangerous to global 
security. Rentier states, particularly ones with poorly structured and managed economies, can be 
reckless. Partially, this could be credited to the dependency on foreign capital for sustainment, 
which is something that cannot be afforded to be lost, perhaps even at the cost of military 
engagement. While Russia has not thus far necessarily demonstrated absolute recklessness in its 
international behaviour, there have certainly been actions that are at the very least controversial 
and negligent, such as facilitating ethnic conflict throughout the entire Caucasus, such as in 
Armenia (de Waal 2003), Azerbaijan (Nuriyev 2007: 164), Chechnya (Karagiannis 2002), 
Dagestan (Nuriyev 2007: 223), and Georgia
247
. The Caucasus of course geographically contains 
coveted petroleum transportation routes (Karagiannis 2002: 9 and Antonenko in Akiner ed. 
2004: 257) as well as access to high quality South Caspian Sea oil in Azerbaijan (Auty in Ibid: 
113). 
 
Reconceptualising Resource Wars: 
A brief point must also be covered on the notion of resource wars, which has been 
described as violent conflict over the access to natural resources (Klare 2002) when discussing 
shortcomings of resource nationalism. Following in the understanding of resource wars, the role 
resource nationalism would have would be facilitating the claims towards natural resources that 
entities make. However, resource nationalism can extend beyond the traditional understanding of 
warfare as a physical violent contest between parties to being a more clandestine and subtle form 
of interstate economic conflict that was covered in the previous chapter. Yet, there is also a 
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supplementary view towards reconceptualising resource wars in a novel perspective, which 
would be on the ideological level for the rights to natural resources. A developing example 
would be in South Sudan, where there is inter-ethnic competition to assert dominance and 
control over the rights to natural resources in the country. Major ethnic groups in this conflict 
would be the Azande, Bari, Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk; of which the Dinka have assumed the 
position of de jure ruling political authority of the country, which gained independence in 
2011
248
. Each group not only seeks to assert control over natural resources located within their 
own traditional areas of inhabitancy but also expands to territory that include areas which are not 
traditionally associated with a respective ethnic group at all. Resource nationalism is used by 
each ethnic group on a national level rather than on a state level although the ruling Dinka under 
the leadership of Salva Kiir have nominally declared that natural resources belong to the country. 
 
A Catalyst to Conflict: 
 Naturally, it is a shortcoming for a concept to potentially facilitate conflict in any sense 
and on a series of levels. In the vein, the possibility of resource nationalism serving as a catalyst 
to engagements should also be observed. Aside from the possibility of spurring resource wars, 
from the case studies it can be witnessed that there is potential for destructive interstate 
competition to occur. A country, such as Iran, would implement a policy of resource nationalism 
and lay claim to natural resources located within sovereign territorial domain. In another country, 
such as the UAE, there would be a likewise implementation of resource nationalism as well but 
for the sake of countering Iranian claim to natural resources. With both countries vying for 
control of raw commodities, a clash over contested natural resources was only bound to occur as 
with the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands, which could be argued from several points of natural 
resources such as land, water, or any potential hydrocarbons around the landmasses. Iran 
affirmed control over the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands and there have been continued tensions 
between the countries over the status of the islands, which has repeatedly been called into 
question by not only the UAE but also by summits held by the GCC
249
. 
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 A supplementary instance of resource nationalism being a catalyst to conflict would be 
with the potential applicability of the concept towards the fuelling of war and the production of a 
“war economy” (Le Billon 2003b: 35). Nationalizing natural resources apart from the central 
government or ruling authority can transpire in conflict and be used to escalate confrontation 
with the selling of materials for the funding of combative activities. Examples of such 
occurrences can be found across the world such as in Angola with the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) generating upwards of 3 billion USD to sustain war 
efforts against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the 1990s via 
diamond exploitation, Sierra Leone with similar exploitations of alluvial gemstones inclusive of 
diamonds generating potentially hundreds of millions of USD for the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) to wage war on the central government in the 1990s, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge 
with the sales of sapphires and rubies in the 1970s, and Afghanistan with Ahmad Shah Massoud 
of the United Islamic Front gaining revenue from the sales of emeralds and lapis lazuli to sustain 
war efforts against the USSR and successive Taliban (Ibid: 34 – 35). Precious metals such as 
gold have also held presence in the funding of a war economy, visibly for example with the 
Kabila-led rebel movement against the Sese Seko regime (Ibid: 35). Gold continues to have a 
role in the financing of numerous armed groups operating in the DRC (Ibid). In the Caucasus, 
ethnic Armenians have been able to sustain a war economy in Karabakh through the sales of 
natural resources inclusive of iron ore, copper, and gold
250
. With increased international demand 
for natural resources the raw materials are converted to amplified priced commodities, signifying 
higher costs paid for natural resources with even more money being directed towards not only 
central governments but armed groups as well. For example, the Rwandan army controlling most 
of the area during the civil war have reportedly received upwards of 20 million USD a month at a 
peak of international demand, according to a UN expert panel dedicated to investigating the role 
of natural resource sales in association with armed conflict, which can certainly contribute 
greatly towards a war effort, whether towards the central government or rebel groups (Le Billon 
2003b: 35). Indeed, funds generated from the sales of progressively demanded natural resources 
can be substantial enough to conduct armed operations and sustain long as well as drawn-out 
conflicts with heightened levels of insurgency, should rebel groups be involved. 
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 Aside from prospective applications of resource nationalism to sustaining a war 
economy, the notion can additionally create ethnic tensions depending on the interpretation of 
the concept, as was demonstrated with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. However, the claim can 
also be illustrated outside of the regional with Namibia and the diamond industry (Le Billon 
2012: 111). The South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) were struggling against 
apartheid South Africa and had claimed all territory and natural resources by association within 
the area to be property of the nations comprising SWAPO (Ibid). Prior to the efforts of SWAPO 
against apartheid, German colonialists asserted claim over diamond resources in the same area 
following genocide on the Herero (Ibid). While in both time periods the diamonds were unable to 
be effectively mined or accessed for an economic line to be set, thereby dismissing the 
possibility of a war economy, the claims over natural resources in the territory of what is now 
Namibia demonstrated the capability of resource nationalism being utilized as a catalyst towards 
ethnic tensions and conflict. 
 
Investment Trepidation: 
Resource nationalism has been conspicuously viewed as contrary to the interests of 
foreign companies and investors, perceiving the utilization of the concept as a high risk 
environment for business profitability. There is a perceived imbalance of control over 
investments with host countries appearing to have more assertion over funds in joint ventures 
with foreign companies. For such a reason, resource nationalism has been credited with the 
enabling of an unattractive international investment environment. 
 A striking example illustrating the fears of a worst case scenario in which foreign 
investors are at the whim of a host country can be observed in the dispute between Russia and 
Shell in 2007 over projects in Sakhalin
251
. In 1996 a technologically inferior Russia signed a 
PSA with the IOC to extract petroleum from the island with a majority stake in the reserves 
(Ibid). Many observers to the PSA note that the contract was inherently unfair and abusive 
towards Russia, which was in dire need of capital following the collapse of the USSR (Ibid). 
Details of the agreement included Shell via the Sakhalin Energy Investment Corporation being 
able to recoup all losses invested in Sakhalin projects plus a 17.5% rate of return before Russia 
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would even see its 10% share of petroleum (Ibid). Shell additionally operated and behaved 
irresponsibly with extraction activities undertaken in Sakhalin. An atrocious safety record, 
disregard for the well-being of the local population, failure to meet expectations of building new 
facilities such as roads and schools, a fuel spill in the third largest city on the island, and 
additional environmental concerns such as endangering whales caused resentment towards the 
IOC. Frustrations were eventually equally expressed from the Putin regime to the IOC that 
resulted in Shell being forced to half its 55% ownership (Ibid). Gazprom bought not only the 
27.5% of shares from Shell but also half of the stakes from other Japanese partners, namely 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi (Ibid). Foreign companies were additionally expected to acquire the $3.6 
billion USD of project setbacks, which was accepted in order to maintain shares. In this dispute, 
Shell was not able to bargain from a position of power given their poor record of operations in 
Sakhalin and more so given that in resource nationalism when a government deems that it is the 
inherent right for the country to assert more control over its natural resources, foreign 
investments are subject to a weaker role. Russia exercised the power of resource nationalism 
with suddenly revoking permits and delaying work on pipelines to the massive LNG terminal 
and oil exportation facility on Sakhalin while simultaneously supporting environmentalists. 
Coupled with a threat from Russia for a $50 billion USD lawsuit, Shell was positioned to lose 
more than just half its shares. 
 Neighbouring Kazakhstan, viewing the success met with the usage of resource 
nationalism in Russia, was feared by IOCs to be tempted to utilize the concept for advantageous 
profitability over foreign investments as well as asserting more control over domestic projects. 
Japan was prompted to caution Kazakhstan against such a policy and warned against a global 
spread of the concept
252
. Economic credibility was cited as a reason against using resource 
nationalism in a similar fashion since contracts can be left unfulfilled and could in a sense be 
disregarded as contracts altogether given that there could be sudden changes that would alter an 
agreement to the point of dismissal (Ibid). 
The Russian victory in the dispute with a major IOC as impressive as Shell created an 
aura of investment fear for existing ventures that was established around the world. It also 
assisted in the hesitation of future engagements of foreign companies with host countries 
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utilizing a policy of resource nationalism, stretching to industries beyond petroleum and IOCs. 
Long-held industry fears were vivified with the Sakhalin scenario and any limitation on 
attracting foreign investments to a country can be regarded as a shortcoming indeed.  
 
Additional Vulnerabilities: 
Resource nationalism has been viewed as a risk to international investments and is 
perceivably invulnerable to foreign influence. However, this is certainly not the case and 
resource nationalism, like all frameworks and theories, does retain areas of vulnerabilities. 
 While Russia has previously exercised its ability to exert control over its natural 
resources to bring an international supermajor into submission and Norway has structured its 
manifestation is such a manner that it would symbiotically rise in tandem with IOCs benefitting 
from petroleum extractions, there are cases in which the framework has been extremely 
susceptible to external forces. A striking example would be with Kuwait and Dow Chemicals. 
Towards the end of 2008 on the eve of the 2009 global financial crisis Kuwait cancelled a $17 
billion joint venture deal with Dow to form K-Dow Petrochemicals
253
. The joint venture, known 
as K-Dow Petrochemicals, was awaiting a $7.5 billion payment from Kuwait and would assist 
Dow in not only reducing its exposure to the recurring nature of the commodity chemicals 
industry but also enabling Dow to acquire Rohm & Haas, a leading manufacturer of chemical 
manufacturing (Ibid). Prior to cancellation, the value of the proposed venture was slashed by 8% 
to $17.4 billion but Kuwaiti lawmakers believed that due to a sharp drop in global demand and a 
deceleration of international markets, the venture would not be in the best interest of the country 
to pursue (Ibid). Indeed, global recessions damaged developed economies and hindered growth 
in emerging ones (Ibid). Hence, the deal was cancelled and Dow was seemingly left abandoned 
as well as without option. However, Dow sued the Kuwaiti Petrochemical Industries Company, 
which is a unit of the state-owned Petroleum Corporation, and was awarded a settlement of $2.19 
billion cash
254
. While this is a small settlement considering the magnitude of funds addressed, the 
payment is not a pittance and the point of foreign entities reigning resource nationalism is 
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demonstrated. Of course, it certainly depends on where the court case is held on presumption that 
a host country will never rule against itself, but it is possible to exploit vulnerability. Another 
relates to the case study of Iran in that international sanctions can have a dire effect upon the 
economy even with resource nationalism in place. Concerning Iran, which has not only a state 
policy of resource nationalism but also constitutional guarantees of natural resource 
management, corruption has been able to thrive to the point of international exposure. Alienation 
from accessing foreign markets and an unwillingness to engage with international companies as 
well as investors rendered resource nationalism in Iran feeble. Even during the administration of 
President Mohammad Khatami from 1997 – 2005 there came a compromise on resource 
nationalism in Iran in the most technical of senses in that Iran licensed fields away to foreign 
investors but with the reservation of a buyback option that would essentially return material 
rights to Iran. Corruption was additionally a problem that festered as well as unemployment 
remaining high. 
Depending on the political structure of a state, resource nationalism can even potentially 
lead the country down a highly unstable path and not produce the security of stability 
presumably inherent to the framework. For example, in autocratic systems like in Saudi Arabia 
there is incredible focus on the pinnacle of society, namely, the king. The position of the king 
should not be underestimated in that in reality there is a personality that is in need to addressing 
rather than a collective entity and elite. One of the challenges in having a monarch or singular 
authoritative figure would be that there could be difficulties in accessing the individual, which 
could limit investments to flourish in the domain. Another would be that development can be 
slower with a single head regulating growth. The psychological aspects of rulers are yet another 
dimension of potential complications that could positively but also negatively impact the 
outcome of resource nationalism and proves to be a serious weakness given the significance of 
risk open for adversity. The issues experienced with autocratic authorities in Saudi Arabia can be 
analogously applied to the UAE as well albeit with additional scopes for each emirate. 
 Other areas of vulnerability have already been identified by conventional research. One 
such example would be the resource curse, which is the situation in which countries and regions 
with an abundance of natural resources tend to exhibit less economic growth and development 
than countries with less natural resources
255
. The resource curse can be viewed as the spiritual 
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antithesis of resource nationalism but it can indeed be the case that the framework can result in 
such an outcome. Naturally, there are a number of conditions and factors that determine what in 
fact has led to the resource curse. But regardless of analysis and conclusion, what can be 
established is that resource exporters there is a concentrated dependency on a resource or set of 
resources capable of generating extraordinary funds to the state (Karl 1997: 48). 
Another weak point would be not just corruption but the circumstances where corruption 
is able to proliferate in a system. Depending on the state interpretation and manifestation, there 
are a number of avenues in which corruption can settle. In Mozambique, resource nationalism 
has been used for exclusive political gains in which the president manages coal and natural gas 
wealth for benefit not necessarily in line with the interests of the state or population
256
. 
Uncontrolled or unregulated spending can additionally lead to foreign borrowing, which once 
again leads a state to a weakened economic stance that is submissive to the lenders. 
Vulnerabilities in resource nationalism can also become exemplified in products of the 
framework such as with SWFs demonstrating mismanagement and uneven distributions of funds. 
With distributions of state-owned natural resource generated capital being even perceivably 
unfair, that is an impairment that can be critically disadvantageous to the host state. 
Depending on state interpretation and manifestation, resource nationalism can be 
beneficial like in the Nordic models. Yet, the vast majority of states utilizing the framework 
exhibit common characteristics of despotic rule, autocracy, corruption, and institutionalized 
deficiencies. While citing successful outcomes such as with Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
shows the potential of positive impact for resource nationalism, such models appear to be 
outliers with emerging economies being inclined to expressing vulnerabilities of the framework. 
However, expression of vulnerabilities does not only occur in emerging economies and 
developed ones can experience the tremors of weaknesses from resource nationalism. The 
Netherlands with Dutch Disease for example proved that even leading economies are not 
infallible to the damage that can be wrought by the framework. 
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Deproblemizing Resource Nationalism: 
Simply due to the fact that there are fallacies with a framework does not signify that there 
cannot be rectifications or solutions to its shortcomings. A starting point for the 
deproblemization of resource nationalism would be in its terminology. Clarifying and clearly 
defining the definitions and understandings of the framework components that make up resource 
nationalism creates logical as well as comprehensible structure; rather than having simultaneous 
definitions and understandings competing with each other to the point of obscuring the concept 
to a state of contradiction and illogical conclusion. In sum, elucidating terminology of the state, 
nations, nationalism, and ethnicity assists in the consistency of resource nationalism; which can 
produce a model that can be more easily directed and addressed given its organisation. In this 
vein, it is also vital to note that following an understanding, it is important to not constantly shift 
or change the understandings of the concepts. Failure to adhere to this premise results in 
confusion and contradiction that is evidenced in the identity crisis experienced by the UAE. 
 
The Masquerade of Nationalism: 
Within the case studies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are newly developing nations that 
have been invented within the past century and few decades, respectively. The idea of the nation 
is not as established or evolved as that of Iran and therefore is prone to challenge as well as 
intimidation as far as legitimacy of establishment is concerned. Iran for example has been one of 
the most continuously assertive nations in history and stretches over millennia to civilizations 
inhabiting the Iranian plateau and can be argued even further back to Aryan movements. Saudi 
Arabia though has been structured from the singular personality of Abdulaziz Al Saud from 1932 
onwards whereas the UAE has distributed its concept of nationhood between seven sheikhs from 
1972 onwards. Therefore, when facing a neighbour such as Iran, which has had territory and its 
nation inhabiting the entire coast of the Arabian Peninsula at many intervals throughout history, 
it is important to the Arabian countries to preserve the integrity of not only their state borders but 
nationhood as well. 
 Ultranationalism can thrive in such a tense environment and has already done so in many 
of the countries following the dissolution of the USSR with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan as select examples. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
there is platform for ultranationalism to take place. Emiratization for example is based on the 
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notion of uniformity and equation with Arabization, which can be interpreted as a form of 
fascism albeit without any violent undertone that was present in the Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, 
controlling the possibility of ultranationalism is vital to deproblemizing resource nationalism. 
Certainly, there is a ludicrous and cynical element to fervent nationalism in the GCC with the 
exception of Oman given the newness of the nations to the international system as well as the 
invented histories proposed to solidify national zeal. However, it can prove to be a serious issue 
to contend with. Therefore, a solution to the situation is needed in order to responsibly manage 
any potential harm that may occur. 
Adopting or at least accepting multi-nationalism as an approach can easily subdue 
ultranationalism and would benefit countries such as Saudi Arabia as well as the UAE. 
Nationalism can be obviously used as a political tool rather than demonstrate the spirituality of 
idealism. Veering away from extremes negates potential backfire that can occur. 
Transparency and Communication: 
Transparency is also pivotally important when concerning the monies generated from 
resource nationalism, especially with by-products of the framework such as with SWFs as well 
as other investment vehicles and company subsidiaries. Communicating the framework 
conceptually to the population is likewise crucial so that awareness of the economy and politics 
creates an atmosphere of inclusion rather than exclusion, which is particularly relevant for many 
ethnic groups that may reside in areas of extractions. Alternative pathways instead of resource 
nationalism are not really existent and the popularity of the framework is only increasing so 
having transparency and effective communication is vital to future successes. There is no point 
in attempting to safeguard or limit revenue gained from natural resource sales entirely from the 
population or reduce its distribution to select circles and elite because that would only be 
worsening and weakening future positions as well as powers of the ruling elite. Knowing that an 
economy based entirely off of natural resources is weaker than an industrialised one is 
imperative to recognising the unreasonable nature of trying to keep a state in such a model. 
While there may be difficulties in translating resource nationalism to industrialisation, possessing 
a transparent system as well as means of effective communication can assist in coordinating 
resolutions rather than devolve into violence or tensions. Both elements can additionally assist in 
the attraction of foreign investments since security is provided with transparency and 
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communication. Already, IOCs operating in host countries have begun to recognize the benefits 
of communication and do so with the population through more constructive means such as 
setting up schools, building roads, and detailing the earnings versus expenditure on the 
population. 
 
Attracting Intrepid Investments: 
Abating investment trepidations to attract foreign funds in essential to the development of 
emerging economies as well as the furthering of developed ones and should not be deterred. 
Harsh terms dictated to international investors by host countries will only create an aura of 
antipathy and possibly even turn away funds altogether. Therefore, demonstrating characteristics 
facilitative of an active and vigorous investment environment that does not bear discrimination 
against foreigners is critical to the progression of the natural resource sector of the host. For 
example, in Norway the demands placed on IOCs seeking hydrocarbon extractions were 
considered modest as well as predictable, especially in contrast to other emerging economies at 
the time that imposed punitive measures on investors (Bayulgen 2010: 193). Moreover, there 
were fluctuations in government demands over IOCs that were correlated with oil prices rather 
than a set percentage of tax (Ibid). When oil prices rose, the government raised taxes and when 
there were falls the government lowered them accordingly (Ibid). The accommodating and 
engaged action with the IOCs that was transparent as well as communicated to the population 
was well-received. The lack of aggression in taxation against foreign companies that would 
allow the Norwegian government to accrue high rents was appreciated by IOCs, which viewed 
the government as cooperative and hospitable rather than combative and xenophobic. The taxes 
were also not discriminatory against foreign companies since it was equally applied to domestic 
companies as well (Ibid). Economic incentives such as IOCs being able to deduct on much oil-
related expenditures if explorations were to occur on the Norwegian continental shelf attracted 
even more firmly grounded dealings with the government (Ibid: 194). Flexibility in adjusting to 
the markets was a lively but profitable experience for the Norwegians. 
 Administrative clarity and consistency helped regulate the stability of the investment 
environment while also cajoling IOCs to accept investment terms even when less favourable 
(Ibid). Basically, every company did know that it was going to be taxed but being able to predict 
by how much was reassuring enough for the companies to operate in the area (Ibid: 195). Heavy 
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competition present would entail that either companies would join or be excluded from deals. 
Needless to mention, the elements of transparency and communication were ever-present. 
Consultation and debates on hydrocarbon affairs provided regular exchanges of information 
between administrators and businesses, which created understanding on policy issues (Ibid). 
Negotiation channels, governmental access, and effective conflict-resolution mechanisms in 
place gave IOCs the means to ensure long-term project profitability in addition to a mutually 
content population (Ibid). 
 In essence, despite implementing resource nationalism a host country is undoubtedly able 
to attract foreign investments and capitalize on their natural resources in a mutually beneficial 
manner. It is always profitable when all parties are gratified and creates the means for which 
future ventures can be conducted as well. 
 
The Recognition of Vulnerability: 
 It is important to remove the arrogance from host countries utilising resource nationalism 
in its behaviour towards the international system. Resource nationalism as exemplified with the 
Kuwaiti case with Dow is one of the many instances in which the framework has been rendered 
powerless. Foreign investments will not occur with fluidity should the host be aggressive or 
belligerent in its economic behaviour with financiers. Similarly, the constant threat of license 
revocation or venture breakdowns is unacceptable after a particular threshold. After all, business 
deals and contracts must be honoured and the excuse of resource nationalism for unfulfilling 
duties is objectionable. Identifying with the idea that like all frameworks there are weaknesses, 
host countries can proceed with more responsible conviction when engaging the international 
system. 
 
The Tactical Management of Deficiencies: 
Strategically targeting and addressing the shortcomings of resource nationalism for 
resolutions enables the framework to produce positive outcomes rather than be caught in a 
detrimental cycle. Already, solutions inclusive of greater communication for the successful 
understanding of a model for the benefit of a population as well as institution-building for 
transparency and the preservation of wealth for future generations have all been cited with 
elucidation. However, region-specific issues such as the bidoon and migratory labour within the 
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case studies and by extension many other countries in the international system can remain in 
technicality. Thusly, there are additional solutions that assist in the management of deficiencies. 
 
Adaptable System of Governance: 
 The Norwegian case has exemplified a successful tactic that will be of undoubted 
importance to other regimes utilizing resource nationalism. Adapting to external conditions and 
compromising is not a sign of desperation since policies can always be changed in a flexible 
system of governance. Coupled with the transparency and communication elements proposed 
earlier, adjustability can in fact be more exciting and engaging with investors in that there will 
always be a need for constant communication. While fiscal notions have been discussed, the 
adaptable system of governance can also be used for political amelioration. In this respect, it will 
be more difficult for dictatorial and authoritarian regimes to be accommodating to flexibility 
since it is equated with malleability that could be contrary to ruling temperaments. That is not to 
say that authoritarian regimes must experience complete upheaval however, but there certainly 
can be reformations and implementations that would benefit the overall system better than 
without the effective political mechanisms. 
 
Controlling Prosperity and Directing the Affluence: 
Resource nationalism can result in extraordinary wealth, which accumulates directly to 
the state. Rents are not mediated with domestic private actors and the host country is 
consequently inclined towards distributive traits, meaning that economic power rests on the 
capability to extract rents and allocate proceeds (Karl 1997: 48 – 49). From the state, nationalist 
ideology is heavily affected by apportionment as is the nation and the ethnicities inhabiting the 
territory. Controlling sudden and extreme opulence is important to not create instability or 
facilitate tensions. This is particularly relevant with economic booms in which affluence reaches 
newfound heights. While booms can increase demands for economic diversification to even 
further advance the rising economy, it is not necessarily the best path to traverse in the earliest 
stages of the boom. It has been argued that planning, efficiency, and effective allocation is most 
crucial during the boom period, which can lead to economic diversification but only on the 
condition that productive energies are not shifted away from responsibilities (Ibid: 67). It is often 
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the case that booms create greater dependency on natural resource revenue and while there is the 
illusion that exporters have gained autonomy, it has actually brought economies into reliance 
(Ibid). Indeed, booms can create the grounds for future crises, which is the unique dilemma of 
the host country (Ibid). 
 However, rent-seeking behaviour and its consequences have been avoided in Norway 
with the state resisting the temptation to spend massive petroleum funds to shield the economy 
from hyperinflation and currency appreciation that did begin to affect domestic industries 
(Bayulgen 2010: 2008 – 2009). The government heavily subsidized industries such as 
shipbuilding, fisheries, agriculture, farming, and textiles with $14 billion between 1973 and 1980 
(Ibid and Andersen 1993: 144). The Petroleum Fund was then established in 1990 in an effort to 
invest petroleum revenue in foreign securities once the subsidized industries stabilized and were 
able to develop without direct governmental intervention (Bayulgen 2010: 208 – 209). To evade 
politicization of the Petroleum Fund, it was moved from the Ministry of Finance to the Central 
Bank of Norway in 1999, which contributed to the long-term vision of saving a portion of 
revenues in the fund to safeguard it for future generations (Ibid). Indeed, directing prosperity 
from the government to stabilize, diversify, and burgeon is an avenue that all states utilizing 
resource nationalism can benefit from. 
 
The State in Responsibility: 
At times, particularly with authoritarian regimes utilizing resource nationalism, there is a 
confusion or vagueness between personal and state interests. In Venezuela during the Gomez 
regime for instance, petroleum was a means for affirming authority in his presidency, 
maintaining stability, removing power from the caudillos, and enriching himself as well as his 
associates (Karl 1997: 77). Questions arise as to whether such actions were in the interests of the 
state or out of personal predisposition or even the possibility of whether the two are synonymous. 
The conflict between state and personal interests is not a unique scenario to resource nationalism 
but does highlight one of the many contests in which the state regardless of political structure 
should be held in responsibility. 
 In the case of Gomez, the role of the presidency was analogous to that of a monarch 
given his de facto powers of authority and while there may be interpretations of the state 
behaving irresponsibly through the direction of funds to Gomez and his circle, there were 
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significant advancements that occurred in the country because of his actions. It is established that 
petroleum funds were used to encourage predation and patronage in Venezuela during this 
period, but is also enhanced stability in the area and it is also established that funds were also 
used to protect Gomez from tensions that led to the downfall of other rulers (Ibid: 79 – 80). But, 
it should also be noted that government revenues increased nearly threefold at an annual rate of 
14.9% during the 1920 – 1929 period and governmental expenditures increased as well (Ibid). 
Therefore, while Gomez was effectively a dictator, he was also a leader that provided many 
benefits to the state. The controversial status is open to opinion but it is undeniable that the 
positive actions have weighed heavily to such an extent that it cannot be denied that the state has 
acted with a degree of responsibility. 
 Good governance is also a vital characteristic to display when concerning responsibility. 
The notion entails a broad range of ideas that does not amount to a singular defined 
understanding (Najem in Najem and Hetherington (eds.) 2003: 3 – 4), but rather demonstrates 
characteristics such as “economic liberalization, creation of market-friendly environments, 
transparency and accountability with respect to both economic and political decision-making, 
political liberalization, the rule of law, and [the] elimination of corruption” (Ibid: 25). While the 
understanding is very wide as proposed, the pervasive usage of the concept, particularly within a 
diverse international system, necessitates such a working definition (Ibid). Some elements of the 
notion have already been reviewed but results of good governance can be elaborated. For 
example, in a theoretical setting, good governance can be used to escape a resource curse. 
Responsible states demonstrating good governance can extricate themselves from the viciously 
detrimental cycle through constructive efforts. While Norway could have fallen into the cycle, it 
instead implemented conservative spending measures and focused on collectively involving the 
population to salvage and revive domestic industries in an effort to abide by the full employment 
policy. Other countries that are in a resource curse that have been unable to remove themselves 
from the insolvency have always been unable to demonstrate good governance. 
 Other responsible measures would be holding open, rational, and informed debates about 
hydrocarbon policies, which can assist in producing agreeable accord (Kaldor, Karl, and Said in 
Kaldor, Karl, and Said eds., 2007: 279). It is often the case that countries do not hold debates 
regarding the policies to be implemented and if there is one, the informational aspect is lacking 
since majority of the public would not be able to understand complex terminology or issues that 
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may arise in implementing one policy over another (Ibid: 279). Consequential impacts of policies 
in particular should be observed. By getting the public to generally understand the nature of the 
policies and factors of the natural resource industries, it would be reasonable to extrapolate that 
the population would be more understanding towards governmental actions, should their input 
and concerns genuinely be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it would enable the public to 
better understand resource management practices that have been adopted within the state. 
Another constructive measure would be to involve the population with debates that could prove 
beneficial to the relationship the citizens have with their government, regardless of political 
structure. Ideally, involving citizens that do not have ulterior or concealed motivations, such as 
elections, would significantly reduce biases that may be incorporated into policymaking and 
debates (Ibid: 280). Operating in transparency to a certain degree may also be favourable in that 
the population would become more comfortable with the activities of the many institutions in the 
country such as the NOCs, where transparency is understood as publically accessible information 
of payment transactions to the governments by foreign companies (Ibid). Such visibility could 
offer more regulated control and eliminate loopholes that can be used by corrupt entities to 
funnel revenues away from the government (Ibid). In this vein, a publically accessible 
publication of the national revenue expenditure would also assist in the lessening of corruption. 
Of course, operating in absolute transparency without regulation of what information is released 
could result in additional tensions should certain groups learn about specific actions such as a 
disregard of expenditure in particular areas inhabited by minority ethnicities. Moreover, state 
accountability should be prioritized, especially with systems where natural resources are heavily 
politicized since tensions can easily fester in such conditions. Boundaries of accountability must 
be clearly demarked and steadfast, inclusive of all members and entities in society, with formal 
proceedings that are visible to the population so that active engagement on behalf of the state can 
be witnessed (Ibid: 280 – 281). Norway implemented such measures, which resulted in 
preventing symptoms of Dutch Disease and effectively turning petroleum into simply another 
raw material, albeit with a high price attached to it (Bayulgen 2010: 215 and Karl 1997: 221). 
 
The Continued Proliferation of Resource Nationalism: 
The increasingly popularity of resource nationalism exhibits a positive trajectory as well 
as future dominance of the framework in the international system, especially with regards to the 
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implementation of nationalized companies, such as NOCs. Already, firms such as Ernst & 
Young have dedicated efforts into investigating and understanding the framework as well as its 
implications
257
. A constructive application that has been prompted by research done at the firm 
would be the view that resource nationalism extends beyond the extraction of petroleum and is 
applicable to other natural resources as well, especially in the mining sector
258
, which is not a 
commonly shared outlook of the framework despite being more relevant. However, for a series 
of risk evaluations, Ernst & Young has placed resource nationalism as the number one risk for 
miners
259. The term “risk” of course is subjective. Maplecroft for example has created a resource 
nationalism index, which quantifies risk and is then ranked and valued on a 10-point scale. Yet, 
the definition of resource nationalism utilized by Maplecroft as well as its quantifying of risk can 
be put into question. For example, in 2012 the organisation placed countries such as Iran 
similarly was placed in an extreme risk category, Russia was placed in the high risk category 
whereas countries such Venezuela as well as the case studies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE were 
placed in a medium risk category (Figure 5.2). With regards to Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
and Venezuela all countries have already implemented resource nationalism though, therefore 
placing such countries in different categories is nonsensical. Furthermore, Iran has been placed 
in the extreme risk category but has been quite publically utilizing the framework for decades. 
Hence, if “extreme risk” were to be equated with “implementation” then Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
and the UAE should also be included in the category. Should the categories be more so equated 
with inclination towards the framework, then once again none of the categorizations would make 
sense. A subsequent evaluation in 2014 though shifted Iran to a medium risk category and 
Venezuela to the extreme risk (Figure 5.3). The evaluations demonstrate an unclear and 
inconsistent understanding of the framework. However, a point that can be gathered from a 
global outlook without following the risk quantification by Maplecroft would be that there are a 
number of countries that have already implemented resource nationalism or are inclined to doing 
so. 
 Africa for example is host to a number of terminable natural resources that would be 
beneficial for countries in the continent to nationalize (Figure 5.4). Indeed, prospects of resource 
                                                 
257
 http://www.ey.com/CA/en/Newsroom/PR-activities/Articles/2010-CMJ-Resource-Nationalism. 
258
 http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Mining---Metals/Mining-Metals-our-videos---Resource-nationalism 
259
 http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/News-releases/News_Resource-nationalism-remains-number-one-risk-for-
miners 
232 
 
nationalism proliferation are extremely high in every country. Sierra Leone and Botswana for 
instance could nationalize the diamond mines and assume the benefits of doing so; analogously 
gold and uranium in other African states can be nationalized as well. Already, renewable natural 
resources such as teak hardwoods have already been nationalized in South Sudan, which has 
exported the materials to international markets close to the inception of state independence, 
which has assisted in not only diversifying the economic generations aside from petroleum but 
also brought revenue to the central government
260
. 
 Shale oil and gas potentials additionally brings an entirely new dimension to resource 
nationalism with countries such as Brazil, Canada, China, Russia, and the USA possessing 
immense reserves (Figure 5.5). Prospects of proliferation extends therefore to regimes and 
economies not thoroughly evaluated in this work. Indeed, democratic and developed economies 
would provide fascinating studies. The implications of Canadian resource nationalization of 
shale oil and gas would undoubtedly boost the country to become an economic titan. When 
Canada proposed the Keystone Pipeline through the USA, the administration of President Barack 
Obama resisted the immediate approval of such a project on grounds that the sensitive 
environment of the Sand Hills region in Nebraska would be negatively affected by the project
261
. 
Indeed, political foresight and pragmatism have been noticeable features of the Obama 
administration and carefully proceeding with future petroleum endeavours is demonstrative of 
not only consideration for the environment but also exhibitive of the importance of petroleum 
undertakings. However, it should also be mentioned that the USA possesses monumental shale 
oil and gas potential that dwarfs that of Canada and can be recovered at a higher rate given 
technological capabilities (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). 
 Conclusively, there are numerous countries utilizing resource nationalism and many more 
that have prospects to do so. Pathways to the framework can arrive in a number of ways and is 
already firmly entrenched in the international system. Hence, continuation of resource 
nationalism will occur and should be engaged. 
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Conclusion: 
Natural resources have been determined to not necessarily be a curse for developing 
economies but not a panacea either. While there may be problems inherent to resource 
nationalism, they are certainly manageable. It very well may be the case that more deficiencies 
have yet to be discovered since they have not yet been identified or developed considering that 
resource nationalism has only recently begun resurgence on the international scale and 
shortcomings can be unique from one state to another. Nonetheless, resource nationalism is on 
the rise with examples including unequivocal calls for implementing the framework in 
Kyrgyzstan with the gold industry
262
 just as neighbouring Uzbekistan did to assert more control 
over their own gold industry
263
 and South African anxiety to utilize resource nationalism as a 
means to assert greater control and benefits from mineral extractions in the country
264
. Indeed, 
resource nationalism is becoming an increasingly popular philosophy for developing economies 
to adopt, especially with regards to the implementation of nationalized companies. The question 
as to when extractions will occur is reliant of a trade between extracting natural resources or 
leaving them for another time to generate revenue. Hence, regardless of the shortcomings, 
management of the deficiencies will likely occur simultaneously with proliferation of the 
framework internationally. 
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Conclusion: Reflections on Resource Nationalism in the Persian Gulf 
This project sought to investigate resource nationalism in the Persian Gulf using the case 
studies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The framework was initially dissected to reveal its 
inner components that would in turn be evaluated and analysed. The state, nation, nationalism, 
and ethnicity were all assessed and remained ever-present throughout the thesis. Each term had 
not only been defined for usage in the project but also was clearly demonstrated with each case 
study. Subsequently, the state interpretations of the framework and various pathways of 
manifestations were covered, which accentuated the versatility and amorphous nature of resource 
nationalism. Ethnic tensions were then reviewed along with SWFs to examine the extent of 
impact manifestations had taken. Consequently, further analysis on energy and security was 
provided, which elucidated additional usages of the framework. Afterwards, a conceptual 
exegesis was undertaken that analysed resource nationalism with all of its perceived benefits and 
shortcomings. Depromblemization was offered in addition to other measures of tactical 
management for the natural resource sector. 
 Resource nationalism has been demonstrated to be far more complex than the superficial 
view of the framework being a claim that a government and/or ethnic group(s) makes to natural 
resources located within their boundaries for the purposes of ownership and control. Its 
implementation in the Persian Gulf within the case studies has been clearly demonstrated. The 
effects of utilizing the framework had also been extensively reviewed. It was apparent that there 
were many complexities, difficulties, and issues associated with resource nationalism, such as 
with ownership rights. It was determined that despite such matters the framework had no 
correlation with causing ethnic tensions; rather it could be viewed as exacerbating or inciting 
them, but ultimately was not the cause. Ethnic tensions were present on both sides of the Persian 
Gulf but were certainly manageable. There was a profound effect that resource nationalism 
maintained on national and ethnic identities between the case studies and the impact on 
international relations was addressed with interstate behaviour being brought forth to 
demystification. The enigma as to whether the framework had any negative impact on the 
countries utilizing it was also asserted and while there were countries that were experiencing 
detriments such as rentierism, the relationship with resource nationalism would enable the 
country to extricate itself through constructive efforts. In this manner, it should be noted that 
while it is philosophically possible for the case studies to develop constructive measures such as 
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transparency, communication, and good governance, under the current socio-political structure it 
is more likely to occur in an ameliorated model in which opacity is illuminated, greater 
communication is promoted, and good governance receives greater attention for development. 
Under the current models some of the negative consequences of resource nationalism have 
already become expressed, such as the underinvestment in the oil and gas sectors and the 
facilitation of economic lethargy. Rather than updating and further developing the sectors into 
becoming more technologically advanced and efficient, there is a prevalent practice of operating 
preexisting petroleum networks that are becoming increasingly dated in addition to declining 
production levels. Trends in the region that were related with resource nationalism had also been 
referenced, such as geopolitical tensions at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.  
The framework can certainly be beneficial and does not need to be feared by any entity 
whether it is a foreign investor seeking business ventures or an ethnic group under the political 
system of a country employing resource nationalism. The interpretation and manifestation of the 
framework is what would result in concerns, but as such are manageable ones. Resource 
nationalism is not a determinant and is indeed a flexible and accommodating framework that is 
able to change in order to adapt to its conditions. Applications of resource nationalism in this 
project have been with oil and gas as the materials of focus, but this does not need to be the case 
since timber, metals, and human resources can also be areas of use. The framework reserves 
incredible power and can make or break an economic sector depending on select factors such as 
management as well as adherence to its implementation. The case study of Iran illustrated 
mismanagement and defiance towards the consistency of resource nationalism while Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE met with greater success with the developments of internationally renowned 
SWFs. SECURITY Indeed, resource nationalism is a diverse and multi-dimensional with its 
complexities extending to other issues seemingly unrelated to the framework. 
In the advent of globalization, resource nationalism is arriving to a platform of evolution. 
There are tantalizing developments with the framework that are to take place in the near future 
and have already been giving signs in other pre-existing models. One noteworthy example would 
be with the role of PMSCs and the effective privatization of natural resources in the UAE. Other 
countries have yet to develop their manifestation of the framework and witnessing as well as 
forecasting the implications of such an evolution is attractive. Natural resources will always have 
a presence in the international system and will be essential for the functioning of a state. Notions 
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of risk and governance will hence be even more relevant. With the resurgence of resource 
nationalism, the project has in its final chapter drawn upon an array of other countries and 
natural resources to illustrate the proliferation. It is important at this state to establish that there 
should be further engagement of resource nationalism between companies and governments. The 
two should not be viewed as competition but rather as interactive partners. After all, the natural 
resources that are located within a host country cannot reasonably become the absolute property 
of a foreign company, especially if there are populations inhabiting the area. It is unreasonable to 
assume that simply because the operations conducted in the past yielded immense revenue that it 
should unquestionably continue in such a trajectory. It is often ignored that many companies in 
this regard have acted in exploitation, which is a standard that is unbecoming of modern 
standards. It used to be the case that it was acceptable for entire populations to become enslaved 
and forced into manual labour for the betterment of another empire, but this age has similarly 
passed and such behaviour has become unacceptable to repeat. Hence, mutual respect must be 
given between the host countries and foreign companies with both acknowledging that there are 
vulnerabilities on both sides. Cooperation and mutually beneficial endeavours have always 
promoted a more positive relationship than one in which one side is furthering more than the 
other. 
 In this vein, it should be addressed that parties must live up to business contracts. 
Developing countries may already have a problem with this due to the lack of infrastructure, but 
it is an issue that will be recurrent in the future should parties not perform their agreed duties. 
After all, it is only fair and legal to assert that should parties enter a contract or venture together 
and agree to perform particular functions, when at least one side does not fulfil its commitments, 
it is undoubtedly condemnable. Behaving illicitly may be perceived by the host country that the 
moves are safeguarding its interests absolutely and are henceforth legitimate. But, it in fact 
demonstrates illegitimacy and casts doubt on the entire model of the host country. Not only does 
it place undue risk on the country with the perception that it is an unreliable business partner but 
it may also bring to light some other aspects of society that are condemnable by the international 
system as well, such as internalized corruption. While countries do have the right to exercise 
control over their own natural resources, that does not give them the right to disregard 
engagements. Countries such as Russia are difficult to reign in given their historical belligerence 
and that many companies cannot afford to make an enemy out of the state. It is certainly different 
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for other countries, even ones with economic standing such as Kuwait, which was humiliated by 
USA courts. 
 It could also be the case that partial foreign ownership is not necessarily negative or 
against resource nationalism. In fact, foreign ownership could potentially guarantee regime 
stability given that companies can put forth investments to build and stabilize regimes (Le Billon 
2012: 71 – 72). Political stability is of course an advantage and should resource nationalism be 
the means to facilitating it, then certainly partial foreign ownership is allowed. Concerning the 
boundaries of resource nationalism, as long as the state maintains the ability to assert its control 
over natural resources located within its territory then such engagements can be fulfilled. The 
assertion of control does not need to be absolute but it does need to be present. PSAs, JOAs, and 
other partnerships may deter governments from engaging in prolonged armed conflicts (Ibid). 
Similarly, domestic and international leverage can still be placed on companies to address social 
as well as environmental impacts as a result of resource extractions, which additionally signifies 
that there are avenues in which host countries can once again project control. 
Therefore, with such attractive developments and reasons for the rise of resource 
nationalism, it should be hailed and enthusiastically interacted. Since initiating my doctorate in 
2010, there have been numerous calls, usages, and prospects for resource nationalism visible 
throughout the international system. For example, the newest country in the world, South Sudan, 
sought to export its natural resources with a state-implemented policy of resource nationalism 
that would be used to generate significant foreign investment to the central government for sales 
of petroleum and timber. In Syria during the civil war Israel utilized the framework to conduct 
clandestine warfare against its neighbour in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights by selling oil and 
gas rights to an energy firm based in New Jersey, USA
265
. Libya experienced a revolution and 
there are now issues being raised with the future of natural resource management in the country. 
Afghanistan and Iraq have continued to experience internal struggles with addressing resource 
nationalism in the country with the former having vast mineral wealth and the latter possessing 
immense petroleum potential but both being hindered by ethnic conflict and tensions. Namibia 
also has prospects for resource nationalism with the potential nationalization of the hoodia plant, 
which is of considerable interest to pharmaceutical industries. In summation, there is incredible 
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demand and potential for resource nationalism to flourish in the future with active signs already 
being pursued. 
 Future directions of research are numerous given the pioneering study conducted on 
resource nationalism in the Persian Gulf using Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Within the case 
studies further investigation can be done on ethnic tensions as they would be a developing and 
constantly progressing study to be updated on. The immediate surrounding littoral region can 
also be similarly examined as was done with this project, Kuwait and Qatar would prove 
fascinating studies just as Bahrain and Oman would as well. Other case studies outside the area 
can also be explored such as with China, Cuba, Russia, Sweden, and Uzbekistan to name a select 
few. Examining different political systems in relation to resource nationalism would also prove 
beneficial as it is a study that has not yet been thoroughly investigated. Changing the materials of 
focus in future case studies to be aside from petroleum would similarly be advantageous to the 
contribution of unique literature in that there has not been significant investigation into other 
areas of natural resources, with the exception of petroleum, that have been studied in the context 
of resource nationalism. However, given the newness of shale oil and gas to academia, providing 
innovative research with such materials at focus would also be valuable. More theoretical 
evaluations and elucidations on the framework could also be positive direction. A final 
constructive recommendation would be with studies having the influence of globalization on the 
framework
266
, with particular emphasis on its components. Essentially, there is a wide range of 
themes and topics that can still be covered by academic research with resource nationalism at the 
core. Yet, until future research does occur this project stands as a testament to the dynamism and 
depth of resource nationalism. 
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Figures: 
Figure 1.1: Iranian political structure flowcharts, where the Supreme Leader
267
 is the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Source: BBC). 
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 It should be noted that the Supreme Leader appoints the head of national broadcasting, such as television and 
radio, but not all media outlets. 
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Figure 1.2: Iran Total Population (Source: World Development Indicators and 
www.knoema.com). 
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246 
 
Figure 1.8: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
247 
 
Figure 1.9: Oil and gas production in Iran from 1970 to 2012 with extrapolated projections 
through to 2030 (Source: EIA and Oil and Gas Journal). 
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Figure 1.10: 
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Figure 1.11: 
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Figure 1.12: Iran Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI and www.knoema.com). 
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Figure 1.13: Saudi Arabia Total Population (Source: World Development Indicators and 
www.knoema.com). 
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Figure 1.14: 
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Figure 1.15: 
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Figure 1.16: 
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Figure 1.17:  
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Figure 1.18: 
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Figure 1.19: Saudi Arabia oil production and 2015 export projections (Source: EIA). 
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Figure 1.20: Saudi Arabia Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI and www.knoema.com). 
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Figure 1.21: UAE Total Population (Source: World Development Indicators and 
www.knoema.com). 
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Figure 1.22: 
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Figure 1.24: 
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Figure 1.25: 
 
  
264 
 
Figure 1.26: 
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Figure 1.27: 
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Figure 1.28: 
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Figure 1.30: UAE Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI and www.knoema.com). 
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Figure 2.1: The scale of resource nationalism, depicting the overarching framework with its four 
components. 
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Figure 4.1: Select oil and gas pipeline infrastructure in the Middle East (Sources: EIA and BP). 
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Figure 4.2: Strait of Hormuz chokepoint graphic with theoretical median line demarcating the 
naval boundaries in the Persian Gulf (Sources: UN and CSIS). 
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Figure 4.3: The Strait of Hormuz inbound and outbound channels (Source: IISS). 
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Figure 4.4: The Trans-Arabian Pipeline (orange) linking Saudi Arabian petroleum in the Persian 
Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea (Source: http://www.stratfor.com/image/oil-export-alternatives-
strait-hormuz). 
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Figure 4.5: Middle East pipeline network, Yanbu port visible on the Red Sea (Source: 
http://www.theodora.com/pipelines/middle_east_pipelines_map.jpg). 
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Figure 4.6: The ADCOP (Habshan to Fujeira) and Dolphin Gas Project from Qatar to the UAE 
(Source: www.europipe.com). 
  
276 
 
Figure 4.7: Sheikh Sagar of Sharjah touring the Artemis destroyer by Admiral Farajullah Rasaei. 
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Figure 4.8: UAE oil and gas reserves, pipelines, refineries, processing plants, and terminals on 
the Persian Gulf (Source: http://fanack.com/en/countries/uae/economy/oil-and-gas/).  
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Figure 4.9: Oil reserves in the UAE (Source: http://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2011/03/the-abu-
dhabi-oil-discoveries).  
 
  
279 
 
Figure 4.10: Oil and gas reserves in the UAE (Source: 
http://www.hibiscuspetroleum.com/about/industry-overview/global-oil-and-gas-market.html). 
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Figure 4.11: Oil and gas reserves in the Persian Gulf (Source: NIOC) 
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Figure 4.12: Iranian oil deposits, pipelines, and refineries as well as select gas fields (Source: 
EIA). 
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Figure 4.13: Iranian gas fields and pipelines as well as select oil deposits (Source: EIA) 
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Figure 4.14: Scales of resource nationalism for Iran and the UAE with application to the Abu 
Musa and Tunb Islands. Both Iran and the UAE exhibit constant and equally high stresses for 
notions of the state and nationalism. While Iran maintains an equal stress on both nation and 
ethnicity, reserving the ability to oscillate emphasis between the two evenly, the UAE places 
more stress on the notion of ethnicity rather than nation. 
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Figure 4.15: Satellite image detailing select petroleum operations in the Persian Gulf at night 
(Source: http://geology.com/articles/oil-fields-from-space/ via http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/).  
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Figure 4.16: Iran oil and gas pipeline infrastructure, processing plants, and oil refineries (Source: 
https://www.pfcenergy.com/).  
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Figure 4.17: Iran oil pipeline infrastructure, refineries, and ports on the Persian Gulf (Source: 
EIA). 
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Figure 4.18: Iran gas pipeline infrastructure, processing plants, and ports on the Persian Gulf 
(Source: EIA). 
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Figure 4.19: Major Saudi Arabian oil and gas pipeline infrastructure (Source: EIA). 
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Figure 4.20: Saudi Arabian religious concentrations and oil deposits (Source: Stratfor). 
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Figure: 4.21: Shia zone of the Saudi Arabian Eastern Province detailing attacked sites of Qatif 
and Al Awamiya (Source: Stratfor). 
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Figure 4.22: Select energy infrastructure of the UAE (Source: EIA). 
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Figure 4.23: World arms trade transfer statistics for the 2009 – 2013 period (Source: SIPRI). 
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Figure 4.24: Regional USA military bases surrounding Iran as of 2011, including a site in the 
Indian Ocean (Source: http://www.businessinsider.com/iran-surrounded-by-us-military-bases-
2011-12). 
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Figure 4.25: Foreign naval presence in the Persian Gulf (Source: RIA). 
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Figure 4.26: Approximate battery location, previously stocked with HY-2s
268
, and Kuhestak on 
the Strait of Hormuz (Source: Google Earth and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/kouhestak-coastal-missile-battery.html). 
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 NATO reporting name: Silkworm. 
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Figure 4.27: Satellite image of battery location off of Kuhestak that details alert shelters, 
hardened shelters, launch pads, firing sections, support sections, and acquisition sections 
(Sources: DigitalGlobe and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/kouhestak-coastal-
missile-battery.html).  
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Figure 4.28: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing abandoned HAWK surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) station (Sources: DigitalGlobe and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-
0-false-false-false.html). 
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Figure 4.29: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing abandoned Skyguard station, most likely 
replaced with 23 mm AAA station (Sources: DigitalGlobe and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html). 
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Figure 4.30: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing heavy fortification progress on the island, 
which is inclusive of geographic hindrances to an amphibious assault such as a multilane ditches 
as well as a high firing ground for the local operatives (Source: GeoEye, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/new-google-earth-imagery.html).  
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Figure 4.31: Abu Musa satellite image detailing a reactivated HAWK battery (Source: GeoEye, 
Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/new-google-earth-imagery.html). 
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Figure 4.32: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing D-30 stations (Sources: DigitalGlobe and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html). 
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Figure 4.33: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing 23 mm AAA stations with possibly 35 
mm guns present, which is typically characterized with a concrete pad near a road (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html).  
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Figure 4.34: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing a northern bunker with over 10 ports that 
can serve for firing AShMs
269
 or additional outlet points connected to a large centre (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html). 
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Figure 4.35: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing hardened military bunkers in the south-
central section of the island (Sources: DigitalGlobe and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html).  
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Figure 4.36: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing above-ground hardened military bunkers 
in the south-eastern section of the island (Sources: DigitalGlobe and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html). 
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Figure 4.37: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing tank deployment on the island (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html). 
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Figure 4.38: Abu Musa Island satellite image detailing possible bunker locations, however, this 
could also be a tactical Iranian illusion used for the purpose of inflating island presence and 
defence capabilities (Sources: DigitalGlobe and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/normal-0-false-false-false.html). 
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Figure 4.39: Ranges of D-30 and 155mm in the Persian Gulf from the Greater Tunb Island. 
Implications of a launch would be that international waters are 12 nautical miles outside the 
Greater Tunb Island, which is certainly within the range of either launch system (Sources: 
Europa Technologies, US Department of State Geographer, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/greater-tunb-imint.html). 
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Figure 4.40: Greater Tunb Island satellite image detailing fortifications and guard posts (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/greater-tunb-
imint.html). 
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Figure 4.41: Greater Tunb satellite image detailing D-30 artillery and unidentified artillery, most 
likely to be 155 mm in size (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/greater-tunb-imint.html). 
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Figure 4.42: Greater Tunb Island satellite image detailing hardened shelters and possible 
underground facilities (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/greater-tunb-imint.html). 
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Figure 4.43: Greater Tunb Island satellite image detailing 23mm AAA stations (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/greater-tunb-
imint.html). 
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Figure 4.44: Lesser Tunb Island satellite image detailing hardened bunkers, airstrip, D-30 
artillery station, port, suspected military bunker complex, and military bunker complex under 
construction (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/lesser-tunb-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.45: Lesser Tunb Island satellite image detailing 23 mm AAA stations (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/lesser-tunb-island-
analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.46: Lesser Tunb Island satellite image detailing a military bunker under construction to 
the southeast of the island (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/lesser-tunb-island-analysis.html). 
 
  
316 
 
Figure 4.47: Lesser Tunb Island satellite image detailing hardened shelters (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/lesser-tunb-island-
analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.48: Lesser Tunb Island satellite image detailing far central-east hardened military 
bunker positioning (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/lesser-tunb-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.49: Sirri Island satellite image detailing an airstrip, locations of AA weaponry, possible 
Skyguard location, and hardened bunkers (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/sirri-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.50: Satellite image of Sirri Island detailing presence of nine individually hardened 
fortified bunkers that could have the possibility of being interconnected (Sources: DigitalGlobe, 
Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/sirri-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.51: Satellite image of Sirri Island depicting air defence that is provided by gun sites of 
35 mm calibre, although some other sites could be of 23 mm calibre. This eastern side of the 
runway on the island is a point in a typical V-formation for a Skyguard radar setup (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/sirri-island-
analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.52: Satellite image of Sirri Island detailing the Western side of the runway with two AA 
machinegun sites of either 23 mm or 35 mm calibre (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/sirri-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.53: Satellite image of Sirri Island detailing possible position of Skyguard radar site 
(Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/sirri-
island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.54: Satellite image of Sirri Island to the far west that detail a cluster of empty buildings 
as well as empty AAA sites. While there may be a military purpose for the island, it is also 
abandoned or disused (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/sirri-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.55: Satellite image of Sirri Island detailing a broadcast tower that may or may not have 
military relations (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/sirri-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.56: Qeshm Island satellite image detailing an air defense site, naval base, and two 
launch zones (Sources: DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Google Earth, CNES/Spot Image and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/qeshm-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.57: Qeshm Island satellite image of the naval base facing the Strait of Hormuz detailing 
a guard post, possible AAA sites, helipad, and 23 mm AA sites (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google 
Earth, TerraMetrics and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/qeshm-island-
analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.58: Qeshm Island satellite image detailing Launch Zone 1 hardened shelters and 
revetments (Sorces: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/qeshm-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.59: Qeshm Island satellite image of Launch Zone 1 deatiling a hardned shelter (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/qeshm-island-
analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.60: Qeshm Island satellite image detailing Launch Zone 1 revetments (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/qeshm-island-
analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.61: Qeshm Island satellite image detailing Launch Zone 2 revetments behind a hill that 
signifying independent targetting stations (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/qeshm-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.62: Qeshm Island satellite image detailing Launch Zone 2 and the steep hill that could 
impede on trajectories should there not be independent targetting stations (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Google Earth, TerraMetrics and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/qeshm-island-analysis.html). 
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Figure 4.63: Larak Island satellite image, one of the easternmost Iranian island in the Persian 
Gulf, detailing possible AAA sites, AShM reventments, lookout points, and local buildings. The 
thin white lines throughout the island are roads (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, 
TerraMetrics, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/larak-island.html). 
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Figure 4.64: Larak Island satellite image detailing two circular formations of AAA pads 
(Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, Europa Technologies, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/larak-island.html). 
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Figure 4.65: Larak Island satellite image detailing three-pronged AShM revetments (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, Europa Technologies, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/larak-island.html). 
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Figure 4.66:  Larak Island satellite image detailing lookout points (Sources: DigitalGlobe, 
Google Earth, Europa Technologies, and http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/larak-
island.html). 
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Figure 4.67: Larak Island satellite image detailing buildings with broadcast towers (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, Europa Technologies, and 
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/larak-island.html). 
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Figure 4.68: Select Iranian missile launch capabilities, detailing HQ-2 sites (red), HAWK sites 
(orange), S-200 sites (purple), 2K12 “Kub” sites (bright green), and Tor-M1E sites (faded 
green). It should be noted that domestically-produced Iranian missiles have not been factored 
into this image (Source: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Iran-SAM-Deployment.html) 
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Figure 4.69: Potential range of S-300PMU1/HQ-9/SA-20 or similar deployment in Iran (Source: 
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Iran-SAM-Deployment.html) 
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Figure 4.70: Potential range of S-400/SA-21 or similar deployment in Iran (Source: 
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Iran-SAM-Deployment.html) 
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Figure 4.71: Satellite image of Al Watah missile complex in Saudi Arabia (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe and IHS Jane’s Intelligence). 
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Figure 4.72: Missile sites in Saudi Arabia indicated by arrows, notably the complexes of Al 
Joffer, Al Sulayyil, and Rawdah (Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, Europa Technologies, Google 
Earth, and TerraMetrics). 
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Figure 4.73: Full range of a DF-3A positioned in the stations of Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil 
(Sources: AND, Google Earth, Europa Technologies, and Tele Atlas). 
  
343 
 
Figure 4.74: Likely range of Saudi Arabian DF-3As positioned in Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil 
(Sources: AND, Google Earth, Europa Technologies, and Tele Atlas). 
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Figure 4.75: Satellite overview of the Al Sulayyil complex detailing the north garrison, south 
garrison, support facility, and launch control site (Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, and Google 
Earth.) 
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Figure 4.76: Satellite image of a DF-3A launchpad in the Al Sulayyil complex (Sources: 
DigitalGlobe and Google Earth). 
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Figure 4.77: Satellite image of the northern garrison of the Al Sulayyil complex detailing 
hardened bunkers, a handling facility, and launcher  (Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, Google 
Earth, and LeadDog Consulting). 
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Figure 4.78: Satellite image of the southern garrison at the Al Sulayyil complex detailing 
numerous hardened bunkers entry point, handling facility, support facility, and entry point 
(Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and LeadDog Consulting). 
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Figure 4.79: Satellite image of the northern and southern garrisons at the Al Sulayyil complex 
(Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and LeadDog Consulting). 
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Figure 4.80: Satellite images of the Al Sulayyil complex between 2003 (top) and 2009 (bottom) 
that demonstrate a lack of site development, which signfies the completion or abandonment of a 
site. In this case, it is certainly an operational and therefore completed complex. (Sources: AND, 
DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and LeadDog Consulting). 
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Figure 4.81: Satellite image of the Al Joffer complex detailing a launch control facility, north 
garrison, south garrison, and support facility (Sources: DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, LeadDog 
Consulting, and TerraMetrics). 
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Figure 4.82: Satelitte image overviewing the Rawdah underground complex and support site 
(Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and LeadDog Consulting). 
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Figure 4.83: Satellite image of the Rawdah support area detailing underground entrances, 
administrative and support facilities, as well as possible launch pads that are consistent with 
preexistent DF-3As already in place in Al Sulayyil (Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, 
and LeadDog Consulting). 
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Figure 4.84: Satellite image of the Rawdah storage site underground entraces, bunkers, and 
possible launch pads (Sources: AND, DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, and LeadDog Consulting). 
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Figure 4.85: R2 800-man desert military complex in Abu Dhabi, UAE (Source: 
www.publicintelligence.net). 
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Figure 4.86: Sweihan Air Base expansion in Abu Dhabi, UAE near Reflex Responses and Zayed 
Military City (Source: www.osimint.com). 
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Figure 4.87: Minhad Air Base, Abu Dhabi, UAE (Source: www.osimint.com). 
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Figure 5.1: The five largest exporters of major conventional weapons (2004 – 2008 and 2009 – 
2013) and their main recipient states (2009 – 2013) (Source: SIPRI). 
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Figure 5.2: Resource Nationalism Index 2012 (Source: 
http://maplecroft.com/about/news/resource_nationalism_index_2012.html)
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Figure 5.3: Resource Nationalism Index 2014 (Source: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/10569653/Resource-nationalism-alive-and-
well-as-Indonesia-bans-key-metal-exports.html) 
  
360 
 
Figure 5.4: Major resources mined in Africa (Sources: The Economist and the US Geological 
Survey). 
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Figure 5.5: Global map detailing assessed basins of shale oil and gas formations (Source: 
Advanced Resources International, EIA, and the US Geological Survey). 
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Figure 5.6: Shale oil and gas in mainland USA (Source: EIA). 
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Figure 5.7: Shale gas potential between Canada, China, and the USA (Source EIA). 
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Appendix A: 
 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
(English Translation from Persian)  
 
Source: http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php (Last Retrieved: April 
12, 2014) 
 
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.  
 
We have sent Our apostles with veritable signs and brought down with them scriptures and the 
scales of justice, so that men might conduct themselves with fairness". 
[Quotations from the Quran; English translation by N.J. Dawood]  
 
PREAMBLE 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the cultural, social, political and 
economic institutions of the people of Iran, based on Islamic principles and rules, and reflecting 
the fundamental desires of the Islamic people. The essence of the great Islamic Revolution of 
Iran, and the course of the struggle of the Muslim people from its beginning to its victory, as 
manifested by the categorical and striking slogans used by all classes of the people, get their 
special character from this fundamental desire. Now our nation, with the whole of its being is in 
the vanguard of this great victory, and strives for the attainment of that desire.  
 
The unique characteristic of this Revolution, as compared with other Iranian movements of the 
last century, is that it is religious and Islamic. The Muslim people of Iran, after living through an 
anti-despotic movement for constitutional government, and anti-colonialist movement for the 
nationalization of petroleum, gained precious experience in that they realized that the basic and 
specific reason for the failure of those movements was that that they were not religious ones. 
Although in those movements Islamic thinking and the guidance of a militant clergy played a 
basic and prominent part, yet they swiftly trailed off into stagnation, because the struggle 
deviated from the true Islam. But now the nation's conscience has awakened to the leadership of 
an exalted Authority, His Eminence Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, and has grasped the necessity of 
following the line of the true religious and Islamic movement. This time the country's militant 
clergy, which has always been in the front lines of the people's movement, together with writers 
and committed intellectuals, has gained new strength (lit: impetus) under his leadership (The 
most recent movement of the Iranian nation began in the HEGIRA lunar year 1382, equivalent to 
the HEGIRA solar year 1341) - (Translator's note: the solar year 1341 equals 1963 A.D.)  
 
THE VANGUARD OF THE MOVEMENT 
Imam Khomeini's crushing protest against that American plot, The White Revolution, which was 
a step taken with a view to strengthening the foundations of the despotic regime and 
consolidating Iran's political, cultural and economic links with World Imperialism, was the 
motive force behind the united uprising of the nation. There followed the great and bloody 
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revolution of the Islamic people in the month of KHORDAD 1342 (Translator's note: equivalent 
to June 1963) -This was indeed the starting-point of the flowering of that magnificent and 
widespread revolt which consolidated and confirmed the Imam's central position as the Islamic 
leader. Despite his banishment from Iran following on his protest against the shameful Law of 
Capitulation (immunity for American advisers), the firm bond (of the people) with the Imam was 
strengthened. The Muslim nation, in particular committed intellectuals and the militant clergy, 
continued along its path, amid banishment and imprisonment, torture and execution.  
 
Meanwhile the informed and responsible section of the community was busy with clarification of 
the issues, within the strongholds of mosques, places of learning, and universities. Inspired by 
the revolutionary religious feeling and the rich fruitfulness of Islam, they began a persistent and 
rewarding struggle to raise the level of awareness and vigilance as regards the fight, and its 
religious nature, among the Muslim nation. The despotic regime began the suppression of the 
Islamic movement with a malignant attack on the FEIZIYE (Translator's note: meaning 
uncertain) and the University and all the clamorous (protesting) Clubs (that were part) of the 
Revolution. It took bloodthirsty but futile steps to quell the revolutionary fury of the people. 
While this was going on firing squads, medieval torture, and long imprisonment were the price 
our Muslim nation paid to demonstrate its firm resolve to continue the struggle. The blood of 
hundreds of young men and women flowed for the Faith in the shooting yards at dawn as they 
raised the cry of "God is Great" (ALLAHU AKBAR). Or they were the target for hostile bullets 
in lanes and bazaars in forwarding the Islamic revolution of Iran, distributing the ever-continuing 
proclamations and messages of the Imam on a variety of occasions, and (asserting) the awareness 
and determination of the Islamic nation ever more widely and deeply.  
 
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT 
Islamic Government is designed on a basis of "religious guardianship" (VELAYAT FAQIYE) as 
put forward by Imam Khomeini at the height of the intense emotion and strangulation (felt) 
under the despotic regime. This created a specific motivation and new field of advance for the 
Muslim people; and opened up the true path for the religious fight of Islam, pressing forward the 
struggle of the committed Muslim combatants, inside and outside the country.  
 
The movement continued along this basic line until eventually the dissatisfaction and fury of the 
people, arising out of the daily increasing pressure and strangulation inside the country, and the 
extension and repetition of the struggle by the clergy, and by militant students at world level, 
severely shook the rule of the regime. The regime and its masters were forced to reduce its 
pressure and strangulation, and - so to speak - to open up the political arena of the country which 
it thought would be the safety valve to secure it against its certain collapse. But the nation was 
aroused, aware (of the situation) , and firmly devoted to the decisive and unshakable leadership 
of the Imam. It began its victorious and united uprising in ever more wide-spread and 
comprehensive fashion.  
 
THE PEOPLES' ANGER 
The publication by the regime on the 17th of the month of DEY, 1356 (equals 7 January 1978) 
(Translator's note: not 1977 as in original translation) of the letter which insulted the sacred order 
of the clergy, and in particular the Imam Khomeini, hastened this movement. It caused the 
people's anger to explode all over the country. In an effort to control this volcano of popular 
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anger, the regime tried to suppress the protest uprising by bloodshed. This very fact set more 
blood pulsing through the veins of the Revolution. Continuing revolutionary passion at the time 
of the seven-day and forty-day commemoration of the martyrs of the Revolution, added on an 
ever-increasing scale to the vitality and ardour and fervent unity of the movement throughout the 
country. It continued and extended the people's upheaval in all the country's organisations by a 
general strike and joining in street demonstrations while actively seeking the downfall of the 
despotic regime. Widespread co-operation of men and women of all classes, and of religious and 
political groups, in this struggle, took place in decisive and dramatic fashion In particular women 
joined openly on all the scenes of this great Holy War, ever more actively and extensively. Such 
a scene would be a mother with a child in her bosom hastening to the battlefield and facing 
machine gun fire This large section of society took a main and decisive part in the struggle.  
 
THE PRICE THE NATION PAID 
After a little over a year the budding Revolution and its continuing struggle settled to its result. 
It's cost (lit: fruit) was the blood of more than 60,000 martyrs, 100,000 wounded and with 
damaged health, and milliards of tomans of financial loss; all amid cries of "Independence", 
"Freedom", and "Islamic Rule". This mighty movement with its reliance upon faith, unity, and 
decisiveness in leadership, came to a victorious conclusion in an atmosphere of emotion and 
tension and of the nation's devotion. It was successful in crushing all the calculations and 
manoeuvrings of Imperialism. A new chapter opened up in its own way for popular revolutions 
in the world.  
 
The 21st and 22nd of the month of BAHMAN 1357 (Translator's note: equivalent to 10th and 
11th February 1979) were the days on which the Shah's establishment collapsed Domestic 
despotism and the foreign domination which depended on it were defeated. This great victory 
brought the glad tidings of final triumph and was the prelude to Islamic Government which was 
the long-felt desire of the Muslim people.  
 
Unanimously, the nation of Iran, in partnership with the religious authorities, and the ULEMA of 
Islam, and the repository of Leadership, in a referendum concerning the Islamic Republic, took a 
final and categorical decision to set up an exalted new republican and Islamic order, and affirmed 
the Islamic Republic by a majority vote of 98.2%.  
 
Now the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, as the announcement of the structure and political, 
social, cultural and economic relationships within society, must guide the way towards the 
consolidation of the foundations of Islamic Government, and produce the design for a new order 
of Government in substitution for the old idolatrous order.  
 
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM 
From the viewpoint of Islam, government does not spring from the sphere of classes or 
domination by individuals or groups. It crystallizes the political aspirations of a nation united in 
faith and thinking which provides itself with an organisation so that in the process of 
transformation of ideas and beliefs, its way may be opened towards the ultimate goal (moving 
towards God). In the course of its revolutionary development our nation was cleansed from the 
dust and rust of idolatry, and from foreign ideological influence. It returned to true Islamic 
intellectual attitudes and views of the world. Now it is planning to build its new model society on 
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such a basis, with Islamic standards. The Mission of the Constitution is to identify itself with the 
basic beliefs of the movement and to bring about the conditions under which the lofty and 
worldwide values' of Islam will flourish.  
 
The Constitution, having regard to the Islamic contents of the Iranian Revolution, which was a 
movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the arrogant, provides a basis for the 
continuation of that revolution both inside and outside the country. It particularly tries to do this 
in developing international relations with other Islamic movements and peoples, so as to prepare 
the way towards a united single world community ("Your community is one community, and I 
am your Lord who you are to worship") Quotation from the Arabic and to the continuation of the 
progressive struggle for the rescue of deprived and oppressed nations throughout the world.  
 
Having regard to the intrinsic nature of this great movement, the Constitution guarantees to 
oppose any kind of despotism, intellectual, social, and as regards monopoly economics, and to 
struggle for freedom from the despotic system, and to entrust men's destiny to their own hands.  
"He releases them from their heavy burdens and yokes which are on them". 
Quotation from the Arabic 
In creating the political structures and foundations for organizing society on the basis of 
acceptance of religion, devout men have the responsibility for government and administration of 
the country.  
"The earth will be inherited by my pious followers". 
Quotation from the Arabic 
Legislation which is to set out the codes for the management of society will have as its central 
axis the Koran and tradition. Therefore there is great necessity for exact and serious supervision 
by just and virtuous and dedicated Islamic scholars (FEQHA-ye-ADEL = just men of religious 
law). Because the aim of government is to help mankind to develop towards the divine order and 
until the ground is cleared and the human talents have blossomed forth for the glorification of 
God's nature in all its dimensions, ("To emulate God's morality11) Quotation from the Arabic, 
there cannot, except by delegation, be active and extensive participation at all stages in the taking 
of political decisions and the determination of destiny for all persons in society, so that every 
individual has a hand in the task of human development and is responsible for growth and 
progress and guidance. This will be the assurance of government for the oppressed of the earth.  
 
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE JUST MAN OF RELIGIOUS LAW (FAQIYEH-e-
ADEL) 
On the basis of continuous Guardianship and Leadership (Imamate) the Constitution provides for 
leadership under all conditions, (by a person) recognized by the people as lender, so that there 
shall be security against deviation by various organisations ("The course of affairs is in the hands 
of those who know God and who are trustworthy in matters having to do with what he permits 
and forbids") - Quotation from the Arabic.  
 
THE ECONOMY AS A MEANS NOT AN END 
In strengthening the foundations of the economy, the governing principle is the satisfaction of 
mankind's needs in the course of its growth and development. It is not (the pursuit) of other 
economic objectives (systems), such as centralization and the accumulation of wealth and the 
search for profit. In materialistic schools of thought, economic activity (the economy) is its own 
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end. This at (different) stages of growth, economic activity is a factor working for destruction 
and corruption and decay. But in Islam economic activity is a means. As an ultimate (lit: waiting) 
means there can be no more effective (instrument) on the path towards the goal.  
 
From this point of view, the Islamic program of economic activity to provide a suitable field for 
the emergence of human creative power in various forms, and in this way provide equal and 
well-balanced opportunities, and make work, for all people, and satisfy the essential 
requirements of the advance towards development is the responsibility of the Islamic 
Government.  
 
WOMEN IN THE CONSTITUTION 
In the creation of Islamic foundations, all the human forces which had been in the service of 
general foreign exploitation will recover their true identity and human rights. In doing so, women 
who have endured more tyranny up till now under the idolatrous order, will naturally vindicate 
their rights further.  
 
The family unit is the basis of society, and the true focus for the growth and elevation of 
mankind. Harmony of beliefs and aspirations in setting up the family is the true foundation of the 
movement towards the development and growth of mankind. This has been a fundamental 
principle. Providing the opportunities for these objectives to be reached is one of the duties of the 
Islamic Government.  
 
Women were drawn away from the family unit and (put into) the condition of "being a mere 
thing", or "being a mere tool for work" in the service of consumerism and exploitation. Re-
assumption of the task of bringing up religiously-minded men and women, ready to work and 
fight together in life's fields of activity, is a serious and precious duty of motherhood. And so 
acceptance of this responsibility as more serious and - from the Islamic point of view -a loftier 
ground for appreciation (lit: value) status (lit: greatness) will be forthcoming.  
 
THE RELIGIOUS ARMY 
In the organisation and equipping of the countries defence forces, there must be regard for faith 
and religion as their basis and rules. And so the Islamic Republic's army, and the corps of 
Revolutionary Guards must be organized in accordance with this aim. They have responsibility 
not only for the safeguarding of the frontiers, but also for a religious mission, which is Holy War 
(JIHAD) along the way of God, and the struggle to extend the supremacy of God's Law in the 
world.  
"Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to 
strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of God and your enemies, and others beside". 
Quotation from the Arabic 
 
THE JUDICIARY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
The question of the judiciary in relation to the safeguarding of the people's rights along the line 
(adopted by) the Islamic movement with the object of preventing localized deviation within the 
Islamic community, is a vital one. Thus provision must be made for the establishment of a 
judicial system on the basis of Islamic justice, manned by just judges, well acquainted with the 
exact rules of the Islamic code. Such a pattern of organisation is necessary because of the 
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delicate and subtle structure of Religion, which must be kept free from any kind of unhealthy 
relationship.  
"And when you judge between man and man, judge with justice". 
Quotation from the Arabic 
 
THE EXECUTIVE POWER 
The executive power must open up the path towards the creation of an Islamic society. This is 
because of its special importance as regards the putting into effect of Islamic ordinances and 
regulations, so that just relationships can be attained in the governing of society; and also 
because of the essential character of this vital question in laying the foundations for the ultimate 
goal of life. Thus (the executive power) is to be hedged about by every kind of intricate 
disciplinary arrangement which may further the attainment of this goal, or negate any source of 
anxiety from the Islamic viewpoint. The bureaucracy which was the offspring of idolatrous rule 
is to be eliminated with severity, so that an executive system of greater efficiency and increasing 
speed (of action) can come into existence to deal with administrative undertakings.  
 
THE PUBLIC MEDIA 
The public media (radio-television) must take their place in the process of development of the 
Islamic revolution, and must serve in the propagation of Islamic culture. In this sphere they must 
look for opportunities for a healthy exchange of differing ideas, and must rigorously refrain from 
the propagation and encouragement of destructive and anti-Islamic qualities (ideas).  
 
In pursuance of the principles of this law which recognize freedom and human dignity as the 
central point (lit: frontispiece) of their objectives, and opens up the path of development and 
perfection of man as the responsibility of all, the Islamic community must elect sagacious and 
devout representatives, and exercise active supervision over their work, to participate in the 
building up of the Islamic society. This in the hope that in building the exemplary Islamic society 
they will succeed in setting a pattern of self-sacrifice to all the people of the world.  
"Thus we appointed you a central nation that you might be witnesses to the people". 
Quotation from the Arabic 
REPRESENTATIVES 
The Council of Experts (MAJLIS-e-KHEBREGAN), composed of representatives of the people, 
drew up the Constitution on the basis of scrutiny of the draft proposed by the Government, and 
of the proposals put forward by various groups. It contains 12 chapters and 175 articles. It was 
completed on the eve of the 15th century since the HEGIRA of the great Prophet (God bless and 
preserve him) and the establishment of the redeeming faith of Islam with the aims and motives 
described above, and in the hope that this century will be the century of the rule of the world by 
the oppressed, and the complete overthrow of the arrogant ones. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php#sthash.xvnAsAK8.dpuf  
 
Chapter I 
General Principles 
 
Article 1 
The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic, endorsed by the people of Iran on 
the basis of their long-standing belief in the sovereignty of truth and Qur'anic justice, in the 
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referendum of Farwardin 9 and 10 in the year 1358 of the solar Islamic calendar, corresponding 
to Jamadi al-'Awwal 1 and 2 in the year 1399 of the lunar Islamic calendar (March 29 and 30, 
1979], through the affirmative vote of a majority of 98.2% of eligible voters, held after the 
victorious Islamic Revolution led by the eminent marji' al-taqlid, Ayatullah al-Uzma Imam 
Khomeini.  
 
Article 2 
The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:  
1. The One God (as stated in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His exclusive 
sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands; 
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws; 
3. The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the course of 
man's ascent towards God; 
4. The justice of God in creation and legislation; 
5. Continuous leadership (imamah) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental role in 
ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam; 
6. The exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with responsibility before 
God; in which equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural independence, and 
national solidarity are secured by recourse to: 
a. continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha' possessing necessary qualifications, exercised on the 
basis off the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Ma'sumun, upon all of whom be peace;  
b. sciences and arts and the most advanced results of human experience, together with the 
effort to advance them further;  
c. negation of all forms of oppression, both the infliction of and the submission to it, and 
of dominance, both its imposition and its acceptance.  
 
Article 3 
In order to attain the objectives specified in Article 2, the government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has the duty of directing all its resources to the following goals:  
1. the creation of a favourable environment for the growth of moral virtues based on faith 
and piety and the struggle against all forms of vice and corruption; 
2. raising the level of public awareness in all areas, through the proper use of the press, 
mass media, and other means; 
3. free education and physical training for everyone at all levels, and the facilitation and 
expansion of higher education; 
4. strengthening the spirit of inquiry, investigation, and innovation in all areas of science, 
technology, and culture, as well as Islamic studies, by establishing research centres and 
encouraging researchers; 
5. the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence; 
6. the elimination of all forms of despotism and autocracy and all attempts to monopolize 
power; 
7. ensuring political and social freedoms within the framework of the law; 
371 
 
8. the participation of the entire people in determining their political, economic, social, and 
cultural destiny; 
9. the abolition of all forms of undesirable discrimination and the provision of equitable 
opportunities for all, in both the material and intellectual spheres; 
10. the creation of a correct administrative system and elimination of superfluous 
government organisations; 
11. all round strengthening of the foundations of national defence to the utmost degree by 
means of universal military training for the sake of safeguarding the independence, 
territorial integrity, and the Islamic order of the country; 
12. the planning of a correct and just economic system, in accordance with Islamic criteria in 
order to create welfare, eliminate poverty, and abolish all forms of deprivation with 
respect to food, housing, work, health care, and the provision of social insurance for all; 
13. the attainment of self-sufficiency in scientific, technological, industrial, agricultural, and 
military domains, and other similar spheres; 
14. securing the multifarious rights of all citizens, both women and men, and providing legal 
protection for all, as well as the equality of-all before the law; 
15. the expansion and strengthening of Islamic brotherhood and public cooperation among all 
the people; 
16. framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal 
commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the mustad'afiin of the world. 
Article 4 
All civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws 
and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally 
to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha' of 
the Guardian Council are judges in this matter.  
 
Article 5 
During the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and 
leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just ('adil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih, who is fully 
aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative 
ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.  
 
Article 6 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of 
public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the election of the President, the 
representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the members of councils, or by means 
of referenda in matters specified in other articles of this Constitution.  
 
Article 7 
In accordance with the command of the Qur'an contained in the verse ("Their affairs are by 
consultations among them" [42:38]) and ("Consult them in affairs" [3:159]), consultative bodies 
- such as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Provincial Councils, and the City, Region, 
District, and Village Councils and the likes of them - are the decision-making and administrative 
organs of the country. The nature of each of these councils, together with the manner of their 
formation, their jurisdiction, and scope of their duties and functions, is determined by the 
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Constitution and laws derived from it.  
 
Article 8 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, al-'amr bilma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar is a universal and 
reciprocal duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the 
government with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the government. The 
conditions, limits, and nature of this duty will be specified by law. (This is in accordance with 
the Qur'anic verse; "The believers, men and women, are guardians of one another; they enjoin 
the good and forbid the evil" [9:71]).  
 
Article 9 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the 
country are inseparable from one another, and their preservation is the duty of the government 
and all individual citizens. No individual, group, or authority, has the right to infringe in the 
slightest way upon the political, cultural, economic, and military independence or the territorial 
integrity of Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom. Similarly, no authority has the right to 
abrogate legitimate freedoms, not even by enacting laws and regulations for that purpose, under 
the pretext of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the country.  
 
Article 10 
Since the family is the fundamental unit of Islamic society, all laws, regulations, and pertinent 
programs must tend to facilitate the formation of a family, ,and to safeguard its sanctity and the 
stability of family relations on the basis of the law and the ethics of Islam.  
 
Article 11 
In accordance with the sacred verse of the Qur'an ("This your community is a single community, 
and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92]), all Muslims form a single nation, and the 
government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a 
view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive 
to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.  
 
Article 12 
The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school [in usual al-Din and fiqh], 
and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools, including the Hanafi, 
Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, are to be accorded full respect, and their followers are free to 
act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites. These schools 
enjoy official status in matters pertaining to religious education, affairs of personal status 
(marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in courts of law. In regions of the 
country where Muslims following any one of these schools of fiqh constitute the majority, local 
regulations, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in accordance with 
the respective school of fiqh, without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other schools.  
 
Article 13 
Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities, who, 
within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act 
according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.  
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Article 14 
In accordance with the sacred verse; ("God does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with 
those who have not fought against you because of your religion and who have not expelled you 
from your homes" [60:8]), the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Mu slims are 
duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic 
justice and equity, and to respect their human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain 
from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran. - See 
more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch01.php#sthash.WWli9MAi.dpuf  
 
Chapter II 
The Official Language, Script, Calendar, and Flag of the Country 
 
Article 15 
The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official 
documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. 
However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for 
teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.  
 
Article 16 
Since the language of the Qur'an and Islamic texts and teachings is Arabic, and since Persian 
literature is thoroughly permeated by this language, it must be taught after elementary level, in 
all classes of secondary school and in all areas of study.  
 
Article 17 
The official calendar of the country takes as its point of departure the migration of the Prophet of 
Islam - God's peace and blessings upon him and his Family. Both the solar and lunar Islamic 
calendars are recognized, but government offices will function according to the solar calendar. 
The official weekly holiday is Friday.  
 
Article 18 
The official flag of Iran is composed of green, white and red colours with the special emblem of 
the Islamic Republic, together with the motto [Allah-o Akbar]. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch02.php#sthash.tCQa7hXh.dpuf  
 
Chapter III 
The Rights of the People 
 
Article 19 
All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; 
and colour, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.  
 
Article 20 
All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and 
enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic 
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criteria.  
 
Article 21 
The government must ensure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity with Islamic 
criteria, and accomplish the following goals:  
1. Create a favourable environment for the growth of woman's personality and the 
restoration of her rights, both the material and intellectual; 
2. The protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and childbearing, and the 
protection of children without guardians; 
3. Establishing competent courts to protect and preserve the family; 
4. The provision of special insurance for widows, and aged women and women without 
support; 
5. The awarding of guardianship of children to worthy mothers, in order to protect the 
interests of the children, in the absence of a legal guardian. 
Article 22 
The dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of the individual are inviolate, 
except in cases sanctioned by law.  
 
Article 23 
The investigation of individuals' beliefs is forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to 
task simply for holding a certain belief.  
 
Article 24  
Publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is where there is 
infringement of the basic tenets of Islam or public rights. In this respect detailed provisions will 
be laid down by law.  
 
Article 25  
Examination of (the contents of), and non-delivery of, letters; recording and divulging of 
telephone conversations; disclosure of telegraphic or telex communications; censorship, pruning 
or non-transmission of messages; tapping and bugging and any kind of investigation are all 
forbidden, unless when so ordered by the law.  
 
Article 26 
Political parties, societies, political and craft associations, and Islamic or recognized minority 
religious associations may be freely brought into being, provided that no violation is involved of 
the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, Islamic standards, and the foundations 
of the Islamic Republic. No person may be prevented from joining, or compelled to join, one of 
the above.  
 
Article 27 
Unarmed assemblies and marches may be freely organized, provided that no violation of the 
foundations of Islam is involved.  
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Article 28 
Every person is entitled to choose the employment he wishes, so long as it is not contrary to 
Islam or the public interest or the rights of others.  
 
The Government is bound, with due regard for the needs of society for a variety of employment 
for all men, to create the possibility of employment, and equal opportunities for obtaining it.  
 
Article 29 
Every person is entitled to the enjoyment of Social Security. This covers retirement, 
unemployment, old age, being laid off (AZ KAR OFTADEGI), being without a guardian, casual 
misfortune, accidents, and occurrences giving rise to the need for health services and medical 
care and treatment, through insurance etc.  
 
The Government is bound, in accordance with the laws, to use public revenues and the revenue 
drawn from individual contributions to provide the services and financial support mentioned 
above for every individual in the country.  
 
Article 30 
The Government is bound to make available, free of charge, educational facilities for all up to 
the close of the secondary stage, and to expand free facilities for higher education up to the limits 
of the country's own capacity.  
 
Article 31 
Every Iranian individual and family is entitled to a dwelling appropriate to its need. The 
Government is bound to provide this, giving priority to those whose need is greatest, in particular 
peasants and workers, in the implementation of this Article.  
 
Article 32 
No person may be arrested except according to and in the manner laid down in the law. If 
someone is detained, the subject matter of the charge, with reasons (for bringing it), must 
immediately be communicated and explained in writing to the accused. Within at most 24 hours 
the file on the case and preliminary documentation must be referred to the competent legal 
authority. Legal procedures must be initiated as early as possible. Anyone infringing this 
principle will be punished in accordance with the law.  
 
Article 33 
No person may be ousted from his residence, or forbidden to reside in the locality of his choice, 
or compelled to reside In a particular locality, unless the law prescribes this.  
 
Article 34 
To ask for justice is the unquestioned right of every individual. Everyone may refer to the 
competent courts in search of justice. All members of the nation are entitled to have recourse to 
such courts within their reach. No one may be prevented from recourse to any court to which the 
law entitles him to refer.  
 
Article 35 
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In all courts, both parties to the claim are entitled to select a lawyer for themselves. If they do not 
have the capacity to do this, the means of a lawyer being appointed to act for them must be made 
available to them.  
 
Article 36 
A sentence to punishment and its execution must only be by the decision of a competent court, 
and by virtue of law.  
 
Article 37 
Innocence is the basic principle No person is considered legally guilty, except in cases where his 
guilt is established in a competent court.  
 
Article 38 
Any kind of torture used to extract an admission of guilt or to obtain information is forbidden. 
Compelling people to give evidence, or confess or take an oath is not allowed. Such evidence or 
confession or oath is null and void. Any person infringing this principle is to be punished in 
accordance with the law.  
 
Article 39 
Aspersion of the dignity of and respect due to any person who has been arrested or put in 
detention, or imprisoned or exiled by command of the law is forbidden in any form, and is liable 
to punishment.  
 
Article 40 
No person may exercise his own rights as a means of constraining others or violating the public 
interest.  
 
Article 41 
Citizenship of Iran is the unquestioned right of all Iranians. The Government may not deprive 
any Iranian of his citizenship, except at their own request, or if they take up citizenship of 
another country.  
 
Article 42 
Foreign nationals may within the limits of the law take up Iranian citizenship. The citizenship of 
such persons may only be taken away if, possibly, another Government accepts them into 
citizenship, or at their own request. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch03.php#sthash.9W27wdUd.dpuf  
 
Chapter IV 
Economy and Financial Affairs 
 
Article 43 
The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its objectives of achieving the economic 
independence of the society, uprooting poverty and deprivation, and fulfilling human needs in 
the process of development while preserving human liberty, is based on the following criteria:  
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1. The provision of basic necessities for all citizens: housing, food, clothing, hygiene, 
medical treatment, education, and the necessary facilities for the establishment of a 
family; 
2. Ensuring conditions and opportunities of employment for everyone, with a view to 
attaining full employment; placing the means of work at the disposal of everyone who is 
able to work but lacks the means, in the form of cooperatives, through granting interest-
free loans or recourse to any other legitimate means that neither results in the 
concentration or circulation of wealth in the hands of a few individuals or groups, nor 
turns the government into a major absolute employer. These steps must be taken with due 
regard for the requirements governing the general economic planning of the country at 
each stage of its growth; 
3. The plan for the national economy, must be structured in such a manner that the form, 
con-tent, and hours of work of every individual will allow him sufficient leisure and 
energy to engage, beyond his professional endeavour, in intellectual, political, and social 
activities leading to all-round development of his self, to take active part in leading the 
affairs of the country, improve his skills, and to make full use of his creativity; 
4. Respect for the right to choose freely one's occupation; refraining from compelling 
anyone to engage in a particular job; and preventing the exploitation of another's labour; 
5. The prohibition of infliction of harm and loss upon others, monopoly, hoarding, usury, 
and other illegitimate and evil practices; 
6. The prohibition of extravagance and wastefulness in all matters related to the economy, 
including consumption, investment, production, distribution, and services; 
7. The utilization of science and technology, and the training of skilled personnel in 
accordance with the developmental needs of the country's economy; 
8. Prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's economy; 
9. Emphasis on increase of agricultural, livestock, and industrial production in order to 
satisfy public needs and to make the country self-sufficient and free from dependence. 
Article 44 
The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: state, cooperative, and 
private, and is to be based on systematic and sound planning. The state sector is to include all 
large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power 
generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and 
telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly 
owned and administered by the State. The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies 
and enterprises concerned with production and distribution, in urban and rural areas, in 
accordance with Islamic criteria. The private sector consists of those activities concerned with 
agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that supplement the economic 
activities of the state and cooperative sectors. Ownership in each of these three sectors is 
protected by the laws of the Islamic Republic, in so far as this ownership is in conformity with 
the other articles of this chapter, does not go beyond the bounds of Islamic law, contributes to the 
economic growth and progress of the country, and does not harm society. The [precise] scope of 
each of these sectors, as well as the regulations and conditions governing their operation, will be 
specified by law.  
 
Article 45 
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Public wealth and property, such as uncultivated or abandoned land, mineral deposits, seas, 
lakes, rivers and other public water-ways, mountains, valleys, forests, marshlands, natural 
forests, unenclosed pastures, legacies without heirs, property of undetermined ownership, and 
public property recovered from usurpers, shall be at the disposal of the Islamic government for it 
to utilize in accordance with the public interest. Law will specify detailed procedures for the 
utilization of each of the foregoing items.  
 
Article 46 
Everyone is the owner of the fruits of his legitimate business and labour, and no one may deprive 
another of the opportunity of business and work under the pretext of his right to ownership.  
 
Article 47 
Private ownership, legitimately acquired, is to be respected. The relevant criteria are determined 
by law.  
 
Article 48 
There must be no discrimination among the various provinces with regard to the exploitation of 
natural resources, utilization of public revenues, and distribution of economic activities among 
the various provinces and regions of the country, thereby ensuring that every region has access to 
the necessary capital and facilities in accordance with its needs and capacity for growth.  
 
Article 49 
The government has the responsibility of confiscating all wealth accumulated through usury, 
usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of 
government contracts and transactions, the sale of uncultivated lands and other resources subject 
to public ownership, the operation of centres of corruption, and other illicit means and sources, 
and restoring it to its legitimate owner; and if no such owner can be identified, it must be 
entrusted to the public treasury. This rule must be executed by the government with due care, 
after investigation and furnishing necessary evidence in accordance with the law of Islam.  
 
Article 50 
The preservation of the environment, in which the present as well as the future generations have 
a right to flourishing social existence, is regarded as a public duty in the Islamic Republic. 
Economic and other activities that inevitably involve pollution of the environment or cause 
irreparable damage to it are therefore forbidden.  
 
Article 51 
No form of taxation may be imposed except in accordance with the law. Provisions for tax 
exemption and reduction will be determined by law.  
 
Article 52 
The annual budget of the country will be drawn up by the government, in the manner specified 
by law, and submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for discussion and approval. Any 
change in the figures contained in the budget will be in accordance with the procedures 
prescribed by law.  
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Article 53 
All sums collected by the government will be deposited into the government accounts at the 
central treasury, and all disbursements, within the limits of allocations approved, shall be made 
in accordance with law.  
 
Article 54 
The National Accounting Agency is to be directly under the supervision of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. Its organisation and mode of operation in Tehran and at the provincial 
capitals, are to be determined by law.  
 
Article 55 
The National Accounting Agency will inspect and audit, in the manner prescribed by law, all the 
accounts of ministries, government institutions and companies as well as other organisations that 
draw, in any way, on the general budget of the country, to ensure that no expenditure exceeds the 
allocations approved and that all sums are spent for the specified purpose. It will collect all 
relevant accounts, documents, and records, in accordance with law, and submit to the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly a report for the settlement of each year's budget together with its own 
comments. This report must be made available to the public. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch04.php#sthash.rvQVQDSm.dpuf  
 
Chapter V 
The Right of National Sovereignty and the Powers Deriving There from 
 
Article 56 
Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He Who has made man 
master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it 
to the vested interests of a particular individual or group. The people are to exercise this divine 
right in the manner specified in the following articles.  
 
Article 57 
The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, 
and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute wilayat al-'amr and 
the leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. 
These powers are independent of each other.  
 
Article 58 
The function of the legislature are to be exercised through the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 
consisting of the elected representatives of the people. Legislation approved by this body, after 
going through the stages specified in the articles below, is communicated to the executive and 
the judiciary for implementation.  
 
Article 59 
In extremely important economic, political, social, and cultural matters, the function of the 
legislature may be exercised through direct recourse to popular vote through a referendum. Any 
request for such direct recourse to public opinion must be approved by two-thirds of the 
members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.  
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Article 60 
The functions of the executive, except in the matters that are directly placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Leadership by the Constitution, are to be exercised by the president and the 
ministers.  
 
Article 61 
The function of the judiciary are to be performed by courts of justice, which are to be formed in 
accordance with the criteria of Islam, and are vested with the authority to examine and settle 
lawsuits, protect the rights of the public, dispense and enact justice, and implement the Divine 
limits [al-hudud al-Ilahiyyah]. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch05.php#sthash.Y3xh4P11.dpuf  
 
Chapter VI 
The Legislative Power 
 
Section One 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly 
 
Article 62 
The Islamic consultative Assembly is constituted by the representatives of the people elected 
directly and by secret ballot. The qualifications of voters and candidates, as well as the nature of 
election, will be specified by law.  
 
Article 63 
The term of membership in the Islamic Consultative Assembly is four years. Elections for each 
term must take place before the end of the preceding term, so that the country is never without an 
Assembly.  
 
Article 64 
There are to be two hundred seventy members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly which, 
keeping in view the human, political, geographic and other similar factors, may increase by not 
more than twenty for each ten-year period from the date of the national referendum of the year 
1368 of the solar Islamic calendar. The Zoroastrians and Jews will each elect one representative; 
Assyrian and Chaldean Christians will jointly elect one representative; and Armenian Christians 
in the north and those in the south of the country will each elect one representative. The limits of 
the election constituencies and the number of representatives will be deter-mined by law.  
 
Article 65 
After the holding of elections, sessions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly are considered 
legally valid when two-thirds of the total number of members are present. Drafts and bills will be 
approved in accordance with the code of procedure approved by it, except in cases where the 
Constitution has specified a certain quorum. The consent of two-thirds of all members present is 
necessary for the approval of the code of procedure of the Assembly.  
 
Article 66 
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The manner of election of the Speaker and the Presiding Board of the Assembly, the number of 
committees and their term of office, and matters related to conducting the discussions and 
maintaining the discipline of the Assembly will be determined by the code of procedure of the 
Assembly.  
 
Article 67 
Members of the Assembly must take the following oath at the first session of the Assembly and 
affix their signatures to its text: In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. In the 
presence of the Glorious Qur'an, I swear by God, the Exalted and Almighty, and undertake, 
swearing by my own honour as a human being, to protect the sanctity of Islam and guard the 
accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution of the Iranian people and the foundations of the 
Islamic Republic; to protect, as a just trustee, the honour bestowed upon me by the people, to 
observe piety in fulfilling my duties as people's representative; to remain always committed to 
the independence and honour of the country; to fulfil my duties towards the nation and the 
service of the people; to defend the Constitution; and to bear in mind, both in speech and writing 
and in the expression of my views, the independence of the country, the freedom of the people, 
and the security of their interests.  
 
Members belonging to the religious minorities will swear by their own sacred books while taking 
this oath.  
 
Members not attending the first session will perform the ceremony of taking the oath at the first 
session they attend.  
 
Article 68 
In time of war and the military occupation of the country, elections due to be held in occupied 
areas or countrywide may be delayed for a specified period if proposed by the President of the 
Republic, and approved by three-fourths of the total members of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly, with the endorsement of the Guardian Council. If a new Assembly is not formed, the 
previous one will continue to function.  
 
Article 69 
The deliberations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be open, and full minutes of them 
made available to the public by the radio and the official gazette. A closed session may be held 
in emergency conditions, if it is required for national security, upon the requisition of the 
President, one of the ministers, or ten members of the Assembly. Legislation passed at a closed 
session is valid only when approved by three-fourths of the members in the presence of the 
Guardian Council. After emergency conditions have ceased to exist, the minutes of such closed 
sessions, together with any legislation approved in them, must be made available to the public.  
 
Article 70 
The President, his deputies and the ministers have the right to participate in the open sessions of 
the Assembly either collectively or individually. They may also have their advisers accompany 
them. If the members of the Assembly deem it necessary, the ministers are obliged to attend 
[Conversely], whenever they request it, their statements are to be heard.  
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Section Two 
Powers and Authority of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
 
Article 71 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly can establish laws on all matters, within the limits of its 
competence as laid down in the Constitution.  
 
Article 72 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws contrary to the usual and ahkam of the 
official religion of the country or to the Constitution. It is the duty of the Guardian Council to 
determine whether a violation has occurred, in accordance with Article 96.  
 
Article 73 
The interpretation of ordinary laws falls within the competence of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly. The intent of this Article does not prevent the interpretations that judges may make in 
the course of cassation.  
 
Article 74 
Government bills are presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly after receiving the 
approval of the Council of Ministers. Members' bills may be introduced in the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly if sponsored by at least fifteen members.  
 
Article 75 
Members' bills and proposals and amendments to government’s bills proposed by members that 
entail the reduction of the public income or the increase of public expenditure may be introduced 
in the Assembly only if means for compensating for the decrease in income or for meeting the 
new expenditure are also specified.  
 
Article 76 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly has the right to investigate and examine all the affairs of the 
country.  
 
Article 77 
International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be approved by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly.  
 
Article 78 
All changes in the boundaries of the country are forbidden, with the exception of minor 
amendments in keeping with the interests of the country, on condition that they are not unilateral, 
do not encroach on the independence and territorial integrity of the country, and receive the 
approval of four-fifths of the total members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.  
 
Article 79 
The proclamation of martial law is forbidden. In case of war or emergency conditions akin to 
war, the government has the right to impose temporarily certain necessary restrictions, with the 
agreement of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In no case can such restrictions last for more 
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than thirty days; if the need for them persists beyond this limit, the government must obtain new 
authorization for them from the Assembly.  
 
Article 80 
The taking and giving of loans or grants-in-aid, domestic and foreign, by the government, must 
be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.  
 
Article 81 
The granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation of companies or institutions dealing 
with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden.  
 
Article 82 
The employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in cases of necessity and with the 
approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.  
 
Article 83 
Government buildings and properties forming part of the national heritage cannot be transferred 
except with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly; that, too, is not applicable in the 
case of irreplaceable treasures.  
 
Article 84 
Every representative is responsible to the entire nation and has the right to express his views on 
all internal and external affairs of the country.  
 
Article 85 
The right of membership is vested with the individual, and is not transferable to others. The 
Assembly cannot delegate the power of legislation to an individual or committee. But whenever 
necessary, it can delegate the power of legislating certain laws to its own committees, in 
accordance with Article 72. In such a case, the laws will be implemented on a tentative basis for 
a period specified by the Assembly, and their final approval will-rest with the Assembly. 
Likewise, the Assembly may, in accordance with Article 72, delegate to the relevant committees 
the responsibility for permanent approval of articles of association of organisations, companies, 
government institutions, or organisations affiliated to the government and or invest the authority 
in the government. In such a case, the government approvals must not be inconsistent with the 
principles and commandments of the official religion in the country and or the Constitution 
which question shall be determined by the Guardian Council in accordance with what is stated in 
Article 96. In addition to this, the government approvals shall not be against the laws and other 
general rules of the country and, while calling for implementation, the same shall be brought to 
the knowledge of the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly for his study and indication 
that the approvals in question are not inconsistent with the aforesaid rules.  
 
Article 86 
Members of the Assembly are completely free in expressing their views and casting their votes 
in the course of performing their duties as representatives, and they cannot be prosecuted or 
arrested for opinions expressed in the Assembly or votes cast in the course of performing their 
duties as representatives.  
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Article 87 
The President must obtain, for the Council of Ministers, after being formed and before all other 
business, a vote of confidence from the Assembly. During his incumbency, he can also seek a 
vote of confidence for the Council of Ministers from the Assembly on important and 
controversial issues.  
 
Article 88 
Whenever at least one-fourth of the total members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly pose a 
question to the President, or any one member of the Assembly poses a question to a minister on a 
subject relating to their duties, the President or the minister is obliged to attend the Assembly and 
answer the question. This answer must not be delayed more than one month in the case of the 
President and ten days in the case of the minister, except with an excuse deemed reasonable by 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly.  
 
Article 89 
1. Members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly can interpolate the Council of Ministers 
or an individual minister in instances they deem necessary. Interpolations can be tabled if 
they bear the signatures of at least ten members. The Council of Ministers or interpolated 
minister must be present in the Assembly within ten days after the tabling of the 
interpolation in order to answer it and seek a vote of confidence. If the Council of 
Ministers or the minister concerned fails to attend the Assembly, the members who tabled 
the interpolation will explain their reasons, and the Assembly will declare a vote of no-
confidence if it deems it necessary. If the Assembly does not pronounce a vote of 
confidence, the Council of Ministers or the minister subject to interpolation is dismissed. 
In both cases, the ministers subject to interpolation cannot become members of the next 
Council of Ministers formed immediately afterwards. 
2. In the event at least one-third of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
interpolate the President concerning his executive responsibilities in relation with the 
Executive Power and the executive affairs of the country, the President must be present in 
the Assembly within one month after the tabling of the interpolation in order to give 
adequate explanations in regard to the matters raised. In the event, after hearing the 
statements of the opposing and favouring members and the reply of the President, two-
thirds of the members of the Assembly declare a vote of no confidence, the same will be 
communicated to the Leadership for information and implementation of Section (10) of 
Article 110 of the Constitution. 
Article 90 
Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the Assembly or the executive power, or the 
judicial power can forward his complaint in writing to the Assembly. The Assembly must 
investigate his complaint and give a satisfactory reply. In cases where the complaint relates to the 
executive or the judiciary, the Assembly must demand proper investigation in the matter and an 
adequate explanation from them, and announce the results within a reasonable time. In cases 
where the subject of the complaint is of public interest, the reply must be made public.  
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Article 91 
With a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in order to examine the 
compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam, a 
council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be constituted with the following composition:  
1. six 'adil fuqaha' conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day, to be selected by 
the Leader. 
2. six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly from among the Muslim jurists nominated-by the Head of the Judicial Power. 
Article 92 
Members of the Guardian Council are elected to serve for a period of six years, but during the 
first term, after three years have passed, half of the members of each group will be changed by 
lot and new members will be elected in their place.  
 
Article 93 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian 
Council in existence, except for the purpose of approving the credentials of its members and the 
election of the six jurists on the Guardian Council.  
 
Article 94 
All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian 
Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a maximum of ten days from its receipt 
with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds 
the legislation incompatible, it will return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the 
legislation will be deemed enforceable.  
 
Article 95 
In cases where the Guardian Council deems ten days inadequate for completing the process of 
review and delivering a definite opinion, it can request the Islamic Consultative Assembly to 
grant an extension of the time limit not exceeding ten days.  
 
Article 96 
The determination of compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly with the laws of Islam rests with the majority vote of the fuqaha' on the Guardian 
Council; and the determination of its compatibility with the Constitution rests with the majority 
of all the members of the Guardian Council.  
 
Article 97 
In order to expedite the work, the members of the Guardian Council may attend the Assembly 
and listen to its debates when a government bill or a members' bill is under discussion. When an 
urgent government or members' bill is placed on the agenda of the Assembly, the members of the 
Guardian Council must attend the Assembly and make their views known.  
 
Article 98 
The authority of the interpretation of the Constitution is vested with the Guardian Council, which 
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is to be done with the consent of three-fourths of its members.  
 
Article 99 
The Guardian Council has the responsibility of supervising the elections of the Assembly of 
Experts for Leadership, the President of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and 
the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch06.php#sthash.SgPGpbrX.dpuf  
 
Chapter VII 
Councils 
 
Article 100 
In order to expedite social, economic, development, public health, cultural, and educational 
programs and facilitate other affairs relating to public welfare with the cooperation of the people 
according to local needs, the administration of each village, division, city, municipality, and 
province will be supervised by a council to be named the Village, Division, City, Municipality, 
or Provincial Council. Members of each of these councils will be elected by the people of the 
locality in question. Qualifications for the eligibility of electors and candidates for these 
councils, as well as their functions and powers, the mode of election, the jurisdiction of these 
councils, the hierarchy of their authority, will be determined by law, in such a way as to preserve 
national unity, territorial integrity, the system of the Islamic Republic, and the sovereignty of the 
central government.  
 
Article 101 
In order to prevent discrimination in the preparation of programs for the development and 
welfare of the provinces, to secure the cooperation of the people, and to arrange for the 
supervision of coordinated implementation of such programs, a Supreme Council of the 
Provinces will be formed, composed of representatives of the Provincial Councils. Law will 
specify the manner in which this council is to be formed and the functions that it is to fulfil.  
 
Article 102 
The Supreme Council of the Provinces has the right within its jurisdiction to draft bills and to 
submit them to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, either directly or through the government. 
These bills must be examined by the Assembly.  
 
Article 103 
Provincial governors, city governors, divisional governors, and other officials appointed by the 
government must abide by all decisions taken by the councils within their jurisdiction.  
 
Article 104 
In order to ensure Islamic equity and cooperation in chalking out the programs and to bring about 
the harmonious progress of all units of production, both industrial and agricultural, councils 
consisting of the representatives of the workers, peasants, other employees, and managers, will 
be formed in educational and administrative units, units of service industries, and other units of a 
like nature, similar councils will be formed, composed of representatives of the members of 
those units. The mode of the formation of these councils and the scope of their functions and 
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powers, are to be specified by law.  
 
Article 105 
Decisions taken by the councils must not be contrary to the criteria of Islam and the laws of the 
country.  
 
Article 106 
The councils may not be dissolved unless they deviate from their legal duties. The body 
responsible for determining such deviation, as well as the manner for dissolving the councils and 
re-forming them, will be specified by law. Should a council have any objection to its dissolution, 
it has the right to appeal to a competent court, and the court is duty-bound to examine its 
complaint outside the docket sequence. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch07.php#sthash.2swtfkja.dpuf  
 
Chapter VIII 
The Leader or Leadership Council 
 
Article 107 
After the demise of the eminent marji' al-taqlid and great leader of the universal Islamic 
revolution, and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatullah al-'Uzma Imam Khomeini - 
quddisa sirruh al-sharif - who was recognized and accepted as marji' and Leader by a decisive 
majority of the people, the task of appointing the Leader shall be vested with the experts elected 
by the people. The experts will review and consult among themselves concerning all the fuqaha' 
possessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. In the event they find one of them 
better versed in Islamic regulations, the subjects of the fiqh, or in political and social Issues, or 
possessing general popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifications mentioned in 
Article 109, they shall elect him as the Leader. Otherwise, in the absence of such a superiority, 
they shall elect and declare one of them as the Leader. The Leader thus elected by the Assembly 
of Experts shall assume all the powers of the wilayat al-amr and all the responsibilities arising 
therefrom. The Leader is equal with the rest of the people of the country in the eyes of law.  
 
Article 108 
The law setting out the number and qualifications of the experts [mentioned in, the preceding 
article], the mode of their election, and the code of procedure regulating the sessions during the 
first term, must be drawn up by the fuqaha' on the first Guardian Council, passed by a majority 
of votes and then finally approved by the Leader of the Revolution. The power to make any 
subsequent change or a review of this law, or approval of all the provisions concerning the duties 
of the experts is vested in themselves.  
 
Article 109 
Following are the essential qualifications and conditions for the Leader: 
a. scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti in different fields of fiqh. 
b. Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic Ummah. 
c. right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and 
adequate capability for leadership.  
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In case of multiplicity of persons fulfilling the above qualifications and conditions, the person 
possessing the better jurisprudential and political perspicacity will be given preference.  
 
Article 110 
Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership: 
1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with 
the Nation's Exigency Council. 
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system. 
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda. 
4. Assuming supreme command of the armed forces. 
5. Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces. 
6. Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of: 
a. The fuqaha' on the Guardian Council. 
b. The supreme judicial authority of the country. 
c. The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
d. The chief of the joint staff. 
e. The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. 
f. The supreme commanders of the armed forces. 
7. Resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and regulation of their 
relations. 
8. Resolving the problems, which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the 
Nation's Exigency Council. 
9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the 
people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to 
the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take 
place by the Guardian Council; and, in the case of the first term [of the Presidency], by 
the Leadership. 
10. Dismissal of the' President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the 
country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional 
duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his 
incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution. 
11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, 
on a recommendation [to that effect] from the Head of judicial power. 
The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person.  
 
Article 111 
Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or lobs one of the 
qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it becomes known that he did not possess 
some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed. The authority of determination in this 
matter is vested with the experts specified in Article 108. In the event of the death, or resignation 
or dismissal of the Leader, the experts shall take steps within the shortest possible time for the 
appointment of the new Leader. Till the appointment of the new Leader, a council consisting of 
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the President, head of the judicial power, and a faqih from the Guardian Council, upon the 
decision of the Nation's Exigency Council, shall temporarily take over all the duties of the 
Leader. In the event, during this period, any one of them is unable to fulfil his duties for 
whatsoever reason, another person, upon the decision of majority of fuqaha' in the Nation's 
Exigency Council shall be elected in his place. This council shall take action in respect of items 
1,3,5, and 10, and sections d, e and f of item 6 of Article 110, upon the decision of three-fourths 
of the members of the Nation's Exigency Council. Whenever the Leader becomes temporarily 
unable to perform the duties of leadership owing to his illness or any other incident, then during 
this period, the council mentioned in this Article shall assume his duties.  
 
Article 112 
Upon the order of the Leader, the Nation's Exigency Council shall meet at any time the Guardian 
Council judges a proposed bill of the Islamic Consultative Assembly to be against the principles 
of Sharia or the Constitution, and the Assembly is 'unable to meet the expectations of the 
Guardian Council. Also, the Council shall meet for consideration on any issue forwarded to it by 
the Leader and shall carry out any other responsibility as mentioned in this Constitution. The 
permanent and changeable members of the Council shall be appointed by the Leader. The rules 
for the Council shall be formulated and approved by the Council members subject to the 
confirmation by the Leader. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch08.php#sthash.yXRlOT6r.dpuf  
 
Chapter IX 
The Executive Power 
 
Section One 
The Presidency 
 
Article 113 
After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the country. His is the 
responsibility for implementing the Constitution and acting as the head of the executive, except 
in matters directly concerned with (the office of) the Leadership.  
 
Article 114 
The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people. His re-election for a 
successive term is permissible only once.  
 
Article 115 
The President must be elected from among religious and political personalities possessing the 
following qualifications: Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administrative capacity and 
resourcefulness; a good past-record; trustworthiness and piety; convinced belief in the 
fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the country.  
 
Article 116 
Candidates nominated for the post of President must declare their candidature officially. Law 
lays down the manner in which the President is to be elected.  
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Article 117 
The President is elected by an absolute majority of votes polled by the voters. But if none of the 
candidates is able to win such a majority In the first round, voting will take place a second time 
on Friday of the following week. In the second round only the two candidates who received 
greatest number of votes in the first round will participate. If, however, some of the candidates 
securing greatest votes in the first round withdraw from the elections, the final choice will be 
between the two candidates who won greater number of votes than all the remaining candidates.  
 
Article 118 
Responsibility for the supervision of the election, of the President lies with the Guardian 
Council, as stipulated in Article 99. But before the establishment of the first Guardian Council, 
however, it lies with a supervisory body to be constituted by law.  
 
Article 119 
The election of a new President must take place no later than one month before the end of the 
term of the outgoing President. In the interim period before the election of the new President and 
the end of the term of the outgoing President, the outgoing President will perform the duties of 
the, President.  
 
Article 120 
In case any of the candidates whose suitability is established in terms of the qualifications listed 
above should die within ten days before polling day, the elections will be postponed for two 
weeks. If one of the candidates securing greatest number of votes dies in the intervening period 
between the first and second rounds of voting, the period for holding (the second round of) the 
election will be extended for two weeks.  
 
Article 121 
The President must take the following oath and affix his signature to it at a session of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly in the presence of the head of the judicial power and the members of the 
Guardian Council:  
"In, the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, I, as President, swear, in the presence of 
the Noble Qur'an and the people of Iran, by God, the Exalted and Almighty, that I will guard the 
official religion of the country, the order of the Islamic Republic and the Constitution of the 
country; that I will devote all my capacities and abilities to the fulfilment of the responsibilities 
that I have assumed; that I will dedicate myself to the service of the people, the honour of the 
country, the propagation of religion and morality, and the support of truth and justice, refraining 
from every kind of arbitrary behaviour; that I will protect the freedom and dignity of all citizens 
and the rights that the Constitution has accorded the people; that in guarding the frontiers and the 
political, economic, and cultural independence of the country I will not shirk any necessary 
measure; that, seeking help from God and following the Prophet of Islam and the infallible 
Imams (peace be upon them), I will guard, as a pious and selfless trustee, the authority vested in 
me by the people as a sacred trust, and transfer it to whomever the people may elect after me."  
 
Article 122 
The President, within the limits of his powers and duties, which he has by virtue of this 
Constitution or other laws, is responsible to the people, the Leader and the Islamic Consultative 
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Assembly.  
 
Article 123 
The President is obliged to sign legislation approved by the Assembly or the result of a 
referendum, after the (related) legal procedures have been completed and it has been 
communicated to him. After signing, he must forward it to the responsible authorities for 
implementation.  
 
Article 124 
The President may have deputies for the performance of his constitutional duties. With the 
approval of the President, the first deputy of the President shall be vested with the 
responsibilities of administering the affairs of the Council of Ministers and coordination of 
functions of other deputies.  
 
Article 125 
The President or his legal representative has the authority to sign treaties, protocols, contracts, 
and agreements concluded by the Iranian government with other governments, as well as 
agreements pertaining to international organisations, after obtaining the approval of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly.  
 
Article 126 
The President is responsible for national planning and budget and state employment affairs and 
may entrust the administration of these to others.  
 
Article 127 
In special circumstances, subject to approval of the Council of Ministers the President may 
appoint one or more special representatives with specific powers. In such cases, the decisions of 
his representative(s) will be considered as tee same as those of the President and the Council of 
Ministers.  
 
Article 128 
The ambassadors shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the foreign minister and 
approval of the President. The President signs the credentials of ambassadors and receives the 
credentials presented by the ambassadors ,of the foreign countries.  
 
Article 129 
The award of state decorations is a prerogative of the President.  
 
Article 130 
The President shall submit his resignation to the Leader and shall continue performing his duties 
until his resignation is not accepted.  
 
Article 131 
In case of death, dismissal, resignation, absence, or illness lasting longer than two months of the 
President, or when his term in office has ended and a new president has not been elected due to 
some impediments, or similar other circumstances, his first deputy shall assume, with the 
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approval of the Leader, the powers and functions of the President. The Council, consisting of the 
Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, head of the judicial power, and the first deputy of 
the President, is obliged to arrange for a new President to be elected within a maximum period of 
fifty days. In case of death of the first deputy to the President, or other matters which prevent 
him to perform his duties, or when the President does not have a first deputy, the Leader shall 
appoint another person in his place.  
 
Article 132 
During the period when the powers and responsibilities of the President are assigned to his first 
deputy or the other person in accordance with Article 131, neither can the ministers be 
interpolated nor can a vote of no-confidence be passed against them. Also, neither can any step 
be undertaken for a review of the Constitution, nor a national referendum be held.  
Section Two 
The President and The Ministers 
 
Article 133 
Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote of 
confidence. With the change of Assembly, a new vote of confidence will not be necessary. The 
number of ministers and the jurisdiction of each will be determined by law.  
 
Article 134 
The President is the head of the Council of Ministers. He supervises the work of the ministers 
and takes all necessary measures to coordinate the decisions of the government. With the 
cooperation of the ministers, he determines the program and policies of the government and 
implements the laws. In the case of discrepancies, or interference in the constitutional duties of 
the government agencies, the decision of the Council of Ministers at the request of the President 
shall be binding provided it does not call for an interpretation of or modification in the laws. The 
President is responsible to the Assembly for the actions of the Council of Ministers.  
 
Article 135 
The ministers shall continue in office unless they are dismissed, or given a vote of no-confidence 
by the Assembly as a result of their interpolation, or a motion for a vote of no-confidence against 
them.  
 
The resignation of the Council of Ministers, or that of each of them shall be submitted to the 
President, and the Council of Ministers shall continue to function until such time as the new 
government is appointed.  
 
The President can appoint a caretaker for a maximum period of three months for the ministries 
having no minister.  
 
Article 136 
The President can dismiss the ministers and in such a case he must obtain a vote of confidence 
for the new minister(s) from the Assembly. In case half of the members of the Council of 
Ministers are changed after the government has received its vote of confidence from the 
Assembly, the government must seek a fresh vote of confidence from the Assembly.  
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Article 137 
Each of the ministers is responsible for his duties to the President and the Assembly, but in 
meters approved by the Council of Ministers as a whole, he is also responsible for the actions of 
the others.  
 
Article 138 
In addition to instances in which the Council of Ministers or a single minister is authorized to 
frame procedures for the implementation of laws, the Council of Ministers has the right to lay 
down rules, regulations, and procedures for performing its administrative duties, ensuring the 
implementation of laws, and setting up administrative bodies. Each of the ministers also has the 
right to frame regulations and issue circular in matters within his jurisdiction and in conformity 
with the decisions of the Council of Ministers. However, the content of all such regulations must 
not violate the letter or the spirit of the law. The government can entrust any portion of its task to 
the commissions composed of some ministers. The decisions of such commissions within the 
rules will be binding after the endorsement of the President.  
 
The ratification and the regulations of the government and the decisions of the commissions 
mentioned under this Article shall also be brought to the notice of the Speaker of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly while being communicated for implementation so that in the event he 
finds them contrary to law, he may send the same stating the reason for reconsideration by the 
Council of Ministers.  
 
Article 139 
The settlement, of claims relating to public and state property or the referral thereof to arbitration 
is in every case dependent on the approval of the Council of Ministers, and the Assembly must 
be informed of these matters. In cases where one party to the dispute is a foreigner, as well as in 
important cases that are purely domestic, the approval of the Assembly must also be obtained. 
Law will specify the important cases intended here.  
 
Article 140 
Allegations of common crimes against the President, his deputies, and the ministers will be 
investigated in common courts of justice with the' knowledge of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly.  
 
Article 141 
The President, the deputies to the President, ministers, and government employees cannot hold 
more than one government position, and it is forbidden for them to hold any kind of additional 
post in institutions of which all or a part of the capital belongs to the government or public 
institutions, to be a member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, to practice the profession of 
attorney or legal adviser, or to hold the post of president, managing director, or membership of 
the board of directors of any kind of private company, with the exception of cooperative 
companies affiliated to the government departments and institutions. Teaching positions in 
universities and research institutions are exempted from this rule.  
 
Article 142 
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The assets of the Leader, the President, the deputies to the President, and ministers, as well as 
those of their spouses and offspring, are to be examined before and after their term of office by 
the head of the judicial power, in order to ensure they have not increased in a fashion contrary to 
law.  
Section Three 
The Army and The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
 
Article 143 
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for guarding the independence and 
territorial integrity of the country, as well as the order of the Islamic Republic.  
 
Article 144 
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic Army, i.e., committed to Islamic 
ideology and the people, and must recruit into its service individuals who have faith in the 
objectives of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to the cause of realizing its goals.  
 
Article 145 
No foreigner will be accepted into the Army or security forces of the country.  
 
Article 146 
The establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for peaceful purposes, is 
forbidden.  
 
Article 147 
In time of peace, the government must utilize the personnel and technical equipment of the Army 
in relief operations, and for educational and productive ends, and the Construction Jihad, while 
fully observing the criteria of Islamic justice and ensuring that such utilization does not harm the 
combat-readiness of the Army.  
 
Article 148 
All forms of personal use of military vehicles, equipment, and other means, as well as taking 
advantage of Army personnel as personal servants and chauffeurs or in similar capacities, are 
forbidden.  
 
Article 149 
Promotions in military rank and their withdrawal take place in accordance with the law.  
 
Article 150 
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, organized in the early days of the triumph of the 
Revolution, is to be maintained so that it may continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and 
its achievements. The scope of the duties of this Corps, and its areas of responsibility, in relation 
to the duties and areas of responsibility of the other armed forces, are to be determined by law, 
with emphasis on brotherly cooperation and harmony among them.  
 
Article 151 
In accordance with the noble Qur'anic verse: 
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"(Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and horses ready for battle, 
striking fear into God's enemy and your enemy, and others beyond them unknown to you but 
known to God... [8:60])" the government is obliged to provide a program of military training, 
with all requisite facilities, fob all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a 
way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defence of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. The possession of arms, however, requires the granting of permission by the competent 
authorities. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch09.php#sthash.IsiagzPE.dpuf  
 
Chapter X 
Foreign Policy 
 
Article 152 
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of 
domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of 
the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims, 
non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually 
peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.  
 
Article 153 
Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, 
or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national life, is forbidden.  
 
Article 154 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society, and 
considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right of 
all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference 
in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad'afun against the 
mustakbirun in every corner of the globe.  
 
Article 155 
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran may grant political asylum to those who seek it 
unless they are regarded as traitors and saboteurs according to the laws of Iran. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch10.php#sthash.Ovf7vvKe.dpuf  
 
Chapter XI 
The Judiciary 
 
 
 
Article 156 
The judiciary is an independent power, the protector of the rights of the individual and society, 
responsible for the implementation of justice, and entrusted with the following duties:  
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1. Investigating and passing judgment on grievances, violations of rights, and complaints; 
the resolving of litigation; the settling of disputes; and the taking of all necessary 
decisions and measures in probate matters as the law may determine; 
2. Restoring public rights and promoting justice and legitimate freedoms; 
3. Supervising the proper enforcement of laws; 
4. Uncovering crimes; prosecuting, punishing, and chastising criminals; and enacting the 
penalties and provisions of the Islamic penal code; 
5. Taking suitable measures to prevent the occurrence of crime and to reform criminals. 
Article 157 
In order to fulfil the responsibilities of the judiciary power in all the matters concerning 
judiciary, administrative and executive areas, the Leader shall appoint a just Mujtahid well 
versed in judiciary affairs and possessing prudence. and administrative abilities as the head of the 
judiciary power for a period of five years who shall be the highest judicial authority.  
 
Article 158 
The head of the judiciary branch is responsible for the following:  
1. Establishment of the organisational structure necessary for the administration of justice 
commensurate with the responsibilities mentioned under Article 156. 
2. Drafting judiciary bills appropriate for the Islamic Republic. 
3. Employment of just and worthy judges, their dismissal, appointment, transfer, assignment 
to particular duties, promotions, and carrying out similar administrative duties, in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 159 
The courts of justice are the official bodies to which all grievances and complaints are to be 
referred. The formation of courts and their jurisdiction is to be determined by law.  
 
Article 160 
The Minister of Justice owes responsibility in all matters concerning the relationship between the 
judiciary, on the one hand, and the executive and legislative branches, on the other hand. He will 
be elected from among the individuals proposed to the President by the head of the judiciary 
branch. The head of the judiciary may delegate full authority to the Minister of Justice in 
financial and administrative areas and for employment of personnel other than judges in which 
case the Minister of Justice shall have the same authority and responsibility as those possessed 
by the other ministers in their capacity as the highest ranking government executives.  
 
Article 161 
The Supreme Court is to be formed for the purpose of supervising the correct implementation of 
the laws by the courts, ensuring uniformity of judicial procedure, and fulfilling any other 
responsibilities assigned to it by law, on the basis of regulations to be established by the head of 
the judicial branch.  
 
Article 162 
The chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General must both be just mujtahids well 
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versed in judicial matters. They will be nominated by the head of the judiciary branch for a 
period of five years, in consultation with the judges of the Supreme Court.  
 
Article 163 
The conditions and qualifications to be fulfilled by a judge will be determined by law, in 
accordance with the criteria of fiqh.  
 
Article 164 
A judge cannot be removed, whether temporarily or permanently, from the post he occupies 
except by trial and proof of his guilt, or in consequence of a violation entailing his dismissal. A 
judge cannot be transferred or redesignated without his consent, except in cases when the interest 
of society necessitates it, that too, with the decision of the head of the judiciary branch after 
consultation with the chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General. The periodic 
transfer and rotation of judges will be in accordance with general regulations to be laid down by 
law.  
 
Article 165 
Trials are to be held openly and members of the public may attend without any restriction; unless 
the court determines that an open trial would be detrimental to public morality or discipline, or if 
in case of private disputes, both the parties request not to hold open hearing.  
 
Article 166 
The verdicts of courts must be well reasoned out and documented with reference to the articles 
and principles of the law in accordance with which they are delivered.  
 
Article 167 
The judge is bound to endeavour to judge each case on the basis of the codified law. In case of 
the absence of any such law, he has to deliver his judgment on the basis of authoritative Islamic 
sources and authentic fatwa. He, on the pretext of the silence of or deficiency of law in the 
matter, or its brevity or contradictory nature, cannot refrain from admitting and examining cases 
and delivering his judgment.  
 
Article 168 
Political and press offenses will be tried openly and in the presence of a jury, in courts of justice. 
The manner of the selection of the jury, its powers, and the definition of political offenses, will 
be determined by law in accordance with the Islamic criteria.  
 
Article 169 
No act or omission may be regarded as a crime with retrospective effect on the basis of a law 
framed subsequently.  
 
Article 170 
Judges of courts are obliged to refrain from executing statutes and regulations of the government 
that are in conflict with the laws or the norms of Islam, or lie outside the competence of, the 
executive power. Everyone has the right to demand the annulment of any such regulation from 
the Court of Administrative Justice.  
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Article 171 
Whenever an individual suffers moral or material loss as the result of a default or error of the 
judge with respect to the subject matter of a case or the verdict delivered, or the application of a 
rule in a particular case, the defaulting judge must stand surety for the reparation of that loss in 
accordance with the Islamic criteria, if it be a case of default. Otherwise, losses will be 
compensated for by the State. In all such cases, the repute and good standing of the accused will 
be restored.  
 
Article 172 
Military courts will be established by law to investigate crimes committed in connection with 
military or security duties by members of the Army, the Gendarmerie, the police, and the Islamic 
Revolution Guards Corps. They will be tried in public courts, however, for common crimes or 
crimes committed while serving the department of justice in executive capacity. The office of 
military prosecutor and the military courts form part of the judiciary and are subject to the same 
principles that regulate the judiciary.  
 
Article 173 
In order to investigate the complaints, grievances, and objections of the people with respect to 
government officials, organs, and statutes, a court will be established to be known as the Court of 
Administrative Justice under the supervision of the head of the judiciary branch. The jurisdiction, 
powers, and mode of operation of this court will be laid down by law.  
 
Article 174 
In accordance with the right of the judiciary to supervise the proper conducting of affairs and the 
correct implementation of laws by the administrative organs of the government, an organisation I 
will be constituted under the supervision of the head of the judiciary branch to be known as the 
National General Inspectorate. The powers and duties of this organisation will be determined by 
law. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch11.php#sthash.rkZVuAzm.dpuf  
 
Chapter XII 
Radio and Television 
 
 
Article 175 
The freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts in the Radio and Television of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran must be guaranteed in keeping with the Islamic' criteria and the best 
interests of the country. The appointment and dismissal of the head of the Radio and Television 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran rests with the Leader. A council consisting of two representatives 
each of the President, the head of the judiciary branch and the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
shall supervise the functioning of this organisation.  
Chapter XIII 
Supreme Council for National Security 
 
Article 176 
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In order to safeguarding the national interests and preserving the Islamic Revolution, the 
territorial integrity and national sovereignty, a Supreme Council for National Security presided 
over by the President shall be constituted to fulfil the following responsibilities:  
1. Determining the defence and national security policies within the framework of general 
policies determined by the Leader. 
2. Coordination of activities in the areas relating to politics, intelligence, social, cultural and 
economic fields in regard to general defence and security policies. 
3. Exploitation of materialistic and intellectual resources of the country for facing the 
internal and external threats. 
The Council shall consist of: heads of three branches of the government, chief of the Supreme 
Command Council of the Armed Forces, the officer in charge of the planning and budget affairs, 
two representatives nominated by the Leader, ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and 
information, a minister related with the subject, and the highest ranking officials from the Armed 
Forces and the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps.  
 
Commensurate with its duties, the Supreme Council for National Security shall form sub-
councils such as Defence Sub-council and National Security Sub-council. Each Sub-council will 
be presided over by the President or a member of the Supreme Council for National Security 
appointed by the President. The scope of authority and responsibility of the Sub-councils will be 
determined by law and their organisational structure will be approved by the Supreme Council 
for National Defence. The decisions of the Supreme Council for National Security shall be 
effective after the confirmation by the Leader. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch12.php#sthash.7oyf1z21.dpuf  
 
Chapter XIV 
Revision of the Constitution 
 
Article 177 
Revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whenever needed by the 
circumstances, will be done in the following manner:  
 
The Leader issues an edict to the President after consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council 
stipulating the amendments or additions to be made by the Council for Revision of the 
Constitution which consists of:  
1. Members of the Guardian Council. 
2. Heads of the three branches of the government. 
3. Permanent members of the Nation's Exigency Council. 
4. Five members from among the Assembly of Experts. 
5. Ten representatives selected by the Leader. 
6. Three representatives from the Council of Ministers. 
7. Three representatives from the judiciary branch. 
8. Ten representatives from among the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
9. Three representatives from among the university professors. 
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The method of working, manner of selection and the terms and conditions of the Council shall be 
determined by law. The decisions of the Council, after the confirmation and signatures of the 
Leader, shall be valid if approved by an absolute majority vote in a national referendum. The 
provisions of Article 59 of the Constitution shall not apply to the referendum for the, "Revision 
of the Constitution." The contents of the Articles of the Constitution related to the Islamic 
character of the political system; the basis of all the rules and regulations according to Islamic 
criteria; the religious footing; the objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the democratic 
character of the government; the wilayat al-'mr the Imamate of Ummah; and the administration 
of the affairs of the country based on national referenda, official religion of Iran [Islam] and the 
school [Twelver Ja'fari] are unalterable. - See more at: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch13.php#sthash.8mYdIgnD.dpuf  
 
 
  
401 
 
Appendix B: 
 
Basic Law of Saudi Arabia  
(English Translation from Arabic) 
 
Source: http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-
information/laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx (Last Retrieved: April 4, 2014) 
The Basic Law of Governance 
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud issued a Royal 
Decree embodying the Basic Law of Governance. The following is the text of the Decree.  
 
In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful.  
No: A/90 
Dated 27th Sha'ban 1412 H (1 March 1992) 
With the help of God, we, Fahd Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Monarch of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, having taken into consideration the public interest, and in view of the progress of the 
State in various fields and out of the desire to achieve the objectives we are pursuing, have 
decreed the following:  
 That the promulgation of the Basic Law of Governance is as the attached text.  
 That all regulations, orders and decrees in force shall remain valid when this Basic Law 
comes into force, until they are amended to conform with it.  
 That this decree shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall come into force on 
the date of its publication.  
   
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
Article 1: 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its 
constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the 
Prophet (PBUH). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the capital.  
Article 2: 
The State public holidays are Eid Al Fitr (the Feast of Ramadan) and Eid Al Adha (The Feast of 
the Sacrifice). Its calendar follows the Hijri year (the lunar year).  
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Article 3: 
The flag of the State is as follows:  
(a) Its colour is green 
(b) Its width equals two thirds of its length  
The words: "There is no god but God and Mohammed is His Messenger" are inscribed in the 
centre, with a drawn sword underneath. The flag should never be inverted. The Law will specify 
the rules pertaining to the flag.  
Article 4:  
The State's Emblem represents two crossed swords with a palm tree in the middle of the upper 
space between them. The Law will define the State's Anthem and medals 
   
CHAPTER TWO 
THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE  
Article 5: 
•  Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
•  Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. 
•  The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and 
His Messenger's Sunna (Traditions).  
•  The Crown Prince shall devote himself exclusively to his duties as Crown Prince and shall 
perform any other duties delegated to him by the King.  
•  Upon the death of the King, the Crown Prince shall assume the Royal powers until a pledge of 
allegiance (bay'a) is given.  
Article 6: 
In support of the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger (PBUH), citizens shall give the 
pledge of allegiance (bay'a) to the King, professing loyalty in times of hardship and ease.  
Article 7: 
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the 
Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the 
other laws of the State.  
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Article 8: 
Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and 
equality according to Islamic Sharia. 
   
CHAPTER THREE 
THE VALUES OF SAUDI SOCIETY  
Article 9: 
The family is the nucleus of Saudi Society. Members of the family shall be raised in the Islamic 
Creed, which demands allegiance and obedience to God, to His Prophet and to the rulers, respect 
for and obedience to the laws, and love for and pride in the homeland and its glorious history.  
Article 10: 
The State shall aspire to promote family bonds and Arab-Islamic values. It shall take care of all 
individuals and provide the right conditions for the growth of their talents and skills.  
Article 11: 
Saudi society is based on full adherence to God's guidance. Members of this society shall 
cooperate amongst themselves in charity, piety and cohesion.  
Article 12: 
Consolidation of the national unity is a duty. The State shall forbid all activities that may lead to 
division, disorder and partition.  
Article 13: 
The aim of education is to implant the Islamic Creed in the hearts of all youths, to help them 
acquire knowledge and skills, to qualify them to become useful members of their society, to love 
their homeland and take pride in its history. 
   
CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES  
Article 14: 
All natural resources that God has deposited underground, above ground, in territorial waters or 
within the land and sea domains under the authority of the State, together with revenues of these 
resources, shall be the property of the State, as provided by the Law.  
The Law shall specify means for exploitation, protection and development of these resources in 
the best interest of the State, and its security and economy.  
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Article 15: 
No concessions or licenses to exploit any public resources of the country shall be granted unless 
authorized by provisions of the Law.  
Article 16: 
Public funds are inviolable. They shall be protected by the State and safeguarded by all citizens 
and residents.  
Article 17: 
Ownership, capital and labour are basic components of the economic and social entity of the 
Kingdom. They are personal rights which perform a social function in accordance with the 
Islamic Sharia.  
Article 18: 
The State shall guarantee private ownership and its sanctity. No-one shall be deprived of his 
private property, unless in service of the public interest. In this case, a fair compensation shall be 
given to him.  
Article 19: 
General confiscation of assets is prohibited. No confiscation of an individual's assets shall be 
enforced without a judicial ruling.  
Article 20: 
No taxes or fees shall be imposed, except in need and on a just basis. Imposition, amendment, 
cancellation or exemption shall take place according to the provisions of the Law.  
Article 21: 
Zakat shall be collected and spent for legitimate expenses.  
Article 22: 
Economic and social development shall be carried out according to a fair, wise plan. 
   
CHAPTER FIVE 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES  
Article 23: 
The State shall protect the Islamic Creed, apply the Sharia, encourage good and discourage evil, 
and undertake its duty regarding the Propagation of Islam (Da'wa).  
Article 24: 
The State shall develop and maintain the Two Holy Mosques. It shall provide care and security 
to pilgrims to help them perform their Hajj and Umra and visit to the Prophet's Mosque in ease 
and comfort.  
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Article 25: 
The State shall nourish the aspirations of Arab and Muslim nations in solidarity and harmony 
and strengthen relations with friendly states.  
Article 26: 
The State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Sharia.  
Article 27: 
The State shall guarantee the rights of the citizens and their families in cases of emergency, 
illness, disability and old age. The State shall support the Social Insurance Law and encourage 
organisations and individuals to participate in philanthropic activities.  
Article 28: 
The State shall facilitate job opportunities for every able person, and enact laws to protect the 
worker and the employer.  
Article 29: 
The State shall patronize sciences, letters and culture. It shall encourage scientific research, 
protect the Islamic and Arab heritage, and contribute towards Arab, Islamic and human 
civilization.  
Article 30: 
The State shall provide public education and commit itself to the eradication of illiteracy.  
Article 31: 
The State shall look after public health and provide health care for every citizen.  
Article 32: 
The State shall work towards the preservation, protection and improvement of the environment, 
as well as prevent pollution.  
Article 33: 
The State shall form armed forces and equip them to defend the Islamic Creed, the Two Holy 
Mosques, the society and the homeland.  
Article 34: 
It shall be the duty of every citizen to defend the Islamic Creed, the society and homeland. The 
Law shall specify rules for military service.  
Article 35: 
The Law shall specify rules pertaining to Saudi Arabian nationality.  
Article 36: 
The State shall provide security for all citizens and residents on its territories. No-one may be 
confined, arrested or imprisoned without reference to the Law.  
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Article 37: 
Dwellings are inviolate. Access is prohibited without their owners' permission. No search may be 
made except in cases specified by the Law.  
Article 38: 
No-one shall be punished for another's crimes. No conviction or penalty shall be inflicted 
without reference to the Sharia or the provisions of the Law. Punishment shall not be imposed ex 
post facto.  
Article 39: 
Mass media and all other vehicles of expression shall employ civil and polite language, 
contribute towards the education of the nation and strengthen unity. It is prohibited to commit 
acts leading to disorder and division, affecting the security of the state and its public relations, or 
undermining human dignity and rights. Details shall be specified in the Law.  
Article 40: 
The privacy of telegraphic and postal communications, and telephone and other means of 
communication, shall be inviolate. There shall be no confiscation, delay, surveillance or 
eavesdropping, except in cases provided by the Law.  
Article 41: 
Residents in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall abide by its laws, observe the values of the 
Saudi community and respect Saudi traditions and feelings.  
Article 42: 
The State shall grant the right of political asylum provided it is in the public interest. 
International agreements and laws shall define rules and procedures for the extradition of 
common criminals.  
Article 43: 
Councils held by the King and the Crown Prince shall be open for all citizens and anyone else 
who may have a complaint or a grievance. A citizen shall be entitled to address public authorities 
and discuss any matters of concern to him. 
   
CHAPTER SIX 
THE AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE  
Article 44: 
The Authorities of the State consist of: 
- The Judicial Authority 
- The Executive Authority 
- The Regulatory Authority 
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These Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their functions, according to this Law or 
other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities.  
Article 45: 
The Holy Qur'an and the Sunna (Traditions) of God's Messenger shall be the source for fatwas 
(religious advisory rulings). The Law shall specify hierarchical organisation for the composition 
of the Council of the Senior Ulema, the Research Administration, and the Office of the Mufti, 
together with their functions.  
Article 46: 
The Judiciary is an independent authority. The decisions of judges shall not be subject to any 
authority other than the authority of the Islamic Sharia.  
Article 47: 
All people, either citizens or residents in the Kingdom, are entitled to file suit on an equal basis. 
The Law shall specify procedures for this purpose.  
Article 48: 
The Courts shall apply rules of the Islamic Sharia in cases that are brought before them, 
according to the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna, and according to laws which are decreed by the 
ruler in agreement with the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna.  
Article 49: 
Courts are empowered to arbitrate in all disputes and crimes, taking into account the provisions 
of Article 53 of this Law.  
Article 50: 
The King or whomsoever he may deputize shall concern himself with the implementation of 
judicial rulings.  
Article 51: 
The Law shall specify the composition of the Supreme Judiciary Council and its functions, as 
well as the hierarchy for the courts and their functions.  
Article 52: 
Judges shall be appointed and relieved by Royal Decree, based on a proposal of the Supreme 
Judiciary Council, in accordance with provisions of the Law.  
Article 53: 
The Law shall specify the hierarchy of the Board of Grievances and its functions.  
Article 54: 
The Law shall specify the relationship between the Commission of Inquiry and the Attorney-
General and their organisation and functions.  
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Article 55: 
The King shall rule the nation according to the Sharia. He shall also supervise the 
implementation of the Sharia, the general policy of the State, and the defence and protection of 
the country.  
Article 56: 
The King is the Prime Minister. Members of the Council of Ministers shall assist him in the 
performance of his mission according to the provisions of this Law and other laws. The Council 
of Ministers Law shall specify the powers of the Council in respect of internal and external 
affairs, organisation of governmental departments and their coordination. In additions, the Law 
shall specify the qualifications and the powers of the ministers, ministerial accountability 
procedures and all matters pertaining to the ministers. The Law of the Council of Ministers and 
the areas of their authority may be amended according to this Law.  
Article 57: 
•  The King shall appoint and relieve deputies of the Prime Minister and member minister of the 
Council by Royal Decree. 
 
•  Deputies of the Prime Minister and member ministers of the Council shall be jointly 
responsible to the King for the implementation of the Sharia, laws and the general policy of the 
State. 
 
•  The King is entitled to dissolve and reconstitute the Council of Ministers. 
Article 58: 
The King shall appoint those who are at the rank of ministers and deputy ministers, and those 
who are at the highest grade and relieve them by a Royal Decree as provided by the Law. 
Ministers and heads of independent departments shall be answerable to the King in respect of the 
ministries and agencies they head.  
Article 59: 
The Law shall specify the rules of the Civil Service, including salaries, awards, compensations, 
privileges, and pensions.  
Article 60: 
The King is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He shall appoint and dismiss officers 
form service, as provided by terms of the Law.  
Article 61: 
The King shall announce any state of emergency or general mobilization and shall declare war. 
The Law shall specify rules for this purpose.  
Article 62: 
If an imminent danger is threatening the safety of the Kingdom, the integrity of its territories or 
the security and interests of its people, or is impeding the functions of official organisations, the 
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King may take urgent measures to deal with such a danger. When he considers that these 
measures should continue, necessary arrangements shall be made in accordance with the Law. 
Article 63: 
The King shall receive kings and heads of state, appoint his representatives to other states, and 
receive credentials of other states' representatives accredited to him.  
Article 64: 
The King shall award medals according to provisions of the Law.  
Article 65: 
The King may delegate some powers of authority to the Crown Prince by Royal Decree.  
Article 66: 
Should the King happen to travel abroad, he shall issue a Royal Decree to deputize the Crown 
Prince to manage the affairs of state and look after the interests of the people, as set out in the 
Royal Decree.  
Article 67: 
The Regulatory Authority shall be concerned with the making of laws and regulations which will 
safeguard all interests, and remove evil from the State's affairs, according to Sharia. Its powers 
shall be exercised according to provisions of this Law and the Law of the Council of Ministers 
and the Law of the Shura Council.  
Article 68: 
The Shura Council shall be established. Its Law shall specify the details of its formation, powers 
and selection of members. The King may dissolve and reconstitute Majlis Ash-Shura.  
Article 69: 
The King may summon Majlis Ash-Shura and the Council of Ministers for a joint session. He 
may summon others whom he deems necessary to attend the meeting and discuss whatever 
affairs he considers fit.  
Article 70: 
Laws, international agreements, treaties and concessions shall be approved and amended by 
Royal Decrees.  
Article 71: 
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette, and implemented effective from the date of 
publication, unless another date is specified. 
   
CHAPTER SEVEN 
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS  
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Article 72: 
•  The Law shall include provisions for the State's revenues and their depositing with the General 
Treasury of the State 
 
•  Revenues shall be recorded and spent according to procedures stipulated by provisions of the 
Law.  
Article 73: 
No commitment to pay a sum of money from the General Treasury shall be made without 
adherence to budget rules. If provisions of the budget cannot cover the demand, then a provision 
shall be made through a Royal Decree.  
Article 74: 
Assets of the State may not be sold, rented or disposed of unless so authorized by the Law.  
Article 75: 
Laws shall specify provisions for currency, banks, standards, measures and weights.  
Article 76: 
The Law shall set the fiscal year for the State. The budget shall be announced according to a 
Royal Decree. It shall specify assessed amounts of revenue and expenditure one month ahead of 
the coming fiscal year. If the budget cannot be issued due to compelling reasons before the 
beginning of the new fiscal year, the budget of the previous year shall remain in force until the 
new budget can be issued.  
Article 77: 
The competent department shall prepare the closing account of the State for the past year and 
forward it to the Prime Minister.  
Article 78: 
Budgets and closing accounts of departments which have corporate rights, shall be subject to the 
same procedures which are applicable to the State's budget and closing accounts 
   
CHAPTER EIGHT 
INSTITUTIONS OF AUDIT  
Article 79: 
All revenues and expenditures of the State, as well as movable and fixed assets, shall be 
subsequently audited to ensure proper use and management. An annual report to this effect shall 
be forwarded to the Prime Minister. The Law shall specify details of the competent auditing 
institution, together with its affiliations and areas of authority.  
Article 80: 
Governmental institutions shall also be audited to ensure proper administrative performance and 
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implementation of laws. Financial and administrative violations shall be investigated. An annual 
report shall be forwarded to the Prime Minister. The Law shall specify details of the competent 
institution in charge, together with its affiliations and areas of authority. 
   
CHAPTER NINE 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
Article 81: 
With regard to treaties and agreements, the application of this Law shall not violate 
commitments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia towards other states, international organisations 
and bodies.  
Article 82: 
No provision of this Law whatsoever may be suspended except on a temporary basis, such as in 
wartime or during the declaration of a state of emergency. Such a suspension shall be in 
accordance with the terms of the Law and may not violate Article 7.  
Article 83: 
No amendment to this Law shall be made, except in the same manner as it was promulgated.  
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Appendix C: 
 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates 
(English Translation from Arabic) 
 
Sources: www.worldstatesmen.org/uae_const.doc (Last Retrieved: April 10, 2014), 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2004.pdf (Last Retrieved: 
April 10, 2014), and http://www.almajles.gov.ae:85/Uploads/Files/2011/06/20/15206.pdf (Last 
Retrieved: April 10, 2014) 
Note: The latter link provided by www.almajles.gov.ae did not contain any constitutional article 
beyond Article 125. 
 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates 
 
The Federal National Council (FNC) and the Federal Supreme Council (FSC) amended the 2 
December 1971 interim constitution of the United Arab Emirates, drafted with the establishment 
of the federation, to make it permanent in 1996. 
 
We, the Rulers of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain and 
Fujairah (1): 
Whereas it is our desire and the desire of the people of our Emirates to establish a Union between 
these Emirates, to promote a better life, more enduring stability and a higher international status 
for the Emirates and their people; 
Desiring to create closer links between the Arab Emirates in the form of an independent, 
sovereign, federal state, capable of protecting its existence and the existence of its members, in 
co-operation with the sister Arab states and with all other friendly states which are members of 
the United Nations Organisation and of the family of nations in general, on a basis of mutual 
respect and reciprocal interests and benefits, 
Desiring also to lay the foundation for federal rule in the coming years on a sound basis, 
corresponding to the realities and the capacities of the Emirates at the present time, enabling the 
Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals, sustaining the identity of its members 
providing that this is not inconsistent with those goals and preparing the people of the Union at 
the same time for a dignified and free constitutional life, and progressing by steps towards a 
comprehensive, representative, democratic regime in an Islamic and Arab society free from fear 
and anxiety; 
And whereas the realisation of the foregoing was our dearest desire, towards which we have bent 
our strongest resolution, being desirous of advancing our country and our people to the status of 
qualifying them to take appropriate place among civilised states and nations; 
 
1 - Ras Al Khaimah joined the Union on the 10th of February 1972. 
For all these reasons and until the preparation of the permanent Constitution for the Union may 
be completed, we proclaim before the Supreme and Omnipotent Creator, and before all the 
peoples, our agreement to this provisional Constitution, to which our signatures were appended, 
which shall be implemented during the transitional period indicated in it ; 
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May Allah, our Protector and Defender, grant us success 
Constitutional Amendment No. (1) of 1996 
The federation supreme council, after perusing the Federation Temporary Constitution and the 
approval of the Cabinet, and Based on what was considered by the Federation Supreme Council 
and approved by the Cabinet and the Federal National Council and certified by the Federation 
Supreme Council, Resolved: 
 
Article 1 
The word “Temporary” is cancelled from the United Arab Emirates Constitution wherever it is. 
 
Article 2 
Abu Dhabi City is the Capital of the Federation. 
 
Article 3 
Any text or provision contrary to this amendment is cancelled. 
 
Article 4 
This constitutional amendment shall be applicable as of the date of issuance thereof and be 
published in the official gazette. 
Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan President of United Arab Emirates Issued by us at the presidential 
palace in Abu Dhabi, On: 22 Rajab 1417 Hijri Corresponding to: 2 Dec. 1996 
 
Article 5 
The Union shall have a Flag, an Emblem and a National Anthem. The Flag and the Emblem shall 
be prescribed by Law. Each Emirate shall retain its own flag for use within its territories. 
 
Article 6 
The Union is a part of the Great Arab Nation, to which it is bound by the ties of religion, 
language, history and common destiny. The people of the Union are one people, and one part of 
the Arab Nation. 
 
Article 7 
Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of 
legislation in the Union. The official language of the Union is Arabic. 
 
Article 8 
The citizens of the Union shall have a single nationality which shall be prescribed by law. When 
abroad, they shall enjoy the protection of the Union Government in accordance with accepted 
international principals. No citizen of the Union may be deprived of his nationality nor may his 
nationality be withdrawn save in exceptional circumstances which shall be defined by Law. 
 
Article 9 
1. The Capital of the Union shall be established in an area allotted to the Union by the Emirates 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai on the borders between them and it shall be given the name "AI 
Karama". 
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2. There shall be allocated in the Union budget for the first year the amount necessary to cover 
the expenses of technical studies and planning for the construction of the Capital. However, 
construction work shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed in not more than seven 
years from the date of entry into force of this Constitution. 
3. Until the construction of the Union Capital is complete, Abu Dhabi shall be the provisional 
headquarters of the Union. 
 
Article 10 
The aims of the Union shall be the maintenance of its independence and sovereignty. The 
safeguard of its security and stability. The defence against any aggression upon its existence or 
the existence of its member states. The protection of the rights and liabilities of the people of the 
Union. The achievement of close co-operation between the Emirates for their common benefit in 
realizing these aims and in promoting their prosperity and progress in all fields. The provision of 
a better life for all citizens together with respect by each Emirate for the independence and 
sovereignty of the other Emirates in their internal affairs within the framework of this 
Constitution. 
 
Article 11 
1. The Emirates of the Union shall form an economic and customs entity. Union Laws shall 
regulate the progressive stages appropriate to the achievement of this entity. 
2. The free movement of all capital and goods between the Emirates of the Union is guaranteed 
and may not be restricted except by a Union Law. 
3. All taxes, fees, duties and tolls imposed on the movement of goods from one member Emirate 
to the other shall be abolished. 
 
Article 12 
The foreign policy of the Union shall be directed towards support for Arab and Islamic causes 
and interests and towards the consolidation of the bonds of friendship and co-operation with all 
nations and peoples on the basis of the principles of the charter of the United Nations and ideal 
international standards.  
PART TWO: THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE 
UNION 
Article 13 
The Union and the member Emirates shall co-operate, within the limits of their jurisdiction and 
abilities, in executing the provisions of this Part. 
 
Article 14 
Equality, social justice, ensuring safety and security and equality of opportunity for all citizens 
shall be the pillars of the Society. Co-operation and mutual mercy shall be a firm bond between 
them. 
 
Article 15 
The family is the basis of society. It is founded on morality, religion, ethics and patriotism. The 
law shall guarantee its existence, safeguard and protect it from corruption. 
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Article 16 
Society shall be responsible for protecting childhood and motherhood and shall protect minors 
and others unable to look after themselves for any reason, such as illness or incapacity or old age 
or forced unemployment. It shall be responsible for assisting them and enabling them to help 
themselves for their own benefit and that of the community. 
Such matters shall be regulated by welfare and social security legislations. 
 
Article 17 
Education shall be a fundamental factor for the progress of society. It shall be compulsory in its 
primary stage and free of charge at all stages, within the Union. The law shall prescribe the 
necessary plans for the propagation and spread of education at various levels and for the 
eradication of illiteracy. 
 
Article 18 
Private schools may be established by individuals and organisations in accordance with the 
provisions of the law, provided that such schools shall be subject to the supervision of the 
competent public authorities and to their directives. 
 
Article 19 
Medical care and means of prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics shall be ensured 
by the community for all citizens. 
The community shall promote the establishment of public and private hospitals, dispensaries and 
cure - houses. 
 
Article 20 
Society shall esteem work as a cornerstone of its development. It shall endeavour to ensure that 
employment is available for citizens and to train them so that they are prepared for it. It shall 
furnish the appropriate facilities for that by providing legislations protecting the rights of the 
employees and the interests of the employers in the light of developing international labour 
legislations. 
 
Article 21 
Private property shall be protected. Conditions relating thereto shall be laid down by Law. No 
one shall be deprived of his private property except in circumstances dictated by the public 
benefit in accordance with the provisions of the Law and on payment of a just compensation. 
 
Article 22 
Public property shall be inviolable. The protection of public property shall be the duty of every 
citizen. The Law shall define the cases in which penalties shall be imposed for the contravention 
of that duty.  
Article 23 
The natural resources and wealth in each Emirate shall be considered to be the public property of 
that Emirate. Society shall be responsible for the protection and proper exploitation of such 
natural resources and wealth for the benefit of the national economy. 
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Article 24 
The basis of the national economy shall be social justice. It is founded on sincere co-operation 
between public and private activities. Its aim shall be the achievement of economic development, 
increase of productivity, raising the standards of living and the achievement of prosperity for 
citizens, all within the limits of Law.  
PART THREE: FREEDOM, RIGHTS AND PUBLIC DUTIES 
Article 25 
All persons are equal before the law, without distinction between citizens of the Union in regard 
to race, nationality, religious belief or social status. 
 
Article 26 
Personal liberty is guaranteed to all citizens. No person may be arrested, searched, detained or 
imprisoned except in accordance with the provisions of law. 
No person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading treatment. 
 
Article 27 
Crimes and punishments shall be defined by the law. No penalty shall be imposed for any act of 
commission or omission committed before the relevant law has been promulgated. 
 
Article 28 
Penalty is personal. An accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty in a legal and fair 
trial. The accused shall have the right to appoint the person who is capable to conduct his 
defence during the trial. The law shall prescribe the cases in which the presence of a counsel for 
defence shall be assigned. Physical and moral abuse of an accused person is prohibited. 
 
Article 29 
Freedom of movement and residence shall be guaranteed to citizens within the limits of law. 
 
Article 30 
Freedom of opinion and expressing it verbally, in writing or by other means of expression shall 
be guaranteed within the limits of law. 
 
Article 31 
Freedom of communication by post, telegraph or other means of communication and the secrecy 
thereof shall be guaranteed in accordance with law. 
 
Article 32 
Freedom to exercise religious worship shall be guaranteed in accordance with established 
customs, provided that it does not conflict with public policy or violate public morals. 
 
Article 33 
Freedom of assembly and establishing associations shall be guaranteed within the limits of law. 
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Article 34 
Every citizen shall be free to choose his occupation, trade or profession within the limits of law. 
Due consideration being given to regulations organising some of such professions and trades. No 
person may be subjected to forced labour except in exceptional circumstances provided for by 
the law and in return for compensation. No person may be enslaved. 
Article 35 
Public service shall be open to all citizens on a basis of equality of circumstances between them, 
in accordance with the provisions of the law. Public service shall be a national service entrusted 
to those undertaking it. The public servant shall aim, in the execution of his duties, at the public 
interest alone. 
 
Article 36 
Homes shall be inviolable. They may not be entered without permission from their inhabitants 
except in accordance with the provisions of the law, and in circumstances laid down therein. 
 
Article 37 
Citizens may not be deported or banished from the Union.  
 
Article 38 
The extradition of citizens and of political refugees shall be prohibited. 
 
Article 39 
The general confiscation of possessions shall be prohibited. Confiscation of an individual’s 
possessions as a punishment may be executed only on the basis of a legal ruling, and in 
circumstances provided for in the law. 
 
Article 40 
Foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the rights and freedoms stipulated in international 
charters which are in force, or in treaties and agreements to which the Union is party. They shall 
be subject to the equivalent obligations. 
 
Article 41 
Every person shall have the right to submit complaints to the competent authorities, including the 
judicial authorities. concerning the abuse or infringement of the rights and freedom stipulated in 
this Part. 
 
Article 42 
Payment of taxes and public charges determined by law is a duty of every citizen. 
 
Article 43 
Defence of the Union is a sacred duty of every citizen and military service is an honour for 
citizens which shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 44 
Respect of the Constitution. laws and orders issued by public authorities in execution thereof, 
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observance of public order and respect of public morality are duties incumbent upon all 
inhabitants of the Union.  
PART FOUR: THE UNION AUTHORITIES 
Article 45 
The Union authorities shall consist of :- 
1. The Supreme Council of the Union. 
2. The President of the Union and his Deputy. 
3. The Council of Ministers of the Union. 
4. The National Assembly of the Union. 
5. The Judiciary of the Union. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION 
 
Article 46 
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be the highest authority in the Union. It shall consist of 
the Rulers of all the Emirates composing the Union, or of those who deputies for the Rulers in 
their Emirates in the event of their absence or if they have been excused from attending. 
Each Emirate shall have a single vote in the deliberations of the Council. 
 
Article 47 
The Supreme Council of the Union shall exercise the following matters :- 
1. Formulation of general policy in all matters invested in the Union by this Constitution and 
consideration of all matters which leads to the achievement of the goals of the Union and the 
common interest of the member Emirates. 
2. Sanction of various Union laws before their promulgation, including the Laws of the Annual 
General Budget and the Final Accounts. 
3. Sanction of decrees relating to matters which by virtue of the provisions of this Constitution 
are subject to the ratification or agreement of the Supreme Council. Such sanction shall take 
place before the promulgation of these decrees by the President of the Union. 
4. Ratification of treaties and international agreements. Such ratification shall be accomplished 
by decree. 
5. Approval of the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, 
acceptance of his resignation and his removal from office upon a proposal from the President of 
the Union. 
6. Approval of the appointment of the President and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union, 
acceptance of their resignations and their dismissal in the circumstances stipulated by this 
Constitution. Such acts shall be accomplished by decrees. 
7. Supreme Control over the affairs of the Union in general. 
8. Any other relevant matters stipulated in this Constitution or in the Union laws. 
 
Article 48 
1. The Supreme Council shall lay down its own bye-laws which shall include its procedure for 
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the conduct of business and the procedure for voting on its decisions. The deliberations of the 
Council shall be secret. 
2. The Supreme Council shall establish a general Secretariat which shall consist of an adequate 
number of officials to assist it in the execution of its duties. 
 
Article 49 
Decisions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be by a majority of five of its 
members provided that this majority includes the votes of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
The minority shall be bound by the view of the said majority. 
But, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be by a majority vote. Such matters 
shall be defined in the bye-laws of the Council. 
 
Article 50 
Sessions of the Supreme Council shall be held in the Union capital. Sessions may be held in any 
other place agreed upon beforehand. 
 
Chapter 2 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNION AND HIS DEPUTY 
 
Article 51 
The Supreme Council of the Union shall elect from among its members a President and a Vice 
President of the Union. The Vice President of the Union shall exercise all the powers of the 
President in the event of his absence for any reason. 
 
Article 52 
The term of office of the President and the Vice President shall be five Gregorian years. They are 
eligible for re-election to the same offices. 
Each of them shall, on assuming office, take the following oath before the Supreme Council 
" I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful to the United Arab Emirates; that 1 will respect 
its Constitution and its laws; that I will protect the interests of the people of the Union; that I will 
discharge my duties faithfully and loyally and that I will safeguard the independence of the 
Union and its territorial integrity." 
 
Article 53 
Upon vacancy of the office of the President or his Deputy for death or resignation, or because 
either one of them ceases to be Ruler in his Emirate for any reason, the Supreme Council shall be 
called into session within one month of that date to elect a successor to the vacant office for the 
period stipulated in Article 52 of this Constitution. 
In the event that the two offices of the President of the Supreme Council and his Deputy become 
vacant simultaneously, the Council shall be immediately called into session by any one of its 
members or by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, to elect a new President 
and Vice President to fill the two vacant offices. 
 
Article 54 
The President of the Union shall assume the following powers: 
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1. Presiding the Supreme Council and directing its discussions. 
2. Presiding the Supreme Council into session, and terminating its sessions according to the rules 
of procedure upon which the Council shall decide its bye-laws. It is obligatory for him to 
convene the Council for sessions, whenever one of its members so requested. 
3. Calling the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers into joint session whenever 
necessity demands. 
4. Signing Union laws, decrees and decisions which the Supreme Council has sanctioned and 
promulgating them. 
5. Appointing the Prime Minister, accepting his resignation and relieving him of office with the 
consent of the Supreme Council. He shall also appoint the Deputy Prime Minister and the 
Ministers and shall receive their resignations and relieve them of office in accordance with a 
proposal from the Prime Minister of the Union. 
6. Appointing the diplomatic representatives of the Union to foreign states and other senior 
Union officials both civil and military (with the exception of the President and Judges of the 
Supreme Court of the Union) and accepting their resignations and dismissing them with the 
consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. Such appointments, acceptance of resignations 
and dismissals shall be accomplished by decrees and in accordance with Union laws. 
7. Signing of letters of credence of diplomatic representatives of the Union to foreign states and 
organisations and accepting the credentials of diplomatic and consular representatives of foreign 
states to the Union and receiving their letters of credence. He shall similarly sign documents of 
appointment and credence of representatives. 
8. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees and decisions through the Council of 
Ministers of the Union and the competent Ministers. 
9. Representing the Union internally, vis-a-vis other states and in all international relations. 
10. Exercising the right of pardon and commutation of sentences and approving capital sentences 
according to the provisions of this Constitution and Union laws. 
11. Conferring decorations and medals of honour, both civil and military, in accordance with the 
laws relating to such decorations and medals. 
12. Any other power vested in him by the Supreme Council or vested in him in conformity with 
this Constitution or Union laws. 
17 All rights are reserved for the Federal National Council 2003. 
Chapter III 
 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE UNION 
 
Article 55 
The Council of Ministers of the Union shall consist of the Prime Minister, his Deputy and a 
number of Ministers. 
 
Article 56 
Ministers shall be chosen from among citizens of the Union known for their competence and 
experience. 
 
Article 57 
The Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Ministers shall, before assuming the responsibilities of 
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their office. take the following oath before the President of the Union:- 
"I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United Arab Emirates; that I will respect its 
Constitution and laws; that 1 will discharge my duties faithfully; that 1 will completely observe 
the interests of the people of the Union and that I will completely safeguard the existence of the 
Union and its territorial integrity." 
 
Article 58 
The law shall define the Jurisdiction of the Ministers and the powers of each Minister. The first 
Council of Ministers of the Union shall be composed of the following Ministers: - 
1. Foreign Affairs 
2. Interior 
3. Defence 
4. Finance, Economy and Industry 
5. Justice 
6. Education 
7. Public Health 
8. Public Works and Agriculture 
9. Communications, Post, Telegraph and Telephones 
10. Labour and Social Affairs 
11. Information 
12. Planning 
 
Article 59 
The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. He shall call it 
into session, direct its debates, follow up the activities of Ministers and shall supervise the co-
ordination of work between the various Ministries and in all executive organs of the Union. 
The Deputy Prime Minister shall exercise all the powers of the Prime Minister in the event of his 
absence for any reason. 
 
Article 60 
The Council of Ministers, in its capacity as the executive authority of the Union, and under the 
supreme control of the President of the Union and the Supreme Council. shall be responsible for 
dealing with all domestic and foreign affairs which are within the competence of the Union 
according to this Constitution and Union laws. 
The Council of Ministers shall, in particular, assume the following powers: 
1. Following up the implementation of the general policy of the Union Government both 
domestic and foreign. 
2. Initiating drafts of Federal Laws and submitting them to the Union National Council before 
they are raised to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council for 
sanction. 
3. Drawing up the annual general budget of the Union, and the final accounts. 
4. Preparing drafts of decrees and various decisions. 
5. Issuing regulations necessary for the implementation of Union laws without amending or 
suspending such regulations or making any exemption from their execution. Issuing also police 
regulations and other regulations relating to the organisation of public services and 
administrations. within the limits of this Constitution and Union laws. A special provision of the 
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law or the Council of Ministers, may charge the competent Union Minister or any other 
administrative authority to promulgate some of such regulations. 
6. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees, decisions and regulations by all the 
concerned authorities in the Union or in the Emirates. 
7. Supervising the execution of judgements rendered by Union Law Courts and the 
implementation of international treaties and agreements concluded by the Union. 
8. Appointment and dismissal of Union employees in accordance with the provisions of the law, 
provided that their appointment and dismissal do not require the issue of a decree. 
9. Controlling the conduct of work in departments and public services of the Union and the 
conduct and discipline of Union employees in general. 
10. Any other authority vested in it by law or by the Supreme Council within the limits of this 
Constitution. 
 
Article 61 
Deliberations of the Council of Ministers shall be secret.  Its resolutions shall be passed by a 
majority of its members. In the event that voting is evenly divided, the side on which the Prime 
Minister has voted shall prevail. The minority shall abide by the opinion of the majority. 
 
Article 62 
While in office, the Prime Minister, his Deputy or any Union Minister, may not practice any 
professional, commercial or financial occupation or enter into any commercial transactions with 
the Government of the Union or the Governments of the Emirates, or combine with their office 
the membership of the board of directors of any financial or commercial company. Furthermore, 
they may not combine with their office more than one official post in any of the Emirates and 
shall relinquish all other local official posts, if any. 
 
Article 63 
The members of the Council of Ministers shall aim to serve in their conduct the interests of the 
Union, the promotion of public welfare and totally renounce personal benefits. Members of the 
Council of Ministers must not seek profit from their official positions in any way whatsoever for 
themselves or for any person closely related to them. 
 
Article 64 
The Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be politically responsible collectively before the 
President of the Union and the Supreme Council of the Union for the execution of the 
general policy of the Union both domestic and foreign. Each of them shall be personally 
responsible to the President of the Union and the Supreme Council for the activities of his 
Ministry or office. The resignation of the Prime Minister, his removal from office, his death, or 
the vacating of his office for any reason whatsoever shall involve the resignation of the whole 
Cabinet. The President of the Union may require the Ministers to remain in office temporarily, to 
carry out immediate administration, until such time as a new Cabinet is formed. 
 
Article 65 
At the beginning of every financial year, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the President of 
the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council, a detailed statement of internal 
achievements, on the Union's relations with other states and international organisations, together 
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with the recommendations of the Cabinet on the best and most practical means of strengthening 
the foundations of the Union, consolidating its security and stability, achieving its goals and 
progress in all fields. 
 
Article 66 
1. The Council of Ministers shall draw up its own bye-laws including its rules of procedure. 
2. The Council of Ministers shall establish a general Secretariat 
Provided with a number of employees to assist it in the conduct of Its business. 
 
Article 67 
The Law shall prescribe the salaries of the Prime Minister, his Deputy and the other Ministers. 
 
Chapter 4 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION 
 
Section 1 
General Provisions. 
 
Article 68 
The National Assembly of the Union shall be composed of forty (1) members. Seats shall be 
distributed to member Emirates as follows: 
Abu Dhabi 8 seats 
Dubai 8 seats 
Sharjah 6 seats 
Ras Al  Khaimah 6 seats 
Ajman 4 seats 
Umm Al Quwain 4 seats 
Fujairah 4 seats 
 
Article 69 
Each Emirate shall be free to determine the method of selection of the citizens representing it in 
the Union National Assembly. 
 
Article 70 
A member of the Union National Assembly must satisfy the following conditions :- 
1. Must be a citizen of one of the Emirates of the Union, and permanently resident in the Emirate 
he represents in the Assembly. 
2. Must be not less than twenty-five Gregorian years of age at the time of his selection. 
3. Must enjoy civil status. good conduct, reputation and not previously convicted of a 
dishonourable offence unless he has been rehabilitated in accordance with the law. 
4. Must have adequate knowledge of reading and writing. 
 
Article 71 
Membership of the Union National Assembly shall be incompatible with any public office in the 
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Union, including Ministerial portfolios. 
 
Article 72 
The term of membership in the Union National Assembly shall be two Gregorian years 
commencing from the date of its first sitting. When this period expires, the Assembly shall be 
completely renewed for the time remaining until the end of the transitional period as laid down in 
Article 144 of this Constitution. Any member who has completed his term may be re-elected 
 
Article 73 
Before assuming his duties in the Assembly or its Committees, a member of the Union National 
Assembly shall take the following oath before the Assembly in public session: - 
“I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United Arab Emirates; that I will respect the 
Constitution and the laws of the Union and that I will discharge my duties in the Assembly and 
its Committees honestly and truthfully”. 
 
Article 74 
If, for any reason, a seat of any member of the Assembly becomes vacant before the end of the 
term of his membership, a replacement shall be selected within two months of the date on which 
the vacancy is announced by the Assembly, unless the vacancy occurs during the three months 
preceding the end of the term of the Assembly. 
The new member shall complete the term of membership of his predecessor. 
 
Article 75 
Sessions of the Union National Assembly shall be held in the Union capital. Exceptionally, 
sessions may be held in any other place within the Union on the basis of a decision taken by a 
majority vote of the members and with the approval of the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 76 
The Assembly shall decide upon the validity of the mandate of its members. It shall also decide 
upon disqualifying members, if they lose one of the required conditions, by a majority of all its 
members and on the proposal of five among them. The Assembly shall be competent to accept 
resignation from membership. The resignation shall be considered as final from the date of its 
acceptance by the Assembly. 
 
Article 77 
A member of the National Assembly of the Union shall represent the whole people of the Union 
and not merely the Emirate which he represents in the Assembly. 
 
Section 2 
Organisation of work in the Assembly 
 
Article 78 
The Assembly shall hold an annual ordinary session lasting not less than six months, 
commencing on the third week of November each year. It may be called into extraordinary 
session whenever the need arises. The Assembly may not consider at an extraordinary session 
any matter other than those for which it has been called into session. 
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Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, the President of the Union shall summon the Union 
National Assembly to convene its first ordinary session within a period not exceeding sixty days 
from the entry into force of this Constitution. This session shall end at the time appointed by the 
Supreme Council by decree. 
 
Article 79 
The Assembly shall be summoned into session, and its session shall be terminated by decree 
issued by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. 
Any meeting held by the Council without a formal summons, or in a place other than that legally 
assigned for its meeting in accordance with this Constitution. Shall be invalid and shall have no 
effect. 
Nevertheless, if the Assembly is not called to hold its meeting for its annual ordinary session 
before the third week of November, the Assembly shall be ipso facto in session on the twenty 
first of the said month. 
26 All rights are reserved for the Federal National Council 2003. 
27 All rights are reserved for the Federal National Council 2003. 
 
Article 80 
The President of the Union shall inaugurate the ordinary annual session of the Assembly 
whereupon he shall deliver a speech reviewing the situation of the country and the important 
events and affairs which happened during the year and outlining the projects and reforms, the 
Union Government plans to undertake during the new session. The President of the Union may 
depute his Vice-President or the Prime Minister to open the session or to deliver the speech. The 
National Assembly shall select, from among its members, a committee to draft the reply to the 
Opening Speech, embodying the Assembly's observations and wishes, and shall submit the reply 
after approval by the Assembly to the President of the Union for submission to the Supreme 
Council. 
 
Article 81 
Members of the Assembly shall not be censured for any opinions or views expressed in the 
course of carrying out their duties within the Assembly or its Committees. 
 
Article 82 
Except in cases of "flagrant delicate", no penal proceedings may be taken against any member 
while the Assembly is in session, without the authorisation of the Assembly. The Assembly must 
be notified if such proceedings are taken while it is not in session. 
 
Article 83 
The President of the Assembly and its other members shall be entitled, from the date of taking 
the oath before the Assembly, to a remuneration which shall be determined by law, and to 
travelling expenses from their place of residence to the place in which the Assembly is meeting. 
 
Article 84 
The Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President, a First and Second Vice President 
and two controllers. The Assembly shall select them all from among its members. The term of 
office of the President and the two Vice Presidents shall expire when the term of the Assembly 
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expires or when it is dissolved in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of 
Article 88. The term of office of the controllers shall expire with the choice of new controllers at 
the opening of the next ordinary annual session. If any post in the Bureau becomes vacant, the  
Assembly shall elect who shall fill it for the remaining period. 
 
Article 85 
The Assembly shall have a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by a number of staff who 
shall be directly responsible to the Assembly. The Assembly's standing orders shall lay down 
their conditions of service and their powers. The Assembly shall lay down its standing orders, 
issued by decree promulgated by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of 
Ministers. The standing orders shall define the powers of the President of the Assembly, his two 
Vice Presidents and the Controllers and shall define generally all matters pertaining to the 
Assembly, its committees, its members, its Secretariat, its employees, its rules and procedures of 
discussion and voting in the Assembly and the Committees and other matters within the limits of 
the provisions of this Constitution. 
 
Article 86 
Sessions of the Assembly shall be public. Secret sessions may be held at the request of a 
representative of the Government, the President of the Assembly or one third of its members. 
 
Article 87 
Deliberations of the Assembly shall not be valid unless a majority of its members at least are 
present. Resolutions shall be taken by an absolute majority of the votes of members present, 
except in cases where a special majority has been prescribed. If votes are equally divided. the 
side which the President of the session supports shall prevail. 
 
Article 88 
Meetings of the Assembly may be adjourned by a decree promulgated by the President of the 
Union with the approval of the Council of Ministers of the Union for a period not exceeding one 
month, provided that such adjournment is not repeated in one session except with the approval of 
the Assembly and for once only. The period of adjournment shall not be deemed part of the term 
of the ordinary session. 
The Assembly may also be dissolved by a decree promulgated by the President of the Union with 
the approval of the Supreme Council of the Union. provided that the decree of dissolution 
includes a summons to the new Assembly to come into session within sixty days of the date of 
the decree of dissolution. The Assembly may not be dissolved again for the same reason. 
 
Section 3 
Powers of the National Assembly 
 
Article 89 
In so far as this does not conflict with the provisions of Article 110, Union Bills, including 
financial bills, shall be submitted to the National Assembly of the Union before their submission 
to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council for ratification. 
The National Assembly shall discuss these bills and may pass them, amend or reject them. 
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Article 90 
The Assembly shall examine during its ordinary. Session the Annual General Budget draft law of 
the Union and the draft law of the final accounts, in accordance with the provisions in Chapter 
Eight of this Constitution. 
 
Article 91 
The Government shall inform the Union Assembly of international treaties and agreements 
concluded with other states and the various international organisations, together with appropriate 
explanations. 
 
Article 92 
The Union National Assembly may discuss any general subject pertaining to the affairs of the 
Union unless the Council of Ministers Informs the Union National Assembly that such 
discussion is contrary to the highest interests of the Union. The Prime Minister or the Minister 
concerned shall attend the debates. The Union National Assembly may express its 
recommendations and may define the subjects for debate. If the Council of Ministers does not 
approve of these recommendations, it shall notify the Union National Assembly of its reasons. 
 
Article 93 
The Government of the Union shall be represented at sessions of the Union National Assembly 
by the Prime Minister or his deputy or one member of the Union Cabinet at least. The Prime 
Minister or his deputy or the competent Minister, shall answer questions put to them by any 
member of the Assembly requesting explanation of any matters within their jurisdiction, in 
conformity with the procedures prescribed in the standing orders of the Assembly. 
 
Chapter 5 
THE JUDICIARY IN THE UNION AND THE EMIRATES 
 
Article 94 
Justice is the basis of rule. In performing their duties, judges shall be independent and shall not 
be subject to any authority but the law and their own conscience. 
 
Article 95 
The Union shall have a Union Supreme Court and Union Primary Tribunals as explained 
hereinafter. 
 
Article 96 
The Union Supreme Court shall consist of a President and a number of judges, not exceeding 
five in all, who shall be appointed by decree, issued by the President of the Union after approval 
by the Supreme Council. The law shall prescribe the number of the chambers in the Court, their 
order and procedures, conditions of service and retirement for its members and the preconditions 
and qualifications required of them. 
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Article 97 
The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court shall not be removed while they 
administer justice. Their tenure of office shall not be terminated except for one of the following 
reasons: - 
1. Death. 
2. Resignation. 
3. Expiration of term of contract for those who are appointed by fixed term contract or 
completion of term of secondment. 
4. Reaching retirement age. 
5. Permanent incapacity to carry the burdens of their duties by reasons of ill health. 
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and proceedings stipulated in the law. 
7. Appointment to other offices with their consent. 
 
Article 98 
The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court shall, before holding office, swear an 
oath before the President of the Union and in the presence of the Union Minister of Justice, that 
they will render justice without fear or favour and that they will be loyal to the Constitution and 
the laws of the Union. 
 
Article 99 
The Union Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in the following matters: - 
1. Various disputes between member Emirates in the Union, or between any one Emirate or more 
and the Union Government, whenever such disputes are submitted to the Court on the request of 
any of the interested parties. 
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union laws, if they are challenged by one or more of 
the Emirates on the grounds of violating the Constitution of the Union. Examination of the 
constitutionality of legislations promulgated by one of the Emirates, if they are challenged by 
one of the Union authorities on the grounds of violation of the Constitution of the Union or of 
Union laws. 
3. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations in general, if such 
request is referred to it by any Court in the country during a pending case before it. The aforesaid 
Court shall be bound to accept the ruling of the Union Supreme Court rendered in this 
connection. 
4. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, when so requested by any Union authority 
or by the Government of any Emirate. Any such interpretation shall be considered binding on all. 
5. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union appointed by decree regarding their actions 
in carrying out their official duties on tile demand of the Supreme Council and in accordance 
with the relevant law. 
6. Crimes directly affecting the interests of the Union, such as crimes relating to its internal or 
external security, forgery of the official records or seals of any of the Union authorities and 
counterfeiting of currency. 
7. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial authorities and the local judicial authorities 
in the Emirates. 
8. Conflict of jurisdiction between the judicial authority in one Emirate and the judicial authority 
in another Emirate. The rules relating thereof shall be regulated by a Union Law. 
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9. Any other jurisdiction stipulated in this Constitution, or which may be assigned to it by a 
Union law. 
 
Article 100 
The Union Supreme Court shall hold its sittings in the capital of the Union. It may, 
exceptionally, assemble when necessary in the capital of any one of the Emirates. 
 
Article 101 
The judgements of the Union Supreme Court shall be final and binding upon all. 
If the Court, in ruling on the constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations, decides that a 
Union legislation is inconsistent with the Union Constitution, or that local legislations or 
regulations under consideration contain provisions which are inconsistent with the Union 
Constitution or with a Union law, the authority concerned in the Union or in the Emirate, 
accordingly, shall be obliged to hasten to take the necessary measures to remove or rectify the 
constitutional inconsistency. 
Article 102 
The Union shall have one or more Union Primary Tribunals which shall sit in the permanent 
capital of the Union or in the capitals of some of the Emirates, in order to exercise the judicial 
powers within the sphere of their jurisdiction in the following cases :- 
1. Civil, commercial and administrative disputes between the Union and individuals whether the 
Union is plaintiff or defendant. 
2. Crimes committed within the boundaries of the permanent capital of the Union, with the 
exception of such matters as are reserved for the Union Supreme Court under Article 99 of this 
Constitution. 
3. Personal status cases, civil and commercial cases and other cases between individuals which 
shall arise in the permanent capital of the Union. 
 
Article 103 
The law shall regulate all matters connected with the Union Primary Tribunals in respect of their 
organisation, formation, and chambers. Local jurisdiction, procedures to be followed before 
them, the oath to be sworn by their judges, conditions of service relating to them and the ways of 
appeal against their judgements. The law may stipulate that appeals against the judgements of 
these Tribunals shall be heard before one of the chambers of the Union Supreme Court, in the 
cases and according to the procedures prescribed therein. 
 
Article 104 
The local judicial authorities in each Emirate shall have jurisdiction in all judicial matters not 
assigned to the Union judicature in accordance with this Constitution. 
 
Article 105 
All or part of the jurisdiction assigned to the local judicial authorities in accordance with the 
preceding Article may be transferred by a Union law issued at the request of the Emirate  
concerned, to the Primary Union Tribunals. Circumstances, in which appeals against judgments 
by the local judicial authorities in penal, civil, commercial and other litigations may be referred 
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to the Union Tribunals, shall be defined by a Union law provided that its decision in such appeals 
shall be final. 
 
Article 106 
The Union shall have a Public Prosecutor who shall be appointed by a Union decree issued with 
the approval of the Council of Ministers, assisted by a number of members of the Public 
Prosecutor's office. The law shall regulate matters relating to the members of the Union Public 
Prosecutor's Office with respect to their method of appointment, ranks, promotion, retirement 
and the qualifications required of them. Besides, the Union Law of Criminal Procedure and trials 
shall regulate the power of this body and its procedures and the competence of its assistants from 
the police and the public security officers. 
 
Article 107 
The President of the Union may grant pardon from the execution of any sentence passed by a 
Union judicature before it is carried out or while it is being served or he may commute such 
sentence, on the basis of the recommendation of the Union Minister of Justice, after obtaining 
the approval of a committee formed under the chairmanship of the Minister and consisting of six 
members selected by the Union Council of Ministers for a term of three years which may be 
renewed. The members of the committee shall be chosen from citizens of good repute and 
capability. Membership of the committee shall be gratis. Its deliberations shall be secret. Its 
decisions shall be issued by a majority vote. 
 
Article 108 
No sentence of death imposed finally by a Union judicial authority shall be carried out until the 
President of the Union has confirmed the sentence. He may substitute it by an attenuate sentence 
in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the preceding Article. 
 
Article 109 
There shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for specified crimes except by law. 
The promulgation of the law of amnesty shall consider such crimes being deemed non avenue, 
and shall remit the execution of the sentence or the remaining part of it.  
PART FIVE: UNION LEGISLATIONS AND DECREES AND THE AUTHORITIES 
HAVING JURISDICTION THEREIN 
Chapter 1 
UNION LAWS 
 
Article 110 
1. Union laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of this Article and other 
appropriate provisions of the Constitution. 
2. A draft law shall become a law after the adoption of the following procedure :- 
a. The Council of Ministers shall prepare a bill and submit it to the Union National Assembly. 
b. The Council of Ministers shall submit the bill to the president of the Union for his approval 
and presentation to the Supreme Council for ratification. 
c. The President of the Union shall sign the bill after ratification by the Supreme Council and 
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shall promulgate it. 
3. 
a. If the Union National Assembly inserts any amendment to the bill and this amendment is not 
acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Union National 
Assembly rejects the bill, the President of the Union or the Supreme Council may refer it back to 
the National Assembly. If the Union National Assembly introduces an amendment on that 
occasion which is not acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the 
Union National Assembly decides to reject the bill, the President of the Union may promulgate 
the law after ratification by the Supreme Council. 
b. The term "bill" in this clause shall mean the draft which is submitted to the President of the 
Union by the Council of Ministers including the amendments, if any, made to it by the Union 
National Assembly. 
4. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the situation requires the promulgation of Union laws when 
the National Assembly is not in session, the Council of Ministers of the Union may issue them 
through the Supreme Council and the President of the Union, provided that the Union Assembly 
is notified at its next meeting. 
 
Article 111 
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Union within a maximum of two weeks 
from the date of their signature and promulgation by the President of the Union after the 
Supreme Council has ratified them. Such laws shall become in force one month after the date of 
their publication in the said Gazette, unless another date is specified in the said law. 
 
Article 112 
No laws may be applied except on what occurs as from the date they become in force and no 
retroactive effect shall result in such laws. The law may, however, stipulate the contrary in 
matters other than criminal, if necessity so requires. 
 
Chapter 11 
LAWS ISSUED BY DECREES 
 
Article 113 
Should necessity arise for urgent promulgation of Union laws between sessions of the Supreme 
Council, the President of the Union together with the Council of Ministers may promulgate the 
necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force of law, provided that they are 
not inconsistent with the Constitution. 
Such decree-laws must be referred to the Supreme Council within a week at the maximum for 
assent or rejection. If they are approved, they shall have the force of law and the Union National 
Assembly shall be notified at its next meeting. 
However, if the Supreme Council does not approve them, they shall cease to have the force of 
law unless that it has decided to sanction their effectiveness during the preceding period, or to 
settle in some other way the effects arising therefrom. 
 
Chapter 12 
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ORDINARY DECREES 
 
Article 114 
No decree may be issued unless the Council of Ministers has confirmed it and the President of 
the Union or the Supreme Council, according to their powers, has ratified it. Decrees shall be 
published in the Official Gazette after signature by the President of the Union. 
 
Article 115 
While the Supreme Council is out of session and if necessity arises, it may authorise the 
President of the Union and the Council of Ministers collectively to promulgate decrees whose 
ratification is within the power of the Supreme Council, provided that such authority shall not 
include ratification of international agreements and treaties or declaration or remission of martial 
law or declaration of a defensive war or appointment of the President or Judges of the Union 
Supreme Court.  
PART SIX: THE EMIRATES 
Article 116 
The Emirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the Union by this Constitution. The 
Emirates shall all participate in the establishment of the Union and shall benefit from its 
existence, services and protection. 
 
Article 117 
The exercise of rule in each Emirate shall aim in particular at the maintenance of security and 
order within its territories, the provision of public utilities for its inhabitants and the raising of 
social and economic standards. 
 
Article 118 
The member Emirates of the Union shall all work for the co-ordination of their legislations in 
various fields with the intention of unifying such legislations as far as possible. 
Two or more Emirates may, after obtaining the approval of the Supreme Council, agglomerate in 
a political or administrative unit, or unify all or part of their public services or establish a single 
or joint administration to run any such service. 
 
Article 119 
Union law shall regulate with utmost ease matters pertaining to the execution of judgements. 
requests for commissions of rogation, serving legal documents and surrender of fugitives 
between member Emirates of the Union. 
40 All rights are reserved for the Federal National Council 2003. 
 
PART SEVEN: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS BETWEEN THE UAE AND THE EMIRATES 
Article 120: 
The UAE has exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the following matters:  
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1. Foreign affairs.  
2. Defence and the federal armed forces.  
3. Protection of the UAE’s security against internal or external threats.  
4. The matters pertaining to security, order, and government in the permanent capital city of the 
UAE.  
5. The matters relating to federal officers and the federal judiciary.  
6. The federal finance, taxes, duties and dues.  
7. The federal public loans.  
8. Post, telegram, telephone, and wireless services.  
9. Paving, maintaining, and improving such roads as the  
Supreme Council may deem main roads, and regulating the traffic movement on those roads. 
10. Air control and issuing licenses to aircrafts and pilots.  
11. Education.  
12. Public health and medical services.  
13. Cash and currency.  
14. Measures, standards and weights.  
15. Electricity services.  
16. The federal nationality, passports, residence and immigration.  
17. The federal properties and all matters relating thereto.  
18. The matters relating to census and statistics for federal purposes.  
19. Federal mass communication.  
 
Article 121: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding Article, the UAE has exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction in the following matters: 
- Labour relations and social security; 
- Ownership of real properties and expropriation for the public interest; 
- Extradition of criminals; 
- Banks; 
- All types of insurance; 
- Protection of agricultural and animal wealth; 
- Major legislation relating to the penal, civil, and commercial codes; company law, civil and 
criminal procedure codes; 
- Protection of intellectual, technical and industrial property rights; copyright; and printing and 
publishing rights; 
1. Article (121) was amended by Constitutional Amendment 1/2009. The previous text reads as 
follows: “Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding Article, the UAE has exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction in the following matters: 
- Labour relations and social security; 
- Ownership of real properties and expropriation for public interest; 
- Extradition of criminals; 
- Banks; 
- All types of insurance; 
- Protection of agricultural and animal wealth; 
- Major legislation relating to the penal, civil, and commercial codes; company law, civil and 
criminal procedure codes; 
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- Protection of intellectual, technical and industrial property rights; copyright; and printing and 
publishing rights; 
- Importation of arms and ammunitions except for use by the armed forces or the security forces 
of any Emirate; 
- Other aviation matters that do not lie within the federal executive jurisdiction; and 
- Delimitation of the territorial waters and regulation of navigation in the high seas. 
- Importation of arms and ammunitions except for use by the security forces of any Emirate; 
- Other aviation matters that do not lie within the federal executive jurisdiction; 
- Delimitation of the territorial waters and regulation of navigation in the high seas; and 
- Regulation of the free financial zones, the manner in which they are established, and how far 
they are  excluded from scope of application of the federal  legislative provisions 
 
Article 122: 
The Emirates shall have jurisdiction in all the matters not conferred exclusively upon the federal 
authorities as provided in the two preceding articles. 
 
Article 123: 
By way of exception from Article 120, paragraph (1), which provides that the UAE has exclusive 
jurisdiction in the matters of foreign policy and international relations, a member Emirate of the 
UAE may conclude limited conventions of a local and administrative nature with the 
neighbouring countries provided that such conventions must not be in conflict with the interests 
of the UAE or the federal laws and that the Federal Supreme Council be so notified in advance. 
If the Supreme Council objects to the conclusion of these conventions, the matter must be put on 
hold until the Federal Court decides as quickly as possible on that objection. An Emirate may 
retain its membership in, or join, the OPEC organisation and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries. 
 
Article 124: 
Before the conclusion of any international treaty or convention, which may affect the status of an 
Emirate, the competent federal authorities shall consult with that Emirate in advance. In case of 
disagreement, the matter is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court to rule on such dispute.  
 
Article 125: 
The Governments of the Emirates shall take the appropriate measures to implement the federal 
laws and the international treaties and conventions concluded by the UAE including the 
enactment of the local laws, regulations, decisions and orders necessary for such implementation. 
The federal authorities may supervise the implementation by the Emirates’ governments of the 
federal laws and decisions, the international treaties and conventions, and the federal court 
judgments. The competent administrative and judicial authorities in the Emirates shall provide to 
the federal authorities all possible assistance in this connection.  
PART EIGHT: FINANCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION 
Article 126 
The general revenues of the Union shall consist of the income from the following resources: 
1. Taxes, fees and duties imposed under a Union law in matters within the legislative and 
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executive jurisdiction of the Union. 
2. Fees and rates received by the Union in return for services provided. 
3. Contribution made by member Emirates of the Union in the Annual Budget of the Union in 
accordance with the article herein coming after. 
4. Union income from its own properties. 
 
Article 127 
The member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a specified proportion of their annual 
revenues to cover the annual general budget expenditure of the Union, in the manner and on the 
scale to be prescribed in the Budget Law. 
 
Article 128 
The law shall prescribe the method of preparing the general budget of the Union and the final 
accounts. The law shall also define the beginning of the financial year. 
 
Article 129 
The draft annual budget of the Union, comprising estimates of revenues and expenditure, shall be 
referred to the Union National Assembly at least two months before the beginning of the 
financial year, for discussion and submission of comments thereon, before the draft budget is 
submitted to the Supreme Council of tile Union, together with those comments, for assent. 
 
Article 130 
The annual general budget shall be issued by a law. In all cases, where the budget law has not 
been promulgated before the beginning of the Financial year. Temporary monthly funds may be 
made by Union decree on the basis of one twelfth of the funds of the previous financial year. 
Revenues shall be collected and expenditure disbursed in accordance with the laws in force at the 
end of the preceding financial year. 
 
Article 131 
All expenditure not provided for in the budget, all expenditure in excess of the budget estimates 
and all transfers of sums from one part to another of the Budget must be covered by a law. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in cases of extreme urgency, such expenditure or transfer may be 
arranged by decree-law in conformity with the provisions of Article 113 of this Constitution. 
 
Article 132 
The Union shall allocate in its annual budget a sum from its revenue to be expended on building, 
and construction projects, internal security and social affairs according to the urgent needs of 
some of the Emirates. 
The execution of these projects and the disbursement thereon shall be drawn from these funds. 
Accomplished by means of and under the supervision of the competent Union bodies with the 
agreement of authorities of the Emirates concerned. The Union may establish a special fund for 
this purpose. 
 
Article 133 
No Union tax may be imposed, amended or abolished except by virtue of law. No person may be 
exempted from payment of such taxes except in the cases specified by law. 
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Union taxes, duties and fees may not be levied on any person except within the limits of the law 
and in accordance with its provisions. 
45 All rights are reserved for the Federal National Council 2003. 
 
Article 134 
No public loan may be contracted except by a Union law. No commitment involving the 
payment of sums from Union Exchequer in a future year or years may be concluded except by 
means of a Union law. 
 
Article 135 
The final accounts of the financial administration of the Union for the completed financial year 
shall be referred to the Union National Assembly within the four months following the end of the 
said year, for its comments thereon, before their submission to the Supreme Council for 
approval, in the light of the Auditor-General's report. 
 
Article 136 
An independent Union department headed by an Auditor-General who shall be appointed by 
decree, shall be established to audit the accounts of the Union and its organs and agencies, and to 
audit any other accounts assigned to the said department for that purpose in accordance with the 
law. The law shall regulate this department and shall define its jurisdiction and the competence 
of those working therein, and the guarantees to be given to it, its head and the employees 
working in it in order that they may carry out their duties in the most efficient manner. 
  
PART NINE: ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY FORCES 
 
Article 137 
Every attack upon any member Emirates of the Union shall be considered an attack upon all the 
Emirates and upon the existence of the Union itself, which all Union and local forces will co-
operate to repel by all means possible. 
 
Article 138 
The Union shall have army, navy and air forces with unified training and command. The 
Commander in Chief of these forces and the Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed and 
dismissed by means of a Union decree. The Union may have A Union Security Forces. The 
Union Council of Ministers shall be responsible directly to the President of the Union and the 
Supreme Council of the Union for the affairs of all these forces. 
 
Article 139 
The law shall regulate military service, general or partial mobilisation, the rights and duties of 
members of the Armed Forces, their disciplinary procedures and similarly the special regulations 
of the Union Security Forces. 
 
Article 140 
The declaration of defensive war shall be declared by a Union decree issued by the President of 
the Union after its approval by the Supreme Council. Offensive war shall be prohibited in 
accordance with the provisions of international charters. 
437 
 
Council of Ministers of the Union, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Interior, 
the Commander in Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. It shall advise and offer views on all 
matters pertaining to defence maintenance of the peace and security of the Union. Forming of the 
armed forces, their equipment and development and the determination of their posts and camps. 
The Council may invite any military adviser or expert or other persons it wishes to attend its 
meetings but they shall have no decisive say in its deliberations. All matters pertaining to this 
Council shall be regulated by means of a law. 
 
Article 141 
A Supreme Defence Council shall be set up under the chairmanship of the President of the 
Union. Among its members shall be the Vice President of the Union, the Chairman of the  
Council of Ministers of the Union, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Interior, 
the Commander in Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. It shall advise and offer views on all 
matters pertaining to defence maintenance of the peace and security of the Union. Forming of the 
armed forces, their equipment and development and the determination of their posts and camps. 
The Council may invite any military adviser or expert or other persons it wishes to attend its 
meetings but they shall have no decisive say in its deliberations. All matters pertaining to this 
Council shall be regulated by means of a law. 
 
Article 142 
The member Emirates shall have the right to set up local security forces ready and equipped to 
join the defensive machinery of the Union to defend, if need arises, the Union against any 
external aggression. 
 
Article 143 
Any Emirate shall have the right to request the assistance of the Armed Forces or the Security 
Forces of the Union in order to maintain security and order within its territories whenever it is 
exposed to danger. Such a request shall be submitted immediately to the Supreme Council of the 
Union for decision. 
The Supreme Council may call upon the aid of the local armed forces belonging to any Emirate 
for this purpose provided that the Emirate requesting assistance and the Emirate to whom the 
forces belong agree. 
The President of the Union and the Council of Ministers of the Union collectively, may, if the 
Supreme Council is not in session, take any immediate measure which cannot be delayed and 
considered necessary and may call the Supreme Council into immediate session.  
PART TEN: FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article 144 
1. Subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs, the provisions of this Constitution shall 
apply for a transitional period of five Gregorian years beginning from the date of its entry into 
force in accordance with provisions of Article 152. 
2. 
a. If the Supreme Council considers that the topmost interests of the Union require the 
amendment of this Constitution, it shall submit a draft constitutional amendment to the Union 
National Assembly. 
438 
 
b. The procedure for approving the constitutional amendment shall be the same as the procedure 
for approving laws. 
c. The approval of the Union National Assembly for a draft constitutional amendment shall 
require the agreement of two-thirds of the votes of members present. The President of the Union 
shall sign the constitutional amendment in the name of the Supreme Council and as its 
representative and shall promulgate the amendment. 
3. During the transitional period, the Supreme Council shall adopt the necessary measures to 
prepare a draft permanent Constitution to take the place of this temporary constitution. It shall 
submit the draft permanent Constitution to the Union National Assembly for debate before 
promulgating it. 
4. The Supreme Council shall call the Union National Assembly into extraordinary session at a 
time not more than six months before the end of the period of validity of this temporary 
Constitution. The permanent Constitution shall be presented at this session. It shall be 
promulgated according to the procedure laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article. 
 
Article 145 
Under no circumstances, may any of the provisions of this Constitution be suspended, except 
when Martial Law is in force and within the limits specified by this law. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, sessions of the National Assembly of the Union may not be 
suspended during that period nor may the immunity of its members be violated. 
 
Article 146 
In case of necessity defined by law, Martial law shall be declared by a decree promulgated with 
the approval of the Supreme Council on the basis of a proposal made by the President of the 
Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. Such decree shall be notified to 
the Union National Assembly at its next meeting. 
Martial law shall be similarly lifted by decree issued with the approval of the Supreme Council 
when the need, for which it was imposed, no longer exists. 
 
Article 147 
Nothing in the application of this Constitution shall affect treaties or agreements concluded by 
member Emirates with states or international organisations unless such treaties or agreements are 
amended or abrogated by agreement between the parties concerned. 
 
Article 148 
All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees, orders and decisions in the various member 
Emirates of the Union in effect upon the coming into force of this Constitution, shall continue to 
be applicable unless amended or replaced in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
Similarly, the measures and organisations existing in the member Emirates shall continue to be 
effective until the promulgation of laws amending them in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
 
Article 149 
As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this Constitution, the Emirates may 
promulgate legislations necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the said Article 
without violation of the provisions of Article 151 of this Constitution. 
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Article 150 
The Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws referred to in this Constitution as quickly as 
possible so as to replace the existing legislations and systems, particularly those which are not 
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
Article 151 
The provisions of this Constitution shall prevail over the Constitutions of the member Emirates 
of the Union and the Union laws which are issued in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution shall have priority over the legislations, regulations and decisions issued by the 
authorities of the Emirates. 
In case of conflict, that part of the inferior legislation which is inconsistent with the superior 
legislation shall be rendered null and void to the extent that removes the inconsistency. In case of 
dispute, the matter shall be referred to the Union Supreme Court for its ruling.  
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